The Case of Sudan
How the West Lost, and China Gained Influence

Peter Bang, Copenhagen Business School

Date: 02.03.2015
Master of Science in International Business and Politics
Supervisor: Anna Leander
Number of Pages: 79
STU Count: 175,036
# Table of Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of figures</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Literature</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Outline</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: International Relations and the English School</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The English School</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International system, international society and world society</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International System</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Society</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Society</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The English School in This Thesis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Research Methodology</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical Positioning</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Selection</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Conflict in Sudan</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in Darfur (2003-present)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudanese Civil War</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Sudan and the Rest of the World</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan and the West</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and Africa</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-interference</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China in Sudan</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1
List of figures

Figure 1. Visual outline and structure

Figure 2. The classic ‘Three Traditions’ model of the English School

Figure 3. Confirmed damaged and destroyed villages in Darfur February 2003 – December 2010

Figure 4. Conflict incidents in 2014 and casualties

Figure 5. Map of Sudan’s oil fields and blocks

Figure 6. Sudan’s oil export partners (2005-9)

Figure 7. China’s oil imports

Figure 8. China’s trade with Sudan

Figure 9. Development in trade between China and Sudan
Abstract
Since the Revolution of National Salvation in Sudan in 1989, Sino-Sudanese relations have developed and China is today one of Sudan’s closest allies throughout the international society. However, recent years have showed that China’s presence in Sudan and other African countries is not unilaterally positive. It has been confirmed that Chinese designed and manufactured arms have been used in the genocide in Darfur, circumventing the UN embargo. This thesis offers a historical explanation for the emergence of Sino-Sudanese relations. It also offers an explanation for the inability of Western Sanctions to prevent genocide and human rights violations in Darfur. Using the English School of International Relations, this thesis will argue that the China’s influential emerge has been a result of domestic and foreign factors. Sudan suffered from internal conflict already before obtaining independence in 1956. This thesis will argue that internal unrest has determined the leadership in Khartoum and been central for Sudan’s turn towards China. While internal conflict is central for understanding Sudan’s foreign policy. This thesis will show that internal conflicts have also been influenced by, initially Western and subsequently, Chinese involvement in Sudan. Lastly, it will be argued that Western values, with regard to human rights, have caused the international society to adopt an unconditional approach towards al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum. This approach has not only been ineffectual in preventing arms from entering Darfur. It has failed to facilitate peace in Sudan and it has also pushed al-Bashir away from the West. As such, this thesis will argue that foreign policy can be explained through interplay between countries as rational and socialised actors.
Acronyms

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU    African Union
CNPC  China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR   Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DUP   Democratic Unionist Party
EU    European Union
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
ICC   International Criminal Court
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IR    International Relations
IS-SOR Internal Security-Security of the Revolution
JEM   Justice Equality Movement
LJM   Liberation Justice Movement
MIC   Military Industry Corporation
NASC  National Alliance for the Salvation of the Country
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation
NIF   National Islamic Front
NORINCO China North Industries Corporation
ONGC  Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
PLO   Palestinian Liberation Organisation
RCC   Revolutionary Command Council
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons
SACDNU Sudan African Closed District National Union
SCP   Sudanese Communist Party
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-IO SPLM-in-Opposition
TMC   Transitional Military Council
UN    United Nations
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNROCA United Nation Register of Conventional Arms
US    United States
WHO   World Health Organisation
WTO   World Trade Organisation
Chapter 1: Introduction

Chinese involvements around the globe have in recent years generated increasing attention in Western media. Especially China’s engagement and investments in the African continent have gathered much attention. China’s greater involvement in the continent has brought cheap consumer goods to poor people in African countries. Further, Chinese companies have upgraded infrastructure and improved conditions for development by constructing roads and schools in large parts of Africa (Reuters, 2013). However, concerns have also emerged regarding China’s intentions and impact in African countries. Criticism has sprouted that China is exercising Neo-colonialism as part of their Africa strategy (Wall street journal, 2014). This criticism includes bringing bad habits, such as corruption, that undermine good governance in host countries (Economist, 2011), and disregard for human rights abuses (Economist, 2013). In other cases, Chinese companies have been accused of directly being involved in human rights abuses (Time Magazine, 2011).

Another area that has generated concern is the inflow of Chinese arms into African conflicts. China has in recent years become a much more active partner in arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China accounted for one quarter of total arms imports into Sub-Saharan Africa in the period of 2006 to 2010. This makes China the single largest arms supplier to the region (Wezeman et al., 2011). This development became the centre of an international outcry in 2008 when the ship An Yue Jiang was notoriously labelled ‘the Ship of Shame’, as it tried to offload munitions destined for Mugabe’s Zimbabwe (New York Times, 2008). South African dockworkers turned the ship away and refused to unload its controversial cargo, eventually causing it to depart for other ports. After being rejected by Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola, the ship was finally forced to head back to China (Telegraph, 2008).

Reports have also indicated that Chinese weapons have circumvented the United Nations (UN) arms embargo on Darfur and have made their way into the region. These arms have been accused of fuelling and prolonging the conflict, while also being used in genocide and human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2012). Meanwhile, the ever present use of
child soldiers in African conflict is also a considerable concern. Human Rights Watch continuously reports that South Sudanese government forces are actively and forcefully recruiting boys as young as 13 years old (Human Rights Watch, August 20, 2014; Human Rights Watch, February 16, 2015).

The inflow of Chinese arms into the region and the evident abuses of fundamental human rights have served as the main motivation behind this thesis. However, the purpose is not to conduct an in-depth study on the use of child soldiers. Nor is the purpose, to conduct a study on the prevalence of Chinese weapons in Africa per se. International governmental and Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are already covering this area extensively. This thesis will instead focus on a central element that has yet to receive much international attention. This is to 1) examine why China has become a major actor in Sudan and 2) why arms continue to flow into Sudan despite Western sanctions which have proven relatively ineffectual in facilitating peace in the country.

**Current Literature**

Before developing the final research question, it is important to get an overview of the current literature on the subject. This will help clarify where this thesis is positioned in contrast to other studies.

There has been written plenty with regard to the prevalence of arms in various conflicts. The UN, together with governmental organisations and NGOs provide substantial data with regard to conflicts. This data documents the flows and sighting of arms from most countries around the world, casualties, indirect mortality rates, number of incidents, human right violations, economic development, and social impact etc. (see SIPRI, Peace Research Institute Oslo, UN Comtrade, UNOCHA, and Small Arms Survey etc.).

Within Academia, the literature of conflict dynamics is also rich on publications regarding conflicts. This literature consists of two clusters. One cluster is attempts to explain how conflicts occur, while the other focuses on how conflicts can be prevented. In the first cluster there have been studies on how conflicts develop through: the role of ethnic disparities (Cederman et al., 2010; Eck, 2009), the availability of natural resources (Lujala, 2010; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005), the geography and location of conflicts (Buhaug et al., 2009; Buhaug,
the organisation structure of rebel groups (Akcinaroglu, 2012), or even income inequality (Sambanis, 2005). Other studies go further and examine how bargaining power between rebel groups and governments influence the outcome of conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2006; Hultquist 2013; Clayton, 2013). While all of these factors are important for a full understanding of conflicts, none of these studies consider the role of foreign actors.

Other studies do address this by investigating the prospects of third parties as mediators in conflict prevention (Piiparinen, 2008; Zwolski, 2012) and intervention (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Hoeffler, 2014). However, this does not explain foreign actors’ role beyond conflict resolution. For example, what the role and motivations for foreign governments and non-state actors are when interfering in conflicts, and how these actors influence these conflicts.

Some articles have tried to answer these questions. Findley and Marineau (2014) argues that actors are motivated by the availability of lootable resources. Kathman (2011) contends that actors’ motivation for intervention is linked to their regional geopolitical interests. Albornoz & Hauk (2014) explains how civil wars might be triggered or prolonged by foreign intervention. Similarly, Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) ties the outcome and length of civil wars to the nature of third party interference. This thesis is positioned closely to this latter group of conflict studies. What differentiates these studies from this thesis is their focus on quantitative data. The advantage of quantitative studies is that they often rely on large sample sizes. These studies are able to identify trends in the length, casualties, and outcome among a variety of different conflicts. Unfortunately, conflicts continue to erupt regularly throughout the world. It therefore makes sense to utilise the abundance of quantitative data that has been created by these conflicts. However, quantitative studies also have limitations. Their reliance on numerical descriptions makes them unable to provide narrative explanations. Identities, perceptions, and beliefs of people cannot be reduced to numbers and cannot be adequately understood without reference the context people live in (Choy, 2014). A combination of both quantitative and qualitative studies is needed for a full understanding of foreign actors’ influence conflicts. This thesis will attempt to complement the last group of conflicts studies mentioned above by providing a qualitative explanation.
One of the existing qualitative studies on the subject is Selwyn Ryan’s *Civil conflict and External involvement in Eastern Africa*. It provides an in-depth study of foreign states’ involvement in conflicts across eastern Africa, while analysing the motivations and strategies of these involvement (Ryan, 1973). Yet, this study is over forty years old. Since 1973, the world order has changed dramatically. The cold war has ended along with the typology of first, second, and third world. Although Russia still keeps close relationships with African states, it is to no extend as involved as it was during the Cold War (African Development Group Bank, 2011). Instead, China has emerged as a major actor in the African continent (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

**Research Question**

As mentioned earlier, Chinese arms and their role in human rights abuses in Sudan have served as the main motivation for this thesis. However, the goal is not to account for their prevalence in the country. The goal of this thesis is study the background behind this development. The Sudanese government has been accused by both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for circumventing arms embargoes and using Chinese weapons against civilians (Amnesty International, 2012; Henry, 2014). Moreover, sub-Saharan Africa has in recent years has seen a greater influx of Chinese involvement and weapons (Wezeman et al., 2011). It is therefore important to question why this development has taken place since it can potentially help avoid a similar situation in other countries.

The outset of this thesis is to investigate which factors have facilitated to China becoming a major actor in Sudan and China’s supply of arms to the country. Through this, it will become evident why Western sanctions against the regime in Khartoum have been ineffectual in preventing human rights violations. Hence, the thesis will attempt to answer the following research question:

*What have been the historical mechanisms that have caused China to become a major foreign actor in Sudan, and how has this influenced conflicts in the Sudan?*

To answer this question, the English School of International Relations will be used as the theoretical framework. The English School is chosen because it embraces methodological pluralism. As such, it recognises the importance of both qualitative and quantitative studies.
Thesis Outline

To answer the research question, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 will present the theoretical framework of the English School. The English school is positioned before the methodology, since it has substantial influence on the ontology, epistemology and methodology of the thesis. Chapter 3 consists of the methodological approach. Here the ontology, epistemology and methodology will be developed with regard to the English School as present in chapter 2. Following these two chapters, chapter 4 will go into detail with regard to the four most serious conflicts that Sudan has suffered from since its independence in 1956. Unfortunately, the total number of conflicts in the country exceeds the scope of the thesis. Because of this, only the most relevant will be chosen. With the historical foundation of conflicts in Sudan concluded, chapter 5 will examine how Sudan’s domestic environment has shaped the country’s foreign relations. Moreover, how these foreign relations has shaped the various leaderships in the country, which have subsequently reshaped its position in the international society. Chapter 6 will give an explanation for how Sudan’s internal conflicts and foreign policy relates to the English School and the thesis’ theoretical foundation. Finally chapter 6 will conclude the findings of the thesis and answer the research question. The reason for arranging the thesis this way is to achieve a progressive structure where each chapter leads to the next.
Chapter 2: International Relations and the English School

What does the English School possess that make it so relevant for answering the research question? Perhaps the easiest way to show this is to highlight the different features that constitute the original research question. Alternatively, the research question could have been divided into three questions asking: Why has Sudan turned east? How has China managed to become a major actor in Sudan? And how has this influenced the conflicts in Sudan? Despite being divided into three, these questions share two main properties that make the English School particularly relevant. Firstly, all three questions are concerned with the relationship between states. Hence it makes good sense to look within IR for a theoretical framework. Secondly, all three questions can be answered through historical narration. This makes the English School particularly compelling, it is the approach within IR that perhaps most extensively encourages analysis through a historical lens. Moreover, the English School recognises the importance of both quantitative and qualitative studies. This conforms well to the arguments presented in chapter 1. Apart from these principal reasons, this chapter will show several other aspects that make the English School relevant for the ontology, epistemology, methodology, structure, and analysis of this thesis. The following section will outline the main features of the English School.

The English School

The English School has often been perceived as a *via media* approach within the IR literature. The methodological pluralism associated with the school together with scarce attention given to its epistemology has spawned scholars to question if the school has potential as a ‘grand theory’ (Finnemore, 2001). The scarce epistemological attention together with its methodological pluralism appears to confused scholars on how to interpret the school. Finnemore (2001) considers its defining attribute – the methodological pluralism – to be useful from a constructivist perspective. However, she also questions whether this defining
attribute inherently limits the school's potential as a viable ‘grand theory’ in IR. She even questions if it is desirable for the school to become a grand theory since it:

“requires a degree of cohesion and discipline that is antithetical to the methodological pluralism that has characterized the English School works and which Barry Buzan views as one of its strongest virtue” (Finnemore, 2001; 509).

This stands in stark contrast to Barry Buzan’s *The English School: An unexploited Resource in IR* which reasons that the methodological pluralism as its strongest virtue can provide a foundation for the potential development of a grand theory (Buzan, 2001). In this respect it is important to note, that IR as a discipline historically has been slow to develop its epistemological and methodological positions. This lack of self-conscious reflection made Mervyn Frost to declare IR as the ‘backward discipline’ in 1986 (Wight, 2002). Totten (2012) agrees Buzan’s vision and argues that the English School should be considered a core theory in IR. With greater epistemological development and ontological clarity, it has the potential to move beyond the notion of merely being a *via media* between rationalist and reflectivist disciplines. It is a theory that “*bridges the rationalist and reflectivist divide*” (Totten, 2012; ii). Totten proposes that the school’s philosophical foundations should be based on Critical Realism. This will facilitate ontological clarity and help the development towards grand theory status (ibid.).

The school originated in the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1959-1984), under the guidance of Hedley Bull, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and Adam Watson (Knudsen, 2000). However, it was Roy E. Jones’ (1981) open critique against the school that first formulated the term ‘English School’, a critique that also placed the school within the London School of Economics (Totten, 2012). Since the 1980s a growing number of scholars have recognized the English School as a distinct direction within IR (Knudsen, 2000)

The central feature that holds the school together is its assertion of theoretical pluralism and effort to capture the totality of international relations. Its advocates consider it a tradition of conversation, where people can take part in the discussion without being dedicated to any particular structure (Buzan & Little, 2001). With this in mind, the school acknowledges that it should not be considered anything but an interpretive theory. Its analytical onset is to
apply a wide theoretical lens to the explanation of history and contemporary politics (Totten, 2012).

Dunne (1998) defines the boundaries of the English School, based on three ‘preliminary articles’ (Totten, 2012). The first is in reference to Bull’s notion of the classical approach of IR, an approach that theorises on the basis of philosophy, history and law (Bull, 1966). Especially the historical approach is critical. As Bull proclaims:

“[O]ur subject can be understood only in historical perspective, and that without an awareness of the past that generated it, the universal international society of the present can have no meaning” (as cited in Totten, 2012; 3).

This devotion to a historical approach is also shared by contemporary scholars of the school, e.g. Buzan (2010) which discusses the prospect of the international society based on the historical evolution of it (Buzan, 2010).

The second ‘article’ according to Dunne, is the interpretive nature of the school. This is also closely related to Bull’s typology of the classical approach. Central to Bull’s argument is the insistence of IR as characterized by the exercise of judgment. Confinement to strict standards of proof and verification make conclusions within IR insignificant. “General propositions ... must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition” (Bull, 1966; 361). In this process, general propositions must not be regarded to be anything but tentative and inconclusive (ibid.).

The third ‘article’ is the emphasis on the separation of values. Proper judgments are constructed on values that are present within the international society as opposed to the values that should be prevailing. From this position, Martin Wight exposes the fallacies of realism, rationalism and revolutionism given the distinctive moral position represented within each (Totten, 2012). Significant works within the English School are defined by this neutrality between order and justice. As Bull stresses in his introduction to The Anarchical Society, his intention is “not to prescribe solutions or canvass the merits of any particular vision of the world order or any particular path that might lead to it” (Bull, 1995; xviii).

Apart from the three central features presented by Dunne, the English school moves further. Martin Wight articulates three traditions of international theory: Realism, rationalism and
revolutionism. For Wight it is only possible to understand international affairs comprehensively by employing all three perspectives. Only through the use of all three traditions is it possible to reach a holistic explanation of international politics. These three traditions represent the spectrum of principles which are all vital for the explanation of international politics. From state-centric self-interest, to a Kantian concept of world society. In this regard the study of international politics becomes contextually organized and context offers an incentive for movement between each approach (Totten, 2012).

**Figure 2. The Classic 'Three Traditions' model of the English School**

- **Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism (Realism) [International System]**
- **Grotesianism (Rationalism) [International Society]**
- **Kantianism (Revolutionism) [World Society]**


*Note: Titles in ( ) are Wight’s labels; titles in [ ] are the analytical focus; titles along the border zones are where the traditions blend into each other.*

**International system, international society and world society**

Another central element to the English School is its stratification of the world into three divisions. Representing the theoretical pluralism of the school, these three divisions line up with Wight’s three traditions. The foundation of the English School is the idea that these three divisions exist at the same time (Buzan, 2004).
International System

The international system resembles the notion of mainstream realism and neorealism. Central to it is the position of power politics amongst states. This highlights the inherent anarchical nature of the world. As noted by Tilly (1990), states form an international system to the extent that they interact with each other regularly. As such, the emphasis is on the existence of sovereign states, and national priorities (Buzan, 2004).

The international system is the precondition for the existence of an international society. Because of this, an international system can exist without it being an international society. A group of states can interact with each other and hereby create the foundations for the international system. This does not presuppose this group to also construct an international society. Turkey, China, Japan and Korea were part of a European-dictated international system before they became part of the subsequent European-dictated international society (Bull, 1995). When states encounter each other, they are part of an international system. This may be represented through trade, war or alliances. However, this does not necessarily constitute the formation of an international society, without the existence of a set of common interest and values that will give these exchanges additional substance (Bull, 1995).

International Society

As noted above the International system is a prerequisite for the formation of an international society. The development from an international system to an international society materializes when some kind of commonality exists between groups of states. An international society is the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states (Buzan, 2001). A common feature among historical international societies is a foundation on shared culture or civilization, or at least some of the elements of a shared civilization: language, understanding of the world, religion, or ethical code (Bull, 1995). As Bull asserts in The Anarchical Society:

“A society of states (or international society) exist when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound of a common set of rules in the relations with one another, and share the working of common institutions” (Bull, 1995; 13).
Through this Bull articulates three intrinsic goals for all societies. First, all societies seek protection against violence. Second, all societies strive for the assertion that promises are kept and agreements are undertaken. Third, all societies wish to safeguard proprietary rights (Bull, 1995). A society’s ability to achieve these goals conveys the level of order in that society (Totten, 2012). Similarly, states have goals for entering a society with other states. First, they seek to the preserve the system and society of states itself i.e. the Westphalian states system. The second goal is to preserve the sovereignty of the states themselves. Third, states seek to maintain peace among each other. This should not be mistaken by universal peace; instead absence of war is the normal condition for states’ continuing relationship. Fourth, the primary goals common to all societies is protection against violence (Bull, 1995).

**World Society**

World society has been the ‘Cinderella’ concept of the English School and has generally received less attention than the international system and the international society (Buzan, 2004). Although, Bull does address the concept of ‘World government’ in *The Anarchical Society*, he remarks that there is not enough evidence that sovereign states will be willing to subordinate themselves to it (Bull, 1995). This argument is not sufficient for Buzan. He argues that world society have been a dustbin for the English School, a place that have been used to deposit what it did not want to talk about. For Buzan this trend is not surprising. The concept has historically been overwhelmed with different perceptions of it. The development and clarification of world society is critical for the validity of the English School, since it can help the school to explain central issues such as globalization (Buzan, 2004).

Classical thinkers contend that it is a prerequisite for the international society. The international society will not come into existence without a shared degree of culture and understanding. Others discuss the nature of the world society. On this issue, the English School has been divided into two clusters: pluralists and solidarists. The core of this debate has been, whether human rights should be considered natural law or positive law. Inspired by Grotius, solidarists argue that human rights should be considered natural law. They are universal and apply to all humans. Contrarily, Bull rejects Grotius’ notion of universalism. Instead, he sides with Oppenheim in that “there are no rules that are valid independent of
human will, that are part of “nature”. Natural law cannot accommodate the fact of moral disagreement, so prominent in the domain of international relations" (as cited in Buzan, 2004; 54). According to these two approaches, the two arguments are mutually exclusive. Whereas Grotius inspired scholars consider rights to be positioned on individuals, Bull upholds that individuals can only claim rights through the state.

Buzan disagrees to this debate. He holds that acceptance of positive law eliminate the notion of them being mutually exclusive to natural law. Instead, rights should be seen on a spectrum from ‘thin’ to ‘thick’. Pluralism is a thinner body of positive law that represents a lower degree of share norms, rules and institutions. Meanwhile, solidarism represents a thicker body of positive law with a higher degree of norms. Taking this position allow for a more juridical view of sovereignty, where the right to self-government is determined by the international society. Hence, sovereignty can be considered to be a social contract (Buzan, 2004).

Reading through this it becomes evident how unclear the concept of world society has been within the English School. For Buzan, the approach to get beyond this opacity is to consider world society as a vehicle to bring non-state actors into the school. This is an area that the English School has been criticised for not addressing. Through this, the international system and international society are state centric levels of analysis, while the world society is concerned with non-state actors. However, this can only be achieved by limiting Kantianism to the solidarist end of international society. Otherwise, there will not be a clear distinction between international society and world society. This approach does not imply neglecting issues such as human rights. Instead, it follows that its analysis has to be based on the interplay between international society and world society (Buzan, 2004).

The English School in This Thesis

The use of the English School has comprehensive implications for the remaining of this thesis. As noted above, it dictates the ontology, epistemology, methodology, structure and analysis. This will be developed in detail in the chapter 3. For now, there are several brief points that ought to be considered before reading through the thesis. First is the acknowledgement that the thesis is interpretive. IR is inherently complex to analyse and unlike other sciences, this thesis contends that, it is not practical analyse by isolating
variables. Second, in tradition with the English School the thesis does not postulate on how the world should be. Rather, it expresses what historical events that have caused the current situation in Sudan. Third, the interplay between the international system, international society and world society is both implicitly and explicitly presented throughout the thesis. While it exists within the structure of the thesis, this interplay is more explicitly expressed in the Chapter 6.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This chapter will frame the methodological approach that will be used to answer the research question. Initially, this thesis' philosophical approach will be presented in order to position its ontology and epistemology with regard to the English School. Secondly, the research methodology will be highlighted. This will provide the method of analysis, as well as, the data collection method. This chapter is structured progressively, i.e. the ontology contributes to the development of the epistemology which subsequently drives the methodological choices. Central to this progressive development is the influence exerted by the English School. At the end of the chapter it should be clear, why these methodological choices are made and more importantly why this method is relevant for answering the research question.

**Philosophical Positioning**

What is science? This is a question that is widely disagreed upon in social science. Knowledge is not merely knowledge. There is not only one correct approach within social science. Philosophy of science is concerned with three questions: What is the world really made of? What is Knowledge? And how do we know? Each of these three questions is tied to three fundamental pillars: Ontology, epistemology, and methodology, respectively (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Although there is no correct way to conduct a study, consideration with regard to these three pillars is necessary. Inability to consider the most relevant approach may lead to studying apples when it was intended to study oranges. The purpose of this section is to develop a research approach which provides coherence between philosophy of science and the objective of this thesis.
Ontology

Ontology denotes the study of being i.e. the nature of things that have existence. Ontology is concerned with answering the question of what the world is really made of (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). When using the English School as a foundation for analysis, this question raises potential issues that need to be addressed.

The philosophical positioning of the English School has only scarcely been developed. This has inclined scholars to question the validity of the school as a separate approach. Conventional wisdom suggests that the school ought only to be considered a via media between the ‘grand theories’ of IR (Little, 2000). Further, following this wisdom, Finne more (2001) ‘admirers’ the English School and finds it useful in her work. However, she admits to do this from a constructivist perspective. Though she welcomes Buzan’s efforts to develop the school’s position as a grand theory, she notes:

“I am less optimistic than Buzan, however, about the prospects that the English School will become either a grand theory or the focus of new trans-Atlantic IR debates” (Finnemore, 2001; 509).

The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the legitimacy of the English School. However, the importance of clarifying its philosophical and methodological approach becomes evident from the quote above. Conventional IR’s treatment of the school as a via media has meant that it has merely been seen as a toolbox useful for supporting existing theories. This is not surprising, considering its methodological pluralism. The stratification of the world employs numerous approaches. The international system is based on realism; the international society shares perspectives with rationalism; and world society uses elements from revolutionism. This has caused the school to merely be relevant for other IR approaches depending on the context studied.

Despite its critique, scholars within the English School have advanced and made attempts to develop its ontological position. Barry Buzan has been one the biggest frontrunners in this process. In From International to World Society?, he explains the ontological pluralism of the English School. The international system and international society are based on the ontology of states. This is not the case for world society, which is based on the ontology of non-state
actors. For Buzan, the distinction between international system and international society constitutes the distinction between a physical system (international system) and a social system (international society). This raises the question, whether there also exists a ‘world system’ as a physical extension of world society. For Buzan, this is not the case. Instead of distinguishing between a physical system and a social system, the centre of attention should be given to what Alexander Wendt defined as ‘rump materialism’ (Buzan, 2004). Rump materialism is the acceptance that states exist regardless of its social construct. This view recognises that states are socialised into the international society. However, it also recognises states are rational actors that function regardless of its socialisation. Through this, the distinction between physical and social system is blurred (Guzzini, 2013). For Buzan, this raises the question of whether the English School should maintain the distinction between international system and international society. Dissolving this distinction makes the idea of a world system redundant since non-state actors are exposed to the same dynamics as states (Buzan, 2004). The notion of rump materialism is central for this thesis. It presents how Sudan as part of the international system has acted as a rational actor while being socialised in an international society. In this thesis the distinction will be maintained since it allows for a clearer expression of this interplay.

For Buzan, it is this interplay between the states as rational and socialised actors that transcends the English School from merely being a via media. It represents a third perspective that enables the school to go beyond the binary opposition between conventional grand theories (Buzan, 2004).

Totten (2012) takes a different tactic. He attempts to tie the English School to Critical Realism by arguing that the latter serves as a meta-theoretical base. The stratification of the world that the English school advocates, roughly follows Bhaskar’s notion of the domains of the Real, Actual, and Empirical in that the former is a subset of the middle, which is a subset of the latter (Bhaskar, 2008). This complements Bull’s idea of the international system being a prerequisite of the international society which, in turn, is a prerequisite of the world society. For Totten, this is evident in that Bhaskar advocates ontological materialism. The social world is dependent on the biological and physical world. Objects’ meaning are given through their material properties; as such, their understanding is socially constructed. Equally, social structures are constructed by the relations to these material objects.
Translated into the context of the English School, the international system, international society, world society should not be regarded as independent domains. They are constructed through the inherent opacity that exists between them. The international system, as a prerequisite, defines the boundaries of the international society. Meanwhile the former is constituted by the nature of the latter (Totten, 2012). This implicates that the international system is a historical stage that arises before the emergence of an international society. Given this logic, the international system can be seen as the condition for how international relations would be without a corresponding international society (Little, 2000).

The English School's ontology acknowledges realist assumptions. Both Bull and Buzan acknowledge the realists' logic of anarchy. As such, the centrality of states remains an important point of analysis. Bull did not discard Kenneth Waltz' conception of balance of power as an unintended consequence of anarchic international system. Instead he argued that this conception on its own is inadequate (Little, 2000).

These arguments constitute the ontological foundation of this thesis. This will be presented by the interplay between Sudan and the international society. This interplay constitutes an important factor for the evolving relationship between China and Sudan. Further, this thesis acknowledges that the international system is a prerequisite for the international society. This allows for an explanation of which elements of shared civilisation that constructed the international society.

**Epistemology**

As outlined above, the ontological positon of the English School acknowledges the existence of states as rational actors. This view resembles that of the realist approach within IR. This is contrarily not the case with regard to its epistemological approach. Instead the school encourages the interplay between a physical system (international system) and a social system (international society). For Buzan, this interplay is tackled with the introduction of Wendt's 'rump materialism'. This is the notion of states as having exogenous interests to those of the international society. These exogenous interests are defined to the extent that states’ identity and interest are constructed on domestic or systemic structures. If the answer is domestic, a state's interest will be exogenous to the international system. If, instead the answer is systemic, a state's interest will be endogenous to the international
Introducing this to the English School allows it to blur the distinction between the presence of physical and social systems. This allows the three domains to survive, instead of having to introduce a world system as a fourth pillar. As Buzan mentions:

“The basic idea of international society is quite simple: Just as human being as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by. This social element has to be put alongside realism’ raw logic of anarchy if one is to get a meaningful picture of how systems and states operate” (Buzan, 2004; 8).

This quote highlights the inherently opaque boundaries that exist between the international system, international society and world society. Further, it ties the epistemology to the ontological foundation.

Another aspect that is central is to identify, is the context of the study. This can be done by categorising the three domains with respect to their type of actors. While international system and international society are concerned with states, world society is concerned with non-state actors. Analysis of international relations needs to be contextually assessed with respect to which domain the analysis is concerned. Another way is to identify the interests of states. This is in respect to the interest and identity of a state being domestically or systemically determined. This is to identify whether states’ interest are exogenous or endogenous to those of the international society. The devotion to context as the deciding factor for the foundation of the analysis, explains the epistemological pluralism of the English School. Context offers a vehicle for researchers to move between different approaches (Totten, 2012).

Despite context being central to the English School, it merely serves as the tool to arrive at a holistic picture of world order. Studies of international relations are fundamentally complex. This is the reason for context and theoretical pluralism being crucial. Without these tools, only half of the picture can be painted. For example, it is not exclusively states that are providers of world order, like realists would say. There are a range of Inter-governmental Organizations and International Non-Governmental Organizations that provide and support global governance. Organisations like the WTO, WHO, and Amnesty International etc. are all providers of world order to the same extent as states (Buzan, 2004).
These aspects of the English School resemble the ideas of Critical Realism. Bull, acknowledged that the general propositions of IR “cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to the doubtful origin” (Bull, 1966; 361). Similarly, Bhaskar acknowledges the need for interpretation and argues that without it “it is impossible to sustain the rationality of scientific growth and change” (Bhaskar, 2008; 4). Likewise, the English School does not disregard realist assumptions. Neither does Critical Realism disregard positivist assumptions. Instead, both frameworks encourage expansive epistemological approaches, i.e. theoretical pluralism (Totten, 2012). Only through this approach can the entire picture painted.

**Methodology**

Given the ontology and epistemology outlined above, the next question is how it is possible to acquire knowledge, i.e. how do we know? And what methods should be used to collect data? These are the main questions regarding the methodology (Moses & Knutsen, 2012).

As outlined above, the English School acknowledges realist perspectives, namely that states, and non-state actors are rational actors. However, it also argues that states are socialised through its interactions with other states. Further, these actors' identity and interests are endogenous or exogenous depending on systemic or domestic structures, respectively. These identities and interests are historically determined. This is why the English School encourages that historical explanations contain key answers to the social constructs of IR analysis. As such, patterns in history are an important point of departure (Little, 2000). This is exemplified when reading Ryan (1973). Here it becomes glaringly obvious how inherently multidimensional the study of IR is. Using different cases throughout eastern Africa he demonstrates how different states had different motives for getting involved in the region. More importantly, Ryan presents the domestic sphere of states into his analysis. IR cannot simply be seen as the relationship between states, leaders and policymakers. States have to take domestic considerations when interacting with other states and the international society. Like other actors being influenced through social interaction, states should be viewed as social actors. Hence, states decision making process is influenced by both historical factors and social relations (Ryan, 1973).
This focus on historical explanations was one of the main reasons for the selection of the English School. As mentioned in the chapter 1, the research question can be divided into three separate ones. Each of these questions can be answered through historical explanations. When conducting a historical study it makes sense to use case studies. However, China’s engagement in Africa is not confined to Sudan and it would have been possible to adopt several cases. The *raison d’être* for only using Sudan as a case is the complexity of analysis from an English School perspective. This is manifested by the interplay between states and other states, the international society, and non-state actors. Moreover, the complexity of IR as presented Ryan (1973) makes it well beyond the scope of this thesis to adopt several cases. If multiple cases were to be used, the depth and level of analysis of each case would become far too superficial to be justifiable. Lastly, the case of Sudan is exceptionally complex in itself. Since its independence in 1956 Sudan has suffered from numerous intrastate and interstate conflicts. Going into detail with each of these conflicts is beyond the scope of this thesis and introducing additional cases is admittedly unrealistic.

**Data Collection**

The employment of case studies is essential for determining how to collect data. Given the decision to conduct only one case study, it is most sensible to make use of qualitative data. Further, the decision to heavily rely on historic events limits the applicability of statistical data. Statistics are relevant for certain parts of the thesis. It allows quantifying the effects of historic events. This is relevant in relation to Sudan’s economic situation, arms flows between China and Sudan, and the number of casualties. Quantitative data present a central part of this thesis. Most of this data is retrieved from secondary sources; these include United Nations specialised agencies, governmental institutions, and NGOs. Using secondary quantitative sources has been decided due to the sheer volume of existing data on the subject. Letting these organisations analyse and compile large volumes of data is much more favourable than relying on individual field reports, since this would obstruct the broad perspective.

Although quantitative data do constitute an important part of this thesis, the bulk of sources are qualitative. This has been decided due to the nature of the research question, as well as
prevalence of the English School. The purpose of the thesis is to examine the background behind the strengthened relations between China and Sudan. Given that states will be treated as rational and socialised actors, qualitative data offers more depth than quantitative data. The nature of the research question makes it counterproductive to quantify Sudan’s decision making. Unlike the quantitative data, the qualitative data will originate from both secondary as well as primary sources. These sources will derive from a wide array news articles, books, academic journals, reports, press releases from NGOs, and legal documents from the United Nations. Although most academic journals and books used in this thesis are secondary sources, a few transcends this. Ted Dagne, has worked as a former advisor for current President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit. Meanwhile Bona Malwal previously worked as advisor for current President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir. These two authors, together with news agencies, UN documents and NGO reports compose the base of primary sources.

To the extent possible this thesis will use primary sources for historical explanations. However, every source included will be evaluated to ensure its credibility. Secondary sources will only be used when deemed more credible than the available primary sources. The approach to focus primary sources has been decided, based on the historic narrative of the thesis. When examining historical events, it is important to use information that has been filtered through interpretation as little as possible. Despite focusing on primary sources, the inclusion of secondary sources has been deemed acceptable for several reasons. As mentioned above it, primary sources are in some cases unreliable. These can deliberately or unintentionally be tainted by personal agendas. In these cases, peer-reviewed sources will generate relatively objective supply of information. A second reason to allow the use of secondary sources is the acceptance of intrinsic and extrinsic influences. Any source, whether primary or secondary, is filtered through interpretation. This is regardless of whether the source originates from first-hand knowledge of political advisors or scholars from a university. This relates back to the actors being rational (intrinsic influence) and socialised (extrinsic influence). Second, given the open nature of the world, recognised by both the English School and Critical Realism, no sources can ever obtain full knowledge of a subject. With this in mind, secondary sources can provide valuable information, as long as it is considered a reliable source.
Case Selection

In 2011 it was estimated that Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa were $14 billion. The majority of this is concentrated in four countries, namely Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and more recently South Sudan (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). This makes these four countries especially interesting when examining China’s growing influence in Africa. However, out of these countries, the case of Sudan is more relevant than the others. It has been subject to fierce condemnations from the West since a coup in 1989 brought current President, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir to power. Sudanese relations with the West have been especially bad since the outbreak of armed conflict in Darfur in 2003. While Sudan has been isolated from the West, China has emerged as one of its closest allies and Chinese companies have become the largest foreign shareholders in the country. Additionally, it has for some time been reported that Chinese arms have flowed into the Darfur conflict circumventing the UN arms embargo that was imposed on the region in 2004. These factors make Sudan particularly relevant when examining the interplay between states as rational and social actors. Lastly, the continuous and ongoing conflict in the country makes it important to study. This can potentially provide new knowledge of how to handle conflicts.
Chapter 4: Conflict in Sudan

As mentioned in the preceding two chapters, Sudan’s position in the international society plays a central part of this thesis. Further, through Wendt’s *rump materialism* it has been acknowledged that both domestic as well as foreign aspects contribute to this position. From this standpoint it would make little sense to immediately analyse Sudan’s foreign relations. At best, this would provide insufficient reasons for Khartoum’s foreign policy, while at worst lead to false conclusions. A study of the country’s domestic sphere is needed. This will highlight how different internal conflicts and changing leaderships have formed the country’s foreign policy. This has ultimately defined Sudan’s relationship with the West and the China.

Sudan has been a country of conflict for the past many years. This began already before independence in 1956, when the Christian and ethnically black south found itself marginalized against the Arab and Muslim North. Before 1947, there was little contact between the two regions. This was in spite of the region being under administration from Egypt and Great Britain. However, the British administration came under pressure from Egypt and the Northern Sudanese elite to annex the South to the North. At this time the British were also trying to strengthen its control over the White Nile. This combination of pressure and efforts to strengthen its presence made the British endorse the annexation. This decision was made without consulting the Southern Sudanese people, who were excluded altogether from the Juba conference (Malwal, 2015). Since then numerous armed conflicts have swept across the country. So many in fact that presenting them all is beyond the scope of this thesis. In this chapter only the four most relevant conflicts will be presented. These four conflicts are the First Sudanese Civil War from 1555 to 1972, the Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005, the ongoing Conflict in Darfur that started in 2003, and the ongoing South Sudanese Civil War which arose in 2013. The former two are vital for a historical understanding of the current leadership in Khartoum. Meanwhile, the latter two represents the current situation in Sudan. These two conflicts have allegedly been
affected by Sudan’s relationship with China. They therefore represent the consequences of Sudan’s position in the international society.

It is important to note that throughout the rest of the thesis, when referring to Sudan, both the North and South are included. Though the South obtained independence in 2011, its association with the north for many years makes this a logical reference.

**First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)**

By 1898 Sudan had come under Anglo-Egyptian administration. Due to different history, culture and identity it was decided that the North and South were to be divided into two separate regions. Hereby, the Christian South would be protected from being influenced by the Arab culture and Islam of the North. However, by the mid-1940s pressure from Nationalists in the North and from Egypt was mounting. At a Conference in Juba in 1947, the British decided to merge the North and South into one unified administrative system. This happened without consulting or gaining consensus from southerners who were excluded altogether from the conference (Idris, 2013). Following the annexation, Northern elites refused to engage with the South in any way that could be considered mutual or equal and the relationship began to deteriorate already by 1952. In August 1955 outraged Southern troops revolted in the town of Torit. Initially the mutiny was triggered by the decision to disarm South Sudanese soldiers and transfer them to the northern part of the country. However, the mutiny soon became a symbol of the North’s discrimination against the South. Khartoum ruthlessly attempted to repress the rebellion, and countless massacres occurred across South Sudan, even in districts that had not joined the rebellion. What had started as a local rebellion soon became a fight for all Southerners against the North. By 1957 the South sent a delegation to Khartoum with demands for the establishment of a federation. However, these demands were quickly dismissed as Khartoum interpreted them as a pretext for separation (Malwal, 2015).

The following year, Abdalla Khalil, who had been publicly elected in 1957, carried out at *coup d’état* against his own government and handed over power to the military under the command of General Ibrahim Abboud. Realising the South’s reluctance to concede on its demands, the sitting government preferred to hand over power to the military rather than to politically compromise. Needless to say, the new military leadership favoured authoritarian
strategies rather than pursuing a political solution. Firstly, this was manifested by introducing policies intended to assimilate the South. Christian Missionaries became restricted in their activities and the government introduced measures to expand the Arabic language as well as Islam. Secondly, the military dismantled the 1957 parliament. Fearing for repercussions its South Sudanese members were forced into exile in neighbouring countries (Idris, 2013; Malwal, 2015).

In response to the discriminatory policies, exiled politicians founded the Sudan African Closed District National Union (SACDNU) in February 1962. The Goal of SACDNU was to obtain complete independence for the South. Initially, it adopted a diplomatic approach to the issue. It did not dismiss the influence of Arabic language and Islam in Sudanese society, but questioned if it was essential for unity. However, by 1963 the increasing violence forced SACDNU to adopt military strategy through its armed wing, the Anya-Nya (Idris, 2013).

In the North, Abboud had come under pressure. The atrocities committed in the South and the failure of the regime to improve or resolve the situation soon led to his demise. In October 1964 he was forced to resign. This gave a minor hope for improving the situation. With great difficulties a roundtable conference was organized in early March 1965, before the election for a new government. Negotiations at the conference proved to be difficult. With elections only three months away no leaders from the North wanted to be considered soft towards the South. Yet again the South found its demands for federation, self-determination, or separation to be rejected (ibid.).

After the election in June that year, the newly inducted government led by Ismail al-Azhari declared all members of the Southern Front party to be outlaws and instructed the Army to liquidate these outlaws. Prime Minister Mahgoub went further, and declared that the roundtable had only spurred additional rebellion in the south, stamping all educated South Sudanese as rebels:

“They serve in the government offices during the day, in order to receive their salaries, with which they support the rebellion at night, these South Sudanese government officials were commanders of the rebellion, killing the government forces. They must be uprooted and eliminated” (Malwal, 2015; 99).
Only one month later the government began ruthless massacres on the civilian population in the South. On the night of July 9 more than 1,400 people were killed in the Southern capital city of Juba alone (Idris, 2006).

This policy continued until 1969, when General Gaafar Nimeiri headed a successful coup against al-Azhari’s government. Nimeiri acknowledged the cultural and historical differences and stated that unity had to be built with these realities in mind. Despite this change in spirit, Nimeiri failed to reconcile with the exiled leaders supporting the rebellion. Nimeiri had hoped to find a solution together with South Sudanese politicians and made no effort to contact the South Sudanese exiles, who continued their fighting. A failed coup against Nimeiri in 1971 triggered significant changes to his approach. Initially, Nimeri had advocated for socialist policies. However, the involvement of the Sudan Communist Party and possibly the Soviet Union changed his attitude. He recognized that the Southern problem had been a major factor in the demise of every government since independence. Following the coup, Khartoum became more favourable towards direct negotiations with the rebels. The previous Minister for Southern Sudan Affairs, Joseph Garang had been executed for his involvement in the coup. His predecessor became Abel Alier, who had previously been a Southern Front militant. Moreover, Nimeiri appointed three Southern politicians as governors for the three provinces in the South. With Southerners representing Khartoum, concrete proposals for implementing regional autonomy were soon suggested and distributed to the exiled rebel groups. At the end of that year negotiations began in Addis Ababa. By February 1972, a settlement acceptable for both parts was reached, resulting in signing of the Addis Ababa peace agreement. The agreement recognised the South as culturally and racially different and admitted that it deserved separate administrative and political arrangements. This essentially gave the South regional autonomy within a united Sudan (Ladouceur, 1975; Idris, 2006). It has been estimates that upwards of 700,000 people died during the 17 year conflict (Bercovitch, 2004).

**Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)**

Throughout the next 11 years the country enjoyed relative peace. However by 1980 the mood had changed. After the failed coup in 1971, Nimeiri had become much more positive towards the West. In 1974 he granted oil concession to Chevron, which was the first
company to find oil in 1978 in the Unity State of the Greater Upper Nile. Through 1982 additional oil fields were discovered in South Kordofan (Yongo-Bure, 2007).

The general consensus in the North, supported by Nimeiri, was that oil revenues should not be shared with the South. After the discovery of the unity oil fields, the government became hesitant to publicly announce that the location of the oil fields were in the South. This generated suspicion among Southerners. This suspicion turned to anger when, in 1980, a group of Arab politicians proposed to redefine the boundaries agreed upon in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. In maps of the proposed bill, the Western Upper Nile areas were cut from the South. Southerners appealed to Nimeiri, who had to issue a decree to assure that the border would remain the same. Later, that year Nimeiri announced the construction of a refinery in Kosti just north of the border. The government reasoned that the construction would be much cheaper in Kosti than in Bentiu. The construction of the refinery was later abolished and replaced with a pipeline from Bentiu to Port Sudan. At the time, the country suffered a debt-ridden and continuously deteriorating economy. The pipeline would allow Chevron to convert the oil much faster. This would supply the country with much needed capital. This infuriated Southerners even more. They viewed this as another attempt to omit them from the oil revenues (Yongo-Bure, 2007; malwal, 2015).

By the early 1980s Nimeiri’s rule was beginning to fade out. His influence had begun diminishing as a result of the country’s economic problems. With growing pressure from opposition groups, Nimeiri decided to reconcile with his old enemies, the Muslim Brotherhood headed by Hassan al-Turabi. Al-Turabi, who was considerably more critical towards the south, became Nimeiri’s principal legal advisor. Soon, this began to influence the government’s policies. In attempts to ensure control over the newly discovered oil fields, the government began to undermine the 1972 Addis Ababa peace Agreement. Ultimately, this led to the abrogation of the agreement and the South’s autonomy in September 1983. Simultaneously, under pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood, Nimeiri imposed Sharia Law throughout the country while declaring Arabic as the official language (Ahmed & Sørbø, 2013; Malwal, 2015).

In response to Khartoum’s new policies, Southerners soon took to arms again. Already in early 1980, fractions of the old Anya-Nya movement had reunited to form the Anya-Nya 2. A
couple of months later, two battalions from the Sudanese Army, stationed in the towns of Bor, Ayed, and Pibor, mutinied to form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Unlike the Anya-Nya movement, the SPLM/A became a melting pot for all Southern tribes, regardless of disagreements and tensions. For the first time, different ethnic groups were able to unite around one national objective. Whether that objective was a united Sudan or 'New Sudan’ was insignificant. It was an organization formed by every people against the regime in the North and was the first group to have tribal and factional cleavages from within (Ali et al, 2005).

The SPLM/A represented the arguably best organised liberation movement that the South had ever managed to gather. The Anya-Nya movements’ actions were mostly spontaneous expressions of the repression from the North. In contrast the SPLM/A was more articulate to define a new political discourse based on national identity and citizenship, rather than racial and religious issues. Changing the discourse allowed the SPLM/A to raise the question of whether Sudan was a country with one identity or multiple identities. As such, the initial goal was not to achieve secession from the North. Rather, the SPLM/A declared the liberation of Sudan as their overarching goal. This included establishing a secular, socialist, united Sudan. Despite initial opposition towards the group, soon, tens of thousands joined the movement (Idris, 2013; Ali, 2005).

The SPLM/A quickly concluded that Khartoum’s position in the conflict would remain strong as long as it was able to extract oil revenues. By February 1984 the SPLM/A initiated attacks on the Chevron oil fields and installations near Bentiu, killing three foreign workers, and wounding another seven. Subsequently Chevron chose to terminate all oil exploration until the political stability had returned (Regler, 2013). The prospects of oil exports had provided hope for economic development. This hope was instead replaced with despair as Sudan’s economic struggles intensified. A deterioration that was only worsened as Nimeiri followed advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and imposed austerity measures. The situation was also made worse by the drought that swept across the Horn of Africa through 1983-85, ultimately costing 250,000 lives. Nimeiri faced growing pressure and internal unrest. In efforts to stay in power he denied that the problem even existed. By March 1985, as a last desperate attempt to stay in power, Nimeiri turned against his last civilian support, the Muslim Brotherhood. He removed them from the government and imprisoned its
leaders, including al-Turabi. Mass riots erupted the following month while Nimeiri was in Washington. Before Nimeiri was able to return the commander-in-chief, General Abd al-Rahman Muhamad Siwar al-Dahab announced that the army would 'yield to the wishes of the people', hereby ousting Nimeri’s government from power (Nmoma, 2006; Holt & Daly, 2011; De Waal, 1997).

In the days following the coup, disagreement arose as how to proceed with the country. Al-Dahab entered negotiations with the National Alliance for the Salvation of the Country (NASC) who was asked give suggestions of how to proceed. The NASC drafted a charter recommending amongst other things, for restoring the autonomy of the South. However, al-Dahab was an adherent of al-Turabi’s Muslim Brothers and its political wing, the National Islamic Front (NIF). Al-Turabi had been one of the driving forces behind Nimeri’s decision to abolish the South’s autonomy and refused to sign the charter. The following day, on April 9 al-Dahab dismissed the charter and announced the formation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). The TMC declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and dissolved the national and regional assemblies. Simultaneously, it sketched a one year transition period (April 1985-April 1986) to prepare for the country’s new democratic era (Collins, 2008).

The SPLM/A had made efforts to end the civil war immediately after the coup. Though, these efforts perished with al-Turabi’s and subsequently the TMC’s reluctance to abolish Sharia Law and re-establish autonomy for the South. With this in mind, the SPLM/A refused to join the transitional government and argued that the coup was merely a continuation of Nimeri’s regime. Following this, the TMC committed itself to a military strategy with the goal of annihilating the SPLM/A and the conflict continued with no prospects of improving conditions (Harir & Tvedt, 1994; Chand, 1989).

By April 1986 it became evident that the TMC would adhere to its promise. Through April 1st 1986 to April 12th, elections were held throughout the country. The Umma party received the by far best results securing 99 seats, thus given power to Umma leader Sadiq al-Mahdi. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) received 66 seats, while the NIF managed to secure the 52 seats by manipulating voter registration. On May 15 al-Sadiq announced a new coalition government together with NIF and the DUP, all three parties being Islamic based
and Arab dominated. The SPLM/A made new efforts to end the civil war. However, the influence of al-Turabi, al-Mahdi’s brother-in-law resulted in a gridlock (Collins, 2008).

The majority of the Umma party, as well as, its leadership were moderate Muslims. In May al-Mahdi and the DUP signed a charter for the adoption of an Islamic constitution, while abrogating all laws passed during the Nimeriri regime, including the September 1983 laws that introduced sharia Law. Al-Mahdi himself was against the September 1983 laws as they were undemocratic and un-Islamic. He defended Southern complaints, as these laws effectively made them second rank citizens. Further, he recognized that common language and religion were lacking in large parts of the country and advocated for adopting limited autonomy in these regions (Warburg, 1995). Al-Madhi repeatedly pledged to repeal the Sharia Law. However, the NIF rigorously denounced this by arguing that “there is no replacement for God’s law” (Kramer et al, 2013; 309).

This kind of fragmentation within the government itself was a central theme throughout Al-Madhi’s tenure. Eventually, it proved to be an unsustainable condition for continuous rule. By 1988, the SPLM/A had accomplished a series of victories in the South, despite being ill-equipped. A demoralised national army appeared to be retreating, reinforcing the feeling of insecurity in the North. In attempts to reverse the momentum al-Mahdi began arming Arab tribes in the border region. This only sparked the aggravation of old tribal rivalries and revived the ‘Arab against Black’ conflict. Worse still, the army began arming southern tribes hostile to SPLM/A, adding additional fragmentation and disorder (Ahmed & Sørbø, 2013). When al-Mahdi was finally forced to compromise with the South in March 1989 he had essentially already lost his power. Previously in February, an alliance of trade unions, professional association, and even the army presented a memorandum indicating that both the army and civilians were losing patience with his administration. As a final attempt to end the conflict, on July 30 a committee presented a draft for the abrogation of the September 1983 laws. This was too late, the same day factions of the army who opposed the reconciliatory policy toppled the government under command from Colonel Omar al-Bashir. This became known as the “revolution of National Salvation” (Warburg, 1990).

Becoming virtually a tradition in Sudanese politic, the leadership in Khartoum was yet again converted to military rule. Similar to every single previous military leader, Al-Bashir’s first
The act was to suspend the constitution, abolish all executive and legislative institutions, and arrest the political leaders of all parties, including al-Turabi. Despite this, the NIF is generally believed to have been behind the coup. Al-Bashir subsequently adopted the NIF’s ideology and political programme and the NIF became the power behind the government. In this context, the arrest was possibly an effort to dispel this involvement (Shinn, 2013).

Afterwards, he established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC was to become the legislative division of the government. The RCC subsequently formed parallel security and police organizations, the Popular Defence Forces – which later became one of the government’s main instruments in the Darfur conflict, and the Council of Forty. Chaired by al-Turabi, the Council of Forty acted as a civilian advisory council, and principally determined the new regime’s strategy. It appointed key positions in the government to members of the NIF. Further, it pursued the expansion of Islam by creating Islamic organisations that had tax exemption on importing and selling goods. Hereby, private companies were undermined and driven out of business. Within weeks of the coup, the RCC had repressed any protest as demonstrations were prohibited throughout the country. The cultural identity of Sudan was defined as a fight between the sacred and profane, the religious and secular, and Islamic Arabs and the Western Christians. It was called upon the faithful to confront the ‘Neo-Crusaders’ from the West (Burr & Collins, 2003).

What had initially been regarded as just another coup had within a month proved to be the birth of a new Sudan. As the regime began to crack down on intellectuals, the general populations stopped discussing politics altogether. This systemic ruthlessness set the Revolution of National Salvation apart from the previous coups. Traditionally, Sudan had enjoyed a deep tradition of freedom of speech in public affairs that had been a source of national pride, and had been part of the overthrow of unpopular governments. The new regime introduced a new approach to contain opposition. A new intelligence agency was formed, the Internal Security-Security of the Revolution (IS-SOR) composed of NIF members. IS-SOR played a central role in securing the new regime and became known for its extreme brutality. It detentions centres quickly received a reputation for ruthless interrogation, torture, and death (Burr & Collins, 2003).

During his brief imprisonment at the coup, al-Turabi met Osama Bin Laden. They became close friends, and Bin laden later married Turabi’s niece. By 1992 they both agreed for al-
Qaeda to relocate headquarters from Afghanistan to Sudan (Shinn, 2013; Mantzikos, 2010). This manifested Sudan’s association with international terrorist organisations. Already in 1991, the U.S. State department noted that al-Turabi and the NIF had intensified its domination of the government and had been the main advocates for closer relations with radical groups. This trend only intensified through 1993 where amongst the groups operating out Khartoum were: the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine, the Domestic Front for the liberation of Palestine, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Algerian FIS, Al-Nada out of Tunisia, Al-Islah, from Yemen, and Egyptian Jama’ at al-Islamiyah. This ultimately led to the US adding Sudan to its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993 (Burr & Collins, 2003).

Al-Mahdi had almost managed to complete an agreement with the South at the time of his overthrow. With power now consolidated to NIF, this reconciliatory approach was abandoned. This view was only augmented when reports appeared in August 1991, that the SPLM/A had split into several factions. The tribal rivalries that had been a part of the group’s identity from its formation appeared to have become too great. The new faction favoured secession in whereas the traditional organisation, commanded by John Garang still advocated for a secular state. For years the SPLM/A had received considerable support from Mengistu Haile-Mariam’s Ethiopia. However, the fall of Mengistu’s regimes in February 1991 meant that this support perished (Johnson, 2011). In light of this, Khartoum, while officially declaring its willingness to participate in peace talk, launched a new offensive against the SPLM/A in February 1992 (Ofcansky, 2003).

While the conflict in the south escalated, al-Turabi’s connection with radical Islamic groups was becoming an issue for Khartoum. Sudan found itself increasingly isolated throughout the international society and its neighbours. In 1994, Eritrea broke relations with Khartoum for aiding and giving asylum to Eritrean Islamic Jihad, who was conspiring a coup against the Eritrean government. The following year, Uganda cut connection due to Khartoum’s support for the extreme Christian group, the Lord’s Resistance Army which tried to overthrow the Ugandan government. On June 29 the same year, while attending a meeting in Addis Ababa, radical Islamists instigated an attempted assassination on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak subsequently accused Khartoum for being involved in the attempt, while also aiding and training “fundamentalist terrorists” and sending them across the border (Idris, 2006). As Khartoum became increasingly isolated, it went in search for new allies.
China had come under pressure from the international society after the crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and was also looking to make new friends. During a visit to Beijing in 1995, al-Bashir secured a deal for China to develop Sudan's oil fields, build a refinery near Khartoum and a pipeline to Port Sudan (Childress, 2010).

Despite finding an ally in China, Sudan still struggled with isolation. Within the government itself, conflict and power struggles were rising. Al-Turabi had made habit of insulting and discrediting al-Bashir, invalidating his decisions. After years of power struggles between the two, Bashir's patience had run out. Pressured by resentment from the army over its marginalized position, al-Bashir acted in December 1999. Declaring a state of emergency, al-Bashir fired al-Turabi together with the rest of the cabinet, and replaced it with his own supporters. After being side-lined, al-Turabi looked to gain influence again. By 2001, he went against his previous statements and signed a memorandum of understanding with the SPLM/A. this made him despised by al-Bashir, who later arrested and charged him with conspiracy against the government. Despite being released in 2003, al-Turabi was been permanently side-lined from politics (Gallab, 2008).

Side-lining Al-Turabi paved the way for pulling Sudan out of its international isolation. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, al-Bashir offered his cooperation to fight international terrorism in efforts to improve relations with the US (Freedom House, 2008). The Sudanese government also made efforts to end the more than 22 year old civil war with the South. In January 2005, the government and SPLM/A came together and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included power-sharing in parliament and sharing of oil revenues, which had been one of the instigating factors of the war. It also provided South Sudan with a transitional six year period of self-determination to 2011. This ultimately led to the decision for the South to obtain independence (Ahmed, 2009). After 22 years, over 2 million killed, four million people displaced, and some 600,000 people fleeing the country as refuges, one of the longest civil wars in history was over (UNMIS, 2015).

**Conflict in Darfur (2003-present)**

The ongoing conflict in Sudan's western region of Darfur began in 2003 when the two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) – not to be mistaken with the SPLM/A– and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) clashed with Sudanese government
forces. Despite being a separate conflict, certain aspects of its origins are interconnected with the civil between 1983 and 2005.

The Darfur region had struggled with internal conflict already in the 1980s. The war between neighbouring Chad and Libya had spilled into the region and Libyan armed forces and Chadian rebels operated in the area up until 1990 (Barltrop, 2011). While Khartoum historically ignored the conflict, Arab tribes – later known as the Janjaweed - armed themselves with support from their Chadian allies and tried to seize land from the indigenous Fur and Masalit people. Throughout the 1990s this development continued as Arab groups continued to seize land, now with the support from Khartoum itself (De Waal, 2007; Dagne, 2010). Darfur’s position in Sudan did not improve conditions. Since independence, Darfur has officially been part of Sudan. Despite this, the region has mostly existed outside control from Khartoum. In 1995, the NIF aimed to finally consolidate its rule in the region and attempted to replace local NIF members with Islamists from the central Sudan. This caused resentment towards the government, and even rebellion (Bassil, 2013). Discontent and violence became increasingly severe, and by the late 1990s, more than 100,000 civilians had already fled to Chad. The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa people began to cooperate and form political movements, armed as well as, unarmed. The two most predominant groups were the JEM which was founded in 2001, and the SLM/A which introduced itself with a series of attacks on government targets in 2002. By 2003, the fighting intensified following a high profile SLM/A attack on the El Fasher airport in April. In response to the uprising, Khartoum, dismissing the JEM and SLM/A as terrorist organisations and employed the same tactic that had used in the Southern conflict. Government forces, collaborating with the Janjaweed, began to brutally repress the rebellion with little consideration for the civilian public. This was primarily done by carrying out aerial bombings, deliberately displacing civilians while restricting access for relief organisations. On the ground, the Janjaweed militia, a group consisting of various Arab tribes from Darfur and Arab immigrant from Chad, became the government’s primary agent in the region. The Janjaweed, now endorsed by Khartoum, continued its objective from the 1980s of pushing out Darfuris and take control of land belonging to non-Arabs. As part of this, its strategy has been reported to principally target civilian and terrorise the civilian population. As fighting escalated, the atrocities reached new levels. Already by mid-2003, the number of
displaced people had reached 200,000, this increased to 600,000 by the end of the year, and on to 1.8 million by the end of 2004 (Barltrop, 2011; De Waal, 2007).

By 2005, the conflict had come to the attention of the international community. The brutality of the conflict had made the US to impose sanctions against the regime in Khartoum. Moreover, the UN had passed a series of resolution that amongst other things called for the deployment of African Union troops to Sudan and an arms embargo on Darfur. The increased international pressure initially improved conditions and fighting diminished. At the same time, the conflict itself had stagnated as the two parties had reached the limit for what they could achieve (Barltrop, 2011). As Condition improved, the SLM/A agreed to negotiate with the government. By May 2005, the two parties met in Abuja, Nigeria and signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. The JEM together with a faction of the SLM/A and various other smaller groups refused to sign the agreement. Instead they formed the National Redemption Front and signed a common declaration to keep fighting. The SLM/A on the other side joined the Janjaweed. Whereas they had previously operated to protect the civilian population, they were now responsible for committing the same atrocities as the Janjaweed (Cook & Mironko, 2006).

As fighting continued, the UN authorized a 26,000-strong peacekeeping force to Darfur to help the existing AU troops. This evidently had only scarce impact. Only a few months later, Amnesty International claimed that the government continued to deploy military equipment in Darfur, disregarding the UN arms embargo (Kramer et al, 2013). During this time, Khartoum's relations with neighbouring Chad deteriorated. Each government accused the other for supporting rebel groups against it. These accusations became especially active when the JEM carried an ambitious, yet unsuccessful, attack on Sudan largest City, Omdurman, across the Nile from Khartoum in May 2008 (Barltrop, 2011). International pressure on Bashir reached a new high when the International Criminal Court called for an arrest of him on July 14 2008 for genocide and crimes against humanity. This was the first time the ICC had requested the arrest of a sitting head of state. Later that same year, al-Bashir announced an immediate ceasefire in Darfur, his request however, was rejected National Redemption Front which swore to fight until power and wealth was shared (Kramer et al, 2013). As fighting continued and al-Bashir was unable to generate any meaningful progress, the ICC went further and issued an arrest warrant in March 2009 for
war crimes and crime against humanity. Bashir was accused of five counts of crimes: murder, rape torture, extermination, and forceful transfer of civilian population (Dagne, 2010). Dismissing the charges, Khartoum responded by expelling ten humanitarian agencies from Sudan, including Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders (Kramer et al, 2013).

Despite this rhetoric, al-Bashir could not neglect the fact that he was under pressure to accomplish some kind of agreement. Already before the ICC issued the arrest warrant, the Sudanese government had agreed to initiate peace talks with the various rebel groups in Darfur. In February 2009, the rivaling parties met in Doha in actual peace talk for the first time since the failed agreement in Abuja. A year later, in February 2010, the JEM and the government signed Framework Agreement to resolve the conflict, though that agreement soon collapsed. More success was achieved the following year when an alliance of smaller rebel groups with the name the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the government signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on July 14, 2011. The National redemption Front refused to sign the agreement (Tuiana, 2013). The LJM now has ministers in Khartoum as well as a strong presence in the Darfur Regional Authority. However, since the agreement in Doha, fights between various rebel groups and the government have continued without any real prospect of slowing down. In 2013 alone, the UN estimated that 300,000 were displaced. In February 2014, Khartoum deployed the Rapid Support Forces, displacing an additional 30,000 people (Reuters, July 31, 2014). As of 2010 it was estimated that the conflict had killed 450,000 people and displaced another 2.7 million. This is in a region that is home to some 7 million (Dagne, 2010).

In many ways the conflict in Darfur resembles and relates to the civil war in the South. Arab nomads have historically trespassed into the farming communities of the local populations for water and grazing. At times this has started armed conflict between the two groups. Meanwhile, the leadership in Khartoum which has predominantly been controlled by Arabs has looked the other way. Throughout history, the indigenous Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa people have experienced systemic discrimination similar to that of Southerners. This served as the underlying factor for the rebellion in the 1980s and the escalating uprising in 2003. In other ways, the conflict is even related to the civil war in the South from 1983 to 2005. The heart of the conflict can be traced to a struggle for power and resources (Dagne, 2010). The oil fields discovered in the South extends into Darfur. Already before the signing of the CPA,
it was evident that the North and South would have to share oil revenues in order to achieve peace. Considering Darfur remained an integral part of Sudan, Khartoum did not have to make a similar concession with the local populations. Moreover, there were no proven reserves found in Darfur at the time (Barltrop, 2011). Despite this, the lack of concession for any potential oil findings only provided ethnic Darfuris with confirmation of widespread ethnic discrimination. This is a major reason for al-Bashir's 2008 failure to secure an agreement with the JEM and dissident faction of the SLM/A (Kramer et al., 2013).

Figure 3. Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages in Darfur February 2003 - December 2010

Source: US Department of State - Humanitarian Informations Unit, Retrieved from reliefweb
**South Sudanese Civil War (2013-present)**

Most recently, a new conflict started in 2013 in South Sudan. Following the South’s secession in 2011, former military leader of the SPLM/A, Salva Kiir Mayardit was inaugurated as the country's first president. Salva Kiir was a founding member of the SPLM/A and had been its military leader since the 1990s. When John Garang was killed in a helicopter crash in 2005, Salva Kiir acted as substitute and became the Southern leader, as well as vice-president of Sudan (BBC, December 23, 2013).

Already at the end of 2012, rumours circulated of an attempted military coup against his leadership. By early 2013 Kiir initiated an extensive reorganization of several prominent positions within the government. Leader of the Police force, Acuil Tito Madut was replaced by former general of the SPLM/A, Pieng Deng Kuol. An additional six deputy chiefs and 29 major generals of the SPLM/A were also released of their command. One month later, in February Kiir issued a decree that retired another 117 generals. The government’s official statement was that it was an effort to demilitarize the newly formed government (Sudan Tribune, January 22, 2013; Aljazeera, December 21, 2013). It had become evident that the SPLM/A was internally divided. After obtaining independence South Sudan had suffered from economic struggles. Although it possessed the largest oil fields throughout Sudan it was unable to export it as a result of a dispute with Khartoum. By July the same year, Vice-President Riek Machar announced that he planned to become the SPLM/A frontrunner at the 2015 election. Kiir responded a few days later by dismissing Machar and his entire cabinet. According Kiir the shake-up was an effort to improve relations with the North. By December that year Kiir announced an attempted *coup d'état* from a group of soldiers allied with Machar (New York Times, December 16, 2013). Machar rejected the accusations and stated:

> "I believe that this country must go democratic. If it is going to be united, it cannot tolerate one man’s rule. It cannot tolerate dictatorship. It cannot tolerate tyranny."

(Reuters, December 26, 2013).

This divide revealed the tribal divide that had originally been part of the foundation of the SPLM/A. Kiir’s Dinka tribe was accused by Machar’s Nuer tribe of monopolizing everything from politics to the army. The alleged coup took place at a meeting on December 15. At the meeting, Kiir commanded the Nuer Presidential Guard of Machar to be disarmed and Machar
himself to be arrested. Nuer factions of the SPLM/A opposed to this and split from the main organisation. Under the leadership of Machar these factions reorganized and formed the SPLM-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The following day, Dinka Security personnel began to arrest, abuse, and kill Nuer soldiers, politicians, and civilians. Meanwhile, the arrest of high ranking SPLM/A members was orchestrated (Small Arms Survey, 2014).

Following the events, fighting broke out in Juba killing more than 500 people (BBC, December 23, 2013). Small Arms Survey have since estimated that some 30 percent of the SPLM/A fighting force, amounting to 35,000 troops, have defected and joined the new rebel movement together with upwards of 10,000 police officers (Small Arms Survey, 2014). Quickly the fighting escalated to genuine tribal war between the Dinka and Nuer tribes with the ‘Nuer White Army’ joining Machar’s SPLM-IO. Comprising of some 50,000 troops, the White Army became the bulk of Machar’s insurgencies. Unlike Machar who wants to become the national leader of South Sudan, the White Army merely seeks revenge for the killings...
committed by Kiir’s government. Both Human Rights Watch and United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) have reported widespread looting and killing of civilians, including ethnic Nuer residents (Human Rights Watch, August 11, 2014). Machar himself has publicly stated that the White Army is difficult to control. Yet they remained to be the bulk of his insurgents in the oilfields. Though the White army have rejected that they fight for power or oil, the northern oilfields have been a central to the fight against Kiir. Attacking the oilfields has essentially forced a complete shutdown of all oil production except for in a few oilfields in the Upper Nile State. These remain operational, although at a reduced output (Bloomberg, April 1, 2014). In January 2015 South Sudan’s oil production was 169,000 barrel per day compared to 340,000 barrels per day in 2011 (Reuters, January 27, 2015; EIA, 2014).

Recently, conditions do appear to have improved. On February 1, 2015, Kiir and Machar signed a ceasefire agreement in Addis Ababa. A final agreement is expected to be concluded by March 5. The initial deal calls for power-sharing arrangement and proposes Kiir to remain president while Machar will be appointed vice-president (BBC, February 1, 2015). Even so, whether the agreement proves to be viable remains to be seen.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that “Tens of thousands of people have been killed or wounded by the conflict, while an additional 1.9 million people have been displaced” (OCHA, 2014). As of November 2014, the International Crisis Group estimated that at least 50,000 people had died but also noted that the figure could be twice as high (Reliefweb, November 15, 2014).
Chapter 5: Sudan and the Rest of the World

Now that the domestic sphere has been outlined, it is possible to examine how the internal conflicts and changing political leaderships have formed Sudan’s relationships with the West and China. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight Sudan’s foreign relations. As mentioned in the introduction, the premise of the thesis is that these foreign relations in themselves influence Sudan’s growing relationship with China, and subsequently the inflow of Chinese arms. The first section of this chapter will focus on Sudan’s troubled relationship with the West, as well as the Western international society in general. This relationship is constructed of both Sudan’s attitude towards the west and the West’s attitude towards Sudan. By the end of this section it will become evident how Sudan’s domestic sphere, as well as the relationship itself has influenced these two perspectives. The second section will briefly outline China’s relationship with Africa. More importantly, this section will examine China’s relationship with Sudan. Through this, it will become evident how Sudan’s relationship with the West has only strengthened China’s influence in the country. This section is related with the last section in this chapter which will illustrate how Chinese businesses and arms have subsequently flowed into Sudan.

Sudan and the West

Sudan’s foreign relations with the West have historically been troublesome. With the changing leaderships in Khartoum, relations have changed accordingly. After independence in 1956, Sudan attempted to exercise non-involvement in the Cold War and established embassies in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite this, Sudan’s background meant that it maintained close ties with Great Britain which supplied one-third of imports and accounted for twenty percent of exports throughout the first decade after independence. The close ties with Great Britain inevitably spilled over into relations with West in general, which was the country’s biggest trading partner and provided most of its foreign aid. The
United States were quick to establish diplomatic relations immediately upon independence in 1956 (Kramer et al., 2013; U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, May 30 2014).

The position of non-involvement proved to be a challenging balancing act, e.g. the Sudanese government accepted economic assistance from the US together with technical assistance from the Soviet Union. Khartoum refused to make closer connection with either of the two. It refused to sign the Eisenhower Doctrine protecting countries from Soviet aggression. In similar fashion, it preferred cooperation with Yugoslavia as an East Bloc alternative to the Soviet Union. Sudan continued this approach of non-involvement when Ibrahim Abboud took to power in 1958. One of Abboud’s first moves was to recognize the People’s Republic of China. Apart from symbolic actions, Sudan preferred to use the United Nations as a medium for its foreign policy. In matters of economic and technical assistance, it also favoured international agencies in hope of avoiding agitating either the West or the East (Kramer et al., 2013).

Sudan’s International focus changed with the inauguration of Ismail al-Azhari as president in 1965. Despite the internal conflict with the South, relations with the US remained relatively stable. Khartoum sustained its non-involvement policy. However, Middle Eastern and African issues became much more prominent. The outbreak of the Six-Day war between Israel and its Arab Neighbours marked a significant shift. Supported by the West and especially the US, Israel quickly defeated the Arabs. Sudan subsequently broke relations with both Great Britain and the United States. As Britain remained the most important trading partner, relations were already re-established in 1968. Conversely, relations with the US remained severed. Instead Khartoum pursued closer military and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union (U.S. embassy in Khartoum, 2015; Kramer et al., 2013).

This trend escalated after the coup in 1969 that brought General Gaafar Nimeiri to power. Nimeiri’s left leaning government drew on socialist inspiration to drive state-directed economic development. The government officially recognized the DDR in 1970 and subsequently began pursuing Soviet economic and military aid (Kramer et al., 2013). This brief period saw relations with the West deteriorate. In 1971 the Sudanese Communist Party’s (SCP) attempted a failed coup d’état against Nimeiri’s military regime. Suspecting that Moscow had been involved in the coup, Nimeiri opened up to the West (Large, 2011).
However, on March 1, 1973 a terrorists group with the name ‘Black September’ assassinated US ambassador Cleo A. Noel. Though the gunmen were charged with murder, they were released to the custody of Egyptian authorities in June 1974. In protest the United States withdrew its ambassador. Relations remained bitter until 1976. Here, President Nimeiri negotiated the release of ten American hostages, being held captive in Northern Ethiopia by Eritrean rebels (U.S. embassy in Khartoum, 2015).

In general, US-Sudanese relations were at a peak during this period. However, Sudan’s economy was suffering from Nimeri’s increasingly corrupt regime. To combat this, he sought closer relations with Washington and the IMF which advocated for austerity measures. By the early 1980s, it had become evident that US support was critical for his survival. As Nimeiri’s relationship with the US peaked, his domestic support diminished feverishly. Amongst the population, the US support was viewed as prolonging a repressive regime (Large, 2011). The breakout of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the 1983-1985 drought and subsequent famine, together with the austerity measures only aggravated the country’s economic troubles. By 1985 the Sudanese people had enough as he was overthrown during a visit in Washington (Nmoma, 2006; FOA, 2000).

Nimeiri’s overthrew marked the last major shift in Sudanese foreign policy. Sudan’s new military leadership looked upon Nimeiri’s relationship with the US with scepticism. Instead, General Suwar al-Dahab introduced a more neutral foreign policy and established closer connection with the Soviet Union and Gaddafi’s Libya. This ultimately led to the signing of a military agreement with Libya in July 1985 (Ofcansky, 2004). Relations were further impaired when the US decided to bomb Libya on April 15 1986. Dahab’s government denounced the bombing as a “brutal military action” (Shaked & Ronen, 1986). The following day US communications officer in Sudan, William J. Calkins was shot and wounded in the head. The US ambassador subsequently ordered the evacuation of all non-essential employees out of the country. The next period from 1986-1989, displayed a marginal improvement of terms between the two countries. After the 1986 elections, al-Dahab handed over the power to a civilian leader in Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Mahdi continued the country’s official neutral foreign policy and requested the departure of US equipment from Port Sudan. The background for this request was to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, as
well as Libya. Despite this, al-Mahdi’s tenure was marked by relatively good relations with US which remained one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance (Nmoma, 2006).

The neutral position was instantly abandoned after the coup in 1989. The coup was led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and supported by Hassan al-Turabi. This marked the first time a radical Islamic group had taken to power in the Arab and Sunni Muslim world (large & Patey, 2011). Under pressure from al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF), al-Bashir created a radical, extremist, and ideological government based on the Sharia Law. The NIF not only set out to create an Islamic State, but went further and advocated for Muslims to create an Islamic Commonwealth. This severely damaged the relationship with the United States. In the wake of the coup, the US decided to suspend all economic and military assistance programs. It continued provide only humanitarian relief. Conditions were not helped by Washington’s concerns for Bashir’s practice of human rights violations in the war with South Sudan, connections with Iran, and support to various terrorist organizations (Nmoma, 2006). Relations were further impaired, when the regime decided to side with Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. At the time Iraq had been a loyal supplier of arms to the regime. This made Sudan unpopular, not only in the international society but also throughout the Arab world which had mostly supported the liberation of Kuwait. The US subsequently closed its embassy altogether in Khartoum in February 1991 (large & Patey, 2011; Nmoma, 2006). Al-Bashir’s and al-Turabi’s new regime also isolated Sudan from most of its former allies and donor nations. By 1990 the European Community suspended development aid to the country. Again in 1991, it reprimanded Khartoum’s inability to cooperate with international aid organizations. This isolated the country from the West even further (Kramer et al., 2013).

By the mid-1990s the war against the SPLM/A together with Sudan’s affiliation with international terrorist organisations deteriorated relations furthermore. By 1994, after reports of Sudanese forces deliberately targeting civilians, the European Union imposed its first arms embargo on the country (Council Decision 94/165/CFSP). The US went a step further. Sudan had become a sanctuary for a myriad of international terrorist organisations, including: Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. As Khartoum referred to these organisations as ‘brothers of Islam’, the US responded by adding Sudan to its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in August 1993 (Large &
The EU and UN were mostly concerned with Sudan's internal conflict and violations against civilians. In contrast, US motives surrounded more on the relationship with these organisations. By 1997, President Clinton went further and issued Executive Order 13067 imposing a comprehensive trade embargo against the entire territory of Sudan. This also blocked assets of the Sudanese government (OFAC, 2013).

For the next couple of years, the relationship remained distant and no additional sanctions were imposed. This changed with the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur. In response to the uprising, the EU announced that the 1994 embargo would be expanded to also include technical and financial assistance related to military activities. Supplies to EU, UN, and AU institutions, as well as mining activities, would remain exempted (Common Position 2004/31/CFSP; Council Regulation (EC) No 131/2004; Common Position 2004/510/CFSP). Later that year the situations in Darfur had become so grim that the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1556. This endorsed the deployment of monitors from the AU and imposed an arms embargo on North, South, and West Darfur (S/RES/1556 (2004)).

Evidently, this embargo had only scarce effect. By March 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1591, calling for a complete arms embargo on all active parties of the N’djamena ceasefire agreement in Darfur. Moreover, resolution 1591 imposed travel ban and assets freeze on individuals identified as being responsible for human rights violations. Lastly, it strongly condemned the Sudanese government for not fulfilling its obligations to disarm the Janjaweed militia and bring justice to those responsible for human rights violations (S/RES/1591 (2005)). Resolution 1591 was subsequently implemented into the EU’s existing embargo on May 30, 2005 (Common Position 2005/411/CFSP).

After al-Bashir’s power struggle with al-Turabi in the late 1990s, Sudan moved away from its affiliation with international terrorist organisations. After the attacks on September 11, 2001 al-Bashir offered to assist with combating terrorism (Freedom House, 2008). This commitment has been acknowledged by the US in its Country Reports on Terrorism. Despite this, the Sudan remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Though Sudan’s shift towards cooperation changed the US approach towards the country, this did not imply any significant improvement; instead Washington began focusing on the conflict in Darfur. On April 26, 2006 President Bush issued Executive Order 13400
which condemned the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the region. Finding “that an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States is posed by the persistence of violence in Sudan’s Darfur region, particularly against civilians”, Executive Order 13400 blocked the property of certain people connected with the conflict in Darfur (Exec. Order No. 13400, 3 C.F.R. 4 (2006). Print.). Further, on October 13 2006, Bush issued executive order 13412. Partly, 13412 exempted South Sudan’s government from executive 13067. However it also prohibited US persons from transactions with the Sudanese petroleum and petrochemical industries, as well as blocking all Sudanese property (Exec. Order No. 13412, 3 C.F.R. 5 (2006). Print.). After President Obama took to office in 2009, he announced a new strategy with regard to Sudan. This strategy comprised of three principles. First, to achieve a definitive end to conflict, human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; Second, to help implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and third, to ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for terrorist (U.S. embassy in Khartoum, 2015). Despite this, comprehensive sanctions remain in place. These prohibit:

- Import of goods or services of Sudanese origin.
- Export of good, technology, or services to Sudan, from the US or by US persons to facilitate export to/from Sudan from/to anywhere.
- For US persons to grant or extent credits or loans to the Government of Sudan.
- Transactions by US person relating to the petroleum or petrochemical industries in Sudan (OFAC, 2013).

It has not only been the US that has imposed comprehensive sanctions against Sudan in recent years. In 2009 the ICC linked the Sudanese government to several armed groups in Darfur. It concluded that al-Bashir could be held responsible for the atrocities in the region. The ICC issued an arrest warrant on March 4, highlighting five charges (ICC-02/05-01/09-1):

1. intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities as a war crime, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute;
2. pillage as a war crime, within the meaning of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute;
iii. murder as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(1)(a) of the Statute;
iv. extermination as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(1)(b) of the Statute;
v. forcible transfer as a crime against humanity, within the meaning of article 7(1)(d) of the Statute.

Already before the announcement Bashir stated that the ICC could “eat” the arrest warrant and said it would “not be worth the ink it is written on” (BBC, March 4, 2009). Following the announcement, Khartoum went further and dismissed the credibility of the court and declared “This decision is exactly what we have been expecting from the court, which was created to target Sudan and to be part of the new mechanism of neo-colonialism” (BBC, March 4, 2009). As of 2015, the arrest warrant remains in place, yet unenforced. As late as January 2015, the ICC requested information from Ethiopian authorities regarding Bashir’s visit during the 24th summit of the African Union (ICC-02/05-01/09-221).

In 2010, the UN decided to strengthen resolution 1591. It called on all states to ensure end user documentation on arms or related material entering Sudan, that is not prohibited by resolutions 1556 and 1591 (S/RES/1945(2010)). Last but not least, The EU amended its embargo on July 9 2011 to also cover South Sudan. This happened in response to the South’s secession earlier that year. Non-lethal military equipment going to South Sudan was exempted from this embargo (Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP). As of today, EU’s sanctions are closely linked the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. However, like US sanctions it extends to also cover travel bans and a freeze on funds, financial assets and economic resources owned by designated persons involved in the Darfur regions (ibid.).

**China and Africa**

Contrary to Sudan’s relationship with the West, the country’s relations with China have been much more persistent. Before going into detail with this relationship, it is important to briefly clarify China’s involvement in Africa in general. Sudan is not the only African country where China is heavily involved; amongst others it is also a major actor in Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In 2008, it replaced the EU and US as Africa’s
largest trading partner. Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Direct investment (FDI) and development aid have also been increasing (van Dijk, 2009).

China’s relations with Africa go back many centuries. However, contemporary Sino-Africa relations date back to 1956 when China established formal diplomatic ties with Egypt (Chun 2012). Relations remained relatively low key during the Cold War. It was not until after the fall of the Soviet Union that China became more involved in the continent. Partly, this was a direct result of end of the cold war. After the Cold War, Russian and eastern Europeans vanished from the continent (van Dijk, 2009). Moreover, the end of the Cold War demolished the ‘East-West’ competition that was a source of conflict in the African continent. This provided a brief hope for peace across the continent. Conversely, it also diminished interest and commitment by the West towards Africa (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

Apart from the end of the Cold War, one other significant event revived China’s interests in Africa. In 1989 the June Fourth Incident at Tiananmen Square occurred. While the crackdown on protesters generated fierce criticism throughout the Western world, African leaders were indifferent to Beijing’s policy. Some even showed support for it (Taylor, 2006; Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). The predominant sentiment throughout North Africa, considered the crackdown to be a necessary and reasonable reaction to a legitimate government that felt threatened. Both Beijing and many African leaders had for some time been of the conviction, that Western countries unfairly criticised their human rights practices. As former Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen pointed out: Most African leaders believed the incident to be an internal affair (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Whereas the incident had damaged Sino-Western relations, African countries’ attitude toward Beijing remained unchanged. As a result, Beijing’s attitude towards third world countries turned from benign neglect to renewed emphasis (Taylor, 2000).

This support from African leaders should also be seen in a larger context. At the time the ‘third wave of democracy’ swept across Africa (Taylor, 2006). The third wave of democracy had arisen with the revolution in Portugal in 1974 and between 1974 and 1990 at least 30 countries had transitioned to democracy. By 1990, sub-Saharan Africa was the only region where Catholics and Protestants lived under authoritarianism in a large number of countries (Huntington, 1991). The diminished commitment by the West towards the continent was
replaced by pressure to secure liberal democracy and human rights. Not only did this threaten to overturn sitting African despots and the established elites. It also ran counter to the official doctrine predominant in African countries (Taylor, 2006).

The relative disinterest from traditional donor countries towards the African continent together with pressure to democratised, allowed China to establish closer economic relationships (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). African leaders like to adopt a position of experiencing imperialism or neo-imperialism. This is often expressed as a deep distrust of any criticism towards their regime. This is especially the case when this criticism is founded on Western centric norms of human rights and democracy. China adheres to this distrust. It asserts that economic rights and rights of subsistence precede individual human rights in developing countries (Taylor, 2006). As director of African Studies at CASS in Beijing, He Wenping noted in 2005 “We don’t believe that human rights should stand above sovereignty”, “We have a different view on this, and African countries share our view.” (Mooney, 2005). China has often criticised Western demands as unrightfully interfering with the domestic sphere of developing countries. It insists that these demands have concealed imperialistic intentions, designed to ultimately undermine the stability and development of developing countries (Tull, 2006). This position was manifested when Chinese President, Yang Shangkun visited the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity – replaced with the African Union 1992. In a speech he announced a five-point proposal for cooperation between China and Africa (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, 47):

- Support for African Sovereignty, national independence and economic development;
- Opposition to foreign intervention;
- Respect for different political systems and development paths;
- Support for African unity, cooperation and the Organisation of African Unity, and
- Belief that African states should participate actively in the international system as equal member.

This strategy has served as a powerful tool for China to construct a common identity with African states vis-à-vis the ‘imperialistic West’. An advisor to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has noted that the Sino-Sudan relationship “has never been threatened.” (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012; 254). He credited this to the fact that China has not interfered with the
internal affairs of Sudan. China has maintained good relations regardless of the various governments in power. China has remained indifferent to whether it has been elected democratically, a military despot, or Islamist leadership (ibid.). China also provides African countries with a striking demonstration for economic development. After 1949 China had been shattered by war. Development levels in certain African countries where higher in than in China. Today China has emerged into an advanced economy and many African leaders look at China as a development model (Large, 2008)

Non-interference

Though China’s doctrine of not non-interference has been a powerful tool to strengthen its relations with African countries. This doctrine has been an integral part to Beijing’s foreign policy since the 1950s (taylor, 2006). It has been one of the five principles of China’s foreign policy since the signing of the Panchsheel treaty of 1954 with India. Signing the treaty, the two governments agreed to cohere to ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (UN treaty Series, 1958; 70):

i. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
ii. mutual non-aggression,
iii. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
iv. equality and mutual benefit, and
v. peaceful co-existence.

Especially the third principle of non-interference in other’s internal affairs has been central to Beijing’s attitude towards international issues. Historically, China has been highly attentive of sovereignty and equality among nations. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, foreign interference with Chinese affairs has been a significant threat to Beijing. As a result, China emphasises sovereignty as the commonality of all nations. All nations should be treated equally and no country has the right to dictate the domestic affairs of others (Anshan, 2007). This is also seen with regards to human rights. In the West, human rights have predominantly emerged in order to protect people from the state. As such, all nations have a responsibility to intervene and protect people wherever they are. China holds that sovereignty is essential since the institutions, protecting human rights, are state-based mechanisms. Human rights do not constitute sufficient reason to
interfere with other countries internal affairs (ibid.). As late as 2014, Xi Jinping publicly reaffirmed China’s commitment to this doctrine (BBC, June 28, 2014).

Despite China’s seemingly ideological background for the doctrine of non-interference, realpolitik also plays an important role. Siding with African nations has allowed Beijing to dampen international pressure for domestic human right violations. The West is in minority in international organisations like the UN. This has enabled China to gather enough support to resist Western condemnations of Chinese domestic human rights issues (Taylor, 2000).

**China in Sudan**

China persistence for non-interference in Sudan’s domestic affairs has prevented the diplomatic struggles that Western-Sudanese relations have suffered from. The first diplomatic ties between the two countries were established in 1959. This was only three years after Sudan obtained independence from British and Egyptian administrations. On February 4 1959, Sudan became the fourth country in Africa to recognise and establish formal relations with China (Dijk, 2009).

Following a visit to Beijing in 1970 by President Nimeiri, China offered its first loan to Sudan. This loan was interest-free and repayable in Sudanese crops. After the failed coup against Nimeiri in 1971, China provided another interest-free loan while also offering to help train and equip Sudanese Armed Forces. China also support Khartoum during the 1970s, in the latter’s fight in the first Sudanese Civil War (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Despite this, relations between the two countries stayed relatively insignificant and symbolic (Large, 2008).

It was not until the coup d’état against al-Mahdi in 1989 that China developed closer ties with Khartoum. The coup put Omar al-Bashir to power and essentially ruined relations with the West. Khartoum continued to commit human rights violations. This together with the country’s affiliation with terrorist organisations caused Khartoum to find itself increasingly isolated. This was not from the international society, but from its neighbours as well. Connections with Iraq and Iran remained close. However, Iraq’s defeat in 1991 meant that it could only provide symbolic support for Khartoum. For some time, Iran continued its support, but by the mid-1990s Tehran moved towards improving its membership in the international society (large & Patey, 2011).
Initially, the coup in 1989 also had implications for Khartoum’s connections with Beijing. The Chinese government seemed uncertain about the motives of the newly formed NIF government. Despite these concerns, relations remained stable. Al-Bashir’s visit to Beijing in 1990 subsequently fostered an Iranian-financed Chinese arms deal worth $300 million in 1991 (Large, 2008).

As relations with the West deteriorated during the 1990s Khartoum turned east in order to develop its oil sector. Throughout the decade preceding the 1989 coup, Chevron had been
the biggest shareholder in Sudan’s oil industry. As the second Sudanese civil war broke out in 1983, the oilfields in the South became increasingly difficult to explore. After the attack on its oil installations in 1984 Chevron terminated its operation until the political stability had returned (Regler, 2013). The coup in 1989 meant that by 1990 Chevron withdrew its operations in the country. By 1992 it pulled out completely and sold its share for a mere $25 million (large, 2008; Switzer, 2002). After Chevron left the country, Khartoum expressed interest in China to develop the Sudanese oil sector. This marked the beginning of major Chinese investment in the country. By 1995 China provided major loans for infrastructure improvements and invested $6 billion in the petroleum sector (Shinn & Eisenmann, 2012). Over the next four years, Chinese companies developed the oilfields in the South and constructed the Greater Nile Pipeline to Port Sudan. By 1999 the pipeline became operational and Sudan began exporting oil (Casertano, 2011; Large & Patey, 2011).

Since 1999 China has become Sudan’s most important trading partner accounting for 76 percent of Sudan exports between 2005 and 2009. 90 percent of Sudan’s export stems from crude oil of which 82 percent goes to China. From 1999 to 2009 oil accounted for 98 per cent of China’s imports from Sudan. Through this period, Sudan accounted for 5.6 percent of China’s total oil imports. This made it the sixth largest supplier behind Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Oman, and Russia. Sudanese imports from China have also increased. Since oil exports began in 1999, Sudan’s imports from China have increased by 640 percent, averaging over $900 million throughout the period to 2009. Though, trade still largely favours Sudan, with exports averaging $2.3 billion during the same period. Despite the trade deficit, China has benefitted in other ways. It established a relatively stable supplier of oil. Oil demand has been a major hindrance for China’s economic growth in recent years. Additionally, the trade has opened up for business opportunities for Chinese manufactured goods (Large & Patey, 2011).
Trade between the two countries peaked in 2010. The Central Bank of Sudan estimated in 2010 that $8.2 billion worth, of mostly oil, was exported to China. This accounted for 72.6 percent of total exports. Meanwhile, Sudan imported just over $2 billion worth of goods from China, accounting for 20.7 percent (Central Bank of Sudan, 2010). With the South’s secession in 2011, trade declined. After independence South Sudan gained control with about three-fourths of the oil production. For Khartoum the split meant that total crude oil exports fell from $11 billion in 2010 to just under $1.8 billion in 2012. This resulted in a loss of 55 percent of Khartoum’s fiscal revenues (EIA, 2014). South Sudan being a landlocked country is dependent on oil transit through the North via the Greater Nile Pipeline. To recover some of the lost revenues, Khartoum began charging transit fees. While requesting fees of $32-26/barrel (bbl) South Sudan was only willing to pay less than $1/bbl. By the end of 2011, strains escalated as Khartoum began confiscating oil from the pipeline as payment for unpaid transit fees. In response, the South shut down production immediately. Not until April 2013, almost 15 months later did the two parts manage to negotiate a deal.
Ultimately, the fees settled at $24.10/bbl for Petrodar facilities and $26/bbl for GNPOC facilities. Despite achieving this agreement, oil production has still not recovered fully. The rising conflict in the South in December 2013 severely damaged key oil installations and forced evacuation of foreign workers. This has shut down oil production in several oil fields (ibid.).

As a result, the North's export to China declined to $6.32 billion in 2011 Sudan. This almost exclusively came from the petroleum and oil sector which accounted for $6.27 billion (Central Bank of Sudan, 2011). The following year, when oil production in the south was shutdown, exports to China almost vanished to a mere $53 million. Meanwhile $1.71 billion was imported, with the bulk being manufactured goods and machinery and equipment (Central bank of Sudan, 2012). By 2013, as Sudan and South Sudan managed to find a settlement, export rose to $4.01 billion. Imports remained largely the same with $1.88 billion. The bulk of imports were again, manufactured goods and machinery and equipment (Central Bank of Sudan, 2013).

Naturally, this development has generated concerns in Beijing, about the stability of the oil supply. It has even challenged Beijing's position of non-interference. Already in January 2014, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for an immediate ceasefire (Reuters, January 6, 2014). By mid-2014 China opted for a more interfering approach and announced it would deploy 700 troops to the existing UN peacekeeping force by March 2015. This is to help protect Chinese workers and oil installations in the Unity and Upper Nile States. These two regions are the only ones with operating oil fields. This will be the first time China sends infantry to a UN peacekeeping force (Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2014; Business Insider, January 16, 2015). Beijing has also acted a mediator in the conflict. Shortly before the recent agreement between Kiir and Machar, China initiated talks and acted as a central mediator between the two during meetings in Khartoum (Reliefweb, January 12, 2015).

**Oil for Arms**

As presented above, China has been very politically active in both Sudan and South Sudan. It has provided loans, built infrastructure, and will be sending troops to the country. Allegedly, 2015 will not be the first time Chinese troops set foot in Sudan. Economist David Hale claimed in 2004 that 4,000 Chinese troops were present in Southern Sudan to protect the oil
pipeline (The Washington Times, March 4, 2004). Despite this, most of China involvement in Sudan has been through companies investing in the country.

Out of the Chinese companies investing in the Sudan, the National China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) stands out. The CNPC is the state owned parent company of PetroChina which is the largest oil and gas producer in China (“PetroChina: Company Profile”, 2015). According to Fortune 500, PetroChina was the fourth largest company in the world based on revenues as of 2014 (Fortune Magazine, 2014).

Subsequent to Sudan's proposal for China to develop the country's oil sector in 1994, the CNPC began investing the Sudan. In September 1995, the CNPC bought Block 6, formerly operated by Chevron in South Kordofan. The following year, it also acquired a 40 percent share – with Petronas acquiring 30 percent – in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Hereby it got access to blocks 1, 2, and 4 which were the highest yielding concessions in the country (Large & Patey, 2011; Tull, 2006). This trend continued as the CNPC took a 41 percent share in the Petrodar Operating Company. With this acquisition the CNPC also obtained block 3 and 7. This venture was again taken together with Petronas which acquired 40 percent of the company. Later, another government-owned Chinese oil company, Sinopec joined in on the venture and acquired 6 percent. In 2005, the CNPC further acquired block 15 at the Red Sea, with the neighbouring block 13 added to its portfolio two years later (Large & Patey, 2011; EIA, 2014).

All the oil produced in Sudan and South Sudan originates from the Muglad and Melut basins. The Muglad Basin encompasses blocks 1, 2, 4, 5A, 6, and 17 while the Melut basin covers blocks 3 and 7. Whereas blocks 2, 4, 6, and 17 is constitute Sudan’s oil production, the remaining blocks was taken over by the South following its independence. Of all these blocks, only two are not owned by subsidiaries to the CNPC. These are block 5A and 17 (EIA, 2014).

To give an idea of the level of monopoly, the CNPC enjoys. In 2006 it was estimated that Sudan total oil production was 434,000/bbl. Out of this 316,000/bbl came from block 1, 2, and 4 owned by GNPOC, 66,000/bbl came from Petrodar’s blocks 3 and 7, while 33,000/bbl arrived from the CNPC’s initial investment, block 6. In total this accrues to 415,000/bbl accounting for 96.6 percent of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s total oil production. Added to this,
substantial oil reserves were not discovered in blocks 3 and 7 until 2003. In these two blocks oil production had only just started in 2006 (IKV Pax Christi, 2008). As a result of the recent conflict between in the South, these two blocks are incidentally also the only ones currently operational (Bloomberg, April 1, 2014).

As the CNPC acquired oil concessions and developed block 1, 2, and 4, GNOPOC agreed with the Khartoum to construct a 1,500-kilometer pipeline from Heglig to Port Sudan. Further, the CNPC agreed to construct a refinery near Khartoum. Its prominent position in these projects allowed it to promote its own subsidiaries. Subsequently, the China Petroleum Material and Equipment Corporation, a subsidiary of the CNPC, became the sole material supply contractor to the refinery construction. It also provided 70 percent of all supplies for the pipeline. Similarly, the China Petroleum Engineering & Construction Corporation became the only contractor for the construction of the pipeline. Using its own subsidiaries allowed the CNPC to utilise any surplus capacity it had, especially labour (Kong, 2010). During its peak, it was believed that there were upwards of 74,000 Chinese workers in Sudan. Though, only 23,800 workers were registered in Sudan in 2004 (Alden, 2007). This influx of Chinese workers has created an entire economy in Sudan with Chinese business including hotels, restaurants, stores and even Chinese television (Kramer et al., 2013). More recently, the attacks on Chinese Workers and the diminished oil production have dropped the number of workers to around 10,000 (Gertel et al., 2014).

Oil revenues have been an integral part of the various conflicts. At first, this was the case in the Struggle between the North and the South. Recently this has also been the case in the conflict between Kiir and Machar. Oil revenues were vital in Khartoum's ability to fight the rebels in the South. This was the reason behind oil facilities and workers becoming targets for the rebels. This tactic ultimately forced Chevron and other Western oil companies to terminate their operations. As Chinese oil installations and workers became targets, Beijing came under pressure to protect its investments. Beijing was faced with three choices: terminate operations and leave its investments, send security personal to Sudan, or provide assistance and equipment to the Sudanese Army. Although exact details remain unclear, it is evident that China elected for a combination of the second and third options (Rotberg, 2008). Although Hale's claim of 4,000 Chinese troops being present in 2004, this number was unsubstantiated. However, multiple reports have indicated similar numbers. It is almost
certain that Chinese security personnel have been and continue to be present in Sudan. Many of these are retired soldiers from the People's Liberation Army (Howard, 2011; MacDonald & Lemco, 2011). In South Sudan though, the only private security company allowed to operate is the Veteran Security Service. Chinese security providers cannot operate without a special permission from the Government of South Sudan (saferworld, 2013).

Apart from sending security and or troops to Sudan, in recent years it has become glaringly evident that China supplies most of the arms entering Sudan. Moreover China has provided technical assistance for the Construction of at least three arms factories outside Khartoum (Enuka, 2011; Saferworld, 2011).

The exact quantity and value of China’s arms exports is uncertain. Regarding Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), China does not openly provide documentation for neither authorisations nor deliveries. Nor does it document its international transfers to UNROCA (Bromley et al, 2013). Despite this, UN inspectors have found that most small arms in the Darfur conflict are Chinese manufactured (Taylor, 2006). From 2003 to 2006, the period where the Sudanese government committed the worst abuses in Darfur, China sold $55 million worth of small arms to the government in Khartoum. From 2004, when the United Nations imposed an embargo on arms transfers to Darfur, and until 2006, China Supplied roughly 90 percent of Khartoum's small arms procurement (Human Rights First, Retrieved 2014). According to Sudan’s own reports to UN Comtrade, China supplied 72 percent of Sudanese imports of SALW, artillery, and ammunition between 2001 and 2008 (Bromley et al, 2013). In contrast, China claimed that it only accounted for 8 percent of total exports to Sudan in 2008. China also claims that abides by the UN embargo. Despite this, UN experts have found that Chinese arms are making their way into Darfur (van Dijk, 2009).

Among SALW that have been sighted in Sudan and South Sudan are assault rifles, general purpose and heavy machine guns, RPG-7 pattern launchers, automatic grenade launchers, antitank missiles, various types of rockets, and small calibre ammunition (Small Arms Survey, 2012). However, arms entering Sudan has not been limited to SALW. Since 1995, arms deliveries have include tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircrafts (Human Rights Watch,

---

1 China supplied 89.95% of Sudan’s small arms in 2004; 94.16% in 2005; and 87.66% in 2006.
In 2003, Khartoum purchased 20 A-5C fighter bombers, capable of delivering 4,000 pounds of bombs. In 2005, the Chinese Company Dongfeng exported more than two hundred military trucks. These were later that year seen on an air force base in Darfur and have been used to transport Sudanese soldiers to sites where civilians have been attacked. In 2006 Sudan received six K-8 trainer aircrafts which can be fitted for ground attacks. A parade in 2007 revealed late model battle tanks and infantry vehicles originating from China (Human Rights First, retrieved September 23, 20014). As noted by Human rights first:

“Much of the money for this shopping spree for weapons came from profits made from oil exports to China. And much of the money has gone directly back to China, for purchases of small arms and other military equipment by Sudan.” (Human Rights retrieved September 23, 20014).

While the presence of major conventional arms is limited to government forces, more recently substantial amounts of SALW have been sighted throughout Sudan. These include brand new Type 56-1 assault rifles – a Chinese version of the AK-47, CQ rifles – a copy the US M16, and Type 80 machine guns – a copy of the Russian PKM. Sighting have also been reported of 35mm QLZ 87 grenade launchers, Type 69 40mm ammunition for the popular Russian RPG-7, and Red Arrow-8 guided anti-tank missiles. All these arms are manufactured by the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Contrary to the Major conventional arms that have been exported to the Sudanese government, these small arms have been accessible to rebel groups as well (Small Arms Survey, 2012). It is uncertain how exactly these arms have fallen into the hands of rebel groups. Some have almost certainly been captured during battles, while others may have been stolen from government stocks. In some cases it is the government have directly assigned arms to supporting rebels group e.g. the Janjaweed in Darfur (ibid.). In the recent conflict between Kiir and Machar there were repeated allegations that Khartoum supported the SPLM-IO. Leaked notes of meeting in August 2014, among the most senior military and security officials, suggested that Khartoum was contemplating on arming Machar’s militia (The Guardian, October 23, 2014). This would certainly explain why Chinese manufactured 7.62x54Rmm Ammunition ended up in the hands of the Nuer White Army in 2008 (Small Arms Survey, 2012).
It is not only Sudan that has seen a large inflow of Chinese arms. In general China has become the most prolific arms exporter to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). While it only accounted for 6 percent of arms exports to the region between 1996 and 2000. In the period 2006-2010 it accounted for 25 percent of exports of major conventional arms (Weseman et al., 2011). In similar fashion, Sudan has become one of the largest arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). According to SIPRI estimates, Sudan was the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa from 2001 to 2005, accounting for 29 percent. Its share did decline after the signing of the CPA in 2005. In the period 2006-2010 it was only the second largest importer, accounting for 16 percent of total imports to the region (Weseman et al., 2011).

This decline has not only been a result of the signing of the CPA. SIPRI estimates that the Sudanese Arms industry is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa followed by Ethiopia and Nigeria. The industry is concentrated in the Military Industry Corporation (MIC), which has seven distinct manufacturing complexes. The MIC manufacturers a wide range of military equipment. This includes Sudanese versions of Chinese-designed WZ-501 armoured personnel carriers and Type-85-2 tanks (Weseman et al., 2011; Small Arms Survey, 2014). China has provided substantial assistance in retrofitting and constructing five of these manufacturing facilities. These include the Elshaheed Ibrrahim Shams el Deen Complex that manufactures the personnel carriers and tanks mentioned above; the Safat Aviation Complex that provide assembly and maintenance of aircrafts; the Yarmouk Industrial complex that produces rockets, artillery pieces, munitions and SALW; the Al Shaggara Ammunition Plant that produces small calibre ammunition, mortar rounds and aircraft bombs and; the Al Zharghaa Engineering Complex that specialises in electronics and communication (Small Arms Survey, 2014, Kramer et al., 2013). Many of these items were on display in MIC’s product gallery at the IDEX conference, February 22-26 2015 (IDEX, 2015).

Beijing’s official position is that SALW should not be transferred to unauthorised non-state actors (Bromley et al, 2013). It claims that it abides by the UN embargos. Despite this, UN experts have found that Chinese arms are making their way into Darfur. Further, China claimed that it only accounted for 8 percent of arms exports to Sudan in 2008 (van Dijk, 2009). Despite this, it has been verified that Chinese weapons have been used to commit violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the government, militias
and rebel groups (Saferworld, 2011). Reports have shown that the genocide and human rights violations in Darfur have been committed by combinations of Janjaweed attacks and government attacks. While the Janjaweed attacks on the ground, Sudanese air force conducts air raids with either helicopter gunships or fighter jets. These aircrafts drop bombs onto villages and farms before or in conjunction with the ground attack (Kotecki, 2008). Although China states that it does not supply arms for conflict in Darfur, the presence of these arms is a violation of Security Council resolution 1945, which:

“Decides that all States shall ensure that any sale or supply of arms and related material to Sudan not prohibited by 1556 (2005) and 1591 (2005), are made conditional upon the necessary end user documentation…” (S/RES/1945(2010)).

In the current South Sudanese conflict, Chinese weapons have also influenced the level of fighting. The combating parties have completely neglected international humanitarian law and have killed civilians in their homes, churches, hospitals and other places where they thought they would be safe. Most often the only motivation for these killings has been ethnicity or political affiliation. This has generated sharp criticism from the United Nations and numerous NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty international, who call for China to stop its supply to the region (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Amnesty, 2012, Kramer et al, 2013). However these criticisms have proven ineffectual and do not erase the hundreds of thousands of deaths that have occurred in Sudan since 2003.
Chapter 6: The Case of Sudan and the English School

Reading through the previous two chapters it becomes evident how complex the case of Sudan is. The internal conflicts in the country have been results of numerous domestic and foreign factors. Internally, Sudan has been characterised by ethnic, religious, and political disparities. These disparities have contributed to the changing leaderships in Khartoum. Moreover, these disparities have also contributed to the country's shifting foreign policy. However, Sudan's foreign policy cannot only be explained by the country's domestic affairs. Its relationship with other countries has in part also directly shaped its foreign policy. This was the case in 1971. The alleged Soviet involvement in the failed coup against President Nimeiri directly resulted in Sudan to seek closer ties the West. As such, Sudan’s foreign policy shifts can directly be explained by a combination of domestic and foreign factors.

However, this explanation is not sufficient. There are many indirect factors that have also contributed to these foreign policy shifts. Like direct influences, these indirect factors stems from a combination of domestic affairs and foreign influences. Sudan’s foreign policy has been determined by a constant interplay between all these factors. In other words, domestic affairs influenced Sudan’s foreign policy both directly and indirectly. Similarly, foreign factors also influenced the country's policy directly and indirectly. To make things even more complicated, these domestic and foreign factors have also altered each other. For example, the failed coup in 1971 made Sudan to become more favourable towards the West. This development had two implications. Firstly, it allowed Chevron to explore oil the country. The discovery of oil indirectly contributed to Nimeiri's decision to abrogate the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. Secondly, as Nimeiri opened up towards the West, he became more supportive of Western development models. Ultimately, this resulted in the adoption of austerity measures which contributed to deteriorate Sudan’s economy. These two events were indirect factors in the demise of Nimeiri’s rule in 1985.
The outset of this thesis was that Sudan's turn towards China can be explained by employing the English School. Thus far, the English school has not been presented into this dynamic. However, it plays a central role for determining the level of actor with which this dynamic occurs. At the international system level, this dynamic occurs through interaction with other states. At the international society level, the dynamic is determined by interaction with international societies. This only occurs in international societies that the country is member of. For example, Sudan is for various obvious reasons not a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As such, ASEAN cannot interact with Sudan at an international societal level. Any interaction that happens between ASEAN and Sudan is exercised at the international system level. Although the example is a little extreme, the logic remains relevant. Lastly, interactions that occur between states and non-state actors are confined to the world society level. These non-state actors comprise of NGOs, autonomous International Organisations, and companies. This chapter will present how the different actors that have influenced Sudan’s foreign policy are separated into these three levels. The last section of the chapter will connect these levels and show the interplay between them.

**International System**

States form an international system to the extent that they interact with other states regularly. This can comprise of both positive and negative interaction. Positive interaction is represented trade, treaties, or alliances. Negative interaction can be expressed by war between countries. At this level, there are no common values or interests that give these interactions additional substance (Bull, 1995). There is only one international system. Despite this, it is possible to group interactions between states. This can be achieved by employing a context to each group. As such, each group of interactions can be denoted by a defined commonality. This can be trade, war, alliances etc.

As noted by Buzan & Wæver (2003), interstate security dynamics in Africa are often spillovers of domestic dynamics, e.g. refugee flows and civil wars. Crossborder intervention is usually conducted with a government supporting rebels the other country. These have been the main instruments of most governments against each other. This has been presented in Sudan’s relations with Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). African conflicts often spill over into numerous countries. For example, Sudan’s internal
conflicts spilled into its neighbouring countries. At first this happened when Abboud’s regime forced political leaders into exile in Sudan’s southern neighbours (Idris, 2013; Malwal, 2015). This ultimately led to the SPLM/A to receive support from amongst others, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea (Johnson, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 1998). Contrarily, Khartoum supported the extreme Christian Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army and Eritrean Islamic Jihad (Idris, 2006). Another example is the Chadian-Libyan war between 1978 and 1987. This conflict spilled into Darfur when Khartoum allowed Chadian rebels and Libyan armed forces to operate out of the region (Barltrop, 2011). During the early 1990s, Egyptian Jama’at al-Islamiyah also operated out of Khartoum (Burr & Collins, 2003). This support directly contributed to strain Sudan’s relations with its neighbours. It led to Eritrea cutting connections with Khartoum in 1994. The following year Uganda also broke relations, while Hosni Mubarak accused Khartoum for aiding and training “fundamentalist terrorists” and sending them across the border (Idris, 2006). The interactions above constitute one group on countries. The boundaries of this group are determined by the commonality that exists between them. Sudan’s direct support of rebel groups can be seen as separate policies towards each of its neighbouring countries. However, these policies made other governments support the SPLM/A. This support represented the countries’ foreign policy towards Sudan. As such, Sudan’s relations to its neighbour states denotes one group. This group is not necessarily limited by geography. Other countries relations were also represented by support for the SPLM/A. Previously Zimbabwe and Namibia supplied the SPLM/A with arms (GlobalSecurity.org, Retrieved February 10, 2015).

This is not the only group that Sudan is influenced by. Following the logic that commonality between state interactions constitute the boundaries groups, others can be identified. Sudan’s relations with Western countries frame another group. The commonality between these interactions, are the sanctions that the especially the United States and EU have imposed. US sanctions came as a result of numerous factors. Concerned with the radical, extremist, ideological government and its practise of human right abuses, the US decided to suspend all economic and military assistance to Sudan. It continued to provide only humanitarian relief. Relations were further impaired with Sudan’s symbolic support for Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The US subsequently closed its embassy in Khartoum in
The al-Bashir government's affiliation with international terrorist organisation also deteriorated the relationship (Large & Patey, 2011). It was a combination of these interactions that led President Clinton to issue Executive Order 13067. This imposed a comprehensive trade embargo and blocked assets of the Sudanese (OFAC, 2013).

These interactions were also the main factors behind the EU's sanctions. European Community's decision to suspend its development aid in 1990 was in response to the government's human rights abuses (Kramer et al., 2013). In 1994, reports emerged of Sudanese government forces deliberately targeting civilians. This influenced the EU's decision to impose its first arms embargo on the country (Council Decision 94/165/CFSP).

Human rights denote the commonality between the US and EU's decision to impose sanctions on Sudan. Moreover, the sanctions represent the commonality of the responses to the human rights abuses by the Sudanese government. These sanctions include suspension of development aid together with the framing of embargos. The difference between the EU arms embargo and the US trade embargos is related to the context for Sudan's relations with each of these actors. While the EU was merely concerned with human rights abuses, the US were also concerned with support for terrorist organisations.

The last group that is relevant for this thesis is constructed of stakeholders in Sudan. This is denoted by states that export of arms, assist in arms manufacturing, or have invested in Sudan. Of the countries in this group, China is the most prominent. To a lesser extent, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Iran, Malaysia, and India are also part of this group. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine have widely been cited as exporting arms to the regime in Khartoum. This occurred even after embargoes where imposed (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Wezeman, 2007). There have not been any reports of neither India nor Malaysia exporting arms to Sudan. However, these two countries have stakeholder interest in the country. Malaysia's state owned oil giant Petronas is together with the CNPC the two biggest shareholders in Sudan's oil industry. In similar fashion, India's state owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) is together with Petronas a major shareholder in the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company that operates block 5A (EIA, 2014). China and Iran have both exported arms to Sudan. Moreover, they also have stakeholder interest in the country. China’s arms exports and investments
were presented in chapter 5. Iran has supplied arms to Khartoum since the 1990s. According to SIPRI, Chinese and Iranian SALW exports accounted for 95 percent in the period 1992-2005 (Wezeman, 2007). Iran allegedly owns 35 percent of the Yarmouk Industrial complex, with some 300 Iranian technicians working there. It has also been reported that Iran assists with manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles at the Safat Aviation Complex. Lastly, MIC technicians are often sent to Iran for training (Small Arms Survey, 2014). The commonality between all these actors is their involvement in Sudan. All these actors can lose from a deterioration of their relationship with the Sudanese government.

Additional groups can most likely be identified. However, the three mentioned above are directly relevant to the research question of this thesis. Each of these groups interacts with Sudan in different ways. It is this interaction that contributes to determine Sudan’s foreign policy. The West has supported the Third Wave of Democracy and has pressured al-Bashir to stop human rights abuses. Meanwhile, China has, together with numerous other countries, not challenged the government. In contrast, it has exported arms and invested in the country. This interaction is thus far only represented at the state level. This is why it has been placed appointed to the international system.

**International Society**

While Sudan is influenced through its interaction with other states, it is also socialised by its membership in international societies. Sudan is member of several international societies. Amongst others it is part of the League of Arab States with which Sudan shares its culture and language with. It is also member of the African Union, a union consisting of 54 African states. The international society most important for this thesis is one that consists of United Nations. Although the UN in itself is an international society, there exists a range of international institutions that have been established on similar foundations. Apart from the UN, this also includes the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Criminal Court etc. As noted By Buzan, an international society is the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states (Buzan, 2001). The shared identity among these institutions is notion of Western values. More specifically, this is the notion that human rights are natural and universal.
Even today, the notion of human rights has is disputed. There are two perceptions to how human rights should be regarded. While one group contends that they are natural, other argue that some rights cannot be considered as more than positive. Those who advocate natural rights define them as rights that people enjoy in their natural state. In Lockean traditions these includes the right to life, liberty, and property. These rights can only be enjoyed if the state limits its domain of power so it does not interfere with them (Arat, 2006). For this reason, they are often also referred to as negative rights since they require nothing more than for the state to refrain from intruding in personal liberty and bodily integrity.

Much of the disagreement arises with regard to the practicality of unconditionally regarding rights as universal. For example, protection against torture is considered a natural right. Despite this, its enforcement requires positive action form the state. It requires training, supervision and control of police and security forces, and public funds to establish a functioning judicial system. In many other countries it would be extremely expensive and politically impossible to (without regime change) to protect from human rights violations (Donnelly, 2013). The separation of rights usually also depends on historical circumstances:

“In Argentina, protection against torture was a very positive right indeed in the late 1970s. Today it is a much more negative right” (Donnelly, 2013; 43).

The notion of human rights as universal can be traced back to the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789. Benjamin Constant noted in 1819 that modern societies had changed from ancient societies. Ancient societies had no notion of individual rights. Liberty in these societies was closely related to the sovereignty of the state. While people had to compromise on the individual rights, they enjoyed greater participation in the administration of the state. The size of modern societies has caused individual influence in administration of the state to diminish. Consequently each individual has become focused with their own pleasures and how they obtain individual liberty (Constant, 1819). It was on this basis that article two in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen stated:

“The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” (Kristensen, 1989; 11).
The French declarations laid the foundation for the contemporary notion of how to perceive human rights. It is this perception that the UN is founded on. This becomes evident in article three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” (UDHR, 1948). Promoting and protecting human rights is the foundation of the UN Charter's vision to achieve a just and peaceful world. The reason for this attention to individual rights was the fact that Western countries dominated the UN Conference in San Francisco in 1945. This dominance is noticeable in the Charter which embodies the dominant Western values at the time (Thakur, 2006).

The reason for outlining this historic foundation of the UN is the impact that is has had on the interaction between Sudan and the international society. The Sudanese government’s decided to disregard human rights and brutally repel the uprising in Darfur in 2003. This tactic was similar to the ones adopted in the South during previous conflicts. Sudan’s policy of non-involvement during the Cold War gave it a strategic position. With the end of the Cold War this position had been compromised. Further, Sudan’s affiliations with terrorist organisations together with the human rights abuses had damaged its relations with other states. The two most prominent were the EU and US, which had already imposed sanctions. The end of the Cold War had essentially altered the shared interests and identity of the UN. During the Cold War the US and Soviet Union had often dictated the agenda in the Security Council (Manusama, 2006). The cliff that had separated the West and the Soviet Union disappeared. The individual human rights that constitute the foundation of the international society gained a much more prominent position. These developments meant that no country have voted against any of resolutions 1556, 1591, or 1945. Both Russia and the US voted for Resolutions 1556 and 1945, while Russia abstained from resolution 1591 (SIPRI, retrieved February 12, 2015). This notion of human rights was also behind the ICC issuance of the arrest warrant on al-Bashir in 2009. The five charges of murder, rape torture, extermination, and forceful transfer of civilian population all relates back to the UDHR article three of right to life, liberty and security. As such, much of the international society's interaction with Sudan has been based on the notion of individual human rights. The fact that the rights are fundamental to the international society has rendered them unconditional and unnegotiable.
World Society

Following Buzan, the world society is a vehicle that enables non-state actors to be brought into the discussion. Non-state actors have played a significant role in the country. This has especially been the case since oil reserves were discovered in the country. Chevron played an influential role in the Nimeiri regime’s 1980 decision to construct a refinery in Kosti rather than Bentiu. Chevron advocated for this decision by arguing that a refinery in Bentiu would be prohibitively expensive. The Kosti refinery would be constructed in two years rather than three to five years. This would allow Chevron to exploit the oil much earlier (Yongo-Bure, 2007).

Traditionally, the most influential non-state actors have been foreign oil companies. Whereas Western oil companies were the most prominent during the late 1970s and 1980s, Asian companies have recently obtained that position. With outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983, Western oil companies gradually retreated from the country. This trend was only augmented as Sudan’s relations with US diminished after the coup in 1989. Replacing the Western oil companies were the CNPC, Petronas, ONGC, and Sinopec. Similar to Chevron in the 1980s, the CNPC’s position as the largest shareholder has provided considerable leverage. Its prominent position in developing the Sudanese oil sector allowed it to promote its own subsidiaries in construction projects. The presence of these companies has also contributed to form Sudan’s foreign policy, especially since 2000. Sino-Sudanese relations have historically been characterised by mutual support and understanding. Despite this, the presence of the Chinese oil companies in Sudan has bound Khartoum to be more favourable towards Chinese influence.

Western companies have generally been reluctant to re-establish investments in Sudan. These companies have to operate under the legal framework of their home countries. As such, they have to operate with the pressures of national or international sanctions. Moreover, Western companies are also prone to disinvestment pressures from consumer reputation (Patey, 2009). Operating in Sudan is associated with human rights violations. The CNPC, Petronas, and the ONGC are government-owned by 90 percent, 100 percent, and 74 percent, respectively. This level of state-ownership makes them less susceptible to influence.
from association with human rights violations. For Khartoum, this makes Asian oil companies one of very few actors willing to develop its oil sector (Patey, 2009).

The CNPCs investments have also generated pressure on the Chinese government to provide security for its oil workers. It is in this light that the numerous reports of the presence of Chinese troops in Sudan should be viewed. Several sources have suggested that these troops were stationed near the oil fields in order to protect them. China’s recent decision to contribute to UN peacekeeping forces in the country has widely been speculated to be part of this strategy (Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2014; Business Insider, January 16, 2015).

While Chinese non-state actors in recent years have enjoyed preferential treatment, Western NGOs, aid organisations, and other non-stake actors have lost much of their influence. For example, Following the ICC’s arrest warrant on al-Bashir in 2009, Khartoum responded by expelling thirteen aid organisations from the country (Reliefweb, March 4 2009). These organisations accounted for 40 percent aid workers and delivered more than half of the total amount of aid (Pantuliano et al., 2009). As mentioned above, Western companies have also been cautious with investing in the country. France’ Total SA and Exxon mobile Corp. did return in South Sudan since its independence in 2011 (Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2014). However, the eruption of conflict has reduced oil production and the CNPC’s blocks 3 and 7 remains the only two, currently operational.

Lastly, Khartoum’s support for radical groups also contributed to Sudan’s change relations with other countries. It was the country’s affiliation with radical Islamic groups that made the US to add the country to its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993 (Large & Patey, 2011). Despite this, nothing has indicated that Khartoum was directly involved in planning attacks against US targets. The presence of these groups did not directly influence Khartoum’s foreign policy. Rather, their presence was a by-product of this foreign policy together with al-Turabi’s strong political position. As such, US-Sudanese relations were not directly influenced by these groups. The US decision to break relations with Khartoum was an indirect result of the latter’s affiliation with these groups.
Sudan turns east

By now it should be evident that there have been a myriad of factors that have contributed to China gaining influence in Sudan. These factors can be separated into three levels: the international system, international society, and world society, depending on the actors.

Foreign influence began long before it gained independence in 1956. The British decided to annex the South to the North in 1947. This decision has been one the main reasons that Sudan has suffered from internal conflict for the past 60 years. At the time Uganda and Kenya were also under British rule. The British even presented the idea of annexing the South to one of these two colonies at the Juba Conference in 1947 (Bereketeab, 2015). The decision to defer from this strategy indirectly caused Sudan internal dynamics to change. The South subsequently experienced explicit discrimination from the Northern elites. This caused in the uprising in Torit in 1955 and demands for federation. These demands were a major reason for Khalil handing over power to the military in 1958. The conflict in the South has been a direct influence in every change in power and coup that Sudan has experienced. The coup in 1989 was instigated by factions of the army who opposed agreements with the South (Warburg, 1990). This constitutes one of many examples where other states have indirectly influenced Sudan's foreign policy. A similar case can be identified in 1986, when the US bombed Libya. Al-Dahab had viewed at the US with scepticism. The bombing provoked him to denounce the US actions as "brutal military action" (Shaked & Ronen, 1986).

To this, it is important to remember that al-Dahab had gained power due to the fall of Nimeiri. Nimeiri's fall was indirectly contributed by Chevron and the IMF. Chevron had been able to convince Nimeiri of the advantages of a refinery in Kosti, and the subsequent pipeline. The IMF advocated austerity measures as the solution to Sudan's economic struggles. At the time, the international society's notion of human rights had not gathered prominence due to Sudan's strategic important in the Cold War. As a result the UN only played a marginal role in Sudan.

Thus far, this chapter has treated Sudan as a socialised actor. It is important to also include Wendt's rump materialism into the discussion. Even though Sudan has been severely affected by foreign influence, its policies have to be viewed as rational. This can be related to
the different regime’s efforts to stay in power. Nimeiri’s decision to abrogate the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement was a result of several considerations. Sudan’s economic struggles had put him under pressure from opposition groups. In efforts to stay in power, Nimeiri decided to reconcile with al-Turabi. Al-Turabi was critical towards the south and had no intentions of letting the South enjoy potential oil revenues. The government subsequently began to undermine the peace agreement.

It was a similar case during the late 1990s’ power struggles between al-Turabi and al-Bashir. Pressured by resentment from the army over its marginalized position, al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and fired al-Turabi together with the rest of the cabinet. Though al-Turabi had been side-lined, Sudan still suffered from international isolation. It was in this light that al-Bashir offered his cooperation to fight international terrorism in efforts to improve relations with the US (Freedom House, 2008). This marked a significant shit if policy from the regime. Though this was recognised by the US, Sudan’s affiliation with terrorist organisations meant that it remained isolated.

The events outlined above have, amongst others, been contributing to Sudan’s shift towards China. They have constituted interplay between Sudan, the international system, the international society, and world society. Khartoum’s human rights abuses during the 1990s impaired relations with its former closest allies. The US and EU decided to impose comprehensive sanctions. Western oil companies were forced to completely retreat from country and sell their concessions. Instead, Khartoum had to look for alternatives to develop its oil sector. Until this development, Sino-Sudanese relations had merely been symbolic. China saw an opportunity to develop its influence in Africa. As such, it was willing to provide loans and develop Sudan’s infrastructure. While China became a major actor in the country, The West unconditional notion of human rights was expressed in 2004. The UN imposed resolution 1556 and further isolated Sudan internationally. This isolation peaked as the ICC issued its arrest warrant in 2009. Contrary to the West, China’s adoption of non-interference has allowed it to be indifferent to the human right violations in Darfur. As a SPLM/A official noted “China is crowding the United States out of Sudan and maybe out of Africa” because it is acting strategically while the United States is not (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012; 254). While Beijing agrees that individuals responsible for violations committed in Darfur must be brought to justice, it has argued that no one has the right to challenge the immunity of a head
of state (Saferworld, 2011). Instead, it has argued that Western governments should do more to get rebel groups to join peace talks, rather than focusing on Khartoum (Patey, 2009). China abstained from voting on Resolutions 1556, 1591, and 1945. Although other countries have also abstained from each individual resolution, China was the only country to abstain from all three (SIPRI, February 12, 2015).

As noted by Wezeman (2007) Western sanctions have ineffectual in stopping the flow of arms into the Darfur. States exporting arms to Sudan have shown no significant change in export behaviour. Further, the Sudanese government has ignored demands, and has continued to support and arm the Janjaweed, while also transferring soldiers to the region. Western sanctions have only facilitated closer ties between Khartoum and Beijing. This should not have come as a surprise, already in 1991 did Huntington highlight that the undemocratic countries in Africa, the Middle East, and mainland Asia are less susceptible to American influence (Huntington, 1991).

This does not mean that China is indifferent to the conflict in Sudan. As the largest stakeholder in the country, China has intrinsic interest in securing the oil fields and establish a stable supply to China. Beijing recently initiated peace talks with Kiir and Machar (Reliefweb, January 12, 2015). It has been a contributor to the signed peace agreement between the two combatants (BBC, February 1, 2015).
Chapter 7: Conclusions

The outset of this thesis was to investigate which factors have facilitated China becoming a major actor in Sudan by answering the research question:

*What have been the historical mechanisms that have caused China to become a major foreign actor in Sudan, and how has this influenced conflicts in the Sudan?*

To answer this question, it was decided to employ the English School of IR. There were several reasons for this employment. First, the school acknowledges theoretical and methodological pluralism. This is expressed by the separation of the world into three: the International System, International Society, and World Society. Second, the English school's attention to historical narrations was relevant with regard to the nature of the research question. By employing the English School it was decided that the most appropriate way to answer the research question was to conduct a case study of Sudan. Sudan was chosen because it offers some interesting dynamics between its relationship with the West and its relationship with China.

Another central reason for selecting the English School was the notion of rump materialism. This is the idea that states are both rational and socialised actors. By following this notion, both domestic and foreign factors influence a state's policies. This was the reason for presenting Sudan's four most serious conflicts. By presenting these four conflicts, dating back to before independence, it was possible to show Khartoum's changing leaderships. Moreover, Chapter 5 showed how Sudan's foreign policy has shifted in tune with its domestic conflicts. Vice versa, Sudan's foreign policy and domestic conflict have also been influenced by its foreign relations. This interplay is a dynamic that is constantly developing.

This dynamic occurs at the three levels identified by the English School depending on the kind of actor involved. At systems level this dynamic is a result of interaction between states. When countries share identities interaction between states institutionalises and creates international societies. At this level, the dynamic represent influence by any given society
that a state is member of. Finally, world society constitutes the level at which non-state actors are able to interact with states. This dynamic is a central part of the explanation for Sudan turning east. Before the end of the Cold War, Sudan was strategically important to both the US and the Soviet Union. Because of this, both powers’ approach towards Sudan was tainted by realpolitik. As such, it was this dynamic that, led to al-Bashir gaining power in 1989. This happened through a series of events dating back to the Juba Conference in 1947.

With the end of the Cold War, human rights protection became one of the predominant issues in the international society. Throughout the 1990s, the West imposed sanctions and embargos on Sudan. Western oil companies were forced to sell their concessions and terminate operation. This was further intensified with the UN resolutions that were imposed between 2004 and 2010. These sanctions were imposed without consideration to a fundamental element of international societies. As noted by Bull (1995) all states wish to safeguard sovereignty when entering an international society (Bull, 1995). The West’s sanctions were intrusive and challenged the sovereignty of Sudan. The sanctions were intended to make Khartoum adhere to international humanitarian law. Instead, they pushed Sudan away from the West. China’s doctrine of non-interference meant, that it was able to capitalise on Western resentment towards Sudan. China offered an alternative solution to developing the Sudanese oil sector. Its foreign policy resembles that of the Superpowers during the Cold War. Its overarching goal is to secure a stable supply of oil for its economic development. The internal conflicts in Sudan have challenged this supply. It is in this light that Chinese arms sales to Sudan should be viewed.

Sudan is not the only case where relations with the West have been destroyed. Zimbabwe has in recent years also been exposed to fierce criticism and discontent from the West. Here China has also emerged as a prominent actor and investor. Hence, the findings of this thesis can potentially be transferred to other cases. To conclude the findings of this thesis, it is inherent to understand the dynamics of states when determining an appropriate policy towards them. It is fitting to conclude with a quote that defines this:

“Criticising the state for its many shortcomings may be of less relevance to understanding security in Africa than seeing through the image of the state to nonstate realities behind it.” Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 227).
References


Ce


Kong, Bo. (2010). *China’s International petroleum Policy.* Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC.


