The State of Somalia

“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”

(Tolstoy, 2009:1)

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# The State of Somalia

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**Abstract**

With the international community engaging more actively in failed states such as Haiti and Afghanistan, Somalia provides a number of interesting insights into the influence of external actors on state-building. Somalia has been a so-called failed state since the collapse of the Siyad Barre dictatorship in 1991. Since then, external efforts been made to create a formal central state. Through a single-case study this thesis investigates the research question – *How does external military intervention impact Somali state-building?*

To answer this, two hypotheses are being developed. The first one represents an endogenous approach to state-building, viewing it as a process to be achieved successfully by internal actors only. The latter represents an exogenous approach to state-building, viewing it as a process also for the partaking of external actors.

In conclusion, external military intervention in Somalia has impacted negatively on Somali state-building. In contrast to this, the traditional structures of Somalia society have survived in spite of the stress of conflict and have demonstrated the ability to provide collective goods. Thus, contain the building blocks to build formal Somali institutions.
Introduction

Somalia has been without a functioning central government since the Siyad Barre regime collapsed in 1991. On the human development index chart it is not even ranked (Human Development Report, 2010). The earthquake in Haiti and the wars in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq have renewed and justified the international focus on how the international community can facilitate state building that increases development and stability. Somalia is a worst-case scenario, demonstrating how a central state should not be build. Both external and internal actors have tried and failed.

This thesis explores the problem and add knowledge to the existing literature on failed states. A failed state is a de jure state but not a de facto state (Ottaway, 2002). Somalia today is a tragic case of a failed state. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been recognized by the international community, but has no real governing power. Failed states bring with them a lot of chaos and external and internal displacement of people. Often, this does not only make a significant part of the population dependent on foreign aid supplies, it also burdens the neighbouring countries when people cross borders into safety. The current drought in the Horn of Africa has made the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya the biggest in the world due to the arrival of Somalis on the verge of starvation.

Somalia has been an unsolved puzzle for the international community for a long period of time. A number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) argue that external involvement has only achieved keeping the fighting alive and the war economy prospering\(^1\). Even though it is dominated by anarchy, informal structures still exist and reports show that the Somali economy is actually not as shattered as presumed. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the case of Somalia, in order to achieve an understanding of the impact of external military intervention on state-building in Somalia.

\(^1\) The war economy in Somalia is in this paper defined as piracy, kidnapping, people smuggling and drug trafficking.
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**Problem field**

The topic of state-building has re-emerged in development literature as a consequence of the Western world’s involvement in the reconstruction of states such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti. For clarity, state-building is “… the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones…” (Fukuyama, 2004:1). It is implicit in Fukuyama’s article that it is always functioning institutions that provide collective goods to the people, which are created or strengthened. Whether the institutions have a negative or positive developmental impact is not addressed, but North (1990) claims that the same type of institutions will have a different influence on different societies.

However, a clear definition of the differences between state-building and nation-building is still missing. The international development community² has focused mainly on external actors’ ability to create sustainable institutions rooted in the Weberian³ idea of a modern state. Little focus has been devoted to the internal aspects of state-building such as the influence of local governance structures.

Recent external efforts to build a central state in Somalia have been concentrated on the inclusion of the traditional structures⁴. Seats in the Somali parliament have been distributed among the four major clans and minority groups have been provided with some representation, this is also know as the 4.5 agreement in Djibouti⁵. The outcome has been various de jure governments with no de facto power causing less stability and an increase in externally displaced people (IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), 2010).

In contrast to the attempts of consolidating power in a central government, the most peaceful period in recent set in 2006, with a dropping number of externally displaced people (ibid). Little international media attention was given to Somalia when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) seized control of South Somalia. The UIC came to

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² I have used the definition of Ottaway (2002), who defines the international community as “… the conglomerate of industrialized democracies and the multilateral agencies over which they have preponderant influence…” (ibid.:1)
³ Where a central state successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
⁴ The Somali local governance structures.
⁵ 4.5 gives the four (4) major clans equal quotas for representation in the government and a half-point (0.5) to the cluster of minority clans.
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power through a conflict-pragmatic agreement between armed militias, businessmen and religious groups. Traditional structures served as the underpinnings of the negotiations and the following agreement. However, unable to accept the UIC as the legitimate de facto power in Somalia, the Ethiopian government decided to invade South Somalia in 2006, and today, the protracted conflict seems as far away from a solution as ever.

The case of Somalia provides a number of interesting insights into the building of informal and formal institutions or, as defined by North (1990), informal and formal constraints. The international development community has focused increasingly on the principle of good governance, and on the importance of building legitimate institutions, which can provide the people with collective goods. The priorities are set on the strengthening of institutional development and on the building of a central state capacity to design and implement policies, and to enable local authorities with the capacity to carry out policies. It also aims at strengthening the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and public participation. While the establishment of the UIC power during the beginning of 2006 can be seen as a pragmatic local attempt to establish some sort of public order by building on existing power structures and by mediating conflicting interests. The Ethiopian intervention in 2006 paved the way for other avenues for state-building by deposing the UIC structures.

Thus, based on the problem field the following research question has been developed:
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**Research question and hypotheses:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How does external military intervention impact Somali state-building?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There have been various external military interventions in Somalia (see the case presentation chapter). The impact of the specific interventions will be analyzed and discussed when relevant. However, the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, which is the most recent external military intervention, has been the focus of many of the interviews and therefore the majority of data have been collected and analyzed regarding the impact of that specific external military intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The research question consists of two phenomenons. The first one is Somali state-building and the latter is external military intervention. It is implicit to the research question that external military intervention has had an impact on Somali state-building.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypotheses:**

In order to answer the research question adequately, two hypotheses have been developed. The hypotheses represent two distinctly different approaches to state-building.

The first approach, which I have defined as the endogenous approach, views state-building as a process *only* that can only be achieved successfully by internal actors (Ottaway (2002), North (1990), Chesterman et al. (2004), Galvan (2004)). The most important of the contributions to the endogenous approach is Galvan (ibid) and his theory of *institutional syncretism*.

The second approach, which I have defined as the exogenous approach, views state-building as a process external actors can positively influence. Collier (2007) is the
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sole advocate of this theory and his contributions to the state-building literature forms
the basis for the second hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1:**

In order for Somali state-building to produce institutions, which can provide the
people with collective goods, it should be rooted in cultural embedded structures

**Hypothesis 2:**

External military intervention can assist Somali state-building

To answer the research question, a single-case study will use the case of Somalia to
test the theory of Collier (2007). It seeks to explain the relationship between Somali
state-building and external military intervention.
Methodology

This chapter will explain the methodological reflections and choices, which have been the guidelines for my collection of data

Objective of research

The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the phenomenon Somali state-building and the impact of external military intervention. This will be done by deductively testing the theory that Collier (2007) has inductively reached through statistical analysis on “why the poorest countries are failing, and what can be done about it”\(^6\) and his theory on the role of external military intervention. The thesis is exploratory as it seeks to further investigate the phenomenon state-building and explanatory as the relationship between Somali state-building and external military intervention is investigated.

It is common in development studies that the main objective is to seek for explanations of what leads to positive development, for instance a sudden reduction of poverty in a given country. This thesis has a different objective. It aims to find the causes for the failings of the Somali people and the external actors to build a state, with the capabilities to solve some of the collective problems that the Somali people are facing, for instance personal insecurity, which is reflected in the high level of Internally Displaced People (IDP) and in the extreme poverty defined by the high number of people living for less than a dollar a day (IDMC, 2010).

The subject of the research

The sudden focus on Somalia has been sparked due to the disturbance to international trade that the Somali pirates are causing. This has created an academic interest in Somali relations. The initial research conducted for this research focused on pirates, but after reviewing the literature and attending various conferences on piracy, it became clear to me that piracy exists only when no government with de facto power is in place. A consensus exists among scholars on Somalia, the Somali Diaspora,

\(^6\) The subheading of Collier’s book *The Bottom Billion* (2007)
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representatives of the Danish state and Danish freight interests that a government with de facto power would be able to remove the safe heavens of the pirates on the coasts of Somalia, and thereby removing the pirates´ base of operation and inherently solving the piracy problem. However, no consensus exists on how state-building in Somalia could successfully be achieved, which is the subject of this thesis. Therefore, rather than looking at the symptoms of a failed state for instance piracy, this thesis will look at the “disease” itself.

Research strategy

Yin (2009) writes about case studies, “… the mode of generalization is analytic generalization, in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (ibid: 28). Therefore, the strategy of the research is to deductively investigate Somali state-building and the impact that external military intervention has had on the phenomenon. The theory of Collier (2007) will be tested through an analysis based of the empirical data collected for the case study. Figure 1 on the following page provides a picture of how the deductive research strategy has inspired the structure of this thesis.
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Research design

Yin (2009) defines research design as a “… logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions” (ibid: 26). The questions, the research has tried to answer concern the phenomenon of state-building, which is difficult to measure through quantitative measures. Therefore, a qualitative research design has been applied to answer the research question.

The case study method was chosen based on the nature of the research object state-building. Yin (2009) states “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (ibid: 18). Therefore, to explain in depth the phenomenon of state-building, the case study
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framework is a useful methodological tool. Furthermore, the choice of a single-case study design is based on Somalia being an exemplary case of the well-developed theory of Collier (2007), thus enabling the case study to be able to challenge, support or revise the theory of Collier (2007). Furthermore, it is an embedded case study design. Where the main unit of analysis is the phenomenon of state-building in Somalia, but in order to provide a detailed picture, subunits of analysis have been identified. These are three distinct regions of Somalia, which all represent various levels of state-building. In sum, each subunit reflects different aspects of the main unit of analysis. The case presentation reflects this methodological choice. It is built up so that the state-building history in Somalia is introduced first. Then follows a presentation of the distinct levels of state-building in the three regions identified. As the regions represent three different levels of state-building, different data collection techniques have been applied, ranging from reports to semi-structured interviews.

Data collection

The considerations about data collection will be outlined in this section.

Primary data

Observations at conferences as well as unstructured and semi-structured interviews constitute the primary sources collected for the thesis. The field observations were made during five conferences 2010-2011, which can be divided into two groups. The first group consisted of conferences on piracy with the main focus on how to prevent piracy. The second group consisted of conferences focusing on the needs of the Somali people such as the Conference for Sustainable Peace and Prosperity in Ethiopia, the Case for Somali Region and the Role of its Diaspora and the Conference on Social Contracts and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first conference focused on peace between Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the latter dealt with the difference between the Western and the African view of the social contract.

The first group of conferences provided insights into how the international community views the Somali situation. Semi-structured interviews with scholars were recorded in conjunction with two of the conferences.
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The second group provided the majority of data used in the analysis. Present at the first conference were many Somali elders\(^7\), businessmen and clergies. Unstructured interviews were recorded. Some of the people interviewed at the conference spoke no Danish and little English, therefore a Danish-Somali student of sociology served as a translator. At the second conference only notes and observation were made.

The two groups represent two opposite sets of objectives. The objective of the conferences on piracy was on how the Danish freight industry could tackle the problem arising from piracy. The objective of the latter group conferences was the improvement of the lives of the Somali and Ethiopian people. Therefore, the interviews conducted at the latter conferences I have regarded as providing more acceptable knowledge because of the fact that the research question relates to the impact of external military intervention on Somali state-building. The Diapora society members have been to Somalia and have a personal attachment to the country giving them a better insight to the effects of state-building than foreign interests.

Semi-structured interviews have been recorded with a number of representatives from the Somali Diaspora as well as a Danish member of a Danish grass root organisation. Two individuals constituting important sources for the thesis have wished to be anonymous. In the analysis they will be referred to as the former Somali official and the member of the Somali Diaspora.

A commonality for all the interviews conducted were questions regarding state-building in Somalia and the interviewees’ view of the history of state-building attempts in Somalia. The interviews considered most relevant were later transcribed. The majority of the interviews were conducted in English while a few of the interviewees preferred Danish, and three were conducted with the assistance of the previously mentioned translator. A total number of 11 interviews were conducted lasting from 10 to 90 minutes. Often, after listening and transcribing the interviews, a list of follow-up questions was produced, and was included in the next interview. This has meant that a constant process of collecting data and reviewing have taken place, revealing new areas of interests.

\(^7\) All men in a Somali diya-paying group have the title elder. However, based on personal skills some have a greater influence. This will be analysed in the section Traditional Structures: A Primo Inter Pares System in the analysis.
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Furthermore, notes were taken at the conferences when a key speaker touched upon the subject of state-building. The notes have also supported the collection of primary data and documented various attitudes toward the concept of state-building.

Secondary data

The secondary data have been collected mainly from reports on the conflict in Somalia, for instance the World Bank’s report *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics* (2005), *The Predicament of the Oday* (2006) published by the Danish Refugee Council and *Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rules of Law* (2005) published by The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. These sources should be treated with caution, as they express the views of the authors and might therefore be biased. For instance, the Danish Refugee Council is a private Danish non-governmental organisation (NGO) and its stated purpose is “a private humanitarian organisation, which seeks to provide refugees with protection from prosecution.”8, the research conducted might be biased as the organisation focuses on refugees and there might be a risk of them wanting to produce knowledge reflecting this. The same can be said of the World Bank report, as it has not undergone review according to official World Bank publications but reflects the finding, interpretations and conclusion of the authors. Furthermore, articles on external military intervention and state-building published in scientific journals, such as *The Journal of Modern African Studies* and *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, have been used. Lastly, the work of Ioan Lewis has provided important insights into the activities of the traditional structures in Somalia.

In sum, data triangulation has been applied, to ensure the weaknesses of the data collected being addressed, by utilizing semi-structured interviews, field observations as well as secondary data in the analysis and in the case presentation.

Validity and reliability of findings

This chapter will address the internal and external validity of the findings, which will be followed by an assessment of the reliability of the findings.

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8 [www.flygtning.dk](http://www.flygtning.dk), viewed 20/09-2011
Construct validity

According to Yin (2009) three tactics increase construct validity when doing case studies:

“The first is the use of multiple sources of evidence … second tactic is to establish a chain of evidence … third tactic is to have the draft case study report reviewed by key informants”

Multiple sources of evidence have been used. The analysis will draw from semi-structured interviews, field observations, and secondary sources in the form of reports and articles published in academic journals, thus data triangulation has been ensured. The second tactic has not been entirely fulfilled as two of the most crucial interviewees wished to remain anonymous, thus preventing the reader from following how the evidence has led to the final conclusion. However, the reader can view a list of the interviewees and the conferences attended in appendix 1.

The third tactic has only been partly used as no key informant has reviewed the case study report. However, findings and arguments have been discussed with the member of Somali Diaspora, in order to obtain a higher level of construct validity.

External validity

The findings of the thesis are most likely not generalizable beyond the case study in question. As with experiments, case studies can make analytical generalisation (Yin, 2009). However, in order for the findings of thesis to apply to more than Somalia, they would have to be tested on other stateless countries. The Somali case was chosen, because it was a exemplary case of Collier’s theory. Other countries do not have the same contextual background as Somalia and therefore the findings are most likely not applicable beyond Somalia. However, some of the findings might be of interest to scholars on for instance Afghanistan as the Afghan society has informal institutions resembling those of Somalia. As the objective of the research was to investigate how external military intervention impacts on Somali state-building, even though the external validity is low, it might provide some insights into other failed states and how the international community should approach the state-building dilemma.
Reliability of findings

To ensure that other researchers reading this thesis can follow the same procedures and arrive at the same findings and conclusion, two tools have been used. The first tool being a case study protocol which has helped as a guideline during the research. Secondly, a database has been constructed containing notes from the various conferences and the recorded interviews. These records can be obtain by future researchers with the exception of the two anonymous interviews conducted with the former Somali official and the member of the Somali Diaspora, according to their wish.
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**Theory**

The thesis seeks to move from the general viewpoint to the more specific. First, the literature on state-building will be reviewed in order to justify the research done. Secondly, the most crucial aspect of Collier’s theory will be described and the first hypothesis will be developed. Thirdly, the endogenous approach to state-building will be explained and the second hypothesis will be developed.

**Literature review**

State-building and nation-building are two concepts, which are often mistakenly used interchangeably. Scott (2007) states,

“State-building is a truly inter-disciplinary topic, drawing interest and discussion from social sciences, international relations, political studies, anthropology, economics, international development and security studies, amongst others.” (ibid: 3)

According to Scott (ibid) several scholars view state-building as a process external actors can engage in, and nation-building as relating to national cultural identity. This terminology will be applied throughout the thesis.

**State-building and development studies**

In order to justify why the state is crucial to a country, the following section will look into the various developmental impacts that states can have.

In the development field, Evans (1989) is the first scholar to create a heuristic tool where the developmental impact of the state can be analysed along a continuum consisting of three different states.

At the far left of the continuum is the *predatory state* that is exemplified by the case of Zaïre where the political elite provides a minimum of collective goods⁹ being preoccupied with rent-seeking and in the lack autonomy. In the *predatory state*

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⁹ Such as security, access to education etc.
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everything is up for sale to the private elite, which Evans defines as being kleptopatrimonialism\(^{10}\).

At the other end of the continuum is the developmental state that is exemplified by the countries Taiwan and South Korea. Evans uses these countries to coin the term embedded autonomy, which is the offspring of

“... a highly bureaucratic apparatus with interventive capacity built on historical experience and a relatively organized set of private actors who can provide useful intelligence and a possibility of decentralized implementation” (ibid.:575).

Thus, he argues that the state-society networks and a well-functioning bureaucracy are the most crucial aspects for a state in order for it to have a positive developmental impact.

In the middle of the continuum is the intermediary state exemplified with Brazil, which sometimes fosters transformative change but also has a tendency towards clientelistic behaviour, owing to the level of bureaucratic capacity being lower than in the developmental state (ibid.).

Evans (1989) concludes

“that the construction of a “real” bureaucratic apparatus (as opposed to a pseudobureaucratic patrimonial apparatus) is a crucial developmental task” (ibid: 582).

He further develops the argument that bureaucratic capacity and social connectedness might be mutually reinforcing. Evans’ (1989) contribution to state-building literature is crucial as it emphasises the importance of the interaction in a country between bureaucratic institutions and state-society networks. A synonym for the predatory state is failed state, which is a political normative concept developed by Gross (1996) who holds the existence of five types of failed states. Both authors build their arguments on the premise that economic growth is the first and foremost important function of a state.

\(^{10}\) Also described by Fukuyama (2004) as neopatrimonialism.
Ghani and Lockhart (2008) have in a recent book *Fixing Failed States* dealt with the functions to be fulfilled by a modern state. Through qualitative research Ghani and Lockhart (ibid) have developed an argument resembling Evans’ (1989). He claims that fostering mutually reinforcing bonds between state, civil society and market is the single most important variable affecting state-building. In a functioning state the bonds need to be constantly renewed (ibid). Furthermore, they elaborate upon the rules of the game as introduced by North (1990) who argues,

“institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (ibid.: 3).

Ghani and Lockhart (2008) claim,

“Rules are resources that can be used to generate collective power; without active citizens, however, who reflect on and consent to these rules, there can be no legitimacy.” (ibid: 121).

It is an interesting argument that without legitimacy, the state will not have the collective power to provide citizens with collective goods. It relates to what is known as the *social contract*, which is a term covering the will of the people to give up personal sovereignty to the government in order to gain collective goods\(^{11}\). However, instead of focusing on which collective goods should be prioritized, they focus on the important functions required from a state to fulfil. This is explained in a qualitative framework consisting of ten functions that a *modern* state should fulfil:

1. Rule of law
2. A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence
3. Administrative control
4. Sound management of public finances
5. Investment in human capital
6. Creation of citizenship rights through social policy
7. Provision of infrastructure services
8. Formation of a market
9. Management of public assets

\(^{11}\) It relates to the discussions of Hobbes, Locke and other philosophers in the Enlightenment period in Europe.
Which state functions should be prioritized in failed states, they argue, depends on the context. However, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) claim that agreeing that these ten functions are what shapes a modern state, will help ease work on how to get failed states to provide all of the functions at a minimum level. Furthermore, they maintain that the rule of law is the most important function. It is rooted in the Weberian idea of a state and it is not discussed whether all societies want to prioritize the same functions. The framework is directed at external actors and where they should prioritize, but lacks the discussion of internal actors’ view of the state. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) maintain that the core problem in third world countries stems from the gap between de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty of governments, which is defined as the sovereignty gap. This will be further discussed in the endogenous approach. However, one might view it as a weak feature that they seem to base their theory on a normative approach to state-building. They offer no empirical evidence that prioritizing these ten functions will strengthen or create institutions, which provides collective goods to the people. However, they do provide the literature on state-building with an interesting new perspective that some functions of a state are more important than others.

Lastly, an important concept in state-building literature is failed state, a term used to describe a variety of states. Somalia is a key example of the definition of a failed state, as the de jure government has no de facto power to rule. Gros (1996) is the only scholar who has developed a global taxonomy of failed states and investigated what is associated with their failure. He develops five types of failed states: anarchic, mirage, anaemic, captured, and aborted states. Somalia is defined as an anarchic state where no centralized government exists and armed groups are fighting for the eventual control of a non-existing state (ibid). Gross (ibid) fails to address the differences between a failed state and a successful state. In his taxonomy a successful state could be a dictatorship. Gross (ibid) contribution to the state-building literature is mainly descriptive, his main objective being that failed states have their own specific different institutional structures and thus face different challenges.

A commonality in the literature on state-building is that the various concepts and theoretical frameworks do not include considerations of how a state representing its
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people can be built in failed states. In such states the notion of a state often is new to the people. It is a premise of the literature that a modern state is preferable but in general, the authors fail to explain why. Unlike Collier, the bulk of literature reviewed in this section lacks considerations of how a state, which can alleviate poverty, is built.

**Collier and state-building**

Paul Collier is one of the key contributors to the academic field of state-building. According to his quantitative analysis international intervention is an effective tool to develop the *bottom billion countries* and the international community should not be hesitate to use it. The bottom billion countries is a term developed by Collier to describe the one billion people living in countries where no economic development is foreseeable in the nearby future:

“The real challenge of development is that there is a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling apart” (Collier, 2008: 3)

He touches upon the question of prioritizing international assistance, claiming

“… an intervention which this year permanently alleviates the poverty of one thousand people in China is simply less valuable than an intervention with the same effect in the Democratic Republic of Congo, not because Chinese people should be less valued than the Congolese but because the prospects for the Chinese are manifestly more promising.” (Collier et al., 2008:10).

It is implicit to Collier’s theory that external shocks are needed to change the status quo of the conditions in the bottom billion countries. According to Collier (2009) the involvement of the international community is crucial for functioning states to emerge in the bottom billion countries. He builds his argument on the cases of Great Britain invading Sierra Leone and the late reaction of France in Rwanda. The former, he argues, was a case of success where Britain successfully stabilized the situation and functioned as a catalyst for a ceasefire. The latter serves as evidence of what happens when leaders of the Western world are hesitant to intervene and lives are lost. His argument is that external military intervention can help to stabilize the societies of the
poorest countries. For instance, the mere threat of external military intervention will provide democratically elected governments with the security they need to rule, thereby functioning as external checks and balances for the bottom billion countries. This will reduce the risk of coup d’état and election fraud, which is devastating to economic growth according to his statistical analysis (ibid).

**Democracy and development**

Collier’s (2009) chain of arguments is that in the bottom billion countries no mechanisms of accountability are in place, to ensure that the losing party of an election accepts defeat. Furthermore, he stipulates that the two most important collective goods, security and accountability, are provided by the government or they are not provided at all. Thus, he demonstrates a very top-down view of how a society works and his analysis is focused on the economics of state-building. Collier (ibid) maintains that the governments of the bottom billion countries are too corrupt to provide these collective goods to the people. Therefore, Collier (ibid) maintains, it is a task for the international community to provide security and accountability, and in the absence of functioning democracies providing collective goods, the bottom billion countries will continue producing the same socioeconomic conditions, which he defines as a poverty trap (ibid). Another trap he identifies is the *conflict trap*. Collier together with different scholars published the World Bank research report called *Breaking the conflict trap* (2003). The report concludes,

“War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles… When development fails, countries are at a high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war.” (ibid:1)

According to Collier et al. (2008) democracy can impede development arguing,

”… below a threshold level of income democracy significantly increases the risk of violence whereas above the threshold it has the opposite effect. Thus, in low-income countries democracy seems not to be the key solution to political violence, and indeed seems likely to intensify the problem of maintaining peace.” (ibid: 24-25)

Further arguing,
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“In the absence of accountability electoral competition actually impedes its subsequent supply. The society becomes more polarized and incumbents use strategies of power retention that require them to keep accountability at bay. Unless the states of the bottom billion can forge themselves into nations they will need some deus ex machina that introduces accountability” (Collier, 2009: 187).

Collier et al. (ibid) follows this reasoning by concluding that external military intervention can introduce the accountability needed.

External military intervention

Collier co-authored a paper The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries (2008). In this paper it is stipulated that maintenance of peace is a prerequisite for any kind of development. He uses the case of Somalia as an example of health development improvements being possible only when peace exists. This owing to the fact that Somalia was the last country in the world to eradicate smallpox, which he claims would be an impossible task in the current Somali situation, as external actors would be incapable of entering Somalia and providing vaccines to the Somali people (ibid). Collier et al. (ibid) also use the Somali situation as an example of a country stuck in the conflict trap.

“When Somalia collapsed into anarchy in 1993 it was allowed to remain without a government for fourteen years. Only once there was evidence that Al Qaida had moved in to the resulting safe haven was international action organized to impose a new government. Perhaps, if Somalia had been left on its own for a century, it would have developed a viable government without external assistance. But, perhaps not: little very recognizable as a national government had emerged in mainland Africa in the centuries prior to external intervention. Small, impoverished societies tend to be structurally insecure: insecurity is a trap from which it is difficult to escape without assistance from beyond the society, although the intervention may come from neighbours, as in the end it did with Somalia, rather than from the developed world.” (ibid:13)

The quote clearly shows that a recognizable viable government is the main objective of external military intervention and that the developed world should have intervened in Somalia and not left the government without a government for fourteen years.
Collier et al. (2008) argue that military intervention needs to be tailored to fit the situation of the conflict-prone country and propose three military interventions:

“The first is the automatic provision of powerful peacekeeping forces to protect government that came to power through certified democratic elections from the threat of rebellion during their period of office. The second is a similar protection against the threat of a coup d’état. The third is for an over-the-horizon guarantee in post-conflict societies” (ibid:54)

The difference between the first two military interventions can be classified as follows. The first one is a restoration of order, the second one deals with maintaining post-conflict peace. The last one deals with preventing coups, which is exemplified by the previously mentioned case of Sierra Leone where Great Britain invaded in 2000 restoring a democratically elected government. A small army was kept in the country in case Great Britain needed to invade again as an over-the-horizon guarantee to intervene if necessary but without having a large military base in the country.

He concludes,

“… international peacekeeping looks to be a good intervention. If the intervention is kept to a modest scale it has a very high cost-benefit ratio, and if it is set at an optimal scale it delivers enormous overall net gains.” (ibid:54)

Again the analysis is based on the economics of conflicts and the main objective of peacekeeping is to ensure economic growth in the bottom billion countries. This is also the case when Collier identifies the drivers of conflict.

**The drivers of conflict**

Through statistical analysis, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that grievances are insufficient at explaining why conflicts occur, even though its perpetrators often justify rebellion as the result of historic wrongs and current atrocities. Based on statistical analysis it is argued that greed rather than grievances is the main motive for rebels. For instance, even though a rebel leader might claim that the reason for fighting the government is wrongs committed in the past, the real reason is that overthrowing the government represents an economic opportunity. This is formulated in the *feasibility hypothesis*, which state,
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“"The feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche.” (ibid: 20)

Based on their statistical analysis Collier and Hoeffler (ibid) have developed a framework for what makes a country prone to civil war:

“We find that three economic characteristics make a country particularly prone to civil war: a low level of income, a low rate of growth, and a structure of income in which primary commodity exports constitute a substantial, but not overwhelming, proportion... In addition to these economic factors, social factors also matter. Societies that have a small population, those with many ethnic divisions, those that are mountainous, and those with a high proportion of youth, are at risk.” (ibid:24)

The social factors they incorporate in their framework are all based on measurable aspects. Intangible aspects of impoverished societies are not dealt with, as this would require qualitative analysis.

Lastly, Collier provides an insight into his own motivations for exploring how to develop the poorest societies:

“On balance, I think that my child, and everyone else’s, will be safer if we respond to the problem of failing states by restoring order, rather than by relying only on the myriad of defensive measure that we need if we don’t.” (Collier, 2008: 126)

Restoring order implies that in the past order has existed. However, Collier does not address what characterized this past order.

Based on Collier’s theory, the first hypothesis has been developed:

**External military intervention can assist Somali state-building**

**Endogenous approach**

The endogenous approach does not exclude involvement of external actors in state-building projects, but it heavily emphasizes the importance of the state-building being locally rooted.
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The endogenous approach views the international community\(^{12}\) as wanting to reproduce a *Weberian* state, which is a state “that enjoys international recognition and exercises control over people and territory through formal and strong, preferably democratic, institutions...” (Ottaway 2002:3) that is a *de jure* as well as a *de facto* state\(^{13}\). Ottaway (ibid) argues that another kind of state exists being a *de facto* but not a *de jure* state, which she defines as a *raw power state*. Ottaway (ibid) uses the Balkans as empirical support to show the difference between internally- and externally-led reconstruction of a state and concludes,

“The distinction between the two extreme types of *de facto* state helps underline a major difference between externally- and internally-led reconstructions. The externally-led or donors’ model demands a transition from the collapsed *de jure* state to the Weberian *de facto* state; the internally-led model more modestly accepts a transition from the collapsed *de jure* state to a raw power *de facto* state that slowly develops institutions though not necessarily democratic ones” (ibid:4).

North (1990) argues that although many Third World Countries have adapted institutional structures of the Western World, the enforcement mechanisms, which are “ …the way enforcement occurs, the norms of behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors…” (ibid: 101), are different from those developed in Western states. North (ibid) maintains that the same institutional framework will produce different outcomes in the different countries. Thus, even though many developing countries build their state in the image of the *Weberian* state, it will not necessarily lead to what the Western world would view as a democratic state. This argument is supported by Galvan (2004), who maintains, the importance of building institutions based on traditional practices.

Ottaway (2002) argues that non-democratic institutions often are more effective in terms of supplying services to communities. Chesterman et al. (2004) argue along the same lines. They maintain that when states fail, the control of power is more important than ever. Thus, raw power is the sine qua non to state-building in failed states and the international community can only create organizations, not institutions.

\(^{12}\) Defined by Ottaway (2002) as “… the conglomerate of industrialized democracies and the multilateral agencies over which they have preponderant influence...” (ibid.:1)

\(^{13}\) Which is also the definition used by the international community when recognizing a nation-state.
The difference between the two is that organizations form the overall framework within which institutions are created.

In the endogenous approach, external intervention is viewed as having a great risk of undermining local governance structures and replacing them with new, less sustainable and legitimate organizations (Ottaway 2002, Chesterman et al. 2004). Furthermore, the endogenous approach focuses on the need of considering the time aspect of state-building, an aspect which is missing from Collier’s theory. They claim that the international community often ignores the time period needed for effective state-building (ibid).

Chesterman et al. (2004) argue,

“While a crisis that thrusts itself onto the international agenda tends to be focused in time, the most important work of building up state institutions takes years or decades” (ibid: 10).

The literature is scarce on how newly imposed institutions interact with embedded institutional structure. The next chapter will introduce institutional theory and new findings on the interaction between traditional structures and newly imposed institutions.

**Institutional syncretism and institutional theory**

North (1990) poses the question

“If poor countries are poor because they are the victims of an institutional structure that prevents growth, is that institutional structure imposed from without or is it endogenously determined or is it some combination of both?” (ibid:134).

It relates to what is missing in the literature on state-building, namely a discussion of the informal institutional structures already in place in a given country as well as the interaction between embedded traditional structures and newly imposed institutions.

North (1990) is a key contributor to literature on state-building and on the influence of formal and informal institutions on society. He holds,
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“Informal constraints come from the cultural transmission of values, from the extension and application of formal rules to solve specific exchange problems, from the solution to straightforward coordination problems. In total, they appear to have a pervasive influence on the institutional structure” (ibid:138)

Further arguing,

“when there is a radical change in the formal rules that makes them inconsistent with the existing informal constraints, there is an unresolved tension between them that will lead to long-run political instability.” (North, 1990: 140).

Thereby, he addresses the importance of the reciprocal relationship between the state and the people it governs.

Dennis C. Galvan (2004) has contributed crucial findings to the study of how to build a strong reciprocal relationship between the state and the people it governs and represents. Approaching state-building from a cultural perspective, Galvan (2004) has conducted a research on the interaction between traditional structures and the state in his book The State Must Be Our Master of Fire. The book is based on a case study of a rural community in Senegal and its interaction with institutions imposed by the Senegalese state. He develops the theory of institutional syncretism, the different levels of institutional structures being created by drawing from both newly imposed institutional structures and from remembered traditional institutional arrangements. Thereby, the state is drawn down towards society, enabling culturally sustainable development. It forms a unique research in state-building literature as it plunders the problem of how to merge new institutions with existing traditional practices (ibid).

Galvan (2004) claims institutional syncretism has

“… the mechanism for “modernization” (understood as the promotion of the institutions needed to function under capitalism and legal-rationalism) while maintaining meaningful connections to legitimacy, community, and stability-promoting values, habits, informal rules, formal rules, and administrative structures.” (ibid: 218).

Further claiming that
“... subordinate populations – simply do not accept the systems of production and domination I (Galvan) have placed under the rough heading “institutional imposition” without some effort to protect their own interests.” (ibid: 209).

According to Galvan (ibid) what happens when institution of non-local origin is tried to be introduced to institutions of local origin can have varies outcomes.

The preferred outcome is institutional syncretism. When institutional syncretism occurs, the elements of informal and formal institutions become

“raw materials in the fabrication of a new, blended, innovative institutional arrangement at all levels of an institutional structure.” (ibid: 216).

The other three possible results are: pseudo-syncretic grafting, disarticulation, imposition and modernizing transformation. In pseudo-syncretic grafting there is no transformation of the contents of institutional elements. In disarticulation the new institutions fail to be integrated within the local traditional structures and float above society. In the last possible result, imposition & modernizing transformation, the lack of popular support and voluntary compliance of the formal state creates two publics, an informal with a high degree of legitimacy and popular consent and a weak formal public with a minimum of legitimacy.

In sum, the endogenous approach questions the ability of external actors to create organizations, that are rooted in the given society. It emphasizes the bond between civil society and state as a key factor in the development of functional and legitimate institutions, thereby the approach focuses on the construction of power, while Colliers’s theory approach deals with the exercise of power. The former stresses the importance of informal constraints, which are cultural embedded structures such as traditions and know practices and their influences on generating the required legitimacy to govern this relates to nation-building. The exogenous approach focuses on the existing failing institutions and the lack of legitimate leaders. North (1990: 360) writes, “formal constraints are rules, laws, constitutions while informal constraints are norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct” (ibid:35). Using North’s (ibid) typology, state-building concerns the formal constraints whereas nation-building focuses on the informal constraints.
As illustrated in figure 1.2, the main difference between the two approaches can be observed. The exogenous approach argues that state-building needs to take place before nation-building can begin, while the endogenous approach views the relationship vice versa and claims that nation-building needs to be strong before state-building can take place.

This leads to the second hypothesis:

In order for state-building to produce institutions, which can provide the people with collective goods, it should be rooted in embedded cultural structures
Case presentation

This chapter will introduce the contextually specific details of Somalia. This will then lead to a presentation of the three subunits of analysis: South Somalia, the Somali borderlands, and Somaliland.

The history of state-building and traditional structures in Somalia

Somalia is the number one failed state in the world, according to The Fund for Peace\(^\text{14}\) (2010), who in the past five years has created a failed state index based on 12 social, economic, political and military indicators (ibid). The degree of conflict is so severe in Somalia that it is not even ranked on the Human Development Index (2010), created by the UNDP, because of lack of data (ibid).

The Colonial Heritage

Three European countries Great Britain, France\(^\text{15}\), and Italy have each individually colonized Somalia. The two most influential colonial powers have been Italy who occupied the South of Somalia from 1889, and Great Britain who controlled the North of Somalia from 1886\(^\text{16}\). In 1950, Italy gained a trusteeship of South Somalia and agreed with the British who controlled the North (also known as British Somaliland) that the Somali people would gain their independence ten years later. Both countries kept their promise and in 1960 British Somaliland and South Somalia were successfully transferred to the Somali Republic under a then well developed Somali political elite (Lewis, 2008).

From scientific socialism to tribalistic policies and fragmentation of the nation state.

The last civilian elections in Somalia were held in March 1969. The 1002 candidates represented 62 parties who applied for office. They were mainly thinly disguised clan organisations, and it clearly reflected the Somali view of the state as a source of

\(^{14}\) The Fund for Peace is a NGO, which every year publishes a list of failed states in the world based on various socioeconomic criteria.

\(^{15}\) In 1888 France and Britain agreed on a demarcation line and the area remained a French colony until 1977 where it became independent as the republic of Djibouti Lewis (2008).

\(^{16}\) [http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/somaliland/pid/3238](http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/somaliland/pid/3238), viewed 2010-10-13
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income rather than a workplace of civil service. The president Shermarked who won the elections was assassinated by a bodyguard the 15th of October 1969 and shortly after the 21st of October, the army calmly seized power and general Muhammad Siyad Barre took office (Lewis, 2008).

Where the former democratically elected government had been pro-western and gained the support of the USA, Siyad Barre backed up by The Soviet Union introduced the so-called scientific socialism and claimed that a new era, without corruption or tribalism, would see the light of day. Those with high hopes were quickly let down.

The war against Ethiopia between 1977-1978, rooted in the disputed Ogaden territory in Ethiopia, ended with Ethiopia defeating Somalia. The defeat had two important implications. First, Ethiopia had been backed up by Cuban troops, which meant that Siyad Barre in 1979 broke relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and shifted alliance to the USA (Bradbury, 2003). As a result the Somalis now became dependent on a different kind of aid system. Secondly, and of interest to this thesis, facing a decrease in popular support, Siyad Barre felt pressured to start governing using tribalistic policies (also named MOD for the three subdivision of his clan the Darod, Marrehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante, along the line of which power was delegated) (Lewis, 2008). This lead to repression of other clans, and a national civil war broke out in 1988 between Siyad Barre’s regime and Somaliland’s Isaq Clansmen. It lasted until 26th of January 1991 when Siyad Barre fled the country (ibid.)

In 1991, during the civil war, Somaliland in the North was established. Still today, it is enjoying relative success thanks to the capability of the regional administration to hold democratic elections and ensure a minimum of accountability and security. Puntland is also often mentioned as a relatively stable region in Somalia but has yet to produce a similarly strong administration. Thus, since 1991 the epicentre of the conflict has been in South Somalia.

The different influences of the two colonial powers on the traditional structures in Somalia is viewed as the main factor affecting the difference in stability (Walls 2009, Bradbury 2003, Menkhaus 2007). This view is supported by Bradbury (2003):

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“In Somaliland, the British administered through a system of indirect rule bestowing new powers on lineage elder. In contrast, Italian colonial policy (in South Somalia) undermined lineage authority to facilitate land alienation for plantation agriculture.” (ibid.:12).

Samatar (2007) has argued that the different influences of the colonial powers have directly affected the stability in the two regions after the collapse of the Siyad Barre dictatorship. According to this argument, the institution of elders in South Somalia was weakened leaving the traditional structures in South Somalia with less institutional capacity than those of Somaliland and Puntland, where the institution of elders where left untouched. However, there is also a negative aspect of the traditional structures. According to a report by the World Bank (2007) most of the armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of clan, it is also supported by Menkhaus (2004).

Since 1991 the idea of a sovereign Somali state exists only in the minds of the Somali people. In order to gain a fulfilling insight into the traditional structures contribution to state-building, I have identified three subunits which represent various levels of state-building.

South Somali

As noted earlier, South Somalia is the epicentre of the conflict. I have identified three different phases leading to the current situation in South Somalia.

Phase 1 (1991-2005)

This period saw two United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II, with the objective of stabilizing Somalia. They both failed in establishing a central state. Two contending analyzes of this period exist. Møller (2009) argues that the missions were counter-productive, leaving Somalia worse off than before the external intervention. Menkhaus (2007) disputes this. He argues that the missions actually succeeded in stabilizing Somalia and that the conflict would have been devastating without external intervention. According to his argument, the stability, which the missions succeeded accomplishing, remained even after the UN forces having been pulled out (ibid).
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Other positive trends in the period happened in 1995 when Somalia experienced a decrease in the intensity of violence and armed clashes became local instead of national (WB, 2007). Menkhaus (2007) has ascribed it to an increase in risk aversion from gunmen. Furthermore, the localisation of conflict made it easier for the traditional structures to identify perpetrators.

The external state-building projects originating from the neighbouring countries Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti failed in establishing a central government (Lewis 2008). According to a number of scholars, one of the state-building projects with the potential to succeed was the peace plan developed in Djibouti in 2000 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)\(^\text{18}\) and with the endorsement of the EU, UN, US, Egypt, Italy, and Libya. By this plan a *Transitional Federal Government* (TFG) was established based on a “4.5 Formula” where the four major clans in Somalia, the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod, were given an equally number of seats in parliament while the minority clans where given the last 0.5 part of the seats. The 4.5 formula recognizes the clan factor in Somali politics, but it was and still is mainly viewed by the people in South Somalia as being dominated by the Darod clan\(^\text{19}\). This was most likely the main reason why the TFG never gained any strength and was completely scattered by 2002 (Menkhaus 2007, Lewis 2008). Since 2005 South Somalia was left largely to itself and a resemblance of Evans´ (1989) term *embedded autonomy* emerged. The local governance structures were capable of ending many of the local conflicts, and an informal bureaucratic apparatus with close links to civil society emerged.

**Phase 2 (2005-2006)**

The inability of the TFG to govern, created space for the local governance structures to operate in South Somalia, and a somewhat pragmatic relationship between businessmen and Islamic groups emerged. The business community wanted a more predictable environment than the one provided by the militias, and took advantage of

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\(^{18}\) IGAD consists of eight Eastern African countries: Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. It focuses on drought control and development initiatives.

clan relations and the Islamic groups to ensure this (Menkhaus 2007). The business community is often viewed as a progressive interest group in Somalia (interview with Abdulkadir Osman Farah). This is also supported by research done by the World Bank, which states:

“Business groups, impelled by profit considerations, see cooperation across clans as imperative because they need to operate across districts and regions of Somalia” (World Bank, 2005:17)

The relative peaceful period ended by the 20th of July 2006. The USA became aware of the Islamic groups ability to consolidate power in South Somalia, which caused two wars. The first war was between The Alliance for The Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The ARPCT tried to gain control of Mogadishu with the backing of the USA. The attempt of the ARPCT failed and left the UIC strengthen20. The UIC, had up until then, been a very messy organisation consisting of various Islamic organisations including the Al-Shabab21. Al-Shabab was the military wing of the UIC (Møller 2009). The ARPCT was defeated by the UIC, in what is known as the second battle of Mogadishu22, after which the UIC seized control of Mogadishu and South Somalia, which lead to the second war. July 20th 2006, U.S. backed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia invited by the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) led by president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. This provoked a bi-polar conflict between the US backed TFG and the Islamic insurgency.

**Phase 3 (2006-present day)**

From 2006 until the writing of this thesis, the military wing of the UIC called Al-Shabab has strengthened its control of South Somalia. Ethiopia withdrew its forces in the autumn of 2008 and ever since, the AU (African Union) has fielded a

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20 Also often referred to by scholars as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC)
21 Arabic for “The Youth”
22 The first battle of Mogadishu, also known as Black Hawk Down, took place in 1993 under UNISOM II.
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peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, where only Uganda and Burundi\(^{23}\) have provided forces (Møller 2009).

The TFG leadership has changed. President Ahmed Sharif Sheikh, former leader of the UIC, first replaced former president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Ahmed Sharif Sheikh has not been able to control more than a small part of Mogadishu mainly owing to the fact that Al-Shabab, after the Ethiopian invasion, has grown stronger and succeeded in branding the TFG as puppets of the two Christian nations USA and Ethiopia. Secondly and more importantly the TFG does not enjoy enough raw-power and is barely capable of controlling even a very small area of Mogadishu with the help of the AU.

The violence in South Somalia has only been escalating since 2006; the numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDP) protected or assisted by the UNHCR confirm this. This suggests that external military intervention leads to an escalation in the number of IDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,277,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 2. Sample taken from the UNHCR webpage http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/reportData.asp?rptType=3, read 18:00 7/10-2010)

The map of locations with the highest number of Internally Displaced People provides a picture of the epicentre of conflict being in South Somalia.

\(^{23}\) Burundi supply of forces to the mission is used to integrate ex-combatants into the Burundi army. Uganda has promised to increase their amount of troops after the terrorist attack in the country July 12\(^{th}\) 2010.
Somaliland and Puntland

Somaliland is the most stable region of Somalia. It held democratic election as late as June 2010, which was internationally recognized as being fair and free, especially compared to other Sub-Saharan countries. As mentioned earlier, the success of
Somaliland is often contributed to the different influences of the colonial powers on the traditional structures.

Walls (2009) further emphasizes in an article, using the period 1991-1993 as a case, that the deeply embedded social norms helped set aside grievances and create a commitment to building consensus in Somaliland (ibid). He maintains that Somali traditional structures have a high degree of egalitarianism, even though they mostly include men. He claims that Ioan M. Lewis’ (1999) seminal text *A Pastoral Democracy* makes a valid point concluding “… although the style of democracy is more akin to the direct democracy of ancient Athens than it is to contemporary representative democracy” (ibid: 377).

Walls (2009) describes the list of principles that were agreed upon in a conference in Somaliland:

“Central amongst these (a list of principles, agreed upon at a conference, designed to avoid future conflict) was the tenet that each clan must assume responsibility for actions taken in its own area. On this basis, clans were to ensure security and the provision of a basic administrative capacity in areas they traditionally occupied” (ibid: 383).

From his point of view Somaliland is dominated by a consensus system, which is a form of majoritarianism. Hence, the road to a predictable and stable form of system in Somaliland has been through some form of direct democracy, rather than the Western Weberian state which is based on in-direct democracy.

Puntland, which is situated South of Somaliland, has not produced the same kind of administration as Somaliland. But the Puntland region is more stable than South Somalia and the seeds of an administration have been planted, but have yet to grow. The proximity to South Somalia is likely to have been a crucial factor in determining the different levels of success in establishing functioning administration in Somaliland and Puntland.

The Ogaden region in Ethiopia and the Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian borderlands
The borderlands of Somalia have experienced a higher level of stability than South Somalia. The borderlands serve as the intermediary example of state-building. A recent briefing paper *Livestock Trade in The Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands* (2010) concludes,

“The cross-border clan relationships that always underpinned the trade are increasingly giving way to multiple clan business enterprises. These involve extensive networks of people and help to build trust and integration among them.” (ibid:1)

The briefing paper serves as evidence of the institutional capacity of traditional structures and their resilience during extreme political instability and uncertainty. The report concludes that Al-Shabab is promoting multi-clan cooperation and tolerance. It might be a strategy, which will enable them to gain legitimacy among livestock traders, because livestock traders seem willing to accept anybody who can ensure them a more predictable political situation.

During my interviews with Somali Diaspora and scholars on Somalia, a great number of the interviewees have stressed that most Somalis are Sunni Muslims and have no wish to follow the Wahhabism practices of Islam introduced by foreign jihadists and enacted by the Al-Shabab. However, Al-Shabab currently controls most of South Somalia and the organization is a political player, which cannot be ignored. According to the member of the Somali Diaspora, Al-Shabab’s organization has the most raw-power in South Somalia, and it is accepted by the South Somali people mainly in lack of an alternative. The question is whether to deal with Al-Shabab or not. So far, only one path has been explored, which is confronting the organization with brute force. The path of diplomacy has not yet been tried.

A report, concerning the borderlands of Somalia, *In Search of Protection and Livelihoods* (2010), commissioned by the Danish Embassy in Nairobi. According to the report, the Dadaab refugee camp, which is located close to the Somali-Kenyan border and is composed mainly of pastoral Somalis, have had a positive socio-economic impact on the Kenyan host community. It concludes that the leadership

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24 Wahhabism: a branch of Islam, generally known for its radical views. It is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is an important importer of Somali meat and has founded several mosques in Somalia.
structure has been one of the main enabling mechanisms to the positive socio-economic,

“The leadership structure in the host community combines traditional clan elders, elected councilors and appointed chiefs. The role of local elders continues to be of great importance but is increasingly integrated with more formalized structures of leadership.” (Royal Danish Embassy 2010:73)

The report does not provide an explanation of which formalized structures are absorbing the role of the local elders, but it still serves as evidence of the positive impact of the traditional structures.

The resilience of the livestock trade has been described by Mubarak (1997) who claims, “… where local communities have succeeded in providing security, the domestic market has shown resilience, flexibility, new energy and effectiveness in responding to free market forces.” (ibid: 2030). He further argues that ensuring internal and external security and promoting trade, investment and growth “… there are three key institutions or centers of influence and power that can carry out these responsibilities. These are the traditional councils of clan elders, the Islamic clergy, and the militia” (ibid: 2034). The common feature of all these institutions is that they are organized on the basis of the traditional structures.

The last example from the borderlands is the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. I attended a peace conference called The Case for The Somali Region and The Role of Its Diaspora Community in Rødovre, Copenhagen, arranged by the Ethiopian Somali Association for Peace & Development. It dealt with the armed conflict between the rebel group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Ethiopian government over the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, which by many Somalis is viewed as part of greater Somalia25. I made one important observation. Many of the Somalis attending the conference were of aged. Where as the demonstrators outside were young people. They were protesting against the cooperation with the Ethiopian government that they regard as the sworn enemy of. It reflected that the Somali Diaspora who have aided the peace process between the ONLF and the Ethiopian

25 Greater Somalia consists of the regions in the Horn of Africa where ethnic Somalis have historically been present i.e. Somalia, Djibouti, Ogaden and the North Eastern Province of Kenya (Lewis, 2008). See Appendix 2.
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government have consisted mainly of elders who are the first among equals in their clans and are capable of getting disputing parties to negotiate. Thereby the traditional structures might have aided the ending of the local conflict in the Ogaden region and not international actors. The Danish government was represented by Birger Fredriksson but had no active role in the peace talks.

Summary

The case presentation above provides a picture of an internally fragmented Somalia, where the different colonial heritages have influenced the traditional structures in the three regions. Thus, creating different formal and informal constraints. The historical account of Somalia suggests that all external military interventions in Somalia have left the Somali people worse off than before in terms of deepening the internal conflict and the fact that informal institutions based on embedded cultural structures have been capable of providing the Somali people with collective goods in the absence of a de facto central state. The impact of traditional structures and external actors is shown in the figure on the following page.
### The State of Somalia

**Geographical area**
- South Somalia
- Somaliland
- The Somali Borderlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Somalia</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
<th>The Somali Borderlands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive impact of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional structures</td>
<td>Helped mediate the agreement between the UIC(^{26}) and the business community</td>
<td>Were essential in building state institutions, preventing conflict and ensured that grievances were set aside</td>
<td>They help structure the livestock trade which is the main source of income for many Somalis in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative impact of</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>traditional structures</td>
<td>Conflict is often organized along clan lines.</td>
<td>Conflict is often organized along clan lines.</td>
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<td><strong>Positive impact of</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the external actors</td>
<td>To ensure the survival of a great number of Somalis by providing emergency assistance i.e. food and medicine</td>
<td>The ability of the Somaliland government to build functioning institutions has been attributed to the fact that no external actors took part in the construction of the administration, except the Somali Diaspora.</td>
<td>NGOs have helped make refugee camps hubs of trade and commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Negative impact of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the external actors</td>
<td>Interventions have failed at creating a stable political environment.</td>
<td>Somaliland has not received international recognition as a sovereign state. This impedes Official Development Aid reaching Somaliland.</td>
<td>I have found no evidence of external actors having a negative impact in the Somali Borderlands</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1

The table above shows the importance of external actors continuing to provide aid relief to the vast numbers of Somalis whose survival depends on it. On the other hand, external actors have not proved themselves being capable of anything, but escalating

\(^{26}\) Union of Islamic Courts
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the Somali conflict. The table also shows the negative aspect of the traditional structures: local conflicts often are organised along clan relations. However, it is clear that where formal institutions have been rooted in the embedded cultural structures, they have been capable of gaining legitimacy and providing the Somali people with collective goods.
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Analysis

The analysis is divided into two chapters. The first chapter will address the second part of the research question, which is the phenomenon *Somali state-building*. The second chapter will address the first part of the research question, which is the *impact of external military intervention*, including an analysis of the attempts at building a central Somali state.

**Somali state-building**

As mentioned earlier in the *problem field*, Fukuyama defines state-building as “… the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones ...” (Fukuyama, 2004:1). This chapter will analyze the crucial elements in Somali state-building and the role of the TFG and traditional structures in Somalia.

**State-building in the three regions**

The relative success of Somaliland to build an administration is an example of *institutional syncretism*, as defined by Galvan (2004) (see the literature review), where institutions have emerged rooted in known traditional practices\(^{27}\). It has made it easier for parties to talk and achieve political settlements. Consequently, Legitimacy is gained among the general Somaliland population. Not based on the Weberian form of democracy, but rather on a hybrid form where modern institutions as we know them in the Western world have been transformed using the known traditional structures. Transparency has enabled an accumulation of the legitimate means of violence, relating to Ottoway’s (2005) definition of as *raw power*. The success of Somaliland can be ascribed to the fact that the international community has not been involved in any of the state-building processes. In South Somalia the UIC is the only organisation that has been able to consolidate sufficient power in order to begin building state institutions. The UIC was capable of fending off any challengers who presided over an equal amount of *raw power*. In the borderlands of Somalia the power vacuum has allowed for trade to flourish. According to one of the key findings of this

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\(^{27}\) For a thorough analysis of the processes leading to the formation of the Somaliland administration see Walls, M. (2009).
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thesis, Somalia is not *one entity* but consist of smaller units with different levels of state-building and development. Different colonial powers have occupied different regions of Somalia and affected the traditional structures in their own way. In recent history conflict has been concentrated in the South and external military interventions have been undertaken in South Somalia more specifically in Mogadishu. This has impacted the traditional structures differently, in the three regions identified. In sum, the institutional capability of the traditional structures vary greatly within Somalia. This seems to be related to the degree external actors activities in the specific region.

**The semantics of traditional structures**

In the interview, the former Somali official claims,

“To understand Somali society and the modern problems of Somalia. To understand why the central government collapsed in 1991 and to understand why it has been so difficult to re-establish the Somali central government through the last decades. Despite the fact that we have the same language, the same history, same culture, same religion ... Why can’t you establish a central government ... To understand all this you have to focus on the clan system.”

The Somalis I have interviewed in Denmark, even those born and raised in Denmark, know exactly what clan they belong to. Some Somalis condemn the clans and accuse them of being the main cause for the protracted conflict in Somalia, often using the metaphor of a virus, which the Somali society is unable to get rid off. However, the majority of the people interviewed also acknowledge that clans *do* serve a purpose in Somalia. As stated by the former Somali official:

“The clan system is a curse as well as a blessing. It is a blessing because in the absence of a state that provides welfare, the family or the extended family are the ones who provide security, help each one another ...”

The member of the Somali Diaspora claimed that in order to stabilize Somalia,

“You need to use the clan or tribe leader; there is no other way to stabilize the country.”
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The dualistic nature of the clans is also reflected in the literature where clanism and tribalism is often used a synonyms even though they have different connotations. When asked about the difference between tribalism and clanism, Danish professor Bjørn Møller argues that the main difference is that tribalism is rooted to a specific geographical area while clanism is not (interview with Bjørn Møller). However, in the interviews conducted, tribalism has often been used to describe the negative impact of kinship relations. Clanism, on the other hand, is a more vague term, which can be attributed positive as well as negative connotations. Tribalism is often used to describe blood ties and blind loyalty, while clanism often points to the Somali pastoral culture. Therefore, I would define clanism as a term to describe a Somali pastoral culture including the traditional structures, which can also be used by individuals to further their own agenda or to build informal institutions. Tribalism, I would define as a term covering the negative bonds of kinship with blood ties and loyalty overshadowing any progress and the tribe function as a small nation-state. In sum, where it is the tribe against the rest of the world. It is necessary to establish a clear idea of the semantics of traditional structures, in order to determine which cultural embedded structures should be incorporated into the building of formal institutions in Somalia.

Traditional structures: A Primo Inter Pares System

Lewis (1962), one of the key scholars on Somalia, argues that in pre-colonial Somali society all men could be politicians in the sense that every male could attend the meetings where disputes and criminal offences were settled (ibid). However, individuals could be more or less influential, depending on personal skills such as wisdom, wealth or oratory talent (ibid). I have defined it as a primo inter pares system28.

According to Lewis (1962) the two most important informal political institutions in pre-colonial Somalia were the shir (political council) and the xeerbeegti (law council). The advantage of the political council was that it could be held anywhere, often in the shade of a tree would suffice. This council would discuss issue relevant to the clan such as peace treaties, planning war against another clan, appoint a war

28 First among equals
leader for such a war etc. (Lewis, 1962). The second institution, the law council, also resolved conflicts albeit legal conflicts such as murder, insult, injury, divorce, inheritance, theft and robbery (ibid). I would regard the focus on reaching a consensus as the most important aspect of the legal. The legal council consisted of four members to ensure that a simple majority could not impose its views. Rather than producing “losers”, as we know it from Western representative democracy where the losing party in an election must accept defeat. Furthermore, the pre-colonial Somali society afforded individuals with the ability to persuade people with a high social status.

Gundel and Dharbaxo’s (2006) report *The Predicament of The Oday* presents the same findings as Lewis (1962). The report finds that the Somali traditional structures are composed of three different, but equally important, tiers: The social structures embedded in the clan, the juridico-political authority structure which is the elders and the customary laws, based on the xeer29 (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006). It resembles the Weberian state with three branches of government. The social structure is the executive branch carrying out the bidding of the judicial branch which is the juridico-political authority structure or the elders. The elders base their ruling on the customary laws, which constitute the legislative branch. Thus, the traditional structures have the capability of functioning as a micro state. The customary law system of these micro states solves 80-90% of all disputes and criminal cases (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006).

The findings suggest that the *primo inter pares* system still exists in Somalia today. This is supported by the interview with Osman Farah30. According to Osman Somalis still hold individuals with certain personal skills in high esteem,

”Traditional leaders and real religious leaders and intellectuals still enjoy a great level of respect in Somalia” (Interview with Osman Farah)

These findings suggest that many of the traditional practices have survived in the Somali society and are capable of facilitating the building of a meritocracy, instead of

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29 Xeer is Somali unwritten customary law which today to solves up to 80-90 % of all disputes and criminal cases. Unlike the individual rights principles in the Western world, it evolves around the principle of collective rights perspective (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006).

30 A ph.d. student at the institute for cultural and global studies at Aalborg University and a member of the Somali Diaspora.
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a corrupt system with personal relations determining appointments and responsibilities. Furthermore, these findings challenge Colliers theory that a certain level of institutionalisation needs to be achieved before democracy can work.

**Traditional structures and direct democracy**

Mogens Herman Hansen (1999) writes “... in a direct democracy the people actually govern themselves, e.g. all have the right to participate in decision-making, whereas in the other sort (representative or in-direct democracy) the only decisions that all have the right to make is to choose the decision-makers” (ibid:1). In an article in the daily Danish newspaper *Information* he further argues that “the federal state which is the most dominate form of state in the world today rose from the city-state culture, where small city-states created federal states”31. The traditional structures share characteristic with those of a direct democracy. The traditional Somali way of dealing with disputes offers every male person wishing to speak his mind to meet. Women are not included in these meetings, and do generally not have the same rights as men. This discriminating aspect of the traditional structures will be analyzed in the section *Human rights and traditional structures*. At the end of these gatherings there are no winners or – more importantly – no losers. In the Western judicial system somebody always end up losing. In opposition to this, in the Somali clan system the person who concedes wins the respect of the whole community by accepting the verdict of the others (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006). However, in Somalia direct democracy is not practiced in the cities but rather in the small pastoral communities. Therefore, the focus of any actors trying to build formal institutions should be directed towards the communities at the countryside. The ability of these communities to create functioning networks as seen in the case of the Somali borderlands should count as evidence of their informal institutional capabilities. The multiple clan business enterprises operating in the Somali borderlands are underpinned by cross-border clan-relationships (Mahmoud, 2010). If formal institutions were built on the embedded institutional constraints of the traditional structures it might lead to *culturally sustainable development* (Galvan, 2004), where formal institutions are adapted by traditional structures, owing to the fact that they are based on the same norms and culture.

31 [http://www.information.dk/247170](http://www.information.dk/247170), viewed the 9/10-2010
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The impact of external actors on the traditional structures can be seen in the history of Somalia. In the pre-colonial time the Somalis did not have a “king” or even a leader of the group. Rather power was delegated equally. The colonial administrations assumed a tribal society to have a chief or king and so, the colonialist started appointing their own (Lewis, 1962). This lead to indirect rule, which created rivalries amongst the elders and thereby weakening the stability of the clans (ibid). It is important to note that Lewis (ibid) conducted his studies of clans mainly in Somaliland and his findings are not general for all of Somalia. However, it underpins the theory that the impact of external actors has turned out more negative than positive in terms of building formal Somali institutions. However, the epicentre of the protracted conflict lies in South Somalia, and the different colonial rulers have had different impacts on the traditional structures in the various regions of Somalia. This suggests that previous external actors have not understood the traditional structures and have therefore built institutions with no root in the culture or norms of Somali society. External actors in Somalia run the risk of aiming at reproducing their own idea of a state without considering the characteristics of the traditional Somali structures. However, the traditional structures do not provide a perfect institutional structure, one reason being the fact that they do uphold human rights, consequently enabling discrimination to exist and grievances to arise.

Negative aspects of the traditional structures

A certain Somali proverb is often cited. It exemplifies the independent culture of Somalis: “Me and my nation against the world, me and my clan against the nation, me and my family against the clan, me and my brother against the family, me against my brother”. The traditional structures capabilities is a falsification of this very stereotype image of Somali culture. However, the traditional structures do have weaknesses. They are not capable of providing the Somali people with economics of scale concerning for instance personal security and business dealings. The traditional structures ensure only clan members rights; everyone outside the clan has no rights unless they have raw power, which can threaten the clan. Furthermore, the common identity provided by the clan is the reason why conflict is organised along clan lines. The former Somali official has addressed this duality of the traditional structures:
“The clan system is a network of safety but it is not perfect, so it has the sign of a curse. In the extreme sense, a clan is a unit where the world rotates around it, the clan is everything whether it is right or wrong. You have loyalty to the clan, so that if people in your clan are doing wrong things, you are bound to support it.” (Interview with the former Somali official)

The quote, which resembles the Somali proverb mentioned, suggests that in the absence of a state providing its people with collective goods, the cultural identity and loyalty of the individual Somali lie first and foremost with the clan. Mainly, because an individual is not capable of manoeuvring in the Somali society without relying on clan relations and will not be able to obtain personal security, set up a business etc. Outside of clan relations impunity exists. Therefore, to be able to secure business transaction and enforce agreements, the Somali people rely on clan relations. Therefore the clan and the traditional structures are two different aspects of Somali embedded cultural structures, having different impacts on Somali society. The causality runs from the traditional structures to clanism. Traditional structures provide the framework for a clan identity to be created. This clan identity can be used to organize conflict, but it can also be used to enforce business contracts and personal security.

Another negative aspect has to be considered. It might prove difficult to scale up the institutional structures of the traditional structures, in order to gain economic of scale and to create a central state. One reason being that a state relies on written agreements, while the oral tradition is an important aspect of the traditional structures in Somalia. For instance, the xeer is unwritten and is passed on through generations orally. It enables the leaders of the clan to influence the xeer and to shape it as they please. Therefore, the xeer law system is dynamic and can change over time, enabling the creation of institutions, which can benefit the entire clan but also benefit individuals who seek it.

The interviews conducted with the Somalis from the Somali Diaspora seem to suggest that they are well-informed about what goes on in Somalia, which they attribute to the oral tradition. However, it might not be preferable in a formal state, mainly because it leaves room for personal interpretations and for the inability to establish a common rule of law.
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Another threat to the integration of the institutional structure of traditional structures into a state is the difficulty of leadership. Gundel and Dharbaxo (2006) have identified a number of threats to the role of elders. A proliferation of the number of elders causes a problem of legitimacy, as the lack of transparency makes it hard to identify who the legitimate elders are. Furthermore, the elders of the clan are not always the leaders of the clan. Throughout the research conducted the various interviewees have used clan elders and clan leaders as synonyms. In an interview with Osman Farah he focuses on the clan leaders:

“The warlords appoint their own clan leaders ...”

This will most likely make them less viable to provide the Somali people with collective goods, as they will tend to favour those individuals who made them leaders. But he also points at leaders with a higher purpose than selvenrichment:

“Traditional leaders, genuine religious leaders and intellectuals still receive a lot of respect in Somalia” (interview with Osman Farah)

This is further supported by Bjørn Møller,

“... it is a good idea to give them (clan elders) some authority because they have legitimacy. In lack of other things, they are the best building blocks one has got. One only has to make sure they do not loose connection to those they represent as clan elders.”

Thus, it is a difficult task to integrate the traditional structures into a central state. The risk exists that when the clan elders, who are regarded as the first among equals, loose the close connection to those who provide them with legitimacy, they will be seen as illegitimate. Furthermore, if warlords appoint them they will most likely make the system corrupt. According to both the member of the Somali Diaspora and the former Somali official politicians in Somalia are all regarded as corrupt and illegitimate. This suggests it is a difficult task to obtain political leaders for formal institutions capable of providing collective goods to the Somali people. Thus, what makes the traditional structures capable of supplying the Somalis with collective goods, might also make them difficult to integrate into a formal state.
Human rights and traditional structures

Traditional structures do not include or ensure human rights. They are based on paternal lineage and rights are only extended to people within the clan. The former Somali official states,

“You cannot have stability, freedom of expression, freedom of association everything at the same time. Therefore the priority must be stability. For instance human rights, we cannot be overly concerned about human rights.”

The former Somali official does not see stability as a consequence of the implementation of human rights. The traditional structures tend to discriminate against minorities. He states,

“… in our old clan system, the system we had was not good for minorities. If you have a clan it depends of how many men, how many warriors you can bring. Swordsmen. So if you have a clan of two thousands swordsmen and there is another clan of say 50 swordsmen and they clash over water, grassing or land, the small clan has no chance. Our system was very harsh on minorities.” (Interview with former Somali official)

A report on a refugee camp in Kenya close to the Somali border backs up this claim:

”Access to natural resources is also to a large extent regulated along clan lines by leaders and elders of the host communities, who are engaged in various agreements with camp residents that govern access, including access to grazing resources. This implies that access is easier if sub-clan affinities are utilised, whereas it is reportedly more difficult or not even possible for minority clans to access host community resources.” (Enghoff et al., 2010:24). Furthermore, gender and age play a crucial role in social relations within the traditional structures. For instance, compensation paid for killing a man has historically been higher than that for killing a woman. Characteristics such as age, status or wealth however have not affected the level of compensation given (Lewis, 1962). However, I made an interesting field observation at the Somali Ethiopian peace conference. One of the speakers who received the biggest applause was an old Somali woman. This suggests that age trumps gender when it comes to respect and influence. Furthermore, the fact that the traditional
Human rights need to be integrated into the traditional structures, obtaining equality between genders and making protection of minorities an accepted part of Somali culture and society. This could provide a formal state built on embedded cultural structures i.e. the traditional structures, with a higher level of legitimacy as no group would be discriminated against.

**Formal and informal constraints**

As mentioned in the case presentation South Somalia is the epicentre of the Somali conflict. The TFG has not been capable of controlling more than a minimum of Mogadishu. However, the TFG is a de jure government recognized by the international community and it has certain de jure institutions in place.
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The figure above illustrates the formal and informal constraints in South Somalia. The formal constraints have no popular support, because according to the interviewees, i.e. the former Somali official, Osman Farah, Bjørn Møller, and the member of the Somali diaspora, the TFG has used the wrong aspect of the traditional structures. Instead of being first and foremost Somali, one is first and foremost responsible to one’s clan. Furthermore, the TFG is incapable of enforcing the formal constraints, as it has no raw power. I have not found any information documenting the existence of a judicial branch in the TFG. It is difficult to gain information about the workings of the TFG. It seems that the only thing keeping the TFG in power in Mogadishu is the small AU force. The TFG is implanted like a new heart in Somalia. The body’s immune system is trying to fight it, but the international community is trying to persuade the system not to reject it. As with a heart transplantation, the body eventually rejects the implanted heart. On the other hand, the traditional structures, according to the interviews conducted, do enjoy a high level of popular support, owing to the fact that the traditional structures are capable of supplying some collective goods to the Somali people.

Al-Shabab and traditional Somali religion

Somalia is an Islamic nation and the vast majority of Somalis are Muslims. As illustrated in figure 1.4 Sharia courts together with the elders are utilized as a judicial branch (this will be analyzed in the section The Somali business community). However, the role of Islam has changed with the uprising of Al-Shabab. Al-Shabab practices a brand of Islam, which is not previously know to the Somali people. The former Somali official addressed this, claiming

“There is a new element (to Islam) that we never had before. We have been Muslims for centuries but our brand of Islam was our own brand. Now we have fanatics (Al-Shabab) who are copying the most extreme elements in Islam.” (ibid)

This is supported by the interview with the member of the Somali Diaspora and Osman Farah. They claim that there is a huge gap between the Sunni Islamic direction traditionally followed by the Somali people, and the Wahabism introduced partly by
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Saudi Arabia. According to their viewpoint the Somali people tolerate Wahabism represented by Al-Shabab only as a lesser evil. The moderate Sunni Islamic practice will be dominant as soon as the Somali people are strong enough to fight them. The former Somali official claimed,

“All they (Al-Shabab) will do is to make life miserable for everybody and the Somalis, take it from me, they could be there maybe five years maybe ten not more, then Somalis will rise against them.” (ibid)

Furthermore, according to Osman some Somalis do not join Al-Shabab based on religious motives, but in search of protection and opportunities (ibid). This is also supported by the interview with the member of the Somali Diaspora. According to him, a former friend of his, living in Somalia, joined Al-Shabab because this was the only option (ibid). Thus, some Somalis choose Al-Shabab based on a simple analysis of power.

Sub-conclusion

This chapter has shown that the embedded cultural structures i.e. the traditional structures are capable of providing the Somali people with collective goods. The practices of the traditional structures resemble direct democracy, which might be preferable in Somalia, as it would thus formalize a number of the accountability mechanisms of from the traditional structures. However, the traditional structures are not the deus ex machina in Somalia. For instance, they do not include nor secure human rights and might not be capable of providing economics of scale. Furthermore, the clan, which is the social underpinning of the traditional structures, can be utilized to organise conflict. However, as the traditional structures are built on an oral tradition, they are dynamic and do not exclude the possibility of change to include human rights. Thus, the traditional structures contain an institutional framework for peace as well as conflict.

External military intervention and central state-building
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This chapter will look into external military intervention, and furthermore analyze the attempts to build a central state.

The political actors in Somalia and the influence of external military intervention

The Somali conflict has changed during time and has moved from consisting mostly of local conflicts between different warlords, into being a bi-polar conflict between the TFG and Al-Shabab. The member of the Somali Diaspora recalled a conversation with an old friend who had now become Al-Shabab’s second in command in Jubaland. The Al-Shabab leader explained to him his view of the Somali situation. According to him, today two groups exist in Somalia, those who fight for Allah and against Ethiopia and those who are against Allah and work together with Ethiopia. Al-Shabab wants to portray itself as an organisation fighting for Allah and Somali independence. This might also be the reason why they have avoided basing their organization on the traditional structures and clan relations32.

External state-building attempts in Somalia have interfered with the internal power structures. The recent external military intervention of Ethiopia backed up by the U.S reinstated the TFG in Mogadishu. This provided Al-Shabab with the necessary narrative to seize control of South Somalia. Even though the first president of the TFG, Sheik Sharif, was a former member of the UIC, Al-Shabab had success to brand him as a puppet of the two Christian nations, being Ethiopia and the United States. According to David K. Leonard33, at the conference Social contracts and Security in Sub-Saharan African Conflict States, the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 was a complete disaster due to a number of reasons, the main one being that Ethiopia is a Christian nation and will be regarded as an aggressor. This is an aspect, which Collier’s theory does not take into account. The colonial history of Western countries together with different religious beliefs will make it very difficult for external military intervention not to be regarded as a hostile takeover by the Somali people.

32 This is based on an article from the Middle East Forum http://www.meforum.org/2486/somalia-al-shabaab-strategic-challenge?gclid=CLT-geawsKMCFYxi2godo0-W3w, viewed 11/09 - 2011
33 David K. Leonard is a professor at the Institute for Development Studies at Berkeley University.
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It is difficult to determine if there is any pragmatic wing of Al-Shabab. According to David K. Leonard the organization is regarded as a legitimate local government in South Somalia. Al-Shabab has been accused of denying aid workers access to Southern Somalia during the drought\textsuperscript{34}. However, a journalist from Channel 4 of Somali recently traveled to Somalia. He reported that as far as he could tell, Al-Shabab actually played a crucial role in distributing and organizing aid relief to the starving people\textsuperscript{35}. Thus, Al-Shabab might not solely be a terrorist organization, but might also be capable of providing some sort of governance structures in South Somalia.

As previously noted, Al-Shabab is an offspring of the UIC and has a more radical political ideology. Nonetheless, branding Al-Shabab as a terrorist organization has only helped the hardliners in Al-Shabab strengthen their position, which is the exact opposite of what the Western world, and especially the US, want. This suggests that it is important for the international community not to rule out cooperation with anybody unless it is impossible, especially, when the most important role of the international community today is to supply aid relief to the starving South Somali population. This is an example of a dilemma known as soft power vs. hard power\textsuperscript{36}. Instead of hard power such as external militarily intervention in Somalia, soft power such as negotiation and education of the population might prove more effective in terms of developmental impact. A large-scale external military intervention is not very likely in the current international political climate and it would most likely make matters worse in Somalia. According to Collier’s theory the objective of an external military intervention is the establishment of a central state. However, the different levels of state-building in the different regions in Somalia clearly illustrate that for Somalia a central state has not been the solution. South Somalia where a de jure central state has been built is the region with the lowest level of state-building i.e. formal institutions capable of providing collective goods.

\textsuperscript{34} http://m.pol.dk/indexarticle.pml;jsessionid=00ED1401B3355719C8ED497033818C50.uw-portal2?articleid=1342873 and http://allafrica.com/stories/201101120588.html. The drought took place in the summer of 2011. Both articles viewed 04/09 - 2011.


\textsuperscript{36} Hard power is tangible force such as military intervention and loan conditionalities, while soft power relates to intangible aspects such as the cultural impact external countries can have.
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In South Somalia the alternative to Al-Shabab is the TFG. But the TFG has only incorporated the negative aspects of the clans and traditional structures. Rather than focusing on delegating power to the largest clans in Somalia, focus should be given to the political institutional mechanisms embedded in the traditional structures. Instead, the TFG established a number of state institutions. The clan representatives captured this as an opportunity to provide their own clan members with benefits. The clan representatives were not elected based on merit, but rather on the social position they hold within their clan. All the individuals interviewed for this thesis have accentuated that all the elected officials of the TFG are corrupt.

One of the main differences between the Al-shabab and the TFG is that of political purpose. Al-Shabab has a conscious political purpose, which is to establish a Somali state based on Islamic rule and fight the infidels who support the TFG. Rhetorically the TFG has a political cause, but in fact it is a pseudo-institutional legislative body, which has been established only to satisfy the clans represented in the TFG and secure the priorities of the international community, such as permission to enter Somali waters and international security. In that sense, the TFG resembles the pirates of Somalia, like the pirates, the TFG officials are criminals seeking self-enrichment. In contemporary Somalia a central state with power being delegated through representative democracy is not coherent with the Somali political system.

The TFG is facing crucial problem. Its governmental institutions enjoy de jure legitimacy only in the form of recognition from the international community, and has no popular support from the Somali people. The TFG is often described as a rubber stamp state, as it is regarded as fulfilling only one function, namely providing the Combined Task Force 150 with permission to enter Somali waters to protect the freighters passing by. At the same time the Al-Shabab has established itself as the de facto power in the most part of South Somalia.

37 With international security I refer to the basic principles of order, which is that states deal with one another based on premises set by an international system such as the UN. Furthermore, this priority analysis is based on the conference, Piracy Off The Coast of Somalia, I attended where Christian Balslev-Olesen argued that post 9/11 the main priorities of the international community are safety and security.

38 CTF is a multinational naval task force, which protects the ships that enter the Gulf of Aden.
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The Somali Diaspora

Most of the interviews conducted with Somalis for this thesis, have been with members of the Danish-Somali Diaspora. The Danish-Somali Diaspora seems to be split up internally and consists of various fractions. The conference on Sustainable Peace and Prosperity in Ethiopia, the Case for Somali Region and the Role of its Diaspora provided a picture of the internal conflicts in the Somali Diaspora. This became clear to me, when I arrived at the conference. In front of the conference venue was a large counter demonstration against the cooperation with Ethiopia, which the protesters regard as the archenemy of Somalia. Police forces had been deployed to ensure that no violence occurred. When entering the conference it was necessary to go through a full body search. As mentioned previously I made various observations. A crucial one was that the majority of the attendees were old, while the protesters outside were young people. A conversation with one of the few young Somalis attending the conferences gave an insight into the extent that families were split over the issue. He explained that when entering the conference members of his own family were calling him names such as traitor. This suggests that the roots of the Somali protracted conflict stretches all the way to Denmark. It also suggests, that the members of the Somali Diaspora are important actors to consider when analysing Somali state-building, as they can perform as mediators as well as instigators of conflict. Another observation made was that Somali elders in Denmark hold a certain degree of respect mostly based on their life experience, they are regarded as primo inter pares.

In the interviews conducted with Somalis from the Diaspora, it seemed that they are well informed about the situation in the region they are coming from. They attribute this fact to the oral tradition in Somali society and the possibility of communicating with relatives in Somali due to the Somali telecommunication industry.

The relationship between state-building and nation-building

In the literature on Somali, a number of scholars (for instance Menkhaus 2004, Lewis, 2008) suggest that a central federal state with power decentralised into states should
be built in Somalia. However, the informal Somali institutions should be provided with the time necessary to organise the Somali society, instead of focusing on how to build formal institutions that will have a positive *trickle down effect*\(^{39}\) on the informal institutions. Today, the informal institutional structures in Somalia are designed to incorporate the risk arising from the insecure situation the Somalis are living under. If given time, as was the case with the rise of the UIC, individuals within, say, the business community would be able to put pressure on powerful actors. Pressuring them to utilize the *raw power*, they have accumulated, to supply them with a predictable environment in which to operate. This was what happened in the case of the UIC. Collier’s theory supports the reinstatement of the TFG, because the theory stipulates that collective goods are provided by the government or are not provided at all. However, the theory does not consider that if the formal institutions are not understood or accepted by the Somali people they will merely be hallow institutions with no actual governing capabilities, as in the case of the institutions established by the TFG.

Another key problem to central state-building in Somalia seems to be the concept of a nation which is unfamiliar to the Somali people. Being a nomadic people, the borders created by the colonialist have not been adopted by the Somali people. As the former Somali official put it:

“… the Somalis do not like being told what to do, they resent it from their pastoral background. I have my camels, I take my things and go.”(ibid)

One of the premises of Collier’s theory is that it is possible to obtain the legitimate means of power. The existing *fear of domination* in Somalia was caused by Siyad Barre’s abuse of power. Power concentrated one administration or in one leader is most likely impossible in the current organisation of Somali. Formal institutions need to be based upon an understanding of shifting power relations and societal transformations. For this purpose a historical perspective is needed. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) greed is the main motivation for conflict rather than grievances. The narrative of grievances, which Al-Shabab has been able to build,

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39 Trickle down effect is a theory used in Reaganomics (named after the US president Ronald Reagan), which stipulates that when the rich get richer, the wealth will *trickle down* to the poor.
facilitates the recruitment of young men to their ranks. On the other hand greed was one of the reasons why the UIC could accumulate power, as the business community wanted a more predictable environment. These contradictions show the complexity of the motivations for conflict and peace.

Collier makes an interesting argument. Below a threshold of income democracy is likely to intensify the problem of maintaining peace. However, this might be true only for one form of democracy, the representative democracy. As previously mentioned the traditional structures in Somalia rely on a system based on the primo inter pares principle and institutions reflecting this. I would argue this to have a greater chance of supplying collective goods to the Somali people. Using North’s (1990) informal and formal constraints I would define nation-building as relating to the informal constraints of society while state-building relates to the formal constraints. Therefore, nation-building should precede state-building. The building blocks of a central state should be found in the traditional structures, which have survived the stress of conflict.

The Somali business community

An article by Powell et al. (2008), which identifies economic growth in Somalia, challenges Collier’s conflict trap. Breaking the conflict trap according to Collier is one of the key objectives of an external military intervention, because the trap impedes economic growth (Collier, 2007). Powell et al. (ibid) point at the telecom industry as an example of an industry in Somalia, which has prospered due to free competition. They present an interesting example in the following:

“In many African countries state monopolies and licensing restrictions raise prices and slow the spread of telecommunications. In Somalia it takes just three days for a land-line to be installed; in neighbouring Kenya waiting lists are many years long” (ibid: 663)

Collier’s (ibid) reasoning that peace is the sine qua non to development is challenged by the findings of Powell et al. (ibid). Collier’s statistical analysis especially focuses on economic growth and on how conflicts impede growth from taking place. However, David K. Leonard and Bjørn Møller both claim that the Somali economy is growing faster than many other countries in the Horn of Africa. As no data exists, this
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is a claim not easily challenged or supported. The Somali businessman interviewed at the conference *The Conference Sustainable Peace and Prosperity in Ethiopia, the Case for Somali Region and the Role of its Diaspora* also claimed that the economy is prospering in the Puntland region, where he conducted business.

It is important to note that even though the economy might be growing in Somaliland and Puntland, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the epicentre of the conflict, South Somalia. Thus, Collier’s claim that war retards development might be true for certain areas, but for other areas, the lack of a state monopoly will create new social networks capable of manoeuvring in a conflict affected environment. The social networks in Somalia are the traditional structures that the business community relies on when deals need to be enforced.

The former Somali official also provides insights into how the Somali business community functions:

“You will also see, while they are fighting in Mogadishu, you can go to the cafe and get in touch with the furthest away corner of the world. You can find several private radios and TV-stations, but because of the lack of government there is no grid system, they are not connected. I have a brother who lives at the other side of town, there are two telephone companies. The two have no common grid. That means if I want to get in touch with somebody from the other side, I have to have both so I have two companies.” (Interview with the former Somalia official)

It point to the necessity of a state or at least some form formal. Economies of scale can be provided by a state, which enables local entrepreneurs to coordinate investments.

According to Collier’s theory war wrecks the economy of a country. However, this is contradicted by the fact that the Somali business community still operates in Somalia and according to David K. Leonard it is flourishing compared to other countries in the Horn of Africa. The business community has survived in Somalia by using informal constraints to keep business running and relies solely on Sharia courts to enforce contracts, thus minimizing externalities. However, the research done for this research suggests that the clans also influence the ability of the business community to conduct business:
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“... they (the business community) are relatively well organized, but still through clan relations. The clan is everywhere, one can manoeuvre within various clans if the interest is great enough.” (Interview with Bjørn Møller).

Cross-clan alliance can be utilized to support for instance profitable trade. Thus, exemplifying the usability of the clan system a wide range of purposes. This is further supported by the interview I conducted with the Somali businessman from Puntland. According to him, he was the owner of 400 boats fishing tuna and crabs.40 In order to ensure that convoys of goods were safely moved through Somalia he claimed that clan relations was utilized:

“... the convoy of trucks change their drivers to another clan when they need to go through South Somalia.”

This serves as evidence of how the traditional structures and religious practices often function as the underpinnings of small-scale development in the Somali society. However, one question remains. Are the traditional structures capable of providing economics of scale, despite the fact that they rely on oral arrangements and are closely linked to personal relations. The traditional structures might not be capable of providing the same benefits as a central state supplying formal constraints.

The objective of external military intervention

Collier’s theory on how to create checks and balances in the bottom billion is based on a top-down approach. He claims that the threat of external military intervention will prevent coup d’états and will provide democratically elected leaders with the reassurance that the threat of external military intervention will defer the opposition from revolting. Furthermore, a government in power, which looses an election, will transfer power to the opposition in fear of external military intervention (ibid).

A weak premise in the argument is that it assumes that civil war persists because of rational choices taken by actors who benefit from the unpredictable conditions created by the civil war. The rise of the UIC can be seen as an attempt by actors to establish more predictable conditions, thus challenging Collier’s argument. Furthermore, the

40 The interview was conducted at The Conference Sustainable Peace and Prosperity in Ethiopia, the Case for Somali Region and the Role of its Diaspora.
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research of this thesis suggests that traditional structures can function as the building blocks of a formal state. It would be in the interest of the Somali people, as well as of the international community, if Somalia were left to deal with its own political situation. This should not exclude external aid for the Somalis who need it. The external military interventions, such as the recent Ethiopian intervention and the UNOSOM I and II, have all tried to put a new central governing body in place. But it has been all too easy for opposition organisations such as the Al-Shabab to brand the new central state as consisting of corrupt leaders with close ties to Christian nations. This is summarized in a quote by the former Somali official:

“I would not say military intervention, it has to go through the government. Assistance to the government of Somalia. Everyone who comes there will appear to be a colonial invader. That is the problem.” (ibid)

The history of Somalia is reason why external military intervention will most likely fail, no matter how well tailored. The fear of domination seems to be a part of the embedded cultural structures in Somalia. The history of an explorative and oppressive state has left the Somali people with a low level of thrust in official state authorities except the authority representing their own clan. In the past external military intervention has focused on building a central state, which is probably the reason for its failure. It is much to prefer to focus on the positive developments inside Somalia itself and utilize the organisational capabilities of the traditional structures.

Comparing Somaliland and South Somalia provides a clear image of the difference between the externally lead central state-building attempts and the traditional. Somalis built the regional administration in Somaliland with the only external assistance coming from the Somalia Diaspora, which provided funds for the negotiation (Walls, 2009). The administration of Somaliland is based on the traditional structures. To some extent it resembles the British parliament with a two-house system. An “upper” house reserved for clan elders, who serve as mediators between clans. A “lower” house consisting of elected clan members that serves as the legislative body.

The Somaliland government system incorporates the accountability mechanisms of the clan system with the institutions focused on reaching consensus. In contrast, to the system of Somaliland, the TFG in South Somalia is based on the 4.5 formula. This formula distributes seats in the parliament equally to the four major clans in Somalia.
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and the last 0.5 to the minority groups in Somalia. The TFG is shaped in the image of a Western state where the majority can impose their will on the minority and it is therefore designed to fail. Furthermore, clan elders who are members of the TFG are perceived as having bought their seat in the TFG and are discredited as corrupt.

Transparency

North (1990) stipulates that:

“… there exist no institutions in a world with complete information. With incomplete information, however, cooperative solutions will break down unless institutions are created that provide sufficient information for individuals to police deviations” (ibid:57).

These institutions could be in the shape of formal as well as informal constraints. According to Collier’s theory, external military intervention would be capable of restoring order in conflict-ridden countries. Attention should be payed to Collier’s formulation “restoring order” thereby acknowledging that order has in fact existed in the bottom billion countries. Chesterman et al. (2004) argue that external intervention runs a large risk of undermining local governance structures i.e. traditional structures, replacing them with less legitimate and sustainable. This is partly true in the case of Somalia. The traditional structures in Somalia, who in the past have been the sources of order, have been undermined but not replaced. They have continued to play a crucial role in the structuring of Somali society.

When external actors, who are not from the Somali Diaspora, meet with Somalis, it is extremely difficult to be certain of who one is dealing with. This finding is based upon a conference on piracy. The Danish diplomat Thomas Winkler is in charge of a task group composed of different countries dealing with the legal problem of persecuting Somali pirates. He had experienced that he never knew who would show up, when he had meetings with Somalis, or if those, with whom he met, actually had any real power:

“When you meet people who are representative from Somalia you are never sure who exactly you are meeting with nor who they represent. This makes the work of a
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diplomat that much harder.” (Piracy Conference hosted by The Centre for Military Studies)

According to Winkler, the TFG is a rubber stamp state existing mainly to grant the international community permission to access Somali waters (ibid). All individuals interviewed for this thesis have confirmed, the same conclusion: the TFG has no real power and chances of the TFG to gain power is close to zero.

In contrast to this, a great number of the interviewees explained that the Somali Diaspora usually has a pretty good idea of what is going on in Somalia. Thus, it seems that the level of transparency changes depending on who is trying to gather information. I will define the levels of transparency as external and internal transparency. Furthermore, as mentioned in the case presentation, the level of internal transparency is different according to the specific region of Somalia. For instance, Somaliland has an administration and is more stable than South Somalia. So all other things being equal the level of internal transparency is higher in Somaliland than in South Somalia. This has implications to the theory of Collier, which regards bottom billion countries as clearly defined countries. His theory does not consider the fact that within countries different regional levels of development might exist. Collier regards bottom billion countries as having the same characteristics. According to him one of his three external military interventions could help deal with their failings. As previously mentioned external military intervention in Somalia has left the country worse off. Thus, the different levels of state-building and the traditional structures in Somalia ought be taken into consideration. Somalia should be regarded not as an entity, but as a country consisting of different regions with different levels of informal and formal constraints.

External military intervention and legitimacy

A formal institution that is transparent and where people understand the accountability mechanisms of the institutions will be capable of affecting the society in which it is embedded. Due to the fact the traditional structures in Somalia are based on primo inter pares system resembling direct democracy, formal institutions should be shaped accordingly in order to gain popular legitimacy. This is most likely easier said than done. Integrating traditional structures into formal institutions might cause
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problems such as the loss of the legitimacy by the traditional leaders. They run the risk of loosing the close connection to those who have provided them with power, as it happened to some traditional leaders in Somaliland (Walls, 2009).

As described by Galvan (2004), institutional syncretism, where modern institutions adapt and syncretise with traditional structures, has only occurred in Somaliland. The recent external military intervention, where the TFG was reinstated, only served to create institutional imposition & modernizing transformation. Galvan (ibid) defines this as the lack of popular support and voluntary compliance of the formal state. The lack of support has created two publics in South Somalia. An informal public, with a high degree of legitimacy and popular consent, and a weak formal public with a minimum of legitimacy.

As mentioned previously two levels of transparency levels exist in Somalia. The first level is the one know to the international community. At the piracy conferences, Danish government officials and NGOs admitted to having little insights into the key political actors in Somalia. The second one is the internal level of transparency. The Somali Diaspora seems to be able to be in between the two, due to the oral tradition in Somalia and the capability of Somalis to build a reasonably functional telecommunication industry. It seems evident from the interviews conducted with members of the Somali Diaspora that they have a high level of knowledge about the political relations in Somalia. This, however, is distorted by external military intervention, most likely owing to the fact that it takes some time for the informal institutions to rearrange in order to meet the new situation, caused by external military intervention. Thus, the findings of this thesis suggest that the both levels of transparency decrease in Somali society due to the impact of external military intervention.

Social contract and priorities

In the Western world the social contract is an individual contract between the individual and the state (David K. Leonard). According to David K. Leonard two social contracts exist in African countries. One social contract between the family and the local governance structures (traditional structures). The other one being between the local governance structures and the state. This is mainly due to the traditional
structures ability to provide collective goods to families, which thereby make them capable of dealing with the state. Thus, the state governs through traditional structures, instead of governing directly. I would define this as the traditional contract. This relationship makes the state dependent on the traditional structures for its legitimacy. The various social contracts are also present in the approach to felonies. In the Western world only the individual who commits the criminal act is responsible. In the traditional structures in Somalia, the mag paying groups, take a collective responsibility for members of the group. When a crime is committed the price of the crime is discussed among the elders. Earlier, the penalty was traditionally paid in camels by the mag paying group. In contemporary Somalia money is used as payment instead. This fact serves as an example of institutional syncretism with the traditional structures utilizing the modern form of exchange but rule based on customary law. (Gundel and Dhaxarbo, 2006).

The interaction between the de jure state in Somalia i.e. the TFG and the de facto institutions i.e. traditional structures, has been dominated by the de jure state. In cases with a new central state-building project having failed or being initiated, the traditional structures have adjusted in order to deal with the new environment. The return of traditional structures is an outcome of the failure of establishing a central state, unable to provide the collective goods provided by the traditional structures. This suggests that if a state were to be built in Somalia, it should incorporate the mechanisms of the traditional structures for instance the importance of reaching a consensus should be one of the main prioritizes of the state.

The premises of the previous attempts to build a central state were rooted in aspects in Somali culture embedding features of conflict. The 4.5 agreement created a de jure state with the embedded problems of the traditional structures and left out the problem solving mechanisms. Tribalism prevailed was used leaving out the rules and ethics of the traditional structures. This created a sectarian project with no mechanisms to control the behaviour of individuals. Therefore, the 4.5 government i.e. the TFG has not been capable of making political decisions or gaining legitimacy. The internal

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41 “Small social units that take collective responsibility for their own security as well as undertaking an obligation to compensate other groups for any harm committed by one of its members.” (Gundel and Dhaxarbo, 2006:vii) The mag paid was the same irrespective of age, rank or wealth: for the male it was set at 100 camels for a female it was set at 50 camels. (Lewis, 1961:164).
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checks and balances of the traditional structures are consensus building and openness in political discussion, integrating these features into the institutions is vital.

As described in the literature review, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) regard the rule of law as the most important function a state should fulfil. At the last piracy conference I attended the UNICEF coordinator in Somalia in the period 2005-2009 Christian Balslev-Olesen gave some interesting insights as to the kind of collective goods prioritized by the Somali people. According to him the priorities of the international community differ from those of the Somali people. Three areas should be prioritized in Somalia according to an agreement between UNICEF and the Somali people: improving security and establishing good governance, strengthening essential basic services and social protection and lastly creating an enabling environment for rapid poverty reduction development. But this agreement was reached prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the changed international priority setting, improving security by combating terrorism has been the sole priority by the international community. According to Christian Balslev-Olsen the Somali people today want to prioritize health and education.

Any state-building attempt in Somalia needs to clearly identify the collective goods prioritized by the Somali people it should not be based on the priorities determined by the international community. At the various piracy conferences the focus of the Danish government and the freight companies has been directed toward building a central state in Somalia. This focus has been prioritized on basis of research pointing at this as the most effective way of combating piracy. Thus, the priorities, of the international community including the approach to the social contract, are fundamentally different from those of the Somali people.

Sub-conclusion

According to Collier’s theory external military intervention could restore order in Somalia and create a central state, which can provide the Somali people with collective goods. Collier’s theory stipulates that only the state can provide checks and balances, without a state they are not provided. The exception is that the international community can provide them using the threat of external military intervention. The
findings of this thesis suggest that focus should be given to the internal check and balances, which exist in Somali society in the form of traditional structures. They provide an institutional framework for construction of accountability mechanisms in Somalia. In sum, the analysis of the findings challenges a number of the premises of Collier’s theory.

Figure 1.5.

Figure 1.5 illustrates a definition of the interaction between state- and nation-building. It should be emphasised that nation-building is the most important factor. Without an organised society, formal institutions cannot be established. An important finding is a fundamental difference between Western representative democracy and traditional structures. Western representative democracy is based on having a winning and a losing party. This is impossible in the current Somali context. The loosing party does not have to accept defeat, which is why representative democracy fails. However, this
thesis has identified an alternative state-building process. Certain aspects of direct
democracy as in the city-state culture of ancient Greece seem to be present in the
Somali traditional structures. Thus, there are no universally institutional blueprints for
broadening democracy or managing entrenched political and social conflicts. For
Somalia to leapfrog its way up the development ladder, the only option is for internal
actors to find a solution based on consensus. Traditional structures together with
Islam provide culturally sustainable informal constraints that have survived the stress
of conflict in Somalia and should be taken into account when the promotion of any
kind of development in Somalia.

External military intervention in Somalia might be effective in terms of stability in the
short term. But as intangible aspects such as culture is not incorporated into the
statistical analysis, on the basis of which Collier has built his research, his theory is
inadequate in the case of Somalia. External military intervention in Somalia has failed
at establishing any kind of basis for long-term development. It has rather escalated the
protracted conflict.
Discussion

In order to answer the research question *how does external military intervention impact Somali state-building?* This chapter will discuss the findings of the preceding analysis. The chapter will be structured into three sections. The first two sections will address the hypotheses derived from the endogenous and exogenous approaches. The last section will discuss the overall findings, which will then lead to the conclusion.

Hypothesis 1

*In order for Somali state-building to produce institutions, which can provide the people with collective goods, it should be rooted in cultural embedded structures.*

As mentioned in the analysis, the semantics and taxonomy of state-building literature needs further clarification.

Somali state-building refers to the formal institutions in Somalia. Only in Somaliland, is the administration capable of providing its people with collective goods. In South Somali, the TFG is not capable of providing any of such goods.

Somali nation-building refers to the intangible aspects such as culture, norms, and traditional practices. This constitutes the basis of the formal institutions in Somaliland. This raises a discussion if Somaliland could function as a role model for the rest of Somalia. The differences in the cultures derived from the colonial heritage might lie heavily embedded in the different regions, so that the rest of Somalia cannot use the experience of Somaliland. However, I would argue that formal institutions working together with traditional structures in distributing aid relief might provide the formal institutions with legitimacy. This would be in compliance with the Somali conception of the social contract as consisting of two relationships: the first one being between the family and the traditional structures, and the second one being between the traditional structures and the state. Therefore, external involvement in Somali state-building could aid the process. Still, it is important that local ownership is prioritized.
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External involvement brings up the discussion of the role of the Somalia Diaspora in a Somali state-building process. The former Somali official stated,

“Since 2000 half the cabinet have consisted of people with foreign passports. And what is worse their families are not in Somalia. Some of them need to make money some of them want to help the country we don’t know the half. But the moment you have a foreign passport your motivations are limited, because in the moment there is a crisis you can always depart and you even may have a tendency to demand more.”

I would call this the passport theory, but I have not found any data, which supports nor contradicts this theory. The chain of arguments is that leaders with no clear vested interests in an altruistic goal, to establish legitimate institutions, will be more likely to become corrupt than those who do. Thus, Somali leaders with a foreign passport will favour clan politics in their efforts to gain unchecked power without the “burden” of the rules or the ethic values of the traditional structures.

The findings of this thesis show that local actors best undertake any kind of development in Somalia. However, a discussion of the limitations of the traditional structures is necessary. As exemplified by the telecommunication industry, problems arise along with the need to coordinate efforts in order to gain economics of scale. State-building should be based from within, but the empirical research, on the other hand, also points to the capabilities of the traditional structures being. However, the traditional structures are the most stable option in the short term. Future research should investigate the possibilities and impediments of scaling up the institutional organisation of the traditional structures.

A crucial finding of this thesis has been that the system of the traditional structures resembles direct democracy rather than representative democracy. The consensus aspect, which seems to be a crucial factor in for instance conflict resolution, should be taken into considerations when formal institutions are developed. Thus, Somali state-building needs to be based on the norms and informal constraints that the Somali people understand in order for them to supply the Somali people with collective goods. According to Collier democracy will, without a certain level of institutionalisation, make a country prone to conflict and impede development. However, the Somalia case suggests that the Somali people do have a sense of how democracy works from their traditional structures possessing the characteristics of a
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direct democracy. Therefore it is fair to presume, the Somali people being very well capable of building their own formal and democratic institutions, be it representative democracy or some other form of democratic rule. Collier’s theory does not explain the Somali case. In his theory, he includes only the economic outcome of bottom billion countries but fails to include an analysis of culture, consciousness and other intangible values that influence economic performance. As described by North (1990):

“Formal rules, even in the most developed economy, make up a small part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; a moment’s reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal constraints … Persisting informal constraints produce outcome that have important implications for the way economies change.” (ibid:67).

The ability of the Somali business community to conduct business in Somalia is evidence that informal constraints have a positive impact on the Somali economy. The TFG might have been successful if its institutional structure was based on elements from traditional structures combined with elements from modern institutions allowing for institutional syncretism to take place (see Galvan, 2004). Furthermore, the TFG mainly consists of Somalis from the Somalia Diaspora. These government members might have a better sense and understanding of the Somali political situation. However, not having lived in Somalia for a while, they might not know the new Somali context, as well as Somalis with an everyday life in Somalia.

It should be stressed that a deus ex machina does not exist for a future Somalia, not even building on the traditional structures with their implied capabilities are capable of solving all the problems and the Somali people face. According to my analysis traditional leaders run the risk of loosing their legitimacy when operating in formal institutions. Also the proliferation of traditional leaders in informal institutions weakens their legitimacy. Therefore, the Somalis´ own experience constraining and exercising power will enable them to wield the benefit of formal institutions for all Somalis.

In this way the first hypothesis can be empirical supported.
Hypothesis 2

External military intervention can assist Somali state-building.

According to Collier, external military intervention can provide the bottom billion countries with external checks and balances allowing for democratically elected leaders to remain in office, claiming that democracy needs certain institutions to be in place before real democracy can flourish. This argument raises at least three issues. First, it implicates that the protracted conflict in Somalia is regarded as a static situation. The context of the conflict is constantly changing and in recent time it has gone from being various local conflicts into being a bi-polar conflict between the TFG and the Al-Shabab.

Secondly, the traditional structures are themselves informal institutions, in some sense resembling a system of direct democracy. This fact contradicts Collier’s claim that formal institutions should be in place before democracy can work. Thirdly, Siyad Barre came to power via the military. A fact that suggests building up a military in Somalia could be a threat to a state rather than actually enforcing it.

The hypothesis can be neither challenged nor supported. Historically external military intervention has lead to formal state-building in Somalia. But not resulted in institutions with the capabilities to provide the Somali people with collective goods. It has resulted in de jure institutions. The latest external military intervention supplied fuel to the conflict and strengthened the extreme wing of the UIC the Al-Shabab.

As previously mentioned Somalia has been called a rubber stamp state. This term could be applied to the institutions established by the external military intervention in Somalia. This leads to the discussion of the role of the international community in Somalia. Today, the exogenous approach to Somalia state-building is clearly not viable. The research done for this thesis suggests that bottom-up initiatives such as seen in Somaliland would be preferable. External actors should learn their lesson from the colonial past. As previously mentioned, colonial administration tried appoint chiefs among the clan leaders as instruments in their ruling of the country. The same could be said about the external attempts to create a Somali state. The attempts are made by external actors in order to deal with the piracy problem.
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Collier’s theory considers only the history of the Western world after the French revolution. The French revolution ended community governance in France, before then they relied on local governance structures. Maybe if the Somalis were left to create a state in the image of their informal constraints, the West could serve as a source of inspiration most importantly the principle of human rights.

In the case of Somalia, external military intervention has not assisted Somali state-building other than creating formal institutions incapable of providing any collective goods to the Somali people. Thus, the second hypothesis is not supported by the findings.

Findings

The findings should be seen as the first step in the direction toward a deeper understanding of internal Somali political relations, thus enabling the international community to better understand how to aid the Somalis in attaining the capabilities to shape their own lives. The findings suggest that hitherto external military intervention in Somalia has only deepened the conflict and undermined internal processes with the potential to create a political background in Somalia. The fear of domination is deeply rooted, maybe to such a degree that a central state cannot be built in the current Somali situation, least of all by external actors.

It is a general perception that Somalia is an anarchistic society where no order exists. Based on numerous interviews and field observations this does not seem to be the case. The Somalis rely on traditional structures, which make up informal constraints enabling Somalis to conduct business and provide some capabilities. The traditional structures can provide informal constraints, but formal constraints are necessary if economics of scale are to be gained. Therefore in the long term the institutional framework of the traditional structures should be replaced or supplemented by formal constraints. These formal institutions should be created based on known practices familiar to the Somali people, in order to gain a general understanding and acceptance of the Somali people and to make way for institutional syncretism.
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The theory of Collier is not supported by the findings of this thesis. However, the findings are not capable of falsifying Collier’s theory as a whole, but the findings do reveal that the theory does not include considerations of context, history and intangible aspects of state-building.
Conclusion

Being intrigued by the protracted conflict in Somalia and motivated by a curiosity about why the Somali people and external actors have failed to build a central state, I set out to answer the research question: How does external military intervention impact Somali state-building?

The thesis sought to deductively examine the research question. Based on Collier’s theory and a literature review on state-building two hypotheses were created. The objective of the thesis was twofold as it sought to explore the phenomenon state-building, at the same time seeking to explain the relationship between Somali state-building and external military intervention.

In the discussion it was argued that the data collected support the first hypothesis, but not the second one.

Regarding the first hypothesis: In order for Somali state-building to produce institutions, which can provide the people with collective goods, it should be rooted in cultural embedded structures, it was argued that the traditional structures, which have survived the stress of the conflict and adapted to function in the new Somali context, need to be the building block in any state-building attempts. Empirical evidence support the hypothesis, as traditional structures have been the only institutional structures capable of providing the Somali people with collective goods. The traditional structures were found to have certain similarities with direct democracy, being based on a system of primo inter pares, with emphasis put on reaching consensus, this finding challenging Collier’s theory that formal checks and balances or a certain level of institutionalization need to be in place before democracy can be pursued. However, the traditional structures are not a deus ex machina for Somalia. Economics of scale are hard to achieve, as shown by the example of the telecommunication industry in. Also, the experience in Somaliland might not serve as an adequate example for the rest of Somalia due to the fundamentally different colonial heritage.

Regarding the second hypothesis: External military intervention can assist Somali state-building, which related to Collier’s theory on state-building, it was argued that
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the attempts, to establish a central state through external military intervention in the past, had failed. Making it very unlikely for future external military intervention to succeed. Furthermore, it was concluded that Collier’s theory is ahistorical, as it does not include an analysis of the context of the bottom billion countries. It was argued that a key factor in state-building is legitimacy. Also the recent external military intervention by Ethiopia (with the backing of the USA) reinstating the TFG was doomed to fail owing to the fact that the TFG was inserted into power in a highly Muslim nation by two Christian nations. It was concluded that external actors have an approach to state-building different than that of the Somali people, as the traditional structures, being the only institutional structures capable of providing any collective goods, are built on some form of direct democracy, whereas external actors regard representative democracy as the objective.

In conclusion, external military intervention in Somalia has impacted negatively on Somali state-building. In contrast to this, the traditional structures of Somalia society have survived in spite of the stress of conflict and have demonstrated the ability to provide collective goods. Thus, contain the building blocks to build formal Somali institutions.
Perspectives

This chapter will deal with the implications that the findings of this thesis might have. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether the findings can be applied to other failed states. However, it is clear that more research needs to be conducted on how external actors can aid state-building in failed countries.

The case of Somalia suggests that the focus of the international community in failed states should be directed toward cultural embedded structures being used as the building blocks of modern formal institutions. The local governance structures might contain mechanisms, to be included by a democratic state-building project. This will help the local population to understand and accept the formal institutions being based on norms and practices already familiar to them through centuries.

Secondly, it is clear that external military interventions have not stabilized Somalia. It is important to consider the historical context as well as the regional context of the country. Somalia has shown that different levels of state-building can occur within a country and that the different colonial rulers have influence the traditional structure differently in the various Somali regions.

Thirdly, the Somali case shows that peace is not necessarily a sine qua non to development and that economic growth and social security are often provided by the traditional structures, which have survived the stress of conflict.

Finally, the thesis has shown that local structures are capable of providing some of the public goods required by a modern state. The capabilities of these structures give hope that the future of the Somali people might not be as bleak as at first glance.

Western societies work as a consequence of the rule of law. The representative democracies are capable of enforcing legislation holding both the de facto and the de jure power. In Somalia the traditional structures work as they are built upon norms and known practices and have de facto power. Formal legislation in Somalia should be based on these known norms and practices or it will have only a small chance of being accepted and adopted by the Somali people.
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Appendices
## Appendix 1 – Table of data collected

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<th>Focus</th>
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<td>Osman Farah</td>
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<td>Somali businessman from Puntland</td>
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<td>The Case for Somali Region and The Role of Its Diaspora</td>
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Appendix 3 – Map of Greater Somalia

(http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%95%E3%82%A1%E3%82%A4%E3%83%AB:Greater_Somalia.jpg, retrieved 10/11-2011)