Visions of Modernity

An investigation of the interplay between nationalism, capitalism, and the state of exception

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Abstract

Against the mainstream theory of democratic and economic overlap, this thesis investigates the complex interplay between nationalism, capitalism, and democracy through the concept of Agamben's "state of exception", which implies that the suspension of democracy is inherent in the democratic logic. Following a Weberian framework, inspired by his idea of the spirit of capitalism, subsequently taken up by Greenfeld, it assumes that nationalism plays an important part in the development of a capitalist ethos, as well as in the development of democratic institutions. The thesis undertakes historical/sociological analyses of the American Civil War, India and its Emergency in 1975, and Indonesia's early independence, along with nationalist writings of each country. Interpreting them as events not outside the field of democracy, but as democracy's attempt to create an environment and ethos where democracy and growth can be achieved for the nation, these case studies are used to illuminate the fundamentally philosophical problem of political order and the position of capitalist growth within this order. It concludes that it cannot find a simple procedural solution for the development of democratic and economic institutions, that they are the product of highly contested visions of society, and that this should be taken into consideration in development and foreign policy, as well as act as a reminder of the fragility of democracy, and that it may not be exportable and institutionalized easily.
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Introduction - the problem
Modern mainstream thought on democracy and its relationship to capitalism holds that capitalism and democratic rights go hand in hand. Capitalism requires agents that can engage in contractual obligations, thus the global expansion of capitalism demands the creation of subjects endowed with rights (for example, Habermas holds this view, (Habermas 2005)). Conversely, the creation of a democratic society of individuals with rights provides the environment for free competition and enterprise, thus generating economic efficiency, innovation, and prospering middle class. Furthermore, it is often considered a relatively simple matter of producing institutions which accord with ideas of democracy, or, like Rawls, to determine behind a "veil of ignorance" a procedural form for which to create democratic frameworks which rational actors would agree upon (Rawls 1999). Faced with the many shipwrecked attempts at creating democracy and prosperity in many regions of the world, this question should be of paramount interest to anyone trying to intervene in these societies.

Through an analysis of historical experiences of creating modern polities, this thesis will investigate this link, and nuance the perspective. Following Agamben, it is assumed that creating the political entity of the state is always complicated - a framework must be created in which the state can govern and enforce its writ; who are the people upon which is claimed authority and obedience, the territorial integrity, and the framework of its government. These are claims which, in the last analysis, cannot be reduced to procedural questions of democracy and constitutionalism, but is the link that constitutionalism claims to represent: the "true" will of the people, or the "true" intention of the founding fathers and the constitution. In a sense it is dealing with the problem of representation and its link to what it represents; the foundational character of the nation and what it is, and who can claim to legitimately rule it. In this perspective, Agamben's notion of the state of exception becomes the paradigmatic political function, the method in which the framework of state governance is created and sovereignty is established over a given territory and the humans inhabiting it. It, so to speak, creates and organizes the environment and creates the basis for democratic institutions, or in the case of most modern dictatorships it postpones the promises of
democratic governance indefinitely by recourse to the continuing need for the suspension of the "normal" situation (read: the creation of the political polity in a certain image) which it is trying to establish. As such, one of the problems of the link between democratic rights and capitalism becomes establishing these preconditions: using the concept of the state of exception to create an environment which has a certain capitalistic ethos or way of life, an "economic culture". This must furthermore be legitimized through the people, the carrier of sovereignty in the modern conception of political rule, and thus overlaps with nationalism. Nationalism, however, can be seen as a form of culture and can therefore be vital to directing the desires of the members of the nation: towards economic growth. Thus the focus of the project is the links between the economic culture and its creation and relation to politics through the state of exception: to actively create and infuse the polity and its citizens with a 'capitalist spirit' in the Weberian sense.

Three cases provide the empirical foundation of the investigation:

1) The American Civil War as an attempt to create a modern economic society and culture through the eradication of the Southern ethos of plantation slavery.

2) The nationalist experience of India and its struggle to create a unified, modern economic nation from the rubble of princely states and exit of the British Raj and the problems of unity presented by multiple identities based on religion, ethnicity, language, caste, and so forth, culminating in the imposition of a state of emergency by Indira Gandhi.¹

3) Indonesia’s experience of sudden nationalism and independence in the wake of Japanese occupation and its many attempts to create a coherent society, culminating in the 'New Order' instituted by the logic of the state of exception in the 1960s.

These are multiple experiences of trying to create modern democratic societies and the economic development and ethos for their functioning in post-colonial situations

¹caste, like slavery, is an interesting cultural and economic specification determining values and meanings of different kinds of labor and the status and dignity they confer.
where questions of who are the people and what is the territory are not easily given. But in the attempt of creating these, serious problems of citizen unrest and alignment of interests take place and a suspension of democracy is enacted to deal with the situation. All three countries are ex-colonial subjects struggling with creating a unified polity without colonial rule, but where the most important binding element had been common colonial rule - neither America, India, or Indonesia had been a unified nation or territory before British or Dutch rule - thus they had to 'create' the national fabric where the political entity can claim legitimate rule. This thesis investigates how these nascent nations struggle to create a coherent national identity and the economic culture and political institutions that can provide a basis for a modern democratic nation, and thus investigate the often simplified assumption of economic prosperity leading to democratic institutionalization and rule, and the link between the two when nations and states try to enforce an orientation towards sustained growth. The thesis is framed around these three examples of states of exception, but in order to understand them and their logic, historical context and the ideas of the particular nationalisms must be investigated. The thesis will therefore produce a historical perspective and interpretation through available sources and culminate in each country’s specific state of exception in order to create an understanding of the complex interaction between democracy, nationalism, capitalism, and the state of exception.

Each country follows different trajectories and the sources differ substantially, as do currently available analyses and interpretations. My methodology therefore allows for a multitude of sources. I have used what was available and what illuminated the cases. For the American case I have been able to use Greenfeld's work as a starting point and guide. For the two other cases I had to use whatever sources available and weave my own web of connections I discovered to be of relevance in the given cases. As the paper in a sense is an exploration of how certain ideas become institutionalized by force (the state of exception), leaders are important as carriers and vehicles of these ideas, and prime articulations of the early nationalism of each country. They are
therefore important, not as persons in themselves, but as nucleus of clusters of ideas trying to shape a nationalism against colonialism.

I hold no illusions that my perspective is the only valid one, or the case material is exhausted. I do, however, consider the contribution to be a worthwhile perspective and attempt to illuminate the complex interplay of relations creating modern polities, economic action, and the philosophical possibility for this.

The theoretical frame

In his book State of Exception Agamben traces a peculiar phenomenon of modern law. It appears under different names depending on space and time, such as *état de siège*, *Ausnahmezustand*, martial law, state of necessity, state of exception, and so on. Fundamentally, the state of exception is a mechanism for safeguarding the constitution and juridical order, and by invoking the need for a state of exception in an experience of crisis the normal workings of law are suspended, the powers of the executive branch are expanded, civil rights denied, and the general checks and balances on the limits of power ignored (in the most extreme cases). The crisis is usually considered (and is most often denominated in the specific instances of law as such) a crisis of security, that is, a crisis caused by war. But often the actual letter of the law is irrelevant, since the dictum and logic of crisis states that “necessity knows no law”. The crisis invoked can thus also be the expectation of war, civil war, and surprisingly often economic crisis is used to claim a state of emergency, thus requiring exceptional measures (Agamben 2005, 11-22). Carl Schmitt famously stated that “Sovereign is he, who decides upon the state of exception” (Schmitt 2009, 25) and it is this statement Agamben takes as inspiration for his analysis. The state of exception appears as a paradoxical structure where in order to preserve the law, law is

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1 I have previously worked with Agamben in this way in relation to democratic infringements and deterioration of civil rights during the American Civil War (Limits to Democracy: An analysis of the American Civil War, VIP-paper, CBS 2014), and there is therefore a certain amount of overlap.

2 In this paper juridical order will mean the broader norms and order of society in the abstract, the sphere of law and the constitutional arrangement of the polity, whereas the law refers to the more specific actual law in its application.
suspended. Or in other words, if one tries to include the state of exception as a measure provisioned by a law one ends up with the paradox: by law I proclaim there is no law. This paradox, according to Agamben, has not been solved within the legal tradition, but is often considered an extra-legal matter in the sense that necessity has no law, as exemplified above. If the exception justifies the suspension of the normal functioning of law, the functioning of law and the legalities concerning it must be beyond theory and codified law since it is by definition exceptional and requires its very suspension. Yet if the sovereign is indeed the one who has the power to proclaim the exception, he is in this sense outside the law, as he who interprets where the law is valid and where it is not.

Thus Agamben is able to write that what is essentially at stake, the central paradox or aporia, in the state of exception is: “I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law.” (Agamben 1998, 15) But contrary to considering it as beyond the scope of law, Agamben considers this central aporia intimately linked with the function of law and sees it as a requirement for its application. Sovereignty is both at the heart of the law, and denotes the law’s very limit, inside and outside. Agamben gives the following description of the phenomenon: “The state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, in so far as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.” (Agamben 2005, 4) When Agamben critiques the legal status of the prisoners of Guantanamo or the bioscans of travelers entering the United States, it is therefore not these specific measures he aims at; it is not enough to stop these individual measures. The fundamental mechanism, and thus the fundamental problem that make them possible (the state of exception and the problem of sovereignty) is still functioning and cannot be solved except on a deep political/ontological plane (Felding 2011, 184). His critique and interest is much more radical and points to the problem of the state of exception as such, and contends that it is entwined with the problem of ontology, tracing it back to Aristotle (Agamben 1998, 7-8). Agamben ties the political ontology (where the function of the state of exception is the paradigm) to the relationship between
potentiality and actuality. "The relation between constituting power and constituted power is just as complicated as the relation Aristotle establishes between potentiality and act, \textit{dynamis} and \textit{energeia}; and, in the last analysis, the relation between constituting and constituted power (perhaps like every authentic understanding of the problem of sovereignty) depends on how one thinks the existence and autonomy of potentiality." (Agamben 1998, 44)

In this sense, the problem of the political appears as a metaphysics of potentiality - to illustrate this potentiality, let us briefly consider the analogous example of language.

\textbf{Potentiality, language and thought}

In his introduction to the English translation of Agamben’s \textit{Idea della prosa}(Idea of Prose), Alexander Düttman writes “\textquoteleft[i]f there is language, if there is communication, then there is necessarily an idea of prose, a medium that can never be reduced to a philosophical or poetic particularity, a communicability that always communicates itself [...] Communication cannot be anything but the communication of communicability, because it is impossible to communicate what is not communicable, what does not belong to the order of language; but, as such, communication implies an exteriority that originally transforms it into communication of \textit{something}” (Agamben 1995, 5). It points out something beyond language, barred from language that we cannot name and keep within language (mirroring the same aporia as the state of exception). Yet it must assume it for language to function as Düttman elaborates: “Communicability always communicates itself, it is nothing but communication itself – if communicability maintained itself separate from communication, the thing would not let itself be named and would be unable to appear. But, at the same time, communicability cannot ever be communicated; it opens the immanence of communication to a hesitation, to a trembling, to an indecision, to the affirmation and to the suspension of exteriority – if communicability let itself be communicated, it would take the form of a thing, and communication, reducing itself to the simple communication of something, would erase itself immediately.” (Agamben, Idea of
In this sense, language maintains itself in a relation to something more or outside of itself. It assumes some form of linguisticness, the mere fact that we “have a language” as opposed to its use in actual denotation and representation of the world. Take for example the word ‘chair’: the word chair denotes chair in its use in representing reality, yet requires a fundamental relation to an indexical grammar or lexical consistency independent of its actual use in a specific context, as parole as opposed to langue (Agamben 1998, 20). Yet every actual denoting presupposes this linguistic character, the communicability it cannot ultimately grasp – it cannot go beyond language and come to terms with it but only denote it as something “outside” of itself, which it paradoxically has to presuppose and be intimately related to for its own functioning. In The Coming Community Agamben touches upon this saying that “what is in question in this bordering is not a limit [...] that knows no exteriority, but a threshold [...], that is, a point of contact with an external space that must remain empty.” (Agamben 1993, 68) The pure communicability of language is thus the limits of language in its actual denoting, an empty space it must remain in relation to where the distinction between inside and outside of language blurs. In using language it must presuppose the pure capacity for language must be presupposed. “If thought were in fact only the potentiality to think this or that intelligibility”, writes Agamben, “it would always already have passed through to the act and it would remain necessarily inferior to its own object.” (Agamben 1993, 35) In the political realm, actual political representation must presuppose a sphere outside itself in which to derive its legitimacy. The reason it is so hard to grasp though, is because it is exactly that limit concept, the threshold where it touches upon the surface where our meaning and understanding stops, yet it is entirely a part of the concepts logic. Agamben writes that “[language] presupposes the nonlinguistic as that which it must maintain itself in a virtual relation (in the form of a langue or, more precisely, a grammatical game, that is, in the form of a discourse whose actual denotation is maintained in infinite suspension) so that it may later denote it in actual speech.” (Agamben 1998, 20) It is, in sense, an appropriation of language of its own outside, its own limit, where it becomes impossible to distinguish what is inside or what is outside. It is a totalizing proposition.
(there is nothing outside language), and to illuminate this logic, let us turn to Bertrand Russell’s Sicilian barber.

**The logical paradox of the state of exception**

William Rasch, using the paradox of Russell’s Sicilian barber since the paradoxical mechanism is the same, has illustrated this succinctly: A Sicilian barber shaves only and everyone in the city who do not shave themselves. But does the barber shave himself? He cannot, but he has to, or he is excluded from the law of shaving that he exercises (Rasch 2007, 92). The apparent solution to the problem these kinds of paradoxes introduce is Wittgenstein’s statement that “the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to the laws of logic” (Rasch 2007, 93). Rasch elaborates that “[i]t simply cannot be subject to the same judgment that it exercises – which is to say that for the law of the excluded middle to operate, it must be the excluded middle, neither true or false. Thus, self-exemption 'solves' the paradox of totalizing propositions by rudely and insolently becoming the paradox. The barber who shaves only and all those who do not shave themselves is not only not excommunicated from his Sicilian village, he is chosen to rule it. He is, at one and the same time, of the town and over it” (Rasch 2007, 93, emphasis in original). Everyone is equal before the law, including the barber. But the law itself cannot be subject to the same law, but must defer the adjudication of its truth to an outside. Thus the laws validity must be established by an outside, and has historically been derived from divine grace, hereditarily, a general will, and so on (cf Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, according to which the sovereign gives and exercises the laws because he is outside and above the social contract). However, this is relative and an immanent part of the logic, so

“this Sicilian law might be subject to a ‘higher’ law, a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ law, but such a world must eventually arrive at God, who then becomes the sovereign source of law by the selfsame self-exemption that hierarchical ordering means to avoid. [...] Ironically, then, for law to be absolute, it must be limited, it must be immanent
to the set in which it rules and stand in no hierarchical relation to the outside. The distinction of levels is displaced—or rather—re-placed, re-entered into the set itself. [...] The law does not derive its power from an external source, but rather achieves its power by distinguishing itself from itself—an act of logical nuclear fission, as it were. Thus, the proposition that maintains that all propositions are either true or false claims for itself the *authority* of truth precisely by refusing to subject itself to the mechanism of truth-testing.”

(Rasch 2007, 94, emphasis in original)

The sovereign power divides itself into constituted and constituting power and “maintains itself in relation to both, positioning itself at their point of indistinction.” (Agamben 1998, 41) Just as the language in the last analysis must rely and assume the pure possibility of language, the law, at a logical level, ultimately relies on the same pure possibility, its own outside and its relation to it. If the law cannot adjudicate its own validity, but always has to refer to somewhere else, in the last instance this “somewhere else” is the analogue to the “pure possibility” of language. It must always refer to somewhere else for its own legitimacy and to ground itself, but this legitimacy is in the last instance “empty”. Hence, in the last analysis divine grace, hereditary tradition, and general will of the population are different modes of “filling” this empty space with meaning and derive legitimacy. It is the presumption of the potentiality of law. It is this intimate link that the state of exception exposes, the extreme limit of law where any conception of inside and outside, what is legal and illegal blurs in trying to ground its own reference. The decisive problem and understanding of these aporias, paradoxes, and ambiguities are, however, that they are exactly that; ambiguities that are unsolvable, and thus have to be *resolved* by decision, interpretation, and action. And any form of decision or action thus attempted to solve itself must refer to an outside or greater “law”, which in the final analysis is that empty space that it tries to appropriate and fill with its own interpretation (I, the sovereign, suspend the order in order to preserve the order on behalf of the people/in
accordance to the intention of the founding fathers, etc). The sovereign's prerogative is in this sense to define this will or outside and try to manifest it, turning it from potentiality into actuality. The sovereign and the state of exception is the bearer of this link.

Since no rule can be applicable to chaos, what is at issue is exactly constructing this order where the rule can become applicable. A “normal” situation must be created, and the sovereign is in this sense he who decides whether the situation is a normal one where the law can be applied. The functioning of the legal order rests on the state of exception, which aims to make the law applicable by a temporary suspension of its exercise. The normal situation must first be produced through measures having “the force of law” but can by definition not have the value of law in the stricter sense (their legality is suspended with reference to necessity). Hence it appropriates the empty space for its own legitimacy (protector of the constitution, or whatever outside authority can be invoked). The sovereign thus does not produce law per se, but guarantees the situation as “a whole in its totality” where the law can become applicable – a space that is entirely beyond law but is required for the law to function (DeCaroli 2007, 50). The theory is thus able to point to a place beyond the normal functioning of the democratic juridical order which it must assume in order for it to work. But in pointing out this space, it also delineates the limits of the democratic order, where it cannot adjudicate its own validity and is in a sense on the verge of a breakdown or a threshold for its own re-negotiation. It opens up the outside space for re-interpretation (that which is beyond the legal code of the law, but which it references: the constitution, which refers to the general will of the political community, and so on ad infinity). But in order for the juridical order to work it must cut this chain of eternal reference and instantiate a specific juridical order grounded in a reference to the empty space. The state of exception is the mediation of this cut, or at least opens up for the possibility of changing the reference point and turning it into legal code; through the state of exception to reorganize the “empty” space into a
demarcated political space where the law can have validity and ground itself as "the true emanation of what the political community is". It is this implicit intimate relation to democracy’s own pure possibility, the potentiality of law, which in the final analysis is a void to which democracy must keep its own relation. As such, the Hobbesian state of nature is not a state of pre-social society, but is in its exteriority incorporated into the center of the political - it is that which is assumed for the political to function and thus becomes the defining presupposition at the heart of the state and thus the state cannot live without it. It is neither inside or outside, but pre-supposed and maintained in the figure of the sovereign (Agamben 1998, 35-36). In breakdown situations what we see are attempts to fulfill this void with meaning in order to restore the “normalcy” (the guardian of the constitution, the dictatorship of the proletariat that with any means necessary must save the revolution by its provisional suspension) and create the space in which law can function. The order must ground itself in an outside, and it is this necessity that implies the ontological relationship between democracy and dictatorship. Viewing the problem in this way allows us to conceptualize this “empty space” or void, which is at issue in the liminal situation (the state of exception). It thus becomes meaningful to talk about what is at issue in this liminal empty space (in our cases, the meanings of the specific nationalisms), what is being fought for as something essentially beyond the juridical order, yet entirely inherent and foundational for the constitution of the juridical democratic order (not in the sense of the legal document but the space in which the legal document can be valid).

Just as a language, i.e. French, presupposes the pure possibility of a language, its pure communicability or linguisticity, a "French" legal order presupposes the pure possibility of law, a unified body where this legal order can go from potentiality to actuality. This is grounded in presuppositions of constitutionalism, union, nation, etc, and the state of exception is exactly the link or mechanism between the possibility (potentiality) and the procedure by which it passes into actuality and creates “the sphere which it can govern by law”. The constitutional limits imposed on sovereignty
are in the end only half-measures. It never transcends the fundamental problem of
linking the legal order to “life” or territory through force; it takes this as its own
presupposition. Arguably, constitutionalism’s attempt to restrict the exercising of
executive power only underscores sovereignty’s exceptional character, and that there
are cases where the norm does not apply. Nothing rings out this inherent aporia as the
idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat protecting the revolution until the
communist utopia can be realized. According to Agamben, it is this “reef on which the
revolutions of our century [the 20th] have been shipwrecked.” (Agamben 1998, 12)
The state of exception becomes the hinge on which the norm and its application rests. This
also means that it becomes the existential limit of the norms of the state, a decision on
what norms are supposed to be in force, and thus is a metaphysical evaluation of the
state's existential character - this is why this space, the state of exception as a
necessity for bringing about the states "true being", can be appropriated by both
revolutionary groups trying to subvert the state order or state powers claim to
suspending the rule in order to save the order (constitution/democracy, e.t.c. Claims
that are, in the final analysis, always decisions on valuations). Thus Hobbes can make
the statement that in a polis or state, "which", in his words "is but an artificial man...
the sovereignty is an artificial soul." (Hobbes 1996, 7, emphasis in original)

Tying it up with capitalism: the nationalist perspective
This is where nationalism is an interesting phenomenon of modernity; it is exactly such
a valuation, a claim, a metaphysical valuation of the proper imagined community
which brings identity, dignity and truth to what it means to be a human being and
member of a nation and grounds the idea of sovereignty in the people and nation.

The modern citizen is always a national citizen: it is inscribed into the political
community through birth⁴. Hence our time’s immense problems with realizing human
rights of refugees and similar persons - they break the continuity between
nationality/birth and citizenship, thus their rights are not inscribed in any specific

⁴Nation’s etymology is nascer - birth.
polity. However, the meaning of nationalism is also always open for interpretation and thus multiple particular nationalisms exist. Democracy rests per definition on some conception of a nation, or at a bare minimum a people\(^5\), but who that people is, and thus the citizen that makes up the political community must always be negotiated. In this sense, both modern democracies and dictatorships have the same root in the idea of a people, as both Michael Mann(Mann 2005) and Liah Greenfeld(Greenfeld 2006, 195) point out - the modern dictatorship manifests and represents the supreme will of the people which is interpreted by an elite political group claiming insight in this will or national interest. In the last instance, the state of exception is the hinge on which this potentiality (the image of the nation) realizes or forces itself into actuality, a mechanism which is present in both the dictatorship and democracy - it is an inherent logic of the political as analyzed by Agamben. According to Liah Greenfeld, the emergence of capitalism and some forms of nationalisms are deeply intertwined. Capitalism within this framework is thus a part of the nationalist image - which is the place of labor relations, capitalist enterprise and growth within the national idea. Greenfeld in her *The Spirit of Capitalism*, inspired by Weber's famous work, uses in her analysis not Protestantism, but nationalism as the social phenomenon which could create an ethos and cultural consciousness able to reorient social action towards sustained growth.

Weber famously posited, in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, that Protestantism, and specifically the idea of pre-destination and calling in Calvinism could be a system of thought capable of redirecting human action and desires towards economic growth. The thesis that Protestantism had this function has remained controversial (and arguably refuted), but for Greenfeld "to prove Weber wrong on this point was to prove him wrong on a relatively minor point of his theory, the essence of which consisted in the claim that the emergence of modern economy presupposed - that is, could not have occurred without - a new set of motivations and a new system of ethics." (Greenfeld 2001, 16) Capitalism still needs to infuse the inanimate world around it (that is, the conditions for economic growth, such as infrastructure, capable

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\(^5\)The etymology of democracy is demos - people.
technology, and so on) with its spirit, to orient people's desires and actions towards exploiting and making use of these conditions, not just for short-term profit and exploitation, to put food on the table and live comfortably, but for rationalized, calculated, sustained growth - that is, enter the race of economic competition for its own sake.

To illustrate the notion of the spirit of capitalism in its purest form Weber refers to a piece of writing of Benjamin Franklin. Franklin introduces with a core capitalist concept, imploring the reader to "Remember" the capitalist adage "that time is money." (Quoted in Weber 1995, 26) Franklin proceeds to reduce all action to a calculation of profit-maximization - that is, as money accumulation as the sole goal and value of ethical behavior. It is an almost ascetic call to forego other pleasures, disconnected from any other valuation of conduct where even honesty is reduced to a mechanism of credit and calculation of profit-maximization. Capital accumulation becomes an ethos in this distillation of the spirit of capitalism, where "not only an instruction for living" is preached, according to Weber, "but a peculiar 'ethic'", whose transgression is not just foolish, but "a form of neglect of duty." (Weber 1995, 28) What is espoused is an ethos, a modern capitalist one. Capitalist accumulation becomes its own goal in such a fundamental sense it ignores the accumulator's happiness or utility "and appears as something rather irrational." (Weber 1995, 29). Capitalist accumulation becomes so rationalized that it disconnects itself from being a means to an end (using money to satisfy other needs), and thus becomes irrational. It is the origin of this peculiar (ideal) form of (Western) capitalism, an ethos as a way of life which appears somewhat normal to us but had been "condemned as an expression of the lowest sort of greed and an abject way of thought" in ancient and medieval time, according to Weber, that he is interested in explaining (Weber 1995, 31-32).

What is of interest is how certain actions, desires, and behaviors are seen as meaningful and valued in a certain way socially: from seeing merchants or bankers and their strive for money as greedy usurers exploiting other people's toil and thus

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6The translation is that of Talcott Parsons, but the page number refers to the Danish edition as the only English version I was able to obtain of Weber's study was an online version without page numbers.
investing these professions with low status in the social hierarchy, to that of economic gain as the fundamental goal of human action and way of life, thus investing it with status and dignity earlier reserved for martial occupations or hereditary status. According to Greenfeld, the modern economic paradigm as the centerpiece of social scientific research and interpretations of our reality

"remains dominant - among other reasons, because it corresponds so well to the preeminence of the economic sphere in the lives of modern Western societies... [They] regard prosperity as the cause of happiness, and economic development as the foundation of all other social processes - an unmitigated good, the necessary condition of a just society. We came to believe that if only a certain satisfactory level of economic development were achieved, all else would follow automatically, thereby making economic development the focus of our care and concern... One hundred and fifty years ago this was a revolutionary view... Economists and economic historians discuss endlessly the reasons for the relative prosperity of nations, for their success or failure in the industrial race, but they do not ask why such a race exists at all and why nations should want to enter it. This they regard as self-evident. But there is nothing self-evident about it. In most historical societies, economic activities held the place occupied by classes which participated in them - the bottom of the social ladder and value hierarchy. They did not connote status and therefore did not attract talent." (Greenfeld 2001, 5)

But instead of Protestantism as the system of thought which can animate the spirit of capitalism, Greenfeld proposes that nationalism can perform such a function. "At the core of this social consciousness [nationalism]", according to Greenfeld, "lies a compelling, inclusive image of society, referred to as the 'nation,' an image of a sovereign community of fundamentally equal members. National consciousness is inherently democratic: egalitarianism represents the essential principle of the social
organization it implies, and popular sovereignty its essential political principle."
(Greenfeld 2001, 2) But just as Weber defines capitalism in a very minimal way; free
labor, a core of rationalization of profit gain and its calculated reinvestment for more
profit, but interacting in different contexts to create different "capitalisms" with
different specific social meanings, so does Greenfeld maintain only that nationalisms
are cultural phenomena which take different forms, shapes, and meanings according
to social contexts and histories shaping them in different ways. The image of the
nation, its sovereignty, and who can claim to represent it can be interpreted in
different ways, giving rise to different kinds of nationalisms. Nonetheless, at the basis
of nationalism still lies the principle and idea of an inclusive community of equal
members - and thus of free labor - and a possibility for social advancement which is
not rooted in estate structures, hereditary tradition, or similar rigid social structures,
along with conferring on the member of the nation a dignity and respect due to
membership, which was earlier restricted to more elite classes. The inclusiveness
reorganized the fundamental status hierarchy, and thus "nationality elevated every
member of the community which it made sovereign. It guaranteed status. National
identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity." (Greenfeld 1992, 48, emphasis in
original) In this quest for dignity and status, capitalism could suddenly become
redefined and work as a parameter of competition depending on national ideology.
Nationalism always has to be defined in its specific context, "for a nation is first and
foremost an embodiment of an ideology. There are no 'dormant' nations which
awaken to the sense of their nationality existing due to some objective unity; rather,
invention and imposition of national identity lead people to believe that they are
indeed united and as a result to become united; it is national identity which often
weaves disparate populations into one." (Greenfeld 1992, 402) This should remind one
eerily of the empty space of politics which the state of exception tries to manifest.
Hence, in some forms of nationalism (starting with the British one), capitalism could
hold a centerpiece for international competition - becoming more wealthy through
industry than your competitors, and thus elevating the status of money-making and
profit-seeking from greed to the benefit of the Commonwealth, and incentivize its
rationalization and institutionalization. Accumulation of wealth was thus not just a personal activity, but by increasing the Commonwealth's capacities and overall wealth and prestige within the international community, the accumulation of wealth became a patriotic activity, and thus provided the individual with prestige and legitimacy instead of an image of greed. According to Greenfeld, "[e]quality became the standard for one's social position and aspirations. Theoretically, one was equal to all other members of society and measured oneself against them. In practice, this implied desire for parity only with those who were 'more equal' than the others and, as a result, a constant race, justified and spurred on by the supreme national ideal, for social superiority." (Greenfeld 2001, 366) The goalpost of this race was growth. Hence the capitalist race of growth and profit-seeking had taken off, but within the nation, with internal competition between citizens, and among those nations whose nationalism was defined by capital accumulation as a parameter for prestige. Some forms of nationalism can then take the place which Protestantism held in Weber's study as a possible animator of the capitalist spirit. Accordingly "[t]he impact of nationalism in the economic sphere is felt most where economic issues are interwoven with political and ideological ones. Nationalism affects economic behavior insofar as it creates a certain ethic (in this sense it is not different from Protestant or any other religious ethic, and similarly to the economic effects of dissimilar religious ethics, economic effects of various nationalisms differ); it affects attitudes toward money and money-making, toward various occupations, thereby determining the strengths and weaknesses of particular economies." (Greenfeld 1992, 489)

As reflective individuals living in complex societies, humans, according to Greenfeld, cannot rely on pure instinct for survival. The human being has to learn to live in the society which it inhabits, and must thus adapt and create a form of blueprint in order to function in the particular society, to give the human being direction, meaning, and function so it can navigate in the given society and its given concept of social order. The blueprint can largely be seen as ones identity: how the image of society is and
one's place in it (Greenfeld 1992, 18-19). Nationalism is just one such blueprint for action and meaning orienting the individual towards certain meanings, desires, occupations, ideals, and how to evaluate and reward actions and imbue them with status. One way in which these blueprints change is visible in the semantics of vocabulary. The word "nation" is the foremost example of this, changing its meaning from a group of foreigners from the same geographical region. When the medieval universities lodged persons of same origin together, it started to mean a community of opinion, as geographical origin and opinion started to overlap. This in turn started to imply nation as a social elite. That social elite, starting in England, in turn became synonymous with the entire population and nation took on meanings of a sovereign people, which in turn, in meeting other countries and peoples, became understood as a unique people (Greenfeld 1992, 4-12). A similar phenomenon is seen in Indonesia with the word merdeka: originating from Sanskrit and entering Javanese texts around the tenth century, it meant an illustrious, wise, eminent man. The meaning changed to imply a free man. In a society of bonded labor, a free man was one who commanded, was rich, and eminent. Nationalist discourse picked up the word and transformed it into free and independent, including personal and political freedom. Sukarno would employ it in most of his speeches, talking of Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia) (Taylor 2003, 304-305). The reason for this being an important shift is that it also connotes the dignity and eminence implied in its historical meaning, a dignity now conferred onto all Indonesians qua Indonesian, not just the social elite. Adapting to new contexts and employed in a changing society, the word is reinterpreted and adapted to a new (or desired) social reality. The word reflects changes and modulates the blueprints of society, both as a conscious act of appropriating the word, but also less conscious as the word's new meanings start to become its regular meaning. The blueprints of society change, and this is registered in the semantic changes of the words (here again, we see the proximity of language and politics, representation of the true meaning and its actuality).

Tying this up with the thought of Agamben, the state of exception becomes an attempt to reorient polity towards certain goals that are believed to be the nation's" true" (but
always presupposed) identity or calling, to enforce a certain way of life, institute a certain ethos which cannot be instituted otherwise - to enforce specific blueprints or put them into being. To weld together a nation which is also a certain vision and valuation of what that nation is and its place, and thus its citizens place, in the world. Not only are all three cases under consideration cases of rising nationalisms and their troubles of welding together disparate peoples and territories into one unity. They are also attempts of modernization, to order society towards a "capitalist" ethos, that is, orienting the calculations of state, and by extension its citizens towards sustained growth as good in itself and a parameter for competition and comparison with other nations. It is here important for this thesis to distinguish between development and self-sustained growth. Development merely implies the construction of a certain infrastructure, making certain services available, exploiting natural resources and so on, an activity which is often state-led or directed and financed from outside the nation. But fundamentally it merely implies exploiting and creating a certain set of infrastructural and natural resources to raise the country to a minimal level of prosperity (although it is expected that the growth of that prosperity will automatically continue). Sustained growth, on the other hand, implies a certain ethic, to not just develop according to an already set blueprint for developing society and exploiting infrastructure and resources, but to continuously go above and beyond the merely existing. To not just raise the prosperity level towards a certain standard, but to renounce any form of satisfaction. Self-sustained growth is thus not just a quantitative difference to mere development, it is qualitatively different. Economists often use the metaphor of "economic take-off", which is when a society starts utilizing its material possibilities, often after a certain amount of development, and the economy suddenly "takes off", like a plane (which also gives the image of a chart where, like the trajectory of a plane taking off, the BNP of a country rises explosively). What Greenfeld points to in this metaphor is that one thing is the physical reality of the airplane, which can be created and developed by engineers, and follows the laws of physics. It needs a pilot to actually animate it and make it take off. And this is a question of intent and will, not just a certain set of physical preconditions(Greenfeld 2001, 9). This is what is meant by
the spirit of capitalism: the will to animate and search for rationalized, continued, self-sustained growth. It is here important to note that nationalism is not necessarily the factor creating this spirit. It is merely a factor, and as such will be investigated in this paper.

The United States of America

The American society, considered the cradle of modern democracy amidst the monarchical absolutism of Europe, could not resolve its conflict but by force. These experiences give a unique insight into the connection implied in the theoretical framework between democracy, nationalism, authoritarianism and capitalism and to understand the limitations of democratic resolution, and its relationship to the capitalist ethos. Lincoln, during the American Civil War, appropriated powers that were beyond his peacetime powers and at odds with the Constitution, legitimized with reference to the exceptionality of the situation. In the prelude to the American Civil War he faced a dilemma: shall he let the Southern states secede, setting a delicate precedent for the Union in future controversial elections and decisions, or shall he rein them in by force and preserve the Union? The Constitution is unclear on the possibility for secession, and for that fact alone secession will ironically be a contestable issue where secession can be threatened; legalities are of little help to Lincoln. The dilemma, however, shows something peculiar about democracy: democratic issues that cannot be resolved by democratic means, where legalities become an indistinguishable grey zone between law and power. The United States, at the time a beacon of liberty and democracy (provided the color of your skin was white and your sex was male), with powers constitutionally shared between two chambers in congress, the presidency, and a supreme court, would decide the question of secession not by democratic means, but by armed conflict from 1861 to 1865.

Not only did Lincoln end up preserving the Union. With wartime powers he abolished slavery in the Southern states, transferring their status from the dimension of property to that of citizenship, a measure he did not believe the Constitution allowed him in
peacetime. This secessionist impulse, however, was present since the very inception of the United States of America when they separated from the British. There had always been a tension between the federal government and the rights of the states. What was the place of the federal government in relation to the states, which were themselves in principle representative of the popular sovereignty? This question had haunted the republic since its inception as seen by the political battle of the founding fathers between Federalists and Jeffersonians (Wood 2009, 95-173). In this perspective the secessionist impulse was part of the constitution of the American federal state and the status of the federal government was ambiguous: somewhat less than a nation yet more than just a compact of several states in alliance. One could easily have imagined an America where multiple American nations were born. However, according to Greenfeld, this secessionist impulse was not only part of the constitutional design, but was an integral part of the nationalism inherited from England (whose values the constitutional design reflected).

The inheritance of nationalism
According to Greenfeld, nationalism appeared in England in the 16th century and slowly took root in all strata of society. The decisive symbolic break she references in her book Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity is the trial of Sir Thomas More, author of Utopia, and "insisting to the last on the unity of Christendom." (Greenfeld 1992, 29) He refused to acknowledge Henry VIII as the head of the English Church, he still believed the Papacy's authority supreme. His identity was Christian and all other parts of his identity (subject of the English king, birthplace, office, e.t.c.) was incidental to this. But Greenfeld points out that his denial of the king’s supremacy was not based purely on dogma, but that it was a denial of what to him was plainly evident: the unity of the indivisible Christendom - which could not be divided into realms claiming their own supremacy in ecclesiastic matters. More's perspective "was that of a pre-nationalist era." (Greenfeld 1992, 30) His judges, however, were transformed. Being Englishmen for them was no longer incidental to that of being a Christian. It was the
main the basis of their allegiance and identity. Found guilty of treason this insistence on Christian unity cost More his head in 1535.

By 1600, according to Greenfeld, "the existence in England of a national consciousness and identity, and as a result, of a new geo-political entity, a nation, was a fact." (Greenfeld 1992, 30) At the core of this English nationalism was the idea of a nation as a community of equal individuals. It was based on humanist principles which held the belief of man "as an active, essentially rational being. Reason was the defining characteristic of humanity. Its possession, namely the ability to consider and choose between alternatives, entitled one to decide what was best for oneself and was the basis for the recognition of the autonomy of the individual conscience and the principle of civic liberty." (Greenfeld 1992, 30) This principle also implied, since men were equal in this regard, right to participation in collective decisions and thus political participation and active membership in the political community. The concept of nation implied a basic respect for the individual qua the equality of human rationality, and this basic humanity entitled one to the membership of a nation. In the English nationalism "the nation was a community of people realizing their nationality; the association of such a community with particular geo-political boundaries was secondary." (Greenfeld 1992, 31) This meant that the English nationalism was first and foremost a commitment to an ideal of what a human being was believed to be, a respect for its dignity and principled individualism. A commitment to an ideal of rational self-governance, and less to a specific geographical and biological specification (the reverence of blood and soil which many nationalisms adhere to) - those particularities were just where it happened to be realized: England. It was a civic conception of nationalism, the ideal was primary, the location secondary. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury summarized this sentiment of nationalism:

"Of all human Affections, the noblest and most becoming human nature, is that of love to one's country. This ... will easily be allowed by all men, who have really a Country, and are of the number of
those who may be called a People, as enjoying the happiness of a real
corstitution and polity, by which they are free and independent... A
multitude held together by force, though under one and the same
head, is not properly united: nor does such a body make a people. It
is the social league, confederacy, and mutual concert, founded in
some common good or interest, which joins the members of a
community, and makes a People one. Absolute Power annuls the
publick; and where there is no publick, or constitution, there is in
reality no mother-Country, or Nation... No people who owed so much
to a constitution, and so little to a soil or climate, were ever known so
indifferent towards one, and so passionately fond of the other... It
may therefore be esteemed no better than a mere subterfuge of
narrow minds to assign this natural passion for society and a country,
to such a relation as that of a mere fungus or common excrescence,
to its parent-mould, or nursing dunghill." (Quoted in Greenfeld 1992,
399-400)

The nationalism of England, cherishing the ideals in the abstract as Shaftesbury so
efluently states, was, in principle, revolutionary until those unattainable ideals were
realized.

This idealistic nationalism arrived in America already with the Mayflower. The English
settlers, according to Greenfeld, "necessarily conceived of the community to which
they belonged to as a nation; the idea of the nation was an American inheritance.
National identity in America thus preceded the formation not only of the specific
American identity (the American sense of uniqueness), but of the institutional
framework of the American nation, and even of the national territory" (Greenfeld
1992, 402). Arriving in America, a new world in the most literal sense of the word, with
no existing social fabric and structures waiting to be transformed by the nationalist
ideology, but starting anew in a land where even the limits of the territory were
unknown made it possible to create a social fabric based upon this nationalist ideology
with minimal obstruction. There were no existing traditional social structures and institutions which the nationalist ideology had to wrestle and compromise, except what little the settlers brought with them from England. The ideology could be infused in all the nascent structures and institutions in this brave New England, from church organization to political structure. In most societies when nationalist ideas emerge, the nationalist idea itself is "transformed by the counter-pressure of institutions and traditions that were the legacy of their pre-national past. The specificity of the American case lay in that the idea of the nation, nationality as such, although undoubtedly also modified by the independently emerging reality, was a much more potent factor in the formation of the national society." (Greenfeld 1992, 402-403) The express English nationalist character of the settlers was nostalgically expressed - contrary to the settlements of Latin America - in their naming of localities: New England, Cambridge, the Carolinas, Georgia. The list goes on, underscoring the sense of identity and sameness with the English fabric transplanted to a new world. They may not inhabit the same soil, but they were devoted to the same ideals (coupled with the express religious devotion of the puritans, especially in New England, commemorated with such names as Providence, Bethlehem, New Haven - referencing either the Holy Land or biblical hopes). The territorial referent of this nationalism was uncertain though, just as the size of the new landmass was, and the geo-political question, what the referent of the American loyalty was, was not settled completely until after the Civil War.

The birth of a (new) nation
During the 18th century, this New England changed. From being the settlements of pliant subjects of the English king in both identity and legal status - not just a New England removed by a vast sea from old England - it transformed into a country and a nation of its own. America acquired a local pride due to the hardships of the early settlements and their perceived difference from the rest of England. Although they still considered themselves Englishmen, just as local patriotism can be expressed by the attachment to the local soccer team, yet this does not interfere with the attachment to
the national team. The Americans took pride in their unique equality and dignity, as Benjamin Franklin noted in *Information to Those Who Would Remove to America*:

"The people have a saying, that God Almighty is himself a mechanic... and he is respected and admired more for the variety, ingenuity, and the utility of his handiworks, than for the antiquity of his family...

According to these opinions of the Americans, one of them would think himself more obliged to a genealogist, who could prove for him that his ancestors and relations for ten generations had been ploughmen, smiths, carpenters... and consequently that they were useful members of society, than if he could only prove that they were gentlemen... living idly on the labor of others." (Quoted in Greenfeld 1992, 408)

America was the realization of the English ideal of equality and merit instead of hereditary privilege. Note also how Franklin connotes all the productive occupations with status and dignity; being productive and creating wealth is dignifying and patriotic, the capitalist ethos is coupled with patriotism. Comparing America to England, likely the most free and equal country in Europe at the time, Crevecoeur considered what would go on in the mind of a visiting Englishman in *Letters from an American Farmer*:

"He must greatly rejoice that he lived to see this fair country discovered and settled; he must necessarily feel a share of national pride [saying to himself], ‘This is the work of my countrymen’... Here he sees the industry of his native country displayed in anew manner... It is not composed, as in Europe, of great lords who possess everything, and of a herd of people who have nothing. Here are no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very
visible one, no great manufactures employing thousands, no great refinements of luxury. The rich and the poor are not so far removed from each other as they are in Europe... Lawyer or merchant are the fairest of titles our towns afford; that if a farmer is the only appellation of the rural inhabitants of our country... We have no princes for whom we toil, starve, and bleed; we are the most perfect society now existing in the world." (Quoted in Greenfeld 1992, 409)

America was the realization of the English national ideal, freed from the traditional obstructions of old institutions and structures. Man was self-governing, self-employing, self-sufficient and thus able to enter into the politic community on equal terms. In this sense, America was more English than England, America made England real.

This is why the continued connection to England started to become intolerable: the Americans did not, at first, feel themselves as different to the English. They considered themselves more English than the English, in the realization of their ideals, and thus sought to realize their goal of (every individual's) self-determination, which they felt being hindered by parliament and crown. Hence the familiar slogan of the American Revolution of no taxation without representation. Two months after the Battle of Bunker Hill, Thomas Jefferson looked "with fondness toward the reconciliation with Great Britain" and just months before the Declaration of Independence the Continental Congress held that it would not want to "dissolve that union which has so long and so happily subsisted between American colonies and the mother country." (Quoted in Greenfeld 1992, 412). The attachment and ideal of a nation as the abstract compact of sovereign individuals with guaranteed rights and liberties meant that in principle every union that was in violation of the principles of liberty would be non-nationalist: resistance to this violation of the nationalism became a duty. Violations of liberty were a betrayal of the nation. Thus it was the British authorities who, from an American viewpoint, usurped and betrayed the nation, violating the Americans’ rights as citizens and restricted their liberty and participation, and the emphasis on the
restoration of these rights were "the most characteristic feature of the official
declarations, petitions, and resolutions of the period immediately preceding
independence." (Greenfeld 1992, 415) . Thus to restore the national values of England,
America, ironically, had to separate from the mother country - and this desire for
separation was in every way legitimate according to the self-same nationalism.
This separation created new problems however. The new nation was only in its
embryonic form. What were to be its geo-political status? Did it give birth to thirteen
new nations, or should they form a union? And if union was sought, what were its
limits vis-a-vis the self-governance of the individual states? With Americans no longer
considering them so much English, they made liberty co-terminus with being human.
They universalized liberty as a human, and not just American or English, right, as
illustrated by the Declaration of Independence. "Universal self-government meant the
self-government - that is, the independence - of each individual (Christian European)
man, and this national commitment to the liberty of every individual man presented a
formidable obstacle for the creation of a single American nation. It was not at all
obvious why there should be only one American nation. In principle, to carry the ideal
of self-government its logical conclusion, every individual constituted a nation in his
own right" (Greenfeld 1992, 423). The amount of colonial unity between the colonies
beyond mutual defense against the British and a love for liberty was questionable. This
tension was inherent in the nationalist ideology, as well as the institutional design of
states acceding to a union where final sovereignty was indeterminate, not to mention
the differences in social structure and political economy between the colonies. The
primacy of nation and union was only solidified with Union victory in the Civil War
when "these United States of America" were molded into "the United States of
America".

The Civil War - two nations in one
The tension between centralization and states' rights inherent in the framework was in
politics battled out between the Federalists and Jeffersonians during the early 19th
century and kept being a decisive problem of the political framework. But how could a
nation born from a commitment to liberty, rights, and democracy decide to adjudicate a democratic question by violence?

By the time of war the United States had effectively evolved into two diverging dominant regions: a Northern region of increasing manufacture, farming, shipping, trade, and industrialization, and where slavery was largely a thing of the past, and a Southern region of cotton plantations, slavery, and a white yeomanry. The North was slowly becoming urbanized, the South was not, the population was larger in the North and its growth faster, and production of canal and railroad infrastructure raced ahead in the North compared to the South (McPherson 1990, 91). Southern agricultural production remained labor-intensive, whereas the North was becoming increasingly more capital-intensive and mechanized (McPherson 1996, 13) The South’s Plantation Belt, where planters were engaged in slave-intensive production of cotton and tobacco for the world market, contained most of the wealth, most of the slaves, and the planters who dominated the Southern society through this wealth and political influence. In many ways, the South resembled an aristocracy cherishing many of the values of the founding fathers: politics was a gentleman’s game, and only gentlemen with sufficient leisure, learning, honor, and civilization should govern it (McPherson 1990, 56) Martial values were also more prevalent in the South testified by the higher frequency of military academies, officers, duels, and volunteers in the Mexican War. Conversely, literacy was less common, the population less educated overall, and fewer intellectuals were of Southern origin (McPherson 1996, 17-19). The decentralized form of government and low taxation left the Southern yeoman regions largely to organize their own affairs and remain independent and self-sufficient (Foner 2002, 12-13). This yeomanry exhibited a culture of white supremacy linked to their independence. Echoing Jefferson, the essence of liberty was independence. The Northern system of wage labor was a system of dependence and wage slavery; only the self-sufficient could truly be free and take part in republican government - and freeing the slaves would denigrate Southern independent agriculture to that of black labor, while the white factory workers in the North were equal to plantation slaves (McPherson 1990,
This was in Southern eyes an unworthy condition for the white man; white men and women reduced to the slave of the employer and dependant on the wage. Slavery served as a basis for white privilege; the white yeoman was equal to the planter in the sense they were both white and part of the “ruling caste” with the possibility of themselves becoming future slave-owners, thus providing him with a sense of dignity and pride in his work and status within the community (McPherson 1990, 199). In the North the interpretation of slavery was the opposite, namely that slavery reduced and degraded all labor to slave labor (McPherson 1990, 39; 55; 199).

According to the Northern ideology of enterprise, the wage situation need only be temporary. By hard work in a growing economy one could himself become an employer, or, at the very least, improve his condition considerably (McPherson 1990, 28). In the Northern analysis, the South was decadent and lazy and according to one anti-slavery writer, the effect of slavery was "to deaden in every class of society that spirit of industry essential to the increase in public wealth." (Foner 1995, 51, emphasis in original)

In the 1780s, Jefferson praised farmers as the “peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue”, and warned against the industrial classes as “sores on the body politic.” (McPherson 1996, 14) This sentiment was still common in the South, as a leader echoed it in 1860: “We want no manufactures; we desire no trading, no mechanical or manufacturing classes.” (McPherson 1996, 14) The North was becoming a modern, industrialized region of manufacture, meritocratic in disposition, of free labor ideology who considered the idleness of plantation life the enemy of enterprise and education, and a teeming religious revival provided the breeding ground for many abolitionists who considered slavery a moral evil. The South considered the North vulgar, greedy, and a threat to their way of life (McPherson 1990, 99). Two quotes makes this case in point: A Georgian native, who had attended Princeton and Harvard claimed that “In this country has arisen two races [Northerners and Southerners] which, although claiming a common parentage, have been so entirely separated by climate, by morals, by religion, and by estimates so totally opposite to all that
constitutes honor, truth, and manliness, that they cannot longer exist under the same government.” One Northerner conversely held that the South was “the foe to Northern Industry – to our mines, our manufactures, and our commerce... She is the foe to our institutions – to our democratic politics in the State, our democratic culture in the school, our democratic work in the community, our democratic equality in the family.” (McPherson 1996, 8-9)This rift had already separated most church denominations into Northern and Southern versions (McPherson 1990, 40). The North was infused with the capitalist ethos and tied it up with the direction of the nation and its democracy, the South kept a traditional world-view of hierarchy, non-free labor, and politics as a preserve of the privileged and capable.

Occasionally, this tension erupted into violence, and the reaction to the violence is informative. In 1856, during the toxic debates on the expansion of slavery, Senator Charles Sumner had insulted the cousin of representative Preston Brooks and Southern honor in a Senate speech denouncing the expansion of slavery. Brooks retorted by severely battering Sumner with his cane in the Senate chamber until the cane broke. This was obviously vilified in the North and proof of the savagery of slaveholders. The South sent Brooks more canes (McPherson 1990, 150-152).

Violence was not the sole prerogative of the South. In 1860, John Brown, intending to abolish slavery through violent means, gathered together a small band of volunteers and proceeded to assault the federal armory at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in the hope of rallying nearby slaves to his cause, arm an insurgency, and force the issue of slavery upon authorities by spilling white blood. The assault was a failure and John Brown was hanged. But his behavior during the trial transformed the image of him and his actions in the North from a “well-intended” yet “misguided and mad enterprise” as one antislavery newspaper put it into that of a hero or martyr, noble in aim and sacrifice but failure in judgment(McPherson 1990, 208). Obviously this distinction between means and ends was unimportant to the Southerners who saw it as a Northern applaud to fanatical violence, treason, and rebellion against their institution and nation (McPherson 1990, 202-211).
These acts of violence clearly illustrate the glaring polarizing tensions in American society and the inability of the institutions of democracy to adequately deal with it (nothing testifies to this better than violence erupting inside the halls of democratic discourse). Within a year it would escalate into a war that cost more American lives than all of America’s other wars combined (McPherson 1996, 38).

**Culmination**

With the election of Lincoln in 1860, the Southern states feared for their peculiar institution’s future prospects when submitted to the new administration. The solution? To secede. Lincoln faced what Tocqueville, the famous commentator on American democracy, in 1835 considered the “most fatal of all defects [...] inherent in the federal system, [that] is the relative weakness of the government of the Union. The principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty. [...] If all the citizens of the state were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the Union, the Federal government would vainly attempt to subdue them individually; they would instinctively unite in a common defense and would find an organization already prepared for them in the sovereignty that their state is allowed to enjoy.” (Tocqueville, Book one, chapter 8, part 5) Tocqueville largely commented on it as a practical problem (of force), but the fundamental problem is clearly elucidated: the sovereignty is divided, which is exactly a reflection of the American nationalism. The fundamental question of the legality of secession cannot easily be answered, but many Southerners either claimed prior sovereignty in the state before entering the Union, and thus a fundamental sovereignty that could never be eliminated, or claiming right of revolution against outside oppression, the most fundamental right when faced with oppressive government. Thus it was their “motive of defending and protecting the rights... which our fathers bequeathed to us” that compelled them, said Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and to “renew such sacrifices as our fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty.” (Quoted in McPherson 1990, 241) They acted out their nationalism, just as their ancestors had done against the British. But if states could secede when confronted with an unfavorable decision (an election
of a president at that), how could the Constitution and democratic government succeed in the aim of making a “more perfect union”? Lincoln reasoned that the Constitution was based on perpetuity, and this was “the fundamental law of all governments.” (Quoted in Belz 1969, 8) Hence the Constitution could not dissolve itself and “no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union.” (Lincoln, quoted in Belz1969, 9) If secession came to take precedence what would keep other disaffected sections from seceding in the future? The Americans “must settle this question now,” said Lincoln, “whether in a free government the minority have the right to break up the government whenever they choose. If we fail it will go far to prove the incapability of the people to govern themselves.” (McPherson 1996, 210) It was a paradoxical position, where the Southern ethos is not fit to govern themselves but must be forced into the Union, or it would show that people would be unfit to govern themselves. It hits the fundamental problem of democracy and the state of exception - it requires a specific ethos and world view that must be forced.

It was thus possible for both sides to earnestly claim legitimacy of belligerence on the background of constitutionalism, freedom, and rights (and thus committing to largely the same American nationalism, yet with slightly different interpretations). The problem, however, cannot be adjudicated within the legal and democratic framework. The basic legality is in question, and all justifications are extra-legal (consider how Lincoln presupposes the fundamentality of perpetuity, just as Davis invokes liberty, the founding fathers and the right of revolution), yet tries to maintain the relation as some form of legality. It very clearly invokes the sovereign problem of in the final instance being the arbiter of where the law is valid – in principle a democratic negotiation would let the South secede (they voted for secession), yet it would be the doom of the democratic experiment. The mere question of the conflict at hand – did the South have a right to secede – unveils this fundamental aporia of any kind of democratic law and the need for the sovereign logic; it cannot be adjudicated whether the law is valid but must be decided upon in order for the system to function. If they did not legally possess the right, they were forced into the Union not by democratic mandate of the
people, but by the force of the constitution and the entire concept of self-government could be questioned. If they were legally allowed, it would throw the entire meaning and power of the Union into flux and deprive it of its authoritative force: whenever political decisions are disagreed upon one simply secedes from the Union, leaving the Union with no actual authoritative power of its policies. Finally, the argument that the South were perhaps not legally allowed to secede, they nonetheless could claim the right of revolution, a prior, even more fundamental right or law than the constitution (just as many abolitionists claimed the divinely endowed rights of individual liberty were higher than even the constitution). Within this framework, or what we can call the limits of what is legal, appeals to what is the foundation of law becomes natural. Thus it was possible for both Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln to earnestly appeal to freedom and the interpretation of the constitution. Not surprisingly the issue was settled with arms. The issue shifted from a question of slavery to a question of constitutionality; states’ rights versus federal rights where both parties claim the virtue of fighting for freedom and democratic government. The slave did not figure in this as soon as secession was a reality; Lincoln’s early war aim was only to preserve the Union and not let the American democratic experiment fail, thus keeping slavery intact in the states where it existed. Ironically, the South, while within the nationalist thinking had the right of self-governance, the self-governing ethos had to conform to certain basic principles, principles which Lincoln, and the war, in the end decided were invalid.

Yet slavery - or rather labor relations, where the slave figured as the central nexus in which all social relations derived or fought for meaning - was the basis for the conflict. It was not a liberation of the slave for the sake of the black man, it was an attempt to impose a world where the dignity of labor and enterprise was manifest. The existence of slavery ridiculed and made a mockery of the toils of the Northern working man, who took pride and dignity in his hard work, and thus as a productive member of the political community of equals. Slavery equaled his hard work with the work of a slave, denying him the status and dignity he thought becoming of a working man. On the
other hand, the Southern plantation elite considered the Northern state of affairs unbecoming for civilized men of leisure. The slave occupies a peculiar position in the Civil War. The slave is the manifestation of that which sparks the conflict and what is being fought for, yet occupies no central place. Lincoln did not consider abolition a war aim until more than a year into the war. The war was first and foremost a question of states’ rights: did the South have the legal right to secede, and if it did, was this the end of the democratic experiment? This was a white man’s war of constitutional problems and the meaning of his labor and national dignity. That said, secession would be a non-issue without slavery – slavery was the heart of the war, but in a peculiar, indirect way. Everything being fought for was symbolized through the black slave: The meaning of freedom, property, and citizenship – the core values of each society was symbolized, conjoined and crisscrossed in the figure of the slave. The white Southerner without slaves who still had the dignity of being white, contrasted with the “white wage slave” without the dignity of independence and living like a slave, and the Northern conception that with the existence of slavery, the dignity of all labor was reduced to that of slave labor not to mention the blotch of slavery tarnishing the reputation of their nation of the free. The slave in this sense becomes not the protagonist of the war, but the stage on which the white man can play out the fight of the meaning of freedom, labor and American nationalism. Not for the black man’s sake and for humanitarian values (at least not primarily, most people had no love for the black man (McPherson 1990, 159)), but for the meaning and status of their own place: their own dignity and meaning of work, of freedom, of political status were all mirrored in the figure of the black slave – thus any change in the status of the black man would imply a change in the status of the white man. In short, the fundamental arrangement and interpretation of status in society are at stake in the figure of the black slave (not to mention the immense economic interests). Hence “in giving freedom to the slave,” Lincoln could say in his second annual message to Congress in December 1862, “we assure freedom to the free.” (Quoted in McPherson 1996, 209, emphasis by McPherson) This was partly a reference

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7 What would today be called the State of Union Address
to emancipation as a war measure, undermining the South’s labor force and preparing for black soldiers in the army, but the reference to the meaning of slavery for the meaning of the white man’s freedom is what makes it poignant. What Agamben makes possible with his thinking, is to conceptualize these meanings as phenomena which are entirely outside the democratic framework, yet are the reference which ground the juridical order. They in a sense fill the empty space of the democratic order’s outside. They are too fundamental in a sense to be organized and adjudicated within the democratic framework. Too much is at risk for the South and they decide to secede from the Union, the figure of the slaver is at odds with everything the North considers themselves to be – and the fact that the conflict is made manifest in the very clear physical figure of the slave (a human being) means it cannot be hidden or ignored. This was not the slaves trying to free themselves, nor was it, essentially a conflict to end slavery and integrate the black man into the political community; it was a white man’s conflict and renegotiation of the fundamental interpretation of the values of freedom, property and status which the political community was founded on. These issues which are beyond the capabilities of democratic resolution are the empty space of pure potentiality which the legal order must keep itself in relation to. It is here important to note, that structurally, the North and the South were almost mirror images of each other - even the constitution which the Confederate states adopted contained only minor differences to the American Constitution, such as entrenching slavery and underscoring the federal framework by giving more power to the individual states, thus entrenching states’ rights. When war broke out, nothing immediately changed within the structures of society⁸ - the same persons occupied the same posts within state infrastructure, went to work as normal and did their duties as normal. The infrastructure of governance stayed the same, from army to postal services and tax collection (which were the main duties of government). The only difference is that orders come from Richmond instead of Washington (where very few orders came already as the central power was quite weak). No other wars have had two countries look so much alike fight - and two democratic ones at that (Bensel 1990, 8

⁸ Due to the pressures of war on economy and society, the two societies would develop along different trajectories during the war (Bensel 1990).
It is exactly the interpretation of the empty space of politics that was at issue, the chain of reference to something outside, or beyond, the mere factual letter of the law; the meaning of freedom, natural law, or the constitution as the founding fathers intended it (which both combatants can interpret and appropriate in their own ways) was at stake. The chain of reference, however, must be cut somewhere and be decided upon, and it is this that was at stake in the conflict. The military measure of freeing the slaves can in this perspective be seen as an attempt to reorganize the Southern system, not by democratic means, but by force. Lincoln told an official of the Interior Department that “the character of the war will be changed. It will be one of subjugation... The [old] South is to be destroyed and replaced by new propositions and ideas.” (Quoted in McPherson 1990, 558) In this perspective it is telling that the emancipation of the slaves was decreed by Lincoln as commander-in-chief as a war measure, itself an ambiguous relation made possible through the state of exception. “I conceive”, Lincoln said, “that I may in an emergency do things on military grounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress.” (Quoted in McPherson 2009, 209) Elsewhere he stated that “as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy.” (Quoted in McPherson 2009, 209) A more forceful statement of the concept of the state of exception can hardly be conceived and Lincoln becomes the guarantor of the space in which the legal order can be valid, but in order to do this, he must first “organize” or “mold” this presupposed space into a more homogenous space where slavery is abolished and the interpretation of freedom and the legal order’s reference is uncontested.

**Concluding remarks**

The war can be seen as an attempt to create a nation as a specific manifestation of nationalism - the Northern states tried to reorganize the South to fit the mold of their nationalist vision and the status and dignity of labor and its relations within it. The North and South, from Independence to the Civil War, developed two different kinds of labor relation systems within the same formal institutions of democracy - this slowly
turned into a battle of antagonistic value systems which manifested themselves in two nationalisms, which became more and more entrenched. The most telling examples of how the South developed a nationalism antagonistic to the North and its rejection of its economic and capitalist values, is how it kept sending Confederate veterans to Congress until the early 20th century as a way maintaining their dignity and self-awareness as a nation different from, and to spite, Northern arrogance and capitalist society (Bensel 1990, 405-406). During the Civil War, the South managed to create an impressive system and capacity for industry, but when the Civil War leaders who organized and created these industries returned to civil life after the conflict, instead of using their gained knowledge, connection, prestige, organizational skills, and capital to create industrial enterprise, they went into professions traditionally linked with Southern values and occupations of prestige: college professors, plantation owners, e.t.c. Society could channel their most ambitious and talented individuals to industrial enterprise, but only in the interest of their nation. When their talents were no longer needed, they returned to prestigious occupations of the traditional South instead of entering industry (Thomas 2011, 213). In the North, instead, we see the rampant growth and industrialization that became the basis for modern America as an economic behemoth: the Gilded Age.

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9 The South can in this sense be said to be the aberration of the nationalist current of America as inherited from the British
India
In 1975, "for no reason at all", as the Nobel Laureate V.S. Naipaul put it, Indira Gandhi asked the President for permission to declare national emergency and suspend the constitution, and got it (Naipaul 2010, v). India, which had fought so hard and for so long against the British for their independence, had, at least for eighteen months, lost its democratic liberties to what appeared the whims of a dictatorial national heiress to the mechanism of the state of exception.

India achieved its independence in 1947 after 60 years of nationalist agitation. In its bid for independence as a nation, the country had to overcome multiple fault lines and multiple possible conflicts among its diverse communities: caste, religion, ethnicities, languages, and a multiplicity of independent princely states. India was considered a "cultural sphere", and not so much a specific country with a national community.

Before the British Empire no one had ruled the entire sub-continental triangle (Khilnani 2012, 18). The British Raj ruled it as a patchwork of different communities and princely principalities with their own relationship to the Raj. The Partition of India, creating the nations India and Pakistan, and the specter of further secessionist impulses and the unsolved problem of Kashmir are the ghosts haunting India and a testament to the many fault lines at work through the many distinctions and social divisions of the sub-continent. The nascent nationalist movement "fully recognized the multifaceted diversity of the Indian people. That India was not yet a developed or structured nation, but a nation-in-the-making, was accepted and made the basis of political and ideological work and agitation. It was fully grasped that the common subjection to colonial rule provided the material and emotional basis for nation-making and that one of the functions of the movement was to structure the nation through a common struggle against colonialism." (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 522) The extra social divisions of caste, religion, and language thus presented an immense task to create a national coherent unity on top of these communities and transgressing them. These issues continue to this day to present delicate questions of what it means to be an Indian, who the Indian is, and what communities belong where and with what duties and rights. Any understanding of India as a nation and its nationalism, however, must
start with the two main icons and vehicles for nationalist agitation and consciousness: The Indian National Congress and Gandhi.

**The nascent nationalism: The Indian National Congress**

Just like American nationalism, India’s nationalism was spawned by the British. But where Americans were born with a nationalism, India had to learn the idea of nationalism and adapt it to its own struggle. As Greenfeld points out, all nationalisms except the British (where it started), and the American (which was born with it), are reciprocate nationalisms, learned and adapted from the meeting with other nationalisms. India is no exception. Without British rule, the conception of a united India would probably be unlikely.

The story of Indian independence and nationalism is in large part the story of the party the Indian National Congress. In fact, it was not just a party, a party which could incorporate every idea, ideology and viewpoint. It was a movement (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 14). The Congress functioned as a parliament, advocating adult franchise and an egalitarian access to politics, which it conceived as decidedly secular. As such, it was bequeathed to them by the British, it took its roots in British ideas of liberty and was founded by a retired Englishman from the Indian Civil Service, Allan Octavian Hume, in 1885 (Khilnani 2012, 25). As the nationalist Gokhale pointed out: "No Indian could have started the Indian National Congress... if an Indian had... come forward to start such a movement embracing all India, the officials in India would not have allowed the movement to come into existence. If the founder of the Congress had not been a great Englishman and a distinguished ex-official, such was the distrust of political agitation in those days that the authorities would have at once found some way or other to suppress the movement."(Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 80-81)

Yet this was not the only way in which the National Congress had an English pedigree. Most of its members were educated in Britain and were either lawyers or journalists and the name was taken from the name of the American Congress to "connote an assembly of the people" (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 78). These educated, liberal individuals had come into contact with the ideas of the nation and modern liberalism through their educations in England and their profession (Khilnani 2012, 6). Arguably
their profession existed as a by-product of the modern nation state which they had learned and experienced through the British: the democratic conception of legitimacy and its relation to law in the profession of the lawyer, and the free press as the voice of the people.

The Congress realized the diversity of India and the complexity of the country. The formation of national unity could therefore not be done along the same lines as in Europe. For example, they institutionalized that no resolution could be passed that a majority of a religious group objected, and the location of Congress meetings would be shifted around the country each year (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 75). The Indian sub-continent was simply too vast an assemblage to easily adopt a form of nationalism - all nations must first "create" their nation and are thus first nations-in-the-making, but the Indian nation faced this in the most extreme degree. A fact which the British tried hard to exploit through 'divide and rule tactics', dividing India into different communities with different interests, for example by making separate electorates for minority groups in assemblies and the partitioning of Bengal (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 125; 142).

There was not an Indian nationalism, but rather a plurality of interpretations and visions of what Indian nationalism should be, all meeting and being debated within the confines of the Indian National Congress. A party which was not organized as a political program designed as specifically left or right, but encompassed multiple ideas and visions of politics. "Widely disparate levels of political militancy and varying economic approaches" were incorporated within one institution with one central goal - Indian nationalism as Indian self-determination (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 79). It could be said to be an "empty nationalism", where the methods of Western democratic discourse were used to debate different conceptions of nationalism. The Western democratic idea was the framework in which the idea of the nation was articulated, but the democratic idea was already borrowed, it was not, as such part and parcel of the nationalism even though Congress was determined to uphold it as a principle.

When India finally received its constitution in 1950, it was devised by twenty British-
educated lawyers and accepted by a body of roughly three hundred persons elected to the Constituent Assembly on restricted franchise, a body Gandhi thought not legitimately sovereign. It was a constitution "squarely in the best Western tradition: as one mortified nationalist in the Assembly lamented, 'We wanted music of Veena and Sitar, but here we have the music of an English band." (Khilnani 2012, 33-34). But the principles served mostly as function for political discourse, how politics should be conducted as a procedure, and was thus not anchored in a specific nationalism, as the previous quotation implies. It was more form than an expression of a cultural nationalism within India itself, and was thus devoid of content (although, principally secular, it managed to entrench caste as a standard division of Indian society, which we shall return to). The Congress managed to sow the seed of a democratic process of politics.

Democracy and liberalism was not articulated as an adherence to the idea of natural rights so important to Western liberalism, but to a principle of procedure. It could therefore not lie as the only basis of a nationalism. The actual formulation of nationalism always needed to be filled with actual content and different Congress members tried to push it towards their own desired direction. But as an institution the Indian National Congress's main function was to engender nationalist thought, the idea of an Indian nation, in the slowly emerging Indian consciousness, to spread and politicize the Indian sub-continent towards a national unity (it was the only pan-Indian institution and organization apart from the British Raj), and it was an institution that inculcated the idea of democratic politics as the legitimate form of politics and debate. "From the very earliest days", according to Sunil Khilnani, the Congress "claimed to speak for the nation and did so by stressing India's right to collective liberty... its demands were not for the equal rights of all individuals but that culturally Indians should be at liberty not to have to suffer the petty - and therefore all the more infuriating - slights of colonialism and that economically they should be free to enrich themselves. Liberty was understood not as an individual right but as a nation's collective right to self-determination. It is hardly surprising that the individualistic accent was muted: Indian society did have a place for the individual, but in the form of
the renouncer, a category relegated to the margins of society. Individuality as a way of social being was a precarious undertaking." (Khilnani 2012, 26) The idea of rights has stuck in India to the rights of collectives - perhaps as a residue of the vast assemblage of communities it had to incorporate and accommodate.

The most ardent nationalists had been through schooling in Britain or lived abroad in other nations. For example, during World War 1, the violently revolutionary Ghadar movement was mainly incited by Indians living abroad in Canada and the United States. They wanted to incite national sentiment and revolution, starting in Punjab, which the local Punjabis were largely indifferent to - and many Sikhs even helped out the authorities against the "fallen". For how could expats be respected as Indians and citizens in the United States or Canada if they were not even respected and free as Indians in their native country? (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 146-154) They had experienced what Greenfeld calls 'ressentiment', which is somewhat similar to the slights Khilnani mentions (Greenfeld 1992, 14-17). The life of Gandhi is a perfect example of this, and the experience manifested in his thought.

**The Gandhian Experience**

Mohandas Gandhi, later to be "Mahatma", the "Great Soul" of Indian Independence, was the most acute example of the experience of 'ressentiment' when he, as a young barrister in South Africa, experienced his difference and the slights of colonial racism. In South Africa he was intensely made aware of his Indianness, and thus used this to produce Indian nationalism as a reciprocal 'ressentiment' mechanism against Britishness. From a respected family and of high caste this experience of insult provoked his dignity (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 171). Furthermore, he had British education, yet it was not enough to become a respected member of society. As Gandhi himself put it: "Thus God laid the foundations of my life in South Africa and sowed the seed of the fight for national self-respect." (Gandhi 2001, 139) Gandhi saw his life as bound up with the Indian nation.
In South Africa he experienced how these distinctions from India blurred and he was reduced to an Indian as any other, regardless of status. He "laid stress on the necessity of forgetting all distinctions such as Hindus, Musalmans, Parsis, Christians, Gujaratis, Madrasis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Kachchhis, Surtis and so on. I suggested, in conclusion, the formation of an association to make representations to the authorities concerned in respect of the hardships of the Indian settlers, and offered to place at its disposal as much of my time and service as was possible." (Gandhi, autobiography, 126) Gandhi experiences Greenfeld's notion of 'ressentiment': Gandhi did not receive the status and dignity he thinks he deserves qua his character, education, heritage, and caste distinction, and in order to mobilize redress it is mobilized as an Indian mobilization for the general dignity of Indians. Only by raising the dignity of Indians as a whole can he receive the status he feels entitled to. But the problem, or the instigative motivator, was first of all created by the denial of Gandhi’s dignity and the nascent nationalist stirrings is thus a reciprocate effect of British/South African policy. No matter how much of a gentleman you are, in the eyes of the ruling race in South Africa, you’re still just a coolie. "I saw that South Africa was no country for a self-respecting Indian, and my mind became more and more occupied with the question as to how this state of things might be improved." (Gandhi 2001, 130). The idea of nationalism presented itself as the solution to this loss of status and to redress it, Indians had to unite and elevate their common dignity.

Gandhi's quest for national self-respect was also a quest for himself and his spirituality. Thus his autobiography is called My Experiments with Truth. It is as much a question of his experiments on how to live an authentic and spiritual life, its relationship to the divine (which Gandhi was continuously obsessed with), which translated into all matters of his life - from celibacy and diet to living arrangements, daily walks, education and child rearing, ethics and morals, and to his political life and quest for a unified India. Everything in his life was about self-realization. As he mentions of his time working with the Natal Indian Congress in South Africa, "If I found myself entirely absorbed in the service of the community, the reason behind it was my desire for self-realization. I had made the religion of service my own, as I felt that God could be
realized only through service. And service for me was the service of India" (Gandhi 2001, 155). They all intertwined and interfered in a way that made Gandhi's entire being political - it is almost impossible to ascertain where his public life stops and his private life starts as he tears down these barriers in his quest for "Truth", authentic living and his search for self-realization. As the national icon he is, he thus becomes a prism of the Indian nationality/nationalism, and his ascetic-spiritual way of life becomes a way to dignify an impoverished life as an Indian in the face of (British) modernization. Being Gandhi, that is Gandhi's quest for self-realization, was completely tied up with his work for national independence for India; thus Swaraj (self-rule for India), and self-realization for Gandhi, was one and the same thing, or, at least, cannot be separated. This also means that Gandhi's own identity is entirely bound up with India, and India's, by Gandhi's iconic status in the national pantheon, is extremely influenced by the Gandhi personality. The spiritual dimension resonates in the villages.

In the beginning, Gandhi, while living in England, tried to become an English gentleman, wear English clothes, and take on the appearance of a studying Englishman. But he cannot seem succeed, thus his identity changes into different experiments of diet, dress, e.t.c. In this sense, Gandhi's entire project is a project of identity. This is also why he could use his body as a thermometer of the climate in India as Khilnani puts it in the introduction to the Penguin edition of Gandhi's autobiography. If Gandhi fasts, the Indian people takes notice, if he walks, the people walks with him - his body and person becomes the singular manifestation of the Indian people. Thus Gandhi's spirituality and anti-modernity (which is a proxy of anti-Briticism and a quest for self-identity in face of the British slights; what do Indians have in which they can dignify themselves against the British? poverty) Gandhi took existing ideas, the idea of the nation and tried to adapt it to his circumstances to produce a nationalism that accords with the world as he saw it and his Indian identity against the British arrogance. Their poverty and their ancient moral civilization become positive valuations against British greed and exploitation. This has profound impact on strains of Indian nationalism, and instead of being matters of ridicule or traditionalism, they become values of distinction in order to raise the dignity of the Indian nation on its
own basis of valuation. In his most complete exposition of his vision of society, *Hind Swaraj*, he charges machinery of having impoverished India, and what India did before machinery "precisely the same should be done today." (Gandhi 1938, 64). The wealthy should devote their money to hand-looms and encourage home-made goods, the doctors should refrain from giving drugs and using Western medicine (Gandhi 1938, 67). For Gandhi, the Indian nationalism and "[r]eal home-rule is self-rule or self-control." (Gandhi 1938, 68). It is moral purity and intensely traditional.

For Gandhi this struggle and this identity became a life of simplicity in the face of the greedy, colonial/capitalist exploitation machine. Gandhi’s search was the search for the simple life, the true Indian life. For him, "the good of the individual is contained in the good of all" (Gandhi 2001, 274-275), contrary to liberalism that claims that the good of the community is realized through the good of the individual. Yet, almost echoing the Weberian Protestant ethic, "a life of labour, i. e. the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman, is the life worth living." (Gandhi 2001, 274-275). This idea, however, contains no growth, it is a vision of a harmonious village where everyone has a place and duty in an ordered cosmos and community. It is illustrated by Gandhi’s farming community experiments, where for example Gandhi preferred a hand-driven press to an engine in order keep in line with the atmosphere of the place - a happy, hardworking community working in the soil and with the body. The work is a spiritual end in itself and its productivity and outcome is to large extent irrelevant. Gandhi’s original plan had been to retire from his practice and "go and live at the Settlement, earn my livelihood by manual work there, and find the joy of service in the fulfillment of Phoenix [the name of the farm]." (Gandhi 2001, 279) He wanted to live the simple life of a peasant, living in simple huts, without any form for unnecessary accessories or luxuries in perpetual reproduction of itself. He preferred the spinning wheel to a heavy engine, the toil of the hand instead of power machinery to do man’s work. It was a traditional life within the classic self-sufficient Indian village (his ideal of the home-spun is also part of this thinking) Gandhi idealized- a self-sufficiency that the colonial regime disrupts and destroys in colonial exploitation. Keeping in line with this ordered cosmos of the village, in his attempt to abolish untouchability, Gandhi did not want to
abolish the caste system (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 88; 294). Gandhi’s being was tied up in a religio-traditional conception of politics, where the moral Indian peasant could go about his day in an ordered society where everyone had their place. "To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. A man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of any field of life. That is why my devotion to Truth has drawn me into the field of politics; and I can say without the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, that those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means." (Gandhi 2001, 453). This link between religion and politics seeped through every part of Gandhi’s thought and politics. Speaking of a specific action of Satyagraha, such an integral part of his political philosophy of non-violence, but also containing the idea of search for Truth and soul force (and thus part of Gandhi’s idea of self-realization): "The idea came to me last night in a dream that we should call upon the country to observe a general hartal[mass strike]. Satyagraha is a process of self-purification and ours is a sacred fight, and it seems to me to be in the fitness of things that it should be commenced with an act of self-purification. Let all the people of India, therefore, suspend their business on that day and observe the day as one of fasting and prayer." (Gandhi 2001, 413)

This traditional view, however, absolutely excludes any form of animating capitalist spirit. It is an ideal of a well-ordered society of self-sufficiency where everyone has their place in the social cosmos. The moral Indian order and Indian virtue defers to it a specific Indian dignity. It, however, doesn’t inculcate an ideal of productive growth and dynamism where people want to leave the village, and produce. Prosperity is seen as the prosperity of self-sufficiency, and any form of labor efficiency and luxury that is more than simple self-sufficiency is wasted in not being applied in the search for self-realization and Truth in the spiritual realm. The spiritual content of the Gandhian nationalism creates the foundation for a mass-movement that can reach the villages and give Indian life dignity in the face of modernity. It, however, stilts the nationalism in its quest for modernity and creates it as a form of anti-modernity. Gandhi’s
manifesto, *Hind Swaraj*, is the most elaborate exposition of these principles of self-sufficiency and true life.

**Nehru - the modernizing nationalism**

Jawaharlal Nehru also went through the British institutions of higher education (and the British jails). He came to power after Independence and had to juggle the many interests at play in the new India and had to act "in a society alive with aspirations, divided between differing conceptions of who the nation was and what the state should do. Congress was in a dispute with itself: Partition had emboldened its Hindu voices, meanwhile those on the socialist Left had exited, and Gandhi in characteristically gnomic fashion called for Congress's dissolution now that the appointed day had come and gone." (Khilnani 2012, 29) But where Gandhi had been the perfect traditionalist Indian in the face of the British, Nehru had been perfectly anglicized. To Nehru, India was a palimpsest. For Nehru, "India was in my blood... And yet I approached her almost an alien critic, full of dislike for the present as well as for many of the relics of the past that I saw. To some extent I came to her via the West and looked at her as a friendly westerner might have done. I was eager and anxious to change her outlook and appearance and give her the garb of modernity. And yet doubts rose within me." (Khilnani 2012, epigraph) Nehru was a reformer and a socialist: he wanted a modern developed Indian nation.

To Nehru, the Indian nation was a patchwork of the many cultures, communities, castes, and religions. "India was like some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously." (Nehru, quoted in Idea of India, xxiii). There was no one single India with a secure identity and foundation, but instead an assemblage of different layers still at work. And Nerhu’s task became to rule all these different layers in one single national polity. There was no consensus in the party or in society at large. "He was convinced that to maintain their
newly won independence, Indians would have to entrust their future to a national
state, whose central responsibility would be to direct economic development; but it
also had to build a constitutional, non-religious regime, extend social opportunities,
and maintain sovereignty in the international arena." (Khilnani 2012, 30) Nehru's
project was to maintain independence, and not necessarily gain ascendancy in an
economic international race. It was purely for the sake of India's inwardness, raising
the economic poverty to create a livable country with dignity, free from outside
interference which had been so traumatic in the form of colonialism. The anti-
colonialist attitude thus insulated the country towards international races, it
attempted non-alignment and was highly active in the anti-colonial struggle (Khilnani
2012, 39-40). Its international outlook seemed to be one where, qua India's spiritual
morality and colonial history, they could engage in the anti-imperialist struggle, where
every nation was on equal terms with an equal claim to self-determination, and thus
dissolve any entanglement with the international race for prestige. Or rather, India's
stand on these issues gave them a certain moral ground in which they could derive
moral prestige. As such, its international prestige was not one of (economic or military)
power but one of humanism, to end colonialism and international competition.

But Nehru did not want an impoverished India, nor did he like the India of social
inequality that the caste system fostered. He wanted a truly modern, secular India, and
even though he had become politically estranged from his mentor, Gandhi, they
evolved a deep friendship during the bloody violence of Partition. They were politically
(and in this sense nationally) different; Gandhi had a vision of the simplistic
Indian nation, where Nehru wanted a modern one. But Gandhi was assured Nehru's
heart was in India (Khilnani 2012, 31). Nehru argued that political freedom should also
mean economic emancipation for the masses (Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 526).
His intellectual principles and philosophy of history, which shaped his actions, was an
idea of a universal movement of history along the Western lines. The possibilities for
India, for Nehru, "was determined by his understanding of the West's historical
trajectory, in which he saw universal significance." (Khilnani 2012, 30) Modernization
was thus what he saw as the goal of India, with all the baggage of his own Western
background this implied. Nehru’s aim was "to use the state actively to reconstitute India’s society, to reform it and to bring it in line with what it took to be the movement of universal history." (Khilnani 2012, 33) It did not, however, have the backing of many outside the intellectual and English-speaking circles (Khilnani 2012, 34). It was an elite idea in a fight between Gandhianism, chauvinistic Hinduism, and the reformism which together represented the main strains of Indian nationalism, whose unity seemed to be a continuously elusive one. The brilliant untouchable lawyer, who also sat in the Constituent Assembly and had a large influence on the final version of the constitution, B. R. Ambedkar, philosophized that in India, "[c]onstitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realize that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic." (Guha 2007, 103) Nehru’s outlook was essentially the outlook of the modern Indian elite with a cosmopolitan outlook.

Yet Nehru was adamant in his desire for Indian development and raising the poor. But exactly this focus on planning, and achieving and following the universal unfolding of history and creating a modern India, hides one striking attribute of the still-remaining ‘traditionalism’ of his outlook: planning is done from the top. Nehru mused "What is a young man’s ambition today? ... They think of becoming economists, because an economist plays a big part in the modern world." (Khilnani 2012, 61) But contrasting this to Benjamin Franklin’s musings on the aspirations of the American people who strive to be farmers, artisans, lawyers, and take pride in their work, the economist is more of a planner (especially in the Indian context of 5 year plans). He is the one who reshapes the Indian economy into a new image. The economist is in a sense idle, or at least imply the idea of an ordered society where expectations follow set rules which the economist can identify and engineer upon in order to create a society, whereas the individual entrepreneur in Franklin’s case is out to improve his lot and raise his status in the world through his toil and labor. Franklin’s farmer is dynamic and changes his own personal world, the economist reshapes an a-dynamic world - the individual is still within a larger cosmos that orders his world; traditionally it was caste, now the economist plans for him. One can sense here the difference between self-sustained
growth and development. The individual entrepreneurship and desire to change one's social status is still absent, the cause is still external to the individual who is now grouped within the categories applied by the economist. The capitalist ethos is, unbeknownst to Nehru, still absent in this line of thinking. Khilnani points out that within a cosmos ordered by the caste system, unfortunate conditions and injustice can be blamed onto the ordering of the cosmos. Caste system and varnas orders society and deflects blame for social wrongs away from individuals (Khilnani 2012, 18-19).

They do not toil to grow, they toil to stay within their traditional sphere of the caste and the community. Naipaul, while travelling in India during the Emergency, experienced how the caste system was still functioning within India. He re-tells the story of an untouchable servant of a foreign businessman. The businessman, recognizing the intelligence of his servant, pays for his education and sets him up with a job. On his return to India, the businessman discovers his old servant to be a latrine-cleaner again: he was barred from his social groups, caste, and clan, and there was "no other group he could join, no woman he could marry." (Naipaul 2010, 158)

In the villages, Naipaul experienced the cruelties of village poverty and hardships of life. Yet in these circumstances, every man "knew his caste, his place; each group lived in its own immemorially defined area." (Naipaul 2010, 18) Caste and the social systems serves as giving people an extremely coherent vision of identity and place in society. This is the end of their horizon. Breaking off from these spiritual and social traditions is hard, both from the perspective of personal experience of reshaping one's identity beyond a caste and from the exclusion of social networks this implies. But they also work as the central system for social interaction - without which, living becomes unbearable as the untouchable servant shows. Khilnani writes of this tension between modernity and traditionalism that it "shows a rapid acceleration and intensification in the long-running encounter between a civilization intricately designed with the specific purpose of perpetuating itself as a society, a community with a shared moral order, one of the world's most sophisticated assemblages of 'great' and 'little' traditions, and, set against it, the imperatives of modern commercial society."(Khilnani 2012, 5)
These tensions clashed in the Emergency Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, imposed in 1975.

**Opposite visions - Emergency imposed**

India experienced a turbulent period in 74-74. Mass movements provoking strikes, riots, and general agitation against authority was widespread. Indian independence, and the subsequent programs of social and industrial development, had promised to deliver India from poverty. Indira Gandhi especially had promised utopian visions of abolishing poverty, and when the promises failed to materialize and corruption was rampant, unrest spread in large parts of the country, with the epicenter in Northern India (Chandra 2003, 1; 12-16). The dissent coalesced around the veteran of the independence struggle, Jayaprakash Narayan\(^{10}\), who "became the symbolic leader" (Khilnani 2012, 45). It was against this unrest and its leadership Indira Gandhi invoked the Emergency, arguing that "the stability, security, unity, the 'fabric' and the very survival of the nation were in danger" and in order to defend democracy, she had to temporarily suspend it (Chandra 2003, 76). JP, now leader of the Jayaprakash Narayan Movement, JPM, equally argued that he was fighting for democracy and the dissent and unrest was a response to abuse of the democratic framework (Chandra 2003, 77; 85).

JP exhibited "guru-like qualities", and it was from his moral authority the movement could derive political strength and unite the many (mutually incompatible) oppositional movements under its umbrella (Chandra 2003, 41; 51). JP had no party affiliation and had quit formal politics after independence, lived a simple lifestyle, and was seen as an incorruptible idealist. He called for a party-less democracy, a more real "Indian" democracy, and branded parliamentary democracy as Western and non-Indian (Chandra 2003, 94-95; 130). He compared his marches to those of Gandhi and used his tactics, had the same emphasis on village rule and democracy, along with an idea of a "return to Gandhi" and his economic ideas of the village and general social

\(^{10}\)JP forthwith.
order. He hoped the policies of the movement "would be cast in the Gandhian mould" (Chandra 2003, 62; 96; 107; 116-119). As such, one of his "major objections to the Nehruvian model of development was that it was 'largely un-Indian'" and not based on Indian and Gandhian value premises (Chandra 2003, 130). He considered the Nehruvian development program as responsible for much of the corruption and poverty of India, and considered Indira Gandhi an accelerated version of her father's model (Chandra 2003, 138).

Indira Gandhi "declared herself committed to the project her father had begun" (Khilnani 2012, 46). She considered herself the continuation of her father's project and also portrayed the Emergency as an opportunity "for promoting and implementing her 'progressive economic agenda' of rapid economic development, social justice and social change." (Chandra 2003, 80) Khilnani writes of the Emergency that it "was a parodic rendition of the wish to return to a technocratically directed push towards industrial growth" of Nehru, but without the democratic legitimacy of her father or a consistent economic vision, but where "draconian methods of human husbandry were deployed upon the poor." (Khilnani 2012, 92-93) What clashed in the conflict, at least on the surface level and how the clash can be mobilized and interpreted by society, was the clash between the Gandhian vision of India versus a continuation of the Nehruvian project of development. The failure of development to deliver India from poverty sparked the unrest, but it gained voice and articulation through these two ideas. Through the Gandhian appeal of the 'real India', JP could mobilize and unite an opposition that had no basis for unity except opposition to Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, could claim to defend India against itself and tried to enforce a vision of modernity and industrial growth through the state of exception. But they are two representations of Indian nationalism and the vision of what India is. One of the members of Nehru's Planning Commission had noted that, with the failure of materialization of take-off and self-generating growth, the solution to India's poverty lay in "'industrial and technological inputs', which to be effective required that 'village habits and psychology... be transformed into the industrial outlook with interests in tools, gadgetry and new innovations, and desire for
The above quote is, in a sense, the fundamental issue of the Indian nationalism where Indira Gandhi tried to enforce the modernizing one through the state of exception. The Gandhian vision of the true India takes pride in the village and its simplistic life, where the modernizing force attempts to shatter these traditions and produce a modernized society with a productive outlook - interest in tools, innovation, and employing them.

Concluding remarks

Indira Gandhi, according to Khilnani, "exuded absolute power. But it was the random, sporadic power of a despot." (Khilnani 2012, 47) For the present case however, Indira Gandhi shows how the state of exception always is at play even in a democratic society, and how it serves as a mechanism to mold the society towards a certain vision that can attain normalcy with procedural rule. But it must always be created first, and sometimes it is attempted by the despot who acts haphazardly, other times it is thrown upon a government as with the American Civil War and the response is a coordinated, well-considered one to restore and re-order normalcy. The distinction, however, is not in the fundamental logic of democracy, but seems to be relatively contingent. Any attempt to delineate a line between the two forms is impossible. That Indira Gandhi happened to "exude absolute power" in a despotic manner and impose the Emergency is accidental, the logic is exactly the same as in the American Civil war. The possibility of this contingency, however, lies more with the differing visions of what India truly is - that there was an open space for interpretation of the 'true India' which Indira Gandhi can create and bring into being - it is an inherent possibility within the political metaphysics. What the Gandhian appeals manage to resonate with, however, is for the Indian villages to attain dignity through their current identity: the identity of their village, their poverty, their caste, to be meaningful and spiritually fulfilling. Reshaping society along modern lines breaks this world and they lose their identity. Caste identity may be oppressing, but one knows one's place, as Naipaul's observations point out. As such, large parts of Indian politics is centered around identity(Khilnani 2012, 54-57). According to Perry Anderson, caste is still a prevalent form of identity today; three quarters of the population reject inter-caste marriage. In
this political landscape, "[a]wakening as voters, the poor and not so poor activate hereditary enclosures as political communities rather than dissolving them. Within these enclosures, internally far more hierarchical than equal, the identities are ascribed and conformity to them enforced" (Anderson 2012, 156) This is the India where "recognition - the quest for dignity - trumps redistribution, leaders gratifying followers with symbols of esteem rather than the substance of emancipation." (Anderson 2012, 155). Instead of delivering schools to their followers, these leaders deliver dignity through symbols - statues. Dignity trumps economic welfare, and it this tension that is also at stake in the Gandhian versus Nehruvian nationalism. In this sense, Indira Gandhi's statement, made shortly before her assassination in 1984, "are we not all secular?" (Keay 2010, 580) can be read that we all consider ourselves as an individual whose primary identification is Indian before other groups. That dignity is given through citizenship, not as member of a specific citizen group - that is, one is first and foremost a modern Indian citizen above other distinctions such as caste, religion, or ethnicity. This is vehemently denied by her assassination at the hands of her Sikh bodyguard over religious/territorial problems. To uproot these bonds of society the state of exception presents itself as a possible solution. The social coherence however is still very much ordered around these communities who have no interest in individual prosperity, and India did not manage to produce an effective nationalism that could overcome this in the meeting between traditional India and the requirements of modernity. Indira Gandhi's attempt at an emergency situation to create a modern situation where economic ethos is the norm and caste is a thing of the past is a hazy attempt in this direction, which was probably partly motivated by the threat of her removal from power. India's democracy "has shown a tenacity of community identities, in the form of caste and religion, as groups struggle to construct majorities that can rule at the Centre." (Khilnani 2012, 59) This is India's problem of locating and

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11 Her assassination was a reprisal to Operation Bluestar, the storm on the Golden Temple in Amritsar, where separatist Sikhs had holed up, which ended with 500 dead according to the government. Other estimations range from 500 to as much as 3.000 (Guha 2007, 567-569). Indira Gandhi's killers are revered as martyrs in the Golden Temple to this day (Guha 2007, 632).

12 Indira Gandhi's election in was invalidated by the Allahabad High Court due to minor irregularities. The more serious charge of election rigging was dropped (Chandra 2003, 64).
producing a coherent national identity. Instead different groups try to take control of
the state to further their own interests, not as individuals loyal to the nation but loyal
to these groups. The politicization of these groups is a phenomenon made possible by
modern democracy making political access to the state possible for diverse groups. Not
abolishing caste, but entrenching it as part of the constitution made these groups
vehicles for job security, access to education, and social benefits. Instead of wanting to
escape caste, one wants to advance its interests and status, and thus one’s own status
as a derivative and your status within the group. India had no overarching national
identity before the British Raj, and they still have not acquired a coherent one - it has
taken the form of multiple identities whose only claim to Indian identity seems to be
the idea of democracy as the form where diverse groups can compete for interests. As
such it is a palimpsest in the Nehruvian sense, but the overarching ideology seems to
retain an emptiness at the center that can be appropriated by the different group
interests - democracy is nothing but the form they all pledge allegiance to. They are
expressions of the many ideas of what the society should be like, the vision as the
foundation of society which was never truly solidified in the nationalist movement, as
it was a melting pot of many viewpoints. While nationalist euphoria could definitely
produce creative zeal to attain dignity as a nation, for example the Swadeshi
movement in 1906 helped open mills, banks, and arts flourished and tried to promote
self-reliance, the movement often showed more "zeal than business acumen"
(Chandra, Mukherjee, et al. 1989, 131). The nationalist movement never became
coherent beyond its principle of democracy and this was not sufficient for creating a
stable identity in the long run in a complex society as the Indian. Furthermore,
capitalism had the connotation and stigma of the values of the British; self-reliance
was preferred to capitalist expansion.
Indonesia

Spread across a vast area the size of Europe, Indonesia is a sprawling archipelago. It consists of 19,000 islands, some of them tiny, some, like Java, are large. Indonesia estimates its population to be 240 million (of these, 130 million live in Java), making it the 4th largest country in the world. The population speaks more than 300 languages (Taylor 2003, 1), of these 200 are major cultural languages spread among 366 self-aware ethnic groups, with Java as its major cultural center at the cost of the outer islands (Vickers 2013, 1; Feith 1962, 27). Ninety per cent of the population is Muslim, but large communities, usually entwined with an ethnicity, are Hindu, Christian or other. Telling the story of such a large and diverse country is obviously difficult, which implies that the creation of the nation and its nationalism be equally fraught with contradictions when the multiple histories, cultures and ethnicities must create overlapping consensus of what the nation is. As such, "Writing a national history of Indonesia is difficult," according to Adrian Vickers, "because it is a nation still coming into being. The state of Indonesia was created first by the almost accidental set of colonial boundaries of the early twentieth century... The colonial state, based as it was in the Netherlands, did its best to deny Indonesians any sense of citizenship, let alone participation. This alienation has continued into the post-colonial period. The nation itself does not have a cohesive society, people still refer to their ethnicity as a primary point of self-description and successive leaders have done little to further the sense of a civic set of norms and institutions." (Vickers 2013, 6-7)

In fact, the main event giving Indonesia its current territorial integrity, although nationalists claim old kingdoms such as the Majapahit covered the entire archipelago, was Dutch colonization; Dutch colonization provided Indonesia with its current borders (Vickers 2013, 7). As a testament to its heterogeneity and its difficulty in acquiring national cohesion, the Indonesian state has faced defiance of its authority in many parts of the territory inherited from the Dutch colonial state. Some of these movements remain to this day (Taylor 2003, 3).
The birth of Indonesian nationalism

Although there had been some overlapping culture due to trade among the many islands, the area now known as Indonesia had never been a single entity, neither as a political form or as a culture. Dutch rule brought some semblance of unity through the Dutch colonial state. Indonesia as a coherent entity can thus be said to be a Dutch invention, which in turn spawns the possibility of Indonesian nationalism. Indonesian nationalism was slowly born around 1900 when Indonesians started to receive some Dutch education and through the educational system came into contact with Dutch/Western ideas and values at a higher level. Vickers uses the life and novels of one Indonesia's foremost national writers, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, as the common thread in his history of modern Indonesia, and Toer's quadrillogy *This Earth of Mankind* is an insightful description of the earliest experiences of Indonesian nationalists and the social fabric of colonial Indonesia. In the novels, Minke, who expects this pet name of his which has become his primary identification is his teacher's mispronunciation of monkey, is a brilliant native student and one of the few natives enrolled in the elite Dutch school system. The novels are a fictionalized account based on the early nationalist Tirto Adhi Syruo, and coming of age in this world, the protagonist realizes how the ideas and ideals of the Dutch are perverted in the colonial setting; how he can never become an equal of a Dutchman, but will always be a native, the exploitation of the people of the Dutch East Indies, and the plight of the common peasant. He becomes a journalist trying to expose the system and organize and spread the early nationalist struggles and ideas. His 'ressentiment' is the now familiar case of nationalist creation: in order to achieve his status he believes he is worthy of - he is smarter, more just, concerned with the future of humankind as a whole and not just his own interests - he has to instead of assimilate, which is impossible for him, fight and create a way of giving dignity to the inhabitants of Indonesia. The rise of other Asian peoples, the Chinese, Filipinos, and especially the Japanese, gives him the inspiration and ideas of mobilizing a nationalism of the Dutch East Indies. It is, however, telling that the word Indonesian as identity or Indonesia as reference to a

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13 At the time called the Dutch East Indies
landmass does not appear in the book. The word Indonesia, coined by an Englishman, does not enter nationalist discourse until the 1920s, after the events of the books take place. In the early years of the 20th century, the native elite is concerned about modern ideas of what it means to be Javanese, Ambonese, or Sumatran (Taylor 2003, 240). The Dutch colonization forces these diverse ideas to fuse into one nation unified against the colonial regime - no longer as Sumatrans or Javanese against the Dutch, but Pan-Indonesian. "By 1920 the most intriguing of words appeared in the parties' vocabulary: 'Indonesia'. Originally coined by a nineteenth-century English naturalist to classify the distinctive ethnic and geographical identity of the archipelago, this was a word that could be adapted to new ends." (Vickers 2013, 81-82). Instead of working for a Javanese nation, Sumatran nation, Ambonese nation, the Indonesian nation, first talked about by Indonesian students in the Netherlands, promised the people under Dutch colonial rule a future as one nation and a unified fight against colonial rule.

But how are the nationalists to raise awareness of their cause? Nationalism was a phenomenon reserved for the Dutch-educated elite. Trying to rouse followers and make them understand the principles of nationalism, to understand grievances as more than particular interests and rebellions against local exploiting landowners, and create a national unity and put these local grievances into wider context, was no easy task. The peasants primarily wanted to be able to survive and fight the exploitation of the plantation system and landownership (for example, when the nationalists tried to adopt and mobilize strikes as a nationalist weapon, most of the workers and peasants "were interested in better pay and conditions rather than nationalism and revolution" (Vickers 2013, 79). The nationalists wanted national "awakening". Sukarno, the first president of independent Indonesia, formulating a nationalism that could unite the disparate elements of Indonesian society and channel it into a single struggle and a single direction, became the head of the mainstream nationalist movement. Contending that "Muslims must not forget that capitalism, the enemy of Marxism, is also the enemy of Islam", and "Marxism, which was previously so violently anti-
nationalist and anti-religious, has now altered its tactics," turning the opposition into "comradeship and support." (Sukarno, quoted in Vickers 2013,83). He attempted to reconcile the religious movements, the communist and socialist movements, and the nationalist movements into a single national movement. A confusing amount of organizations, however, continued to proliferate and be created well into the 30's (Vickers 2013, 84). According to Feith, the early nationalist movements and their organizations were "in fact one of repeated splits" and not of increasing coherence (Feith 1962, 20).

It was, however, not until the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945 that the nationalist movement became a mass-based movement - until then it remained an elite urban phenomenon unable to penetrate into the villages of Indonesia. Whether this had to do with the lack of organizational skill of the nationalists, the lack of coherence and the level of crackdown of the colonial administration, or because of a lack of ability to produce a nationalism with a spiritual element to appeal to the peasantry, like Gandhi and his ability to make the Indian Congress as mass movement, is beyond the scope of this paper - I suspect, however, all of the above played significant role. The fact remains that it was the Japanese occupation that produced nationalism as a mass movement: They destroyed much of the Dutch edifice and structure of rule, fostered nationalist sentiment in the population, sponsored national-politico propaganda organizations, nationalist organizations, spread propaganda all the way to the village level, put men like Sukarno into high places, and created paramilitary organizations based on nationalist sentiments (Vickers 2013, 87; 98; Ricklefs 2008, 235). From schools to culture, to employing writers as propaganda managers, film makers, theater, and village organizations, to educate Indonesians in (anti-western) nationalist values based on Japanese ideals, the Japanese occupation managed to mobilize, politicize, arm, and agitate for an Asian nationalism, with a militant anti-Western bent, at all levels of society (Ricklefs 2008, 235-245; Feith 1962, 6-7). The Japanese were definitely harsher rulers, mobilizing the entire society to wartime production with little

14 Whether Indonesian independence would have been achieved without Japanese occupation is beyond the scope of this paper. It did, however, have an immense impact on how it came to be achieved.
regard for Indonesian lives, but they also mobilized, organized, and animated this society (or rather, these societies) into action and it was thus ready to defy the Dutch attempt to retake its colony after the fall of the Japanese.

Mobilizing, agitating and arming such a heterogeneous society gave rise to problems of cooperation. When the Japanese, realizing defeat in the war and expecting revolution in Java, set down an investigate committee comprised of top political leaders of Indonesia, Sukarno's version of "religiously neutral nationalism" was the only basis "on which the other leaders could agree" (Ricklefs 2008, 245). A somewhat neutral minimal definition of Indonesian nationalism whose particulars were to be figured out as the nascent nation came into being, it was, however, based on Sukarno's idea of *pancasila*, "five principles", which were to become the official ideology of the Indonesian state and embodied in the constitution of 1945 (which Sukarno would later re-instate as the basis for Guided Democracy). These principles were: belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice, and democracy (Ricklefs 2008, 245-246). In a tumultuous and heterogeneous society moving rapidly from traditionalism to modernity, from colonialism to independence, from feudalism to nationalism, where all social norms are being renegotiated, these five principles left a lot of room for interpretation.

The Allies en route to disarm the Japanese in Indonesia, unaware of the massive changes and politicization of the masses, expected to regain control of the colony and return it to the Dutch. In the meantime, Indonesia, in a statement prepared by Sukarno had declared Independence and a revolutionary war for independence followed. The Indonesian revolution and independence, where Indonesians fought together shoulder to shoulder against attempts at re-colonization, is "one of myth" however. The social forces unleashed by the politicization of the Indonesian archipelago could not materialize into a harmonious new nation in such a short time; the revolutionary period was one of "bitter struggle among contending individuals and social forces" (Ricklefs 2008, 248). Compared with the American and Indian cases, those two countries still had the apparatus of state. Indonesia, on the other hand, were left with
the rubble and destruction of first the Dutch colonial state (which they had very limited access and control of - in 1940, of the 3.039 higher-rank civil services positions, only 221 we occupied by Indonesians, and then the sprawling amount of organizations led by the Japanese had shaken the traditional organization of society (Feith 1962, 6; 17)). In short, they had to organize a state almost from scratch among a plethora of social forces and reorganize political and social relations. They were committed to independence, but the actual shape of the post-colonial nation(s) was fiercely contested. In practice, the revolution was a fragmented phenomenon, more welded together by its common fight against Dutch colonial re-conquest than any positive content of the substance of nation. After five revolutionary years, which saw intense fighting both between Indonesian and Dutch, but also Indonesian regions, the revolutionary state was formally swept away, and a unitary Republic of Indonesia with a provisional constitution declared (Ricklefs 2008, 270).

Besides being a violent and chaotic time it was also a period of hope and expectation. The restructuring of society along new lines of nationalist identity and the active engagement in fighting as an independent people produced increased experiences of self-respect and dignity, both collective and individual in most of society; the struggle "brought forth enormous creative energy" (Feith 1962, 17). In most situations, individual achievement (especially in the revolution) became the basic source of prestige, and in a society where every social relation was being restructured, opportunity and the promise of advancement for ambitious persons was unprecedented. This phenomenon, however, was primarily prevalent in Java, as much of the territory outside Java had returned to Dutch rule during the Revolution, again showcasing the many different experiences of Indonesia (Feith 1962, 18).

Having declared the revolution over and the unitary Republic declared did in no way mean that the flux of tensions in Indonesian society was swept away. Multiple pockets defying central rule continued to humiliate the center, and the political sphere was a complex arena of competing claims and attempts at producing a coherent Indonesian polity. As an indicator of the political chaos, Indonesia was "gifted" with 7 cabinets
between the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1950 and the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1957. Sukarno, however, was President for the duration (and for the duration of Guided Democracy as well). In fact, Sukarno, and the visions and nationalism he was able to relay, and thus the symbols he represented, seems to be the point which kept Indonesia together (along with the repressive mechanism of the army - the army, however, could be rebellious too and fragment, where Sukarno again seems to be uniting force). Not ignorant of his own project, he later called himself the "Mouthpiece of the Revolution" and thus represented himself as the symbol of the nation and main interpreter of the revolutionary spirit of the people (Taylor 2003, 312). And for Sukarno, and what can from now on be considered Indonesian nationalism, the nation and its principles were embodied in the previously mentioned pancasila.

Sukarno's Pancasila were written into the preamble of the 1945 constitution and provided the principal basis of the Indonesian state (Feith and Castles 1970, 40). These five principles, "the pillars", as the preamble reads, were formulated in this specific instance as: "One Deity, just and civilized Humanity, Indonesian Unity, Indonesian Unity, and People's rule guided wisely through consultation and representation, in order to achieve Social Justice for the whole Indonesian people" - the capitalized word being the essential part of each principle(Feith and Castles 1970, 50). The exact content of them never seemed to go much beyond sloganism, and was thus a minimal formulation of principles that could achieve consensus in a new-born society, as was noted earlier. In Sukarno's first speech elaborating on pancasila, however, the anti-Western, anti-capitalist bent is obvious in an attempt to raise a certain Indonesian form of modernity, democracy and social justice: "We have seen that in European states there are representative bodies, there is a parliamentary democracy; but is it not precisely in Europe that people are at the mercy of the capitalists? In America there is a representative body of the people, but are not people in America at the mercy of the capitalists? Are not people at the mercy of the capitalists throughout the whole Western world?" (Feith and Castles 1970, 46). "Friends," Sukarno suggested, "if we are looking for democracy, it must not be Western democracy, but
permusjawaratan [consultation, deliberation, conference] which brings life, that is politico-economic democracy which is capable of bringing social prosperity." (Feith and Castles 1970, 47). Sukarno elaborated on this point that "the permusjuwaratan body we shall establish must not be a deliberative body for political democracy alone, but a body which, together with the community, will be able to give effect to two principles: political justice and social justice." (Feith and Castles 1970, 47). What was needed for Indonesia, in the face of the capitalist Dutch practice as they had experienced and interpreted it, was "cohesion, integration, and solidarity - not 'individualism' but 'collectivism,' not 'liberalism' but 'socialism.'" (Feith 1962, 35) As various constitutions put it, the Indonesian economy would instead be "based on the principle of family relationships." (Feith 1962, 36) Owing to an intention of unity, it was an ideology with minimal content.

The lack of ability to produce consensus on more than the utopian visions of a future Indonesia, but also consensus on how to actually conduct politics in this newly politicized country, was proved by the 7 successive cabinets, and the lack of a political party receiving a majority of votes in the 1955 election, the only real national election in Indonesia before the end of Suharto's rule in the 1990s. Splits in politics were based on existing conflicts, and many regions were entirely dominated by one party or another. Politics was patronage-based where leaders depended and mobilized networks of loyalty derived from traditional social hierarchies or networks established through the Revolutionary experience. These patronage networks "extended into the bureaucracy and down to the village level." (Vickers 2013, 127-128) Jobs were distributed as favors to friends or in return to other favors, and popularity and prestige from participation in the Revolution got you further than merit. Factionalism was rampant. Taking part in this system and joining a faction under a local leader meant access to resources for the rural poor. Loyalty was thus not based on ideology, but what loyalty could achieve. Generally, the successive cabinets and nationalists (Sukarno particularly) prioritized prestige for the Indonesian nation, creating a nation, its image, and fostering its cultural identity, to economic matters (Feith 1962, 37; 557). One of the major nationalist economic policies, however, was the attempt to put
enterprise into Indonesian hands. Most enterprise was still Dutch- or Chinese-owned, but licensing and Indonesianization was attempted to turn enterprise and ownership indigenous. In 1956 when the harbor facilities and stevedoring, which had been controlled by Dutch and Chinese companies, were turned over to Indonesian enterprises, along with the accompanying government credit to facilitate it, the major parties of government divided up the facilities among associations of warehousing firms established by the parties for the occasion (Feith 1962, 478-479). This channeling of credit and patronage was prevalent in the entire field of economic action, from credit to licensing and their abuse, to the industrial establishments (Feith 1962, 478-479; Robison 1986, 44-45). While Indonesianization managed to expand the role of Indonesian nationals within the economy, it was an ineffective system overall. License-reselling was rampant, many national banks were "get-rich-quick organizations" reaping the discrepancy between the low interests of government banks and the market and similar patronage-exploiting activities. There was not much incentive to be commercially viable when the main income was exploitation of patronage benefits, and most of the money was often spent on "prestige-creating consumption, on furniture, cars, and mountain bungalows" (Feith 1962, 374-381; 565). The faction-riddled army participated in large-scale smuggling, organized by regional factions and penetrating into the top regional army command - exploiting office was not an exclusive prerogative of the civilian elite. In fact, army and politics often overlapped (Feith 1962, 481-500; Ricklefs 2008, 279-282). While not unusual in many societies, the tendency of exploiting office and patronage for wealth and then using it on prestige-consumption points to the fact that within Indonesian society prestige was not gained by your merits in office, but wealth and consumption. The ethos was not capitalist-bureaucratic and disinterested, but exploitative for prestige gains elsewhere. Unable to sever the ties of loyalty to traditional networks, and within the framework of the new state these networks could be mobilized for gain/expropriation, where "relationships were conducted between officials of the state and individual capitalists on the basis of the private appropriation of state power and resources by its own officials. It was this 'patrimonial' aspect of state power that was to prove significant in
determining which individual enterprises prospered and which declined within the context of general state policy." (Robison 1986, 47) "Indeed, bureaucratic capitalism, or capital owned by officials of state and party bureaucracies," according to Robison, "became a major feature of private capital ownership in Indonesia." (Robison 1986, 48)

Young Indonesia did not manage to create an overarching loyalty and consensus that amounted to more than mere symbols of unity. And in a fledgling, war-torn nation, these networks of patronage were also one of the few means of survival, encouraging the effect further. The state remained an arena where private actors expropriated wealth to dispense through traditional loyalty and patronage structures to gain prestige.

**Guided Democracy**

"By 1957", in Ricklefs's words, "this first democratic experiment had collapsed, corruption was widespread, the territorial unity of the nation was threatened, social justice had not been achieved, economic problems had not been solved, and the expectations generated by the Revolution were frustrated." (Ricklefs 2008, 273) With the first free election of Indonesia revealing not the unity of the country, but instead its many regional and factional tensions, the expected solution it was supposed to be in giving Indonesia a popular mandate for direction failed to materialize. In the course of 1956 and 57, the country was coming apart with the army commanders of the outer islands aligning up with political factions to defy the authority of Jakarta and announce their own republics. Sukarno then called for a return to "real Indonesian democracy", a "Guided Democracy", which he had hinted at earlier.

The election campaign had exacerbated existing tensions within Indonesian society, and at many smaller units the competition between the parties for votes had perceived to divide what were formerly perceived to be integrated units, such as the village (Reeve 1985, 119). To rid this "disease of liberalism ", a democracy which creates a conflict of all against all, Sukarno wanted to return to "to our own personality" and recreate society along the lines of the family principle and *gotong rojong* (mutual help, a concept derived or inspired by an idealized version of the village
distribution of work in ancient Indonesia) (Reeve 1985, 117; 121). Western democracy of "50 per cent plus one being right", was not an Indonesian democracy, a democracy in tune with the Indonesian spirit would be a "Guided Democracy". Political parties were not how Indonesian democracy should function: instead of parties competing for votes, the real needs of society should be represented by functional groups based on the family principle. These groups "held out the promise of channels of representation that stood above ethnic, social, religious, and ideological cleavages, as compared to the factitious and divisive party system." (Reeve 1985, 121) Guided Democracy was the continuation of the concept of the family principle Sukarno had mentioned in his previous speeches and the Constitution of 1945, which he claimed to be derived from centuries-old Indonesian traditions (Reeve 1985, 113). It was an idea inspired by other early nationalists. One early twentieth century formulation of the family principle by a radical nationalist was: "Borne up by the principle of the 'fullness and holiness of life', we can do no other than give primacy to the complete and holy Family, with its Father and Mother, who in every good family, stand side by side, have the same rights but different tasks, have a unity of interests, a unity of strengths, and a unity of soul." (Reeve 1985, 10) The principle of Guided Democracy was thus establishing itself on a longer tradition of nationalist thought which Sukarno could pay homage to and claim to represent the true Indonesian spirit with all the spiritual connotations and values that the above quotation implies. Suharto would later continue this tradition and also claim that his New Order was guided by the family principle (Reeve 1985, 11).

Although Sukarno did not manage to eliminate the parties in toto, only to marginalize their influence in the beginning, he organized councils and bodies with powers along these functionalist lines. Meeting obvious resistance to his proposals by large sections of the political party elite, on July 5, 1959, Sukarno, by presidential decree (and as such, a function of the sovereign prerogative deciding on the state of exception) abolished parliament, reinstituted the 1945 constitution, and Guided Democracy was finally in full effect (Reeve 1985, 129). These functional groups of workers, peasants,
entrepreneurs, religious leaders, army officers, would be represented in a council lead by Sukarno. They would thus represent 'the entire body of the nation', working as a harmonious whole without regard to factional interests, but would discuss and compromise on the "real" interests and desires of "the Indonesian people" - it was assumed that this was a special Indonesian trait, the real Indonesian spirit of government that had existed for thousands of years in the organic whole of the Indonesian village (Reeve 1985, 136-137). The functional groups would thus not just represent their groups with regards to that groups specific interests, but would consider all the groups and decide in common on the interests of the whole society, as a family in gotong rojong. Sukarno's organic vision of a harmonious society contained no contradictions: "Just as the class issue would lose its relevance after independence so it appears would the existence of many parties as a product of the several social levels in society: 'because Indonesian society has many levels. Each level has its own party'. However when independence was achieved 'these classes will disappear, because we do not approve of the existence of classes in the Indonesian people" (Reeve 1985, 34).Instead, Indonesia had a collective of a people who had mutual interests, it was up to the functional groups, and Sukarno as the mediator and leader, the final arbiter of ideological interpretation of that will, to cooperate to find what the mutual interests consisted of and how to promote them.

These functional groups were created on the basis of such groups as workers, peasants, intellectuals, youth, and so on. It is obvious, from the perspective of Agamben at least, that the division of these functional groups, instead of voluntary engagement in parties that can represent the individuals interests, is a decision on what society is, what makes up society, and the direction it should take. It is thus a representation of the metaphysical principle of the nation the sovereign tries to bring into being through the sovereign principle.

While Sukarno did not manage to abolish the parties, although some were banned, he did manage to restrict their influence. Robison asserts that "[t]he role of the parties was diminished not only by the emergence of these appointed bodies, responsible to
and, in the last analysis, advisory to the president, but by the fact that the membership of these bodies was determined, not by the party hierarchies, but by the President and the military High Command. Party power was further eroded with the emergence of the concept that democracy was best served not by party representation but by the representation of functional social groups. In the 1960 parliament, 129 members were appointed to represent the parties, compared to 154 appointed to represent functional groups including the Army, peasants, trade unions, women and youth."

(Robison 1986, 69-70). It was within the framework of functional groups the army would entrench its power and, with the New Order, become the primary player within the Indonesian state.

The New Order

With the help of Guided Democracy the Army had become a major functionalist group. It had played a major role in the Revolution, endowing it with enormous prestige and nationalist affection, and it saw itself as a safeguard of the Revolution. It felt entitled to a say in what it safeguarded and had taken part in coming into being: it was keenly interested in politics. Making it a functional group in 1958, it was further provided with a justification in administration and politics, which it already had taken a large share of during the many periods of martial law in regions of the archipelago and the subsequent infrastructural development and civic engagement (Reeve 1985, 185; 189; 269). In the wake of a failed coup on 30 September 1965\textsuperscript{15}, the army, more specifically Suharto managed to capitalize on it and gain central power in Indonesia and institute what was called by the state ideologues the New Order. As the name implies, what Suharto attempted, and used as basis for legitimacy, was a break with the Old Order which had so obviously failed to deliver to the Indonesians the prosperity their Revolution entitled them to. How this New Order specifically differed from the Old Order and how it went about to realize these promises (or rather, also fail to) is harder to ascertain. It was a regime based on the military and authoritarianism, oppressed

\textsuperscript{15} In the wake of this coup, and using it as a justification, an estimated 500,000 Indonesians suspected of communist ties were killed (Vickers 2013, 160-165). While deeply troubling, and definitely an important historical fact, this thesis does not have the space or framework to do these horrible, but complex, events justice.
political opposition and freedom of the press through violence, in way Guided Democracy was not, but the basic steps towards limitations on liberal party democracy had been taken by Sukarno. The discourse of political struggle and conception was still framed within the Guided Democracy discourse and the family principle was still often articulated (Reeve 1985, 227). The New Order should, in fact, do what Guided Democracy had failed to; what was at issue were not the principles themselves, but their interpretation. It was thus the functional groupings, which Sukarno slowly abandoned, that the New Order committed to (Reeve 1985, 280). It is thus hard to differentiate and give a coherent explanation of what the New Order contained, just as it was hard to specify what direction the Old Order had. Robison remarks that "even within this time-span [1965-1974] it is difficult to find a single label to describe the thrust of policy. Not only are there conflicting directions in policy but there are conflicting interpretations of the overall effect of Bappena [economic advisers] policy."

(Robison 1986, 133) The Bappenas

"rejected both the economically paralysing effect of etatism and the social irresponsibility of liberal free-fight capitalism, preferring instead what they called 'economic democracy' or 'pancasila economy'. This appeared to be some form of capitalism in which the energy of market forces was unleashed to produce maximum growth but at the same time restrained in the interests of social justice. At this point it becomes apparent that explaining Indonesian economic policy in terms of the expressed ideological attachments of the Bappenas technocrats is limited in its effectiveness. This is not simply because we are dealing with a whole array of contradictory and vague statements, but because the development of policy and the flourishing of particular economic ideologies relates to specific and concrete stages in the development of the political economy of Indonesia and the changing political and economic dominance of specific forces."
Different aspects of technocrat ideology became dominant at
different times." (Rise of Capital, 136-137)

Reeve has a similar conclusion to the content of the New Order regime: "The most
striking aspect of the restatements of this view of society in the New Order, as set out
above, is that they are no more than restatements. This body of thought has not been
developed. Rather it has been asserted and reasserted in the face of developments
since independence, with quotation and reference back but without new dimensions
or new directions." (Reeve 1985, 320) Indonesia did not manage to produce a coherent
vision and direction that could shape society and policy through the many political
changes, or rather, political non-changes in new dressings, through its early cabinets,
Guided Democracy, and the early New Order.

Concluding remarks
Both Guided Democracy and the New Order came about within the framework of the
state of exception. Sukarno used presidential powers to suspend parliament,
reinstated the 1945 constitution by decree, and for long periods the entire country
was under martial law. It was within this framework he could set up his system of
functional groups as an alternative to party democracy, and it was within this context
Suharto gained power and claimed legitimacy. While Suharto managed to position
himself and take advantage of the coup on 30 September, 1965, and as such in a sense
what would normally be called outside the scope of ordinary politics, it merely
emphasizes the fundamental mechanism of the state of exception. Both of these
leaders tried to enforce a certain vision of society and create a state of normalcy
according to their image and conception. Both failed, and both shared many of the
same characteristics. They claimed an Indonesian nationalism with an emphasis on
pancasila and the family principle and the unity of Indonesia. But actually putting these
values into practice, give them content never succeeded. Yet the state of exception
functioned as an attempt to enforce this (minimal) vision of society, however, without
giving the archipelago actual unity in any meaningful way. The American society was
born with a form of unity, India had been agitating for nationalism and created a mass-
based organization, the Indian Congress, in which democratic institutions could be fostered and competing nationalisms could be expanded upon and adjudicated for 60 years. Indonesia experienced this process of nationalist unity and agitation within a very short period in comparison, primarily mass-mobilizing it during the Japanese occupation. Any actual content to a nationalism beyond mere sloganism did not have time to be negotiated, discussed, or experimented with: it did not have time to mature. It was not that Indonesians did not express nationalist zeal and energy, as Feith was quoted on earlier. In fact, Indonesians showed a remarkable activity in the creation of bodies, political, as well as organizational, acronyms and ideas burst forth, but they all "had come to so little" (Reeve 1985, 248). This can be seen as an articulation of the many-faceted heterogeneity of the archipelago and its complete lack of unity and any form of "capitalist ethos". There is no overarching direction or agreement on what these ideas should entail and they are therefore easily manipulated by particular interests. What is at stake is the production of bodies where one can take on identity, fit in, and raise and fight for ones particular interests within a collective. This is partly also what is expressed by the functionalist system and family principle, which most of the nation claimed allegiance to: the individual has a specific space within society and thus endowed with a particular duty, but also a particular identity as part of a group - increasing that groups dignity, prestige and interests betters your position. That is, you work within this system which entrenches the positions and implies stasis; while not as extreme, it works somewhat similarly to the caste system in India. One does not necessarily want to get ahead of "the rest", but want one's group to "get ahead", and to "get ahead" within one's group. The means for this is patronage, the status emblems are luxurious consumption. It is the antithesis of the American Dream of creating one's own enterprise - one is already part of a group. And without a nationalism that can effectively give a vision for where the nation as a whole should direct its energies, the state becomes an arena for the different factions to gain spoils. These groups are not inherently productive in a self-sustaining growth perspective, but give meaning and identity to members of the collective - the groups work as vehicles for producing status. The inability of being able to find a
"succession" and what would happen when Sukarno died (see for example Reeve 1985, 215), underscores how fragmented these societies are - without the integrative force of a symbolic leader to unite disparate sections of society there is no central solid idea to take the place. There is no central loyalty or bureaucratic loyalty.
Conclusion

All three countries have a remarkable status within the democratic pantheon: the United States as the cradle of modern democracy; India as the largest democracy in the world; and Indonesia (now) the largest majority Muslim democracy. They all have a catalogue of nationalist paragons and founders: the founding fathers of The United States along with Abraham Lincoln; Gandhi and Nehru in India; and Sukarno in Indonesia, although less known. All of them are post-colonial countries, with the United States and Indonesia having to fight for their independence and India given to the people by the British. Since independence, they have shared some experiences while others have been unique. All faced serious threats to their integrity from within their borders, India experienced the traumatic Partition, and all had to abandon democracy at times. What this paper has underlined is that democracy and its antithesis, authoritarianism or dictatorship, is not necessarily qualitatively different but can rather be seen as a spectrum, or more precisely, the specter of dictatorship is part of the democratic logic. Whether authoritarianism through the form of the state of exception is employed is not a question of institutions per se, but one of decisions, and thus how persons experience and understand their world and environment. The state of exception works as a mechanism to bring this state about. As such, it is tied up with nationalism, and realization of that nationalism: what is the true fabric of society.

In the cases examined here, the American experience can be called the paradigmatic experience. America had a more or less coherent vision of the ideals of society - it was born with it from the British and hence all its institutions were infused with these ideals. It was the basic fabric of society. Through the different experiences and different trajectories of development in the North and the South, these ideals did not diverge, but rather the content was re-interpreted in different light qua the slave. The Civil War was the most extreme way to re-negotiate these values. What should be adjudicated by their impressive democratic institutions and their pledge of loyalty to them should have made resolution of the conflict peaceful. It was anything but. The conflict was too deep and fundamentally about the status of the slave, and hence, the status of the white man as well as his relationship to himself and labor - where he
derived his dignity, self-respect and status within society - is reflected in the slave. The Civil War was thus, fundamentally, a question about the status of labor relations and how labor confers status in two more and more diverging conceptions of the nation, and thus by extension, what made a man. It was a war of dignity, but one that has to be understood in the context of nationalism, how that national dignity was translated into personal terms: liberty and the right to own your own labor, individuality, and the value of getting ahead of your equals by hard work. The North managed to impose this vision on the Southern society in principle but in reality it was arguably a conflict that remained well into the 20th century. The American case shows how democracy, nationalism, and capitalism can be deeply tied up, and in this case it ends with a "successful resolution". America evolved into one of the most productive democracies in the modern world, a society devoted to the capitalist ethos and self-sustained growth. India, on the other hand, can be seen as a "middle of the road" case. Through the many years of nationalist agitation and interaction with the British Empire, India became acquainted with the structure and organization of democratic institutions. Nationalism became more and more widespread, and Gandhi succeeded in turning it into a mass-mobilization. However, not being born with it and having ancient institutions, differing in each region, and even within the same regions, this remarkably complex society had to figure out how to adapt this idea to the Pan-Indian context. Through the Indian National Congress they were endowed with an institution in which to figure out this question, but the answers and possibilities were endless. Against the British indignities they raised the spiritual and ancient civilization of the East into a positive value against the greedy, capitalist colonialist. What exactly this spirituality contained, what Indianess was, had to be created. It was, however, simple to figure out what it is not: Western. India attempted an alternative form of modernity, which had two forms. Gandhian modernity, or rather, anti-modernity taking pride in the village system, did not want to abolish caste, and almost sacralized poverty: the symbol of Gandhi, in his dhoti, his fasts, and his ascetic living, became the symbol of Indian spirituality to rally around. The other modernity was that of Nehru, an alternative to Western capitalism too, but the actual content of this modernity and
nationalism were hard to put into practice: how to create a prosperous society without the capitalist vision, how to create an "Indian" modern society? What was it? It needed to uproot the caste system, had to negotiate the place of tradition, had to negotiate what the idea of India was. The tensions came to fruition with the JP movement, representing and referring to the Gandhian appeals and symbols, trying to combat the corruption and greed of the central administration, and Indira Gandhi who maintained she continued her father's project. To protect this project and vision she had to suspend democracy to safeguard it. In Indira Gandhi's conception of the Indian society, she famously remarked "Are we not all secular?" A few months later she was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguard because of religious grievances overlapping with secessionist demands (Keay 2010, 580). We could interpret this as a defiant rejection of the modern, secular (both in the sense of non-religious, but also as the nation and its democracy expecting supreme allegiance before other loyalties -religious, or ethnic, cultural) India of her vision. In India they did not manage to tear down the traditional institutions, the authority structures, or create a truly secular society - caste is still an important matter, Hindu nationalism is on the rise, religion is entrenched in the constitution as specific privileges to certain groups. There was no central idea of India, and, for the period under analysis, a limited capitalist ethos. The implementation of the nationalist vision did not manage to break with the ancient institutions and loyalties of a many-facetted India. Caste is the most glaring example of this, but the many secessionist demands, demands from specific group interests, and so on are further examples. Nonetheless, India manages to claim reverence for the democratic form of politics, and from the comparative cases under examination here, I expect the institution of Congress was a major reason for the inculcation of democracy as the legitimate form of politics and part of the (if vague) national fiber. As Ambedkar, the untouchable co-creator of the constitution, remarked "in politics" India would have "equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value." (Guha 2007, 122) Although it had the
form of democracy, the nationalism did not manage to coalesce into a coherent form with much content in which to create a true nation of equals with a common goal and vision. In this sense it was in the middle of the road.

The final case, Indonesia, is also the "worst" example of the problems of uniting nationalism, democracy, and sustained growth. Being neither born with a nationalism, nor endowed with an institution in which it could effectively develop such as the Indian National Congress, Indonesia almost woke up to mass mobilization, mass-based nationalism and popular organization with the arrival of the Japanese. Within a very short time span, with an extremely fragmented organizational infrastructure and coherence (The United States simply kept their institutions, both in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, India took over the structures of the British Raj and was given authority), Indonesia literally had to stitch the country together. Furthermore, they had to figure out what Indonesia was in the middle of inter-regional war and war with the Dutch. As in the Indian case, the nationalism was largely defined by what it is not: Western. The actual content had to be created. Sukarno appeared on the political scene as the symbol of unity and was able to manipulate and create a basic idea of what Indonesia's values were: pancasila and unity through diversity. But they were almost devoid of content - the unity of Indonesia was symbolic in rhetoric and manifested by Sukarno historically as an idea of the Revolution, and in practice through the army and repression. The emptiness of the pancasila ideology made it possible for diverse groups to claim legitimacy and the contents changed rapidly in face of new experiences and failures - the vocabulary, however, did not. Thus it was easy to pass from phase to phase, from the democratic experiments, to Guided Democracy, to New Order. None of them, however, could produce meaningful content and direction to pancasila and development became exploitation, office became appanage (or rather, stayed appanage), as the political and social system never managed to create loyalty to the state and nation as such. Group interests, particularities and patronage were rampant, and the functionalist groups, which were supposed to alleviate this and create the harmonious Indonesian society without antagonistic interests, the real Indonesia, only further entrenched the problem. Thus
Suharto was the dictator who expropriated the most wealth from his country (Vickers 2013, 1), an activity that is decidedly anti-capitalist in ethos, and not in line with self-sustained growth. However, it was not just Suharto. Office and position were to the benefit of its possessor and those loyal to him in a fragmented polity that could not figure out its direction. In the Indonesian case, the state of exception failed to bring about nationalism, democracy, or a capitalist ethos.

All three cases, from the perspective of this thesis, are examples of how the state of exception is an integral part of the democratic logic. The way in which this logic changes and structures society (or rather attempts to), is deeply tied up with conceptions of nationalism and its relation to capitalism - and thus has an important effect on both. It is employed in order to direct the nation towards a certain vision and its "true interests", and as such it is a decision on what the citizen is. All the nations explored here attempted to create a state and by implication a citizenry that could be prosperous. In the cases of India and Indonesia it largely failed due to indigenous structures and how the state of exception was employed (Indonesia). Capitalist enterprise in these two countries were further marked by the stigma of colonialism and they thus had to shape a nationalism that could be developing but not "greedy" - modernity the Asian way. The conception of capitalism within this framework, however, had primarily a reference to nationalism, not democracy: it was not liberal capitalism. Democracy was assumed in all the cases but interpreted differently. Nationalism thus becomes the mediator between capitalism and democracy, and the state of exception (that decidedly anti-democratic mechanism, part of democracy's logic), becomes the instrument in which to realize them. But all three examples show the resilience of these societies. In the United States, the South remained antagonistic to the North, the caste system and traditionalism of India was not overcome, and Indonesia failed to achieve proper coherence and vision.

This should turn our focus to the possibility of exporting and producing democratic polities and economic development. As the complex web and interconnections of ideas, social groups, and institutions, mediated through the state of exception as this
thesis demonstrates, there is no simple procedural solution that can overcome these structures by democratic means. New ones have to be created and wrestle with old ones and the state of exception can be seen as a way of mediating between these and institutionalizing the desired ones (the perfect example of this is the American case - if any country should be able to mediate its differences through rational reasoning and democratic institutions, this should be it). It is in this perspective understandable why these tasks often fail: restructuring a society along new lines has serious consequences for the inhabitants’ experience and the 'blueprint' of their world. For example, the attempts at democratic exportation through warfare (Iraq, Afghanistan), and thus the logic of state of exception, is a case in point of the social structures that has to be overcome and redeveloped. But furthermore, it also underscores the fundamental aporia of democratic rule - to create democratic rule through force. Democracy, as well as capitalism, requires a specific way of life of its subjects. If this way of life is not prevalent, the logic dictates it must be forced.
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