Master’s Thesis

RIDING SOLO IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
— The “sharing” phenomenon and its implications in the Danish labor market

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Abstract

The emergence of the so-called “sharing economy” has triggered a political race in Europe to harness its alleged efficiencies and innovations. We are currently in a haze of unreliable and insufficient data about this phenomenon—unreliable because notions of “sharing” obscure the presence of solo self-employed workers with poor working conditions, and insufficient because we know very little about the effects of the sharing economy’s employment relations in each national context. This paper therefore seeks to shed light on the phenomenon from a Danish labor market perspective, before talks of a coordinated European response to the “sharing” challenges become a reality. Adopting a case study approach, this paper examines the legal and practical aspects of finding work through three Danish sharing economy platforms, and assesses the working conditions for its service providers. It relates platform work to “conventional” employment in the transportation and cleaning industries, and views platforms as potential new labor market intermediaries. Based partly on expert interviews, the paper discusses the challenges faced by providers to collectively organize, and assesses potential ways to overcome the sharing economy’s lack of collection action. Given the lack of data about the size of the “sharing” workforce and the lifestyles of its providers, the area remains uncharted territory. The paper highlights that workers in the Danish sharing economy are outsiders in the Danish model, whose persistent lack of collective action could, in time, mean drastic consequences for labor market governance, as well as for the collaboration between the Danish state and the social partners. The findings show that there is no one-size-fits-all response, which could limit the possibility for cross-border, European solutions.
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Appendix 1: Interview guide
1. Introduction

The phenomenon known as “the sharing economy” is fast becoming the talk of the town. But what are we really talking about? With a strong reliance on digital technologies, the companies in the sharing economy operate online platforms (or “apps”) that efficiently match people seeking temporary help with people willing to do the job—anything from delivery service, a car ride, to assembling a piece of furniture. People willing to rent out their private homes or belongings can also be matched through a platform with people looking for short-term rentals. The business models build on the idea that economic and/or social gains can be captured by systematizing activities typically found in the informal sector, i.e. neighbors or family members helping each other out (Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015). But unlike familial sharing, connections are made between strangers. To preempt abuse and to build trust between these strangers, platform users must give each other ratings based on the quality of service, friendliness, etc. (Dervojeda et al. 2013).

By now, this global phenomenon has triggered a political race across Europe to harness its innovations and novel business models in the best possible way. The Netherlands and the UK were some of the countries that moved fast to embrace the idea. In Denmark, the government views it as a recipe for growth, intending to launch a strategy in June 2016 to support the development of the sharing economy (Henriksen 2016). But as the sharing economy has spread to more and more European cities every year, through local startups and international platforms like Uber and Airbnb, it has gotten a mixed reception. Private taxi services have met the most resistance, for example in Germany, France, and Spain, and a general regulatory uncertainty has emerged regarding these platforms and the legality of their activities (Valero 2016). Based on this, the European Commission is expected to unveil guidelines in June 2016 about the EU legislative stance, reflecting Commissioner Bienkowska’s idea of a single European approach to the sharing economy (Ibid; Mackay 2015). The Commission also has a mind to ensure that the development of the phenomenon is encouraged, “without favouring one business model over another” (Valero 2016).

When new phenomena like this emerge, questions inevitably arise about how it challenges or improves upon the status quo. The sharing economy’s innovations have made even some of the harshest critics recognize the potential efficiency gains from improved allocations of resources and reductions in transaction costs (Edelman and Geradin 2015). But this alleged recipe for growth still raises concern across Europe and North America: How are the rights of consumers ensured? It is really as environmentally friendly as promised? Will it strengthen social cohesion? Does it promote
informal economic activity? (Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015). In discussions about the sharing economy, there has been a disproportionate focus on the consumer experience. As a consequence, the concerns of the solo self-employed workers, who supply their time and services, have largely been overlooked (De Stefano 2016; Aloisi 2016). Labor experts are therefore drawing attention to the reportedly poor wages and working conditions in the sharing economy.

The emergence of the sharing economy, starting 5-10 years ago, can be seen as a component of a broader transformation (Aloisi 2016). The “industrial equilibrium” in Western societies has been altering during the last 30 years (Häusermann and Schwander 2012: 28-29). We have seen a rise of the service sector, ever more efficient technological systems of production, and a growing number of non-standard employment relationships in the labor market (Ibid.). This transformation has been forecasted as “The Fourth Industrial Revolution”, in which technological advances are going to disrupt and profoundly change our industries—altering the way we work and the way we live our lives (Schwab 2016). The technology used in the sharing economy is in this regard contributing by creating and developing markets for small-scale services. In the process, it is assembling an extremely flexible and casual workforce that can be hired and fired in the course of an hour (De Stefano 2016). It has been argued that although The Fourth Industrial Revolution can bring significant efficiencies, these may come at the price of growing social and economic inequality (Schwab 2016). While the other concerns about the sharing economy are of significant practical importance, there is an acute need to learn more about what these new business models mean for the labor market and for the future of labor market policy in Europe.

The question of how significant a role the sharing economy will play in the future world of work can be added to the long list of everything else we do not yet know about it. In fact, it is difficult to even get a reliable estimate of the size of the phenomenon, seeing as there is no common understanding of its boundaries. In 2013, an approximation showed that the global revenue of sharing economy activities was around 15 billion USD\(^1\) (Pwc 2013). Although this is a modest figure compared to “conventional” industries with comparable activities, the sharing economy is projected to have an impressive growth rate of over 30 % in the next 10-15 years (Ibid.). Our lack of knowledge extends to the size of the “sharing” workforce, and to the fact that we do not know if platform work will only cover ad hoc activities, or if the sharing economy will be host to more permanent or long-term employment.

\(^1\) In the five main areas of the phenomenon: Peer-to-peer finance, online staffing, peer-to-peer accommodation, car sharing, music and video streaming (Pwc 2013).
What we do know is that most of the sharing economy is not “driven by an altruistic spirit” as originally envisaged (Aloisi 2016: 34). These “sharing” processes are warping and “weirding” work to an extent where it is not even called work—it is “gigs” or “rides” or “tasks” (Walker 2015; De Stefano 2016: 2). I choose to look at it as work, even when it is not legally (or practically) framed as such (I return to this issue in Chapter 4). If it turns out that the sharing economy’s fringe work is not really challenging labor market structures, and should not be considered anything more than neighbors helping each other out, we may rest easy. But probably not.

These fast-expanding business models are mobilizing solo self-employed service providers everywhere. In light of very different national labor market institutions and structures, I find it exceedingly relevant to learn more about what platform work means within each national context. In this paper, the sharing economy’s triangular relationship (between the platform, the client, and the provider), and what it means for providers’ working conditions in a Danish context, is analyzed. The labor market in Denmark is characterized by comparatively high levels of labor market organization, which lets the social partners take an active role in regulating labor standards through collectively bargained agreements. On account of this structure, the workforce enjoys comparatively generous benefits and high security. The emergence of platform work in the US has been called out as a race to the bottom in terms of labor standards (Schor 2014). Given the large differences between the institutional setups in America and in Denmark, my paper will explore if similar dynamics are likely to appear in the Danish context.

This paper shows that the sharing economy is a heterogeneous field, where neither definitions nor responses are one-size-fits-all. It will relate platform work to conventional service sector employment, and show that the current employment type and working conditions pertaining to sharing economy providers in Denmark have some exclusionary tendencies that may bring the undesirable effect of growing inequality in the Danish labor market. It consists of three overlapping components: One that systematically categorizes the sharing economy, one that explores employment type, working conditions, and labor relations, and one that discusses the challenges and implications of the phenomenon in a Danish context, aiming to inform further research in the process. It does not presume familiarity with the sharing economy’s business models, or the issues that service providers face. As I am dealing with an emerging and understudied area, the paper will shed light on some of the obvious and less obvious aspects of the phenomenon, by pursuing the following research question:
Based on the current employment type and working conditions pertaining to so-called sharing economy service providers, to what extent may the prevalence of the providers have a segmentation effect on the Danish labor market, and how may this have implications for existing employment relations in Denmark?

1.1 Introducing the chapters

Chapter 2 contributes with a definition and systematic screening of platforms in the sharing economy. Criteria for when working conditions should be subject to examination is established here. Chapter 3 reviews theoretical explanations for inequalities in the labor market, and relates segmentation to the Danish model. Chapter 4 explains the choice of methods and data. Chapter 5 explores the practical and legal aspects of finding work through the sharing economy. It analyzes the relationship between platforms and providers by looking into the policies and guidelines of three Danish platforms: Ahandyhand, GoMore, and TrunkBird. The legal status of solo self-employment is also discussed and related to tests for dependency. Chapter 6 looks into the characteristics of the “conventional” transportation and cleaning industries in Denmark, in order to understand more about the areas that the sharing economy is tapping into. Chapter 7 looks at the sharing economy from a labor market intermediation perspective, and discusses providers’ obstacles for collectively organizing and a few possible solutions to the dilemma. The findings are based partly on the conversations I had with three experts on how to make sense of the emergence of the sharing economy in the Danish labor market. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the lack of data, the dilemma of non-standard employment types, as well as the theoretical fit and future theory-building. Lastly, the paper is concluded.
2. Making sense of the sharing economy

In this chapter, the different sides of the sharing economy are defined and categorized. The objective is to identify when working conditions in the sharing economy should be studied, which will aid future standardization and regulatory processes. Platforms will be categorized according to types of compensation, types of participants, and by what is being commoditized. These categorizations will serve as the selection criteria for the case study, as well as serve as a contribution to the on-going debate on the boundaries of the phenomenon.

2.1 Defining the boundaries of the sharing economy

There is great diversity among the social and economic activities in the sharing economy (Schor 2014). Activities range from the recirculation of used products (e.g. via the Danish clothing swapping platform and store, Resecond), to the renting out of apartments or other items to strangers (e.g. via the short-term rentals platform, Airbnb), to service provision in a variety of local and global markets (e.g. via the Danish courier platform, TrunkBird, or the global crowdwork platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk), to money lending schemes (e.g. via the crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter). There is an on-going debate about how these different activities can be captured by different terms. I observe that “sharing” is stretched to cover activities that would normally be considered regular commercial activity. It has been pointed out that the sharing economy is rich with idealistic rhetoric about social community building (Colbjørnsen 2016), which is obscuring its commercial components (Cherry 2016). While the discussion of terminology is an important one, it is not the focus here. A note of caution is hereby made about the appropriateness of the “sharing” rhetoric. “Sharing” and “the sharing economy” will be used in this paper simply for the fact that they are the most widely understood terms, but will be accompanied by a narrower definition:

The sharing economy is confined to companies (platforms) that deploy accessibility-based business models in peer-to-peer markets. Platforms with this type of business model are not limited to specific industries, because can theoretically act as a broker and intermediary.

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2 Terms in circulation include: gig economy (De Stefano 2016), on-demand economy (ibid.), peer-to-peer economy (Aloisi 2016), collaborative consumption (Botsman and Rogers 2010), connected consumption (Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015), accessibility-based economy (Dervojeda et al. 2013), platform economy, intermediation economy (Nesheim and Jesnes 2015).

3 The common use of “peer” in the literature is meant to represent the horizontal relationship between users in the sharing economy (Aloisi 2016). Due to their interchangeable roles, “peer” is used for both “providers” and “clients”, both of which are considered non-commercial. Hereinafter, platform users will sometimes be referred to as peers.
between any number of users who want to share any underutilized asset with each other, from products to skills to money. (adapted from Dervojeda et al. 2013: 3)

This definition differs from Botsman and Rogers’ (2010) typology by excluding the recirculation of used goods. It is excluded because “accessibility-based activities” only include temporary access to assets (or labor) without any change of ownership. Recirculation platforms include the online marketplace, Reshopper, through which mainly used products can be sold, and Resecond, a physical store in Copenhagen in which one used dress can be swapped for another. The swapping or purchasing of used goods will not be considered here, because it is a form of retailing, making it less comparable to cases involving service provision, and because it involves a relatively uncomplicated relationship between seller and buyer.

**Figure 1** The triangular relationship between platform, provider, and client, with arrows illustrating information flows (green and blue) and service provisions (white). Source: Author’s compilation.

The triangular relationship for accessibility-based activities is more complicated. Figure 1 illustrates how the platform acts as an intermediary between the client and the provider by controlling the flow of information (green and blue arrows). The blue arrows represent a demand-driven mode of matching, in which clients’ demands are communicated to the provider through the platform (Dervojeda et al. 2013). The green arrows represent a supply-driven mode, in which clients are
matched with available supply through the platform. Transactions are not illustrated in Figure 1, as payment flows vary based on platform setup. In addition to the service provision between provider and client, the platform may also offer additional services, such as insurance or improved visibility in the platform’s search engine. Platform operators generally claim that they supply an information-based intermediary service, and are thus neither employer nor temporary staffing agency. This self-image has been challenged by a number of stakeholders, who claim that it is not an accurate description of the actual relationship. The triangular relationship and its implications for service providers in the Danish labor market will be addressed at a later stage, while the following sections will categorize the different platforms and their activities contained within the definition.

2.1.1 Compensation
Firstly, platforms contained within the definition can operate with monetary compensation as well as non-monetary bartering, i.e. whether users pay money for the services or if swapping is involved. Some authors have called for a clearer definitional separation between the two sides, arguing that incentives vary greatly between the activities. An example is that swapping (or non-monetary trading) may be done to be more environmentally friendly or to improve social ties (Skytte 2014). Terms such as collaborative consumption (fælles forbrug) and connected consumption have been coined to capture activities with these particular values (Botsman and Rogers 2010; Skytte 2014; Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015). I choose to include non-monetary activities in the above definition, because these activities are perhaps the most genuine examples of “sharing” in the sharing economy (Skytte 2014). Nevertheless, I find the distinction between the two sides very significant, because compensation indeed reveals something about motivations. The example of “time banking” in Schor and Fitzmaurice’s (2015) research shows that, when people swap services, i.e. trade equal amounts of time doing various tasks without payment, the higher skilled participants are more likely to lose interest in the scheme, because their specialized skills are not equal to those of others. The fact that most public debate on the sharing economy tends to include both types of compensation, without making much of a distinction, is perceived here as misleading. As I want to study the employment relationships of people who receive money in exchange for their labor, non-monetary compensation will not be considered further.

2.1.2 Market participants
Secondly, the definition builds on peer-to-peer markets, which means that any activity involving non-peer participants, such as businesses, is outside the scope. However, it is not uncommon for
definitions to take both business-to-peer and peer-to-business markets into account (Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015). In the business-to-peer sharing market, you will find the car sharing company DriveNow (owned in Denmark by the public transit company Arriva), which offers flexible car rentals that you can pay by the minute and drop off anywhere in the city when you are done. It is essentially a creative reinvention of conventional car rentals (in which the company owns the vehicles) making it irrelevant for the scope of this paper.

In the peer-to-business market, you will find the company UpWork (formerly Elance-oDesk), which lets clients hire freelancers (i.e. crowdworkers) online, on a case-by-case basis, to solve tasks like graphic design or programming (Eurofound 2015; Aloisi 2016). This peer-to-business market is growing in importance on a global scale, especially for IT services. Crowdwork platforms like UpWork are emerging in Denmark, however, not to the same extent as peer-to-peer markets (Eurofound 2015; Cevea and HK 2015). In line with the chosen definition, the continued focus will be on the peer-to-peer space. Hereinafter, potential challenges identified in the peer-to-peer space, for instance concerning working conditions, will be assumed to be mirrored in the peer-to-business space.

2.1.3 Commoditization

Thirdly, the definition contains the exchange of any asset, such as physical products and services. What is being commoditized is an important parameter for determining when employment relationships should be studied. Figure 2 shows how the activities of Danish as well as international peer-to-peer platforms can be grouped: Tangible/digital assets, labor, and a combination of the two.

The tangible assets space resembles a conventional rental market, and it is where people give strangers access to tangible (idle) assets, such as apartments, cars, or tools. This type of “sharing” is primarily not labor intensive, although it requires some facilitation. The digital assets space is where peers give strangers access to non-tangible assets, such as money or digital music. If the production time of making the money or the music is not factored in, this space is not labor intensive either. While a number of issues have been raised about activities brokered through platforms in these spaces (see for example Edelman and Geradin 2015), working conditions is not one of them, seeing as the activities are not labor intensive⁴. The continued focus will therefore not lie here.

⁴ Two noteworthy limitations: Firstly, the issue of poor artist compensation on accessibility-based music platforms should not be discounted, but the issue cannot be addressed probably here. Secondly, operating a rental business can be considered work, but as this entails commoditizing off of objects and not labor, it will not be addressed further, even though it bears some relevance.
*Activities brokered through this platform can in theory be placed in both “Labor” and “Combination”.

**Figure 2** Types of commoditization. Source: Author’s compilation.

The labor space resembles a conventional service market, and it is where people give strangers access to their time and skill set, which makes it by definition labor intensive. It includes work such as babysitting, educational services, dog walking, IT and graphic design and clerical services. Similarly, the combined space is where peers give strangers access to their time, skill set, and their tangible assets, either because the service provider uses his or her own tangible assets in the provision of the service, or because the service involves an end-product that has been made with the supplier’s materials. This space is also by definition labor intensive, and involves an additional investment (and therefore financial risk\(^5\) in terms of purchase cost, depreciation, and damage) on the part of the service provider. It includes work such as chauffeur and transportation services, food services, cleaning, and craftwork.

The question of when regulators must consider the sharing economy relevant from a labor market perspective has been raised by politicians and researchers alike\(^6\). I choose to answer that particular question as follows:

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\(^5\) The presence of financial risk is even an important assessment criteria for the tax authorities to determine employment form (SKAT 2016b).

\(^6\) For instance, during a Danish parliamentary negotiation about the sharing economy in 2014. See Folketinget’s meeting 50, “F 10 Om udbredelse af deleøkonomi”.

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Working conditions for providers in the sharing economy should be studied when 1) activities involve compensation in the form of money, 2) activities are labor intensive (i.e. when access to labor or a combination of labor and assets is given), and 3) when the participants are not (initially) established businesses.

The above set of distinctions significantly narrows down the sharing economy. Its usefulness lies in the fact that it divides the heterogeneous sharing economy into smaller, more homogeneous spaces. This may help to ensure that undue praise or criticism does not fall on every platform that claims to be operating within the broadly defined sharing economy. These distinctions are therefore useful when the need for standardization arises, and regulatory attention is drawn towards the sharing economy.

Figure 3 Examples of platforms operating either locally or globally, and skills levels of the services offered. Source: Author’s compilation.

2.1.4 Skills and proximity
There are two additional dimensions to consider, namely proximity and skills. These will serve as additional selection criteria for the cases in this paper. Figure 3 groups the platforms mentioned
above according to 1) whether the services require general or specialized skills, and 2) whether the service providers have to be within a certain local proximity of clients, or can be anywhere in the world in front of a computer. It will not always be possible to draw such lines, as existing platforms offer broad ranges of services, sometimes both globally and locally. A large number of platforms, however, broker services that require general or low skills levels and are low paid (Eurofound 2015; Aloisi 2016). Examples of common services requiring only general skills are repetitive data entry in global (online) markets, and chauffeur services or household chores in local markets. Providers from local and global platforms face conditions that are similar, but not entirely comparable (Aloisi 2016; De Stefano 2016). Based on this, I choose to only consider platforms with locally-bound services in Denmark, as providers’ ties to the Danish labor market are clearer.

As “the room for describing the key features of these platforms is still huge”, the remaining parts of the paper will follow Aloisi’s example by exploring platforms and their business models on a case-by-case basis (Aloisi 2016: 15). The Danish platforms Ahandyhand, TrunkBird and GoMore from the lower left-hand quadrant will be included in this examination (see Chapter 4 for more on case selection).

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7 Work that require general skills is thus understood as manual or repetitive, where extensive experience does not change the nature of the work and may not be a necessary precondition.
3. Explanations for labor market segmentation

In this chapter, labor market segmentation as a concept is introduced and the theoretical literature’s understanding of segmentation tendencies is explored. Since the 1970s, segmentation approaches to labor markets have been developed as an alternative to the prevailing neoclassical explanation of labor market organization. These perspectives will be tied to the particularities of the Danish model, in order to show how to approach the case of platform work in the Danish labor market. In this pursuit, the objective is to answer the following question: Based on previous theory-building on labor market segmentation, what may cause inequality and differential treatment in the Danish labor market?

3.1 Segmentation in the labor market

The concept of labor market segmentation covers the inequalities in wages and working conditions that can be found for different groups of workers in the labor market. These differences may cut horizontally across sectors or vertically across occupational types within any organization (Peck 1996). Segmentation therefore refers to the way labor markets are divided into submarkets, which can be distinguished by different characteristics and behavioral rules (Reich et al. 1973). In modern Western societies, the increase of non-standard working relationships, i.e. anything other than full-time secure employment, is seen as contributing to further segmentation (Häusermann and Schwander 2012). In submarkets characterized by poor and unstable working conditions, certain social groups are found to be overrepresented, such as women, young people, ethnic minorities and immigrants, and individuals with little to no education (Reich et al. 1973; Häusermann and Schwander 2012). Theories of segmentation are concerned with explaining the processes by which segmentation is (re)produced in the labor market. The literature has been complemented continuously since the 1970’s, which means that the segmentation approach cannot be considered one model (despite the fact that is it sometimes referred to as the dualist model) (Rubery 1992; 2007). Consequently, the different approaches focus on different, but related, processes as causal bases for segmentation, but all still represent a significant break with the neoclassical orthodox model of the 1960’s. While the orthodox model claims that the employees, hereafter called the labor supply-side, hold primacy in explaining labor market segmentation, segmentation theorists place more responsibility with the employing organizations, hereafter called the labor demand-side (Rubery 2007).
3.2 Contributions in the segmentation literature

The first generation approach by Doeringer and Piore derived from institutional economics. Its innovation was the idea that a dual labor market is created by industrial structures and by the technological imperative that constantly reconfigures needs in the workplace (Peck 1996). According to Doeringer and Piore, the labor market is split into primary and secondary sectors: The stable industries (and the good jobs) are found in the primary sectors, whereas the supporting industries that are vulnerable to competitive pressures (and where the jobs have poorer working conditions) are found in the secondary sectors (Peck 1996). While this approach introduced the idea that labor markets should be viewed from the labor demand-side, it was the second generation approach by Edwards, Gordon and Reich that attributed even more power to the demand-side, constituting a more fundamental break with the orthodox model (Peck 1996). The second generation of approaches followed in the dualist model footsteps. However, as ideas were derived from a Marxist tradition, theorists saw labor market segmentation as a result of historical class struggle and, above all, an intentional strategy by the capitalist class to exercise control over the workers (Rubery 2007; Peck 1996). As recognized by Peck (1996: 56), this strong emphasis on the labor demand-side meant that “the dualist model helped to open up a series of fundamental questions around the operations of the labor market”. The early parts of the segmentation literature described above were, however, criticized for providing relatively weak causal connections, despite their different premises (Rubery 2007). A newer approach in the segmentation literature has sought to fill some of these gaps.

The third generation approach by Wilkinson and Rubery, among others, takes a more holistic route. This part of the literature features multi-causal explanations, and takes into account “the combined effects of technological, social, institutional, and economic forces in the generation of labor market structures” (Peck 1996: 49). This means that a condition such as the governance system in the labor market is regarded as an important explanatory variable, alongside the demand- and supply-side conditions. This paper will lean on the third generation approach as a way to view and understand practices that arise in the labor market. It should be noted that the segmentation approaches are not complete theoretical constructs (Rubery 1992), and that their applicability will be treated as such. The following sections will therefore elaborate on the segmentation literature’s common ground and develop a more complete picture of the third generation approach, as well as show what segmentation means in Danish terms.
3.3 Segmentation tendencies

Even though the causal bases differ across the different approaches, there is a significant amount of common ground. It can be summarized in terms of analytical priorities and precepts as follows:

Firstly, the labor demand-side is treated as the analytical starting point. This side is treated as an important determinant of labor market organization, because it is where jobs and levels of demand for employment are shaped. This point contrasts the neoclassical model, in which the demand-side is a function of the labor supply-side’s characteristics, implying that employing organizations are not directly contributing to segmentation. (Rubery 1992: 246-247)

Secondly, the social and institutional settings are also treated as important determinants of labor market organization and, consequently, of the labor demand. This point implies that segmentation created by competitive market mechanisms can be reinforced or cushioned by institutions. (Rubery 1992: 246-247)

Thirdly, there is no universal pattern of organization in employment and in labor markets. This point implies that segmentation, i.e. inequalities, can take different forms within and between societies, and that segmentation should therefore be treated according to its particular policy context. (Rubery 1992: 246-247; Peck 1996: 63; Häusermann and Schwander 2012: 27)

Building on these three points, the third generation approach has moved beyond the dual model of earlier authors. It explains segmentation not only in terms of the dual relationship between supply and demand, but also as a result of reproduction of other institutions that impact employment, such as labor unions, as well as state actions and the role of social regulation. Accordingly, inequalities in the labor market are seen as the result of segmentation tendencies that (re)produce practices of differential treatment between workers, which have been grouped under the following three headings: 1) industrial and technological, originating from the side of labor demand; 2) social, originating from the side of the labor supply; and 3) institutional, originating from the side of the state (Peck 1996).
3.3.1 Labor demand segmentation

Segmentation theorists agree that particularly the practices originating from the labor demand-side “led to the persistence or persistent recreation of labour market segments, with no tendency for the capitalist system over time to erode divisions or upgrade employment for all groups” (Rubery 2007: 2). Technological changes are causal processes that constantly reconfigure the needs for labor. This process is known as the technology imperative, which dictates the inevitable adoption of any available technology at any given time (Chandler 1995). It will cause changes over time to the demand for labor in different industries in terms of skills and competencies, while also shaping the labor demand in terms of size and employment types.

This should be viewed in connection with the imperative of labor control processes pursued by employers to suit the individual firm and its product market (Peck 1996). The third generation approach holds that there are primary and secondary markets (and workers) within firms, within industries, and within the whole labor market (Peck 1996). Divisions between primary and secondary jobs and tasks in the workplace are created by employing organizations to optimize their productive output and market responsiveness. Especially in industries vulnerable to competitive pressures, these practices lead to the segmentation of workers, where contingent secondary segments are hired (with unfavorable working conditions) only to account for booms in the business cycle (Peck 1996). This desire to gain flexibility in the firm is a process that can explain how some workers face insecure labor market positions. Flexibility is, however, not only something individual capitalists desire, but something the entire capitalist system necessitates. This means that there is a tendency for inter-capitalist competition, whereby smaller firms in competitive industries are exploited by larger firms in more stable areas (Rubery 2007; Peck 1996).

3.3.2 Labor supply segmentation

Bringing in the element of social reproduction and its effects on the behavior and characteristics of the labor supply, is how the third generation approach adds more nuance and relevance to the literature (Peck 1996). The analytical precept is that the social reality, and different social groups, also exists relatively independently of capitalist strategies or behavior. It is recognized that capitalists are interested in the preservation of the social groups, which are exploited in the labor market in order to achieve flexibility and profits, but that other circumstances play a role in determining these groups’ labor market position (Ibid.).
Practices that contribute to supply-side segmentation are union strategies that try to control or counterbalance the effects of competition in the capitalist system. Unionized workers are interested in maintaining certain labor market segments, for instance by setting educational or credentials requirements for certain jobs, effectively protecting some workers while excluding others from the field. Segmentation theorists claim that there is “an uneven terrain of possibilities for collective organization”, which means that union practices put unorganized groups, typically familiar groups like women, ethnic minorities, disabled workers, and the young, in a disadvantaged position in the workforce (Peck 1996: 68-69).

There may also be certain social groups that are historically marginalized or stigmatized for different reasons, whose weak economic and political position means that they are allocated the jobs at the very bottom of the hierarchy (Peck 1996). The family is one example of a social institution recognized as (re)producing classes and social groups in society. It can have a reinforcing effect on, for instance, traditional gender roles, which in turn has an impact on the educational choices and career paths of men and women (Ibid.). Some early segmentation studies showed that the reinforced notion of women as homemakers meant that women took on work that acted as a flexible employment buffer, even in primary sectors (Rubery 1988). A recent revisit shows an institutional change, and that women are now resisting taking on this role in the labor market (Rubery 2013). The circumstances contributing to the reproduction of certain groups’ marginalized status in the workforce are highly dependent on context (and time), but segmentation theorists do hold that “segmentation is partly a product of who does the jobs, [and] social conventions concerning appropriate forms of wages and unwaged work undertaken by different social groups” (Peck 1996: 72). Therefore, as long as marginalized groups are reproduced in the social sphere, jobs will be created to “suit” those particular groups.

3.3.3 The state in segmentation
The state manages the contradictions (market failures) that arise between the supply- and demand-side. The state is responsible for institutionalizing the different safety nets that are needed when, for example, the labor supply increases in times of unemployment (e.g. active labor market policies, or compulsory training removing workers from the labor market for a time), or when the labor demand cannot be met (e.g. incentivized training programs with pay that lead directly to employment) (Peck 1996). Therefore, its role is to cushion transitions within the labor market, and to ensure that segmentation is not created when workers switch from one job to another, and in other transitions,
such as retirement or family formation. With this role, segmentation theorists say that the state inevitably creates disadvantaged groups, by mandating or incentivizing non-participation in the labor market, such as compulsory education at a young age (removing young people from the labor market), and support schemes for people with disabilities who are relieved of having to work (removing even disabled individuals who are willing to work). The interference of the state is seen as a necessary, but contradictory, process. How the state intervenes and the role of the social partnership and collective agreements, plays a large part in determining which segmentation tendencies are reproduced.

The approach described above implies that there are complex mechanisms behind any given labor market structure. This means that the assessment of relations in the labor market and their segmentation effects, in the sense of inequalities and differential treatment, should be held against the particular institutional, social and industrial setting.

3.4 Segmentation in relation to the Danish model

3.4.1 Particularities of the model

When the matter of working relationships for providers in the sharing economy is raised, it must be viewed in relation to how the labor market is regulated in Denmark. The first feature of labor market governance in Denmark is that: 1) Wages and working condition are regulated by collective agreements between the social partners and only to a limited extent by law (Due and Madsen 2006: 28-30). It shows how the social partners and collective bargaining have a very prominent and legitimate role. Due and Madsen (Ibid.) identify an additional five features: 2) Both the workers and the businesses in the Danish labor market are (voluntarily) highly organized, which means that there are high degrees of coverage by collective agreements for both employees and employers. 3) There is a national coordination of and recurring collective bargaining between the social partners. 4) The regulatory system is coherent with strong relations between the partners, both at the sector and the company level. 5) The collective bargaining is based on the principle of consensus. During the term of a collective agreement, the partners are at a truce, but they have the right to strike in connection with the renegotiation of, and the drafting of new, collective agreements. Lastly, 6) the partners have their own system for addressing potential disputes, the Labor Court (Arbeidsretten).

Seeing as this system is voluntary, there are groups of both workers and employers that, for different reasons, fall outside the model. As a consequence, the workers outside the model, who are not
covered by a collective agreement, do not strictly have access to minimum standards for wages and working conditions. It is the fear that the providers in the sharing economy will fall into the group not covered by any collective agreements, and that the platforms and its clients are exploiting it to circumvent labor standards, that has given rise to debate in Denmark.

3.4.2 Dualism in a Danish context: Insiders and outsiders
When dualism is applied to the Danish labor market, there is a relatively clear divide between primary and secondary markets. The determining factor is whether workers in the market are covered by a collective agreement and have union membership or not (Larsen 2011). Insiders in the Danish model are therefore defined as having union membership (of a union that is responsible for negotiating collective agreements on your behalf) and coverage by a collective agreement in the workplace giving access to good working conditions and wages. Outsiders are, on the other hand, defined by their lack of coverage, and are therefore said to work in the secondary labor market.

Taking a point of departure in the first and simple test of insider-outsider status in the Danish model, Larsen (2011) identifies additional dimensions that can help to determine whether workers are insiders or outsiders, namely employment type, social protection rights, wages, and other labor conditions including entitlements, job security, career prospects and educational qualifications. These are also identified as important dimensions for testing degrees of precariousness of work in a Danish context (Mailand and Larsen 2011), which makes for a good analytical starting point, when asking the question if new practices in the labor market will create more outsiders, and what might be the scope of differential treatment.

Precarious work is most often found among the outsiders. It can be distinguished by low wages, poor working conditions, and little job security, often on account of non-standard employment relationships. When workers in Denmark have a non-standard employment type (e.g. part-time, fixed-term contracts, self-employment, temporary agency work), they may find themselves at the very lowest end of the spectrum, within more than one of the above dimensions (Larsen 2011). In this paper, I explore whether providers in the sharing economy in Denmark will have this risk profile, due to their non-standard employment type of solo self-employment (understood as someone who is legally self-employed but does not have any employees).
The self-employed are a diverse group, and self-employment does not always constitute precarious work in a Danish context (Eichhorst et al. 2013). The concept of “dependent self-employment” covers the space between self-employment and wage-employment, where formally self-employed workers do contract work that can be aligned with that of employees, without having the same status or working conditions. Solo self-employed workers who are economically dependent (i.e. incur financial risk), subordinate to clients, and have insecure and fluctuating payment flows can be defined as dependent self-employed (Eichhorst et al. 2013). In Denmark, this type of subordinate relationship for a self-employed individual cannot always be legally distinguished from legitimate self-employment, and consequently, statistical sources cannot account for this variation. A separate test must therefore be used to assess whether solo self-employment can be considered dependent (and precarious) work in my case study (I return to this in Chapter 5).

### 3.4.3 A segmentation approach in a Danish context

To understand inequality in the Danish labor market, the strong social partnership must be considered, seeing as the insider-outsider status of workers is more dependent on membership, than on other notions of good and bad jobs. In many areas, the social partnership ensures comparatively low levels of inequality and favorable working conditions, even for non-standard employment types. Industry safety and labor standards are mainly the result of bargaining processes between the employing organizations and the unions, processes that are less characterized by conflict and more by consensus (Larsen 2011). In light of this collaboration, exclusionary tendencies may not be attributed only to one side. It therefore makes sense, following the third generation approach, to see inequality as something that derives from a combination of practices, and not a few intentional strategies. What is more, the state enables the collective bargaining and collaborates with the social partners on many labor market issues. The state heightens the status of collectively bargained agreements, thereby also contributing to the exclusion of some workers who do not have equal access to membership or coverage.

When approaching the subject of the sharing economy, the technological dimension that was mentioned earlier is essential. This is because the triangular relationship lacks a traditional employer. Technological possibilities enable flexible labor demand to be met in new ways, which means that the labor demand-side is not irrelevant. The individual service providers are indeed legally self-employed, and could thus be considered their own employers. But it is important to note that the platforms and the clients shape labor demand, particularly in terms of the demand for skills and competencies.
There is also an implicit demand for a specific employment type, namely solo self-employment, which is how clients can achieve a cost-reduction on the services they purchase, and how platforms can assemble a causal and flexible “workforce” to step in when clients make their demands known through the platform. In this sense, they can jointly potentially shape segmentation effects.

3.4.4 Summary
This chapter has shown how a reality in which certain workers have a particularly disadvantaged labor market position can be understood. In answer to the question asked at the beginning, I derive the following understanding from the theory applied in a Danish context: The emergence of practices in the labor market, which cannot be reconciled with the Danish model, will lead to greater inequality and differential treatment of workers. If the status as an outsider in the Danish model can be linked to de facto disadvantage, the political relevance of the divide between insiders and outsiders is likely to increase (Häusermann and Schwander 2012). This may induce a need for new regulation, which in turn begs the question if the social partners should reach an agreement on how to proceed, or if state intervention is needed.
4. Methods

This paper is made up of many connected components, each developing pieces of knowledge that serve to answer the research question. In this chapter, I will briefly account for how these components have been developed.

4.1 Objective

The objective of this paper is twofold: To shed light on the employment relationships of service providers who work in the sharing economy in Denmark, and on the implications it may have for existing relations in the Danish labor market. Employment relationships are understood as the legal conditions of employment, the practical conditions involved with finding work and the working conditions, as well as the workers’ ties to the welfare state and to the social partnership. The existing relations in the Danish labor market are understood as the division of responsibility for social and labor protections between the social partners and the state. So far, a disproportionate amount of attention has been paid to the clients in the triangular relationship. In pursuit of the objective, I therefore look at the providers, and how the triangular relationship impacts their labor market position in Denmark, both from a legal and a practical perspective.

4.2 Research design and theoretical approach

For the amount of attention that the sharing economy has received worldwide, the area is relatively uncharted territory. What is more, the matter of how the sharing economy relates, and will continue to relate, to the existing labor markets structures of Western societies is still unknown. Data, regulatory response, and case law on this matter are only just beginning to take form. Faced with limitations in terms of access to data, particularly in a Danish context, I follow an exploratory research design, in which qualitative data is drawn from multiple sources. In that sense, this paper is a pilot study—the means to define the unresolved and urgent questions for further research.

Above all, the exploratory research design is suitable to gather information about providers’ employment relationship. It is accompanied by a theoretical approach suitable to contextualize these findings. The segmentation approach to labor markets explains by which mechanisms inequalities between different workers and industries arise. As the approach explains this through very different empirical considerations, the mechanisms were related to the particularities of the Danish labor
market in Chapter 3. The knowledge of what constitutes segmentation effects in the Danish labor market can help to make up for the lack of knowledge about the sharing economy, and, short of the proverbial crystal ball, make it possible to assess the effects of the triangular relationship.

The use of segmentation theory expresses an underlying critical stance. The adoption of a “critical orientation toward liberalism—our sociohistorical climate”—means that I, and segmentation theorists, do not take a point of departure in an empirically unassailable model, such as orthodox economics (idea by theorist Roberto Unger described in Delanty and Strydom 2010: 216). It means that I do not automatically see the emergence of the sharing economy’s business models as healthy competition to incumbents. The very existence of persistently segmented groups and successful intermediaries in the labor market defies the assumptions of the orthodox model. The research approach will therefore be founded more in what the selected cases tell us about actual (legal) conditions, rather than the ideological outcomes “promised” by the sharing economy.

4.3 Case selection

4.3.1 Platforms

On account of this research design, cases were selected for examination based on empirical considerations (Bleijenbergh 2010). A screening (and selection) process was made in Chapter 2, where the different sides of the sharing economy were categorized and described. The platforms Ahandyhand, GoMore, and TrunkBird were chosen based on the presence of the following conditions: Money is exchanged between providers and clients; the market is described as “peer-to-peer” where the users are not (initially) commercial actors; the providers commoditize off of their labor in combination with their tangible assets; the work is done locally, and requires only general skills.

While the platforms share the above similarities, the following variations make it interesting to do a multiple case study comparison. Two of the platforms have demand-driven modes of matching (TrunkBird and Ahandyhand) and one has a supply-driven setup (GoMore). Two platforms use an online payment system (GoMore and TrunkBird) and one currently operates with cash payments only (Ahandyhand). Variations (of which more are detailed in Chapter 5) can be a way to identify different effects derived from different platform setups.
Another variation hinted at in the introduction, is the fact that activities are not always formally considered work, or may not yet have the characteristics of work. This is the case with GoMore, where ride-sharing activities are classified by the tax authorities as “colleagues riding in the same car to work together” or “car-pooling”. This means that the income is not taxed, and that it challenges the idea that GoMore-drivers are indeed workers. The first reason that I still choose to use the case of GoMore, is that the platform is not meant for colleagues who want to car-pool to work—it is meant for strangers. I find it relevant to consider GoMore simply for the fact that the tax rules were not created for this purpose, and may not always allow for the use of this loophole. The second reason is that clients are treated as paying customers, and in turn, they treat the service as an alternative to, for instance, public transit. In this type of economy exchange, it is unfortunate if the drivers lose all consideration. While it is true that the size of the Danish sharing economy today is relatively small, the growth rates experienced in other cities across North American and Europe have shown an unprecedented potential for expansion and adaptation. It is therefore relevant to consider even the smallest of cases, as we are still in the early phases of development.

The fact that platforms involving online crowdsourcing or crowdwork were not selected for examination does not signify irrelevance in a Danish context. It has already been mentioned that these types of platforms are not currently emerging in Denmark to the same extent as in other countries\(^8\). It may only be a matter of time, however, before the appeal of efficiency makes Danish businesses expand into this space. The platforms in this space come with a long list of potential social issues\(^9\). Due to constraints of both time and scope, this list of issues means that a proper comparison between locally-bound and global platforms cannot be made in this paper.

### 4.3.2 Industries

In order to gain some understanding of the industries that providers in the sharing economy operate in, I have selected two areas for comparison. Cleaning services in the private sector have been selected as an example of household services facilitated through Ahandyhand. The transportation of

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\(^8\) Cevea and HK (2015) found that the largest crowdwork platform, UpWork, had 1621 accounts from Denmark, of which only 163 were active users.

\(^9\) Aloisi (2016) identify the following issues: The anonymity in crowdwork risks the “dehumanization of work”; the potential for identify fraud, and even shielding of child labor, is a risk in crowdwork; large-scale discrimination of workers based on filtering out certain parts of the world is made possible with crowdwork platforms. A common issue for both locally-bound and global platforms is the barrier for collective action, perhaps accentuated for global platforms due to the larger distances (both physically and culturally) (see Chapter 7 for more on this issue).
goods, including courier and removal services, in the private sector has been selected to represent TrunkBird’s services. Taxi services will only be considered sporadically, particularly in relation to wages, because this is the closest example of GoMore’s ride-sharing services. The taxi industry, and platforms like Uber that are moving into this area, will not be considered, as the area is regulated differently than the other areas. Both cleaners and chauffeurs are part of the operational service sector, which will be referred to in terms of broader labor market trends.

4.4 Data and validity

4.4.1 Data collection from platform websites

In Chapter 5, a central component is based on data collected directly from the websites of the selected platforms. A few other researchers have analyzed the “terms and conditions” or “user agreement” documents of sharing economy platforms before, as a way to understand platform policies and control mechanisms (see for example Aloisi 2016 and De Stefano 2016). While I also took this approach, I chose to broaden my document analysis to include other snippets of information and guides from the websites. The user agreement document is indeed the most legally binding document, but I find the various guides to be just as relevant tools for the platforms to regulate users’ behavior, and thereby the practical conditions of providers’ employment relationship. I particularly find this approach valuable, as I discovered that from the time my data gathering was concluded and until the time of writing, some of these guidelines had been altered by the platform operators. Although a long list of references to the same website may seem excessive, these potential alterations emphasized the need to accurately account for where the data came from and when it was accessed.

For the exact same reason as above, the information that I have gathered is a snapshot of the current time. Platforms in the sharing economy are highly flexible, and I expect the selected platforms to develop and adapt their policies continuously. When the Danish government launches its strategy for the promotion of the sharing economy in June 2016, the platforms may decide to make alterations that ensure a higher degree of support and cooperation from public authorities. In light of this

10 See Sprague 2015 and Cherry 2016 for examples of when the contents of user agreement documents have been tried in US court cases.

11 By chance, I discovered that Ahandyhand 2016a has been altered to Ahandyhand 2016h one month later, although record of this cannot be found on the website. Similarly, the link for TrunkBird 2016d was found to be mysteriously inactive at the time of writing.
potential invalidity of the data, I particularly focus on the framework conditions that are not subject to change as easily.

4.4.2 Data and sector codes for the cleaning and transportation industries

In Chapter 6, this paper draws partly on statistical data available through Statistics Denmark, which means that sector delimitations follow the DB07 sector codes (Dansk branchekode). When calculating industry size, the codes used were: 49.00.3 Freight transport by road and via pipeline, 53.00.00 Postal and courier activities, and 81.21.00 Services to buildings, cleaning and landscape activities (Danmarks Statistik 2007). Wherever possible, I used more specific subcodes: 49.41.00, 49.42.00, and 53.20.00 for transport, and 81.21.00 for cleaning (Ibid.). The DISCO.08 job function codes that I found to be aligned closest with the kind of work done by providers in the sharing economy were: 8322, 8332, and 9621 for transport, and 9111 for cleaning (Danmarks Statistik 2016e). Regrettably, the more detailed industry information that I would have liked to find cannot be obtained through the publicly available statistical database at this time. Therefore, numbers from different datasets have been pieced together to the best of my ability, complemented by secondary data from reports published by the relevant employers’ associations (DTL, The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI/Service), The Confederation of Danish Enterprise (Dansk Erhverv)), and a research paper on industrial cleaning by The Employment Relations Research Centre at Copenhagen University (FAOS).

On the one hand, it must be recognized that some of these sector delimitations are too broad for a comparison with an area as small as the sharing economy. On the other hand, it is relevant to see platform work as part of a larger context. Until we have more knowledge about how far platform work is likely to extend, i.e. if it will only constitute supplementary fringe-work for a small number of people or if it will compete with the conventional sectors for staff, my approach is to compare framework conditions for evidence of either more or less stability.

4.4.3 Secondary sources on the emergence of the sharing economy

Throughout the chapters, I draw on research that has been tracking recent developments in the sharing economy. These secondary sources, including Schor and Fitzmaurice 2015, Aloisi 2016, De Stefano 2016, and Dervojeda et al. 2013, cover North American and some European perspectives. For the screening process in Chapter 2, I was able to use two Danish sources that elaborate on different types of platform setups, namely Skytte 2014 and Dalberg Research 2014, which helped to
make the categorizations relevant even for platforms that have been founded in Denmark. The case study published by the European Commission’s Business Innovation Observatory, Dervojeda et al. 2013, supplied knowledge of platforms from other European countries.

As mentioned earlier, the field is still rather new and there is no common understanding of its boundaries. Some authors are still at a point where they want to encompass the entire phenomenon in one typology. While this does have merit, I found that the activities contained within other authors’ categorizations were too diverse for comparison, and I found some dimensions to be missing entirely. These observations motivated my approach in Chapter 2, where multiple criteria were introduced so that platforms whose setups were too different from the rest would not be covered. Other authors are trying to rename smaller, more homogeneous pieces of the sharing economy. In time, these efforts will undoubtedly provide a clearer picture. Until characteristics can be fittingly associated with terminology, I would recommend (and have gone with) a characteristics-based approach.

4.4.4 Expert interviews on the sharing economy in Denmark

As a supplement to the secondary literature, expert interviews were used to provide more nuance to the topic of the sharing economy in a Danish context. Three semi-structured interviews were held during April 2016 with: Søren Kaj Andersen from the Employment Relations Research Centre at Copenhagen University (FAOS); Peter James Stark from the labor union, HK; and Malthe Mikkel Munkøe from the employers’ association, The Confederation of Danish Enterprise (Dansk Erhverv).

The interviews were designed as “intentional conversations”, in which a guide was loosely followed with both specific and open-ended questions (Barlow 2010: 498; see appendix). The purpose for this was twofold. Firstly, specific questions were used to standardize some of the answers, in order to enable comparison across interviews and with the literature. Secondly, a more unstructured conversation meant that the interviewees could describe the phenomenon and its challenges from their perspective. In the analysis, answers to both types of questions did not stray very much from one interviewee to another, which meant that I was able to group some of the answers. These were the basis for Chapter 7.

The answers have been used with the following pitfalls in mind. Firstly, it must be recognized that the majority of answers are speculative, as the sharing economy is still a new area, and has only recently
been growing in volume. This means that I ultimately rely on the answers as educated guesses about how the sharing economy phenomenon will be treated in Denmark, and about what sort of challenges we may come to experience. Secondly, contact was made to people who were already interested in the topic. As the social partners are engaged in agenda setting, they have a natural interest in shaping the discourses surrounding topics of interest. Seeing as the objective was not to analyze their communication or framing of the topic, it was rather beneficial for my purpose that the interviewees were familiar with the triangular relationships and of specific platforms.

4.5 Limitations

In Chapter 2 and throughout the text in this chapter, I explain the choices that have served to limit the scope of this paper. Given these choices, my findings are limited to Danish context and to the particular types of business models examined. This prevents that undue praise or criticism falls on platforms with significantly different setups, but also prevents me from generalizing. Furthermore, it is not possible for me to make very precise predictions about the trajectory of the sharing economy in Denmark, as this would have required more than a snapshot analysis of platforms, more legal precedent on the legality of activities and employment forms, and more knowledge of how the Danish government intends to promote or constrain “sharing” activities. At present, this information is simply too limited.

As the paper focuses mainly on the direct effects of structure, it can only provide a partial picture of the effects of the phenomenon. Naturally, there is an interest in the indirect disruptions that the sharing economy may introduce, particularly concerning the losses of jobs with established market players. As I have reasoned, the sharing economy platforms that I look at are still relatively small, making it difficult to compare their activities directly to the transportation or cleaning industries. If such an assessment was to be made, the taxi industry would be an obvious choice. Currently, however, charges have been filed against Uber’s Danish taxi drivers for their lack of proper licensing, which means that the future of this type of platform work is uncertain in Denmark. Accommodation is another obvious choice, as rental platforms like Airbnb offer cheaper and perhaps more attractive accommodation to tourists, potentially resulting in the decline of jobs in hotels and hostels. As I made a choice in Chapter 2 not to focus on the commoditization of assets, this area has not been researched.

12 Edelman and Geradin (2015) explore some of these issues, by relating the activities of platforms like Uber and Airbnb to conventional sectors in the US.
5. Platform work in the sharing economy

In this chapter, three Danish startups, Ahandyhand, TrunkBird, and GoMore, that have gained a foothold in the sharing economy will be scrutinized. The legal conditions for the solo self-employed in the Danish labor market and the practical conditions that impact how providers from these platforms find work will be examined. The objective is to establish how these providers fare in the labor market, and if they have the risk profile of an outsider.

5.1 Introducing the platforms

5.1.1 Ahandyhand

Ahandyhand

Ahandyhand\textsuperscript{13} was founded in 2009 and is, by the platform operators’ own account, designed to be a virtual notice board for services. The majority of services facilitated through this platform are of the household variety, such as cleaning, craftwork, gardening, and child care. A close comparison is the US-based platform TaskRabbit, through which any errand can be completed. It has adopted a similar terminology for its users as the crowdwork platform Amazon Mechanical Turk, namely users who are looking for help are “requesters”, and users who want to do the work are “providers”, or called by the nickname “Handyhanders” (Ahandyhand 2015a; Aloisi 2016). Presently, Ahandyhand has over 6,000 users signed up as providers (Ahandyhand 2016d), and in 2015, the number of active requesters was over 25,000 (Ahandyhand 2015b), which makes it one of the largest sharing economy platforms from Denmark. Signing up as either a provider or a requestor is free until work has been agreed upon. It can be differentiated from its international counterparts, like TaskRabbit, due to the fact that services are not framed as “gigs” or “errands”, but as actual work (De Stefano 2016; Ahandyhand 2015a). This framing is also reflected in Ahandyhand’s long term goal, which is to become Denmark’s most professional service platform for peers, and to expand to other European countries with its business model (Ahandyhand 2016e; 2016f).

The matching is demand-driven, which means that requests for work must be posted by requesters (Ahandyhand 2016b). It then gets distributed automatically to local providers, after which the providers can submit bids for completion of the service, and the requester can accept or bargain about the hourly wage or total price (Ahandyhand 2016b; 2016h). Providers can upgrade their profile for better visibility by paying 45 DKK per month to the platform operators, which is an example of an

\textsuperscript{13} \url{www.ahandyhand.dk}
additional platform service (Ibid.). Requesters pay a flat rate fee of 69 DKK to the platform operators when contacting a service provider, while the payment between the requester and provider is handled in person when the work has been done, either in cash or through bank transfers (Ahandyhand 2016c). The received payment is subject to income taxation on the part of the provider (SKAT 2016). Payments for the services are not channeled through any online payment system owned by Ahandyhand. However, Ahandyhand has introduced a new measure in 2016, saying that the providers must submit documentation for hours worked to the platform upon request (Ahandyhand 2016h).

Ahandyhand offers comprehensive legal guides for both requesters and providers in order for them to understand how the activities they engage in affect each other, and how providers will be affected by income taxation depending on status as a student, pensioner, or freelancer (Ahandyhand 2014a; 2014b). Ahandyhand maintains, like every sharing economy platform, that the platform itself is not a participant in any transactions between the users. The platform’s “user agreement” document, which all users must agree to, clearly underlines that the legal standing of the service providers is that of a self-employed person, and not an employee of the platform (Ahandyhand 2015a). In terms of risks, Ahandyhand’s guidelines and user agreement document also state that the provider must have insurance for both the requestor’s property (because the requestor’s homeowner insurance, if present, does not cover a provider), as well as their own materials (Ahandyhand 2014a). It is evident that the platform has gone to great length to avoid creating any illusions about the legal standing of the parties involved in this triangular relationship.

5.1.2 TrunkBird

TrunkBird14 was founded in 2014 and is there to ship people's things in a “greener and more fun” way (TrunkBird 2016a). TrunkBird facilitates the connection between peers who want to ship any kind of object from one location to another, nicknamed “the senders”, and peers who are willing to do the transporting, “the travelers” (TrunkBird 2016b). Currently, there are over 3,500 users, without any distinction made between who is a sender and a traveler, as users of the site can engage in both activities at any time (Ibid.). User accounts are free of charge and typically created conveniently through someone's Facebook account. The company communicates in an informal, easygoing way,

14 www.trunkbird.dk. The founder of TrunkBird ran a similar platform called Bringrs founded in 2013 (Dalberg Research 2014).
emphasizing the social aspects of sharing, and it encourages making use of friends and other peers to get objects shipped, instead of paying a business to do the job.

The service offered by TrunkBird is demand-driven, which means the senders must post requests on the website, stating what needs to be shipped, when the delivery should take place, as well as pickup and destination (TrunkBird 2016b). The senders can indicate a desired price point, but suppliers must still submit bids on the job, after which the senders must accept or reject (Ibid.). This specific type of pricing is required, because TrunkBird has chosen to include a generous, but mandatory insurance for the shipped objects up to 10,000 DKK with no excess (Ibid.). Similar preemptive actions have been taken in other parts of the sharing economy, for instance, in short-term rentals through Airbnb, where a mandatory insurance covers potential damages up to 5 million DKK (Airbnb 2016). TrunkBird manages all payment collections and payouts through its website, and charges a 10% transaction fee to the provider to cover the insurance and platform operational costs (TrunkBird 2016d). The payment system thereby differs from Ahandyhand’s, as TrunkBird’s users must commit to having payments directly withdrawn from or deposited into their bank accounts (Ibid.). Regardless of the fact that the payments are channeled through TrunkBird, the providers are still responsible for declaring all of this income to the tax authorities (SKAT 2016). At this time, no agreement or requirement between the platforms and the tax authorities exist for mandatory reporting of payments not pertaining to the transaction fee.

On its website, the platform operators do not attempt to counsel its “travelers” about their status as solo self-employed or their income tax issues. As is standard for many “regulations” documents in the sharing economy, TrunkBird renounces any responsibility concerning the actions of its users (TrunkBird 2016c). It provides no other clarifying clauses about the triangular relationship other than an introductory statement saying that the purpose of the service is to share information. The additional clauses in the document concern privacy policy, retention of personal data, copyright, and the like (Ibid.).

5.1.3 GoMore

GoMore15 was founded in 2005 and is undoubtedly the most well-known sharing economy platform in Denmark. GoMore’s goal is to give its users a “social, pleasant experience while traveling”, and it does so by connecting people who travel by car, nicknamed “the drivers”, with people who are willing

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15 [www.gomore.dk](http://www.gomore.dk)
to buy an empty seat on a given route, “the passengers” (GoMore 2016e; 2014). While over 400,000 registered users is an impressive figure (GoMore 2016b), it must be noted that user accounts are extremely easy to create, free of charge, and that the possession of an account does not necessarily mean that someone has used the service. The platform’s main activity, and the one which will be in focus here, is ride-sharing or car-pooling. Its other services include private car rentals and car leasing (Ibid.), which would have to be treated separately due to the nature of those activities. Car-pooling has a special status in many cities, and is sometime encouraged by the authorities, because it is a way for people to save money, decrease pollution, and ease up congested rush-hour traffic (Cherry 2016). GoMore thereby attempts to systematize (and profit off of) the common activity of car-pooling.

The ride-sharing service is supply-driven, which means that the drivers must post the individual routes that they will be traveling on any given day and time, along with a fixed price per seat, and the amount of spare seats and trunk space available in the car (GoMore 2016d). Passengers can then browse and book rides. Payments are made through GoMore’s online booking system, and a 10 % transaction fee is taken out by GoMore from the driver’s payment, eliminating the option for paying in person and in cash (GoMore 2016d; 2016c; 2014). The payments that GoMore drivers receive are treated differently than the payments received by service providers in TrunkBird and Ahandyhand. Since car-pooling is considered a cost-sharing practice, and since it is assumed that the ride would have taken place no matter what, there is no declarable profit for the driver and no income taxation according to the tax authorities (SKAT 2016).

In other respects, GoMore does follow “the typical” sharing economy business model. In the “terms and conditions” document, it is clearly stated that the platform is merely a middleman, without any responsibility or liability (GoMore 2014). The driver is responsible for having the legally mandatory insurance that covers damage to passengers and other parties in the case of an accident (GoMore 2015), not unlike providers from Ahandyhand.

5.2 Positioning providers in the labor market

5.2.1 Employment form
A central element in the limited literature on platform work is the current legal standing of service providers (De Stefano 2016; Aloisi 2016; Sprague 2015). In Denmark, there are two legal statuses in the tax system: Wage-employment and self-employment (Eichhorst et al. 2013; SKAT 2016b). Providers from Ahandyhand and TrunkBird belong in the latter category, and can be classified as solo
self-employed. The tax authorities look at this category in two ways: If financial risk is present, the provider will be considered a commercial business owner, and if not, a fee-based employee (SKAT 2016b). The term “freelancer”, which is often used for providers, can fit into either category. Financial risk involves taking on expenses for materials and equipment, while being held liable for damages (Ibid.). Since only accessibility-based platforms in the “combination” space was chosen for examination, and due to some of the insurance issues that will be touched upon below, providers will be considered commercial business owners for the time being. The tax authorities will make this assessment on a case-by-case basis, which seems appropriate, given the lack of a one-size-fits-all category.

In the following sections, framework conditions for the solo self-employed in Denmark will be explored along another three dimensions: Wages, social protection rights, and labor rights entitlements. These dimensions derive from analyses carried out by Mailand and Larsen (2011) and the European Parliament study on dependent self-employment (Eichhorst et al. 2013). Afterwards, the question of whether this is an appropriate employment type describing the working relationship accurately will be explored. A growing body of literature has been occupied with determining the state of dependency of self-employed individuals. It has resulted in the identification of dimensions where certain self-employed individuals are found to be aligned with wage-employees despite their legal statuses (Eichhorst et al. 2013). These dimensions will be applied, illustrating that other conditions may have an impact on providers’ labor market position.

5.2.2 Wages
The providers who are classified as legally solo self-employed business owners must register for a business (CVR) number and for VAT once their revenue is over 50,000 DKK in a 12-month period (SKAT 2016). As data about the actual wages of providers is unavailable, the only safe assumption to make is that the income levels for providers are variable. Some specific conditions concerning each platform, however, make it possible to comment on income and whether it is possible to live off of it.

Ahandyhand encourages both requestors and providers to agree upon an hourly wage, as opposed to a fixed price (Ahandyhand 2016a). For cleaning services, Ahandyhand’s example of a wage is 140 DKK per hour (Ahandyhand 2016b), which is similar to the average basic wage of 138.43 DKK per hour\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{16}\) The job function code used is for cleaning in private homes, DISCO-08 9111. The wages for other types of cleaning services are over 20 DKK more per hour, and 15 DKK more per basic hour.
for cleaning services in the private sector in Denmark in 2013 (Danmarks Statistik 2016c). At first glance, this would seem to be in line with Ahandyhand’s goal to grow into a professional service business, by suggesting wage levels aligned with the industry average (Ahandyhand 2016e). The basic wage is, however, not the whole story for cleaners in wage-employment, as additional pay supplements are given for nuisance or odd hours (genetillæg), pension, and other benefits, pushing the wage to 158.51 DKK per hour for salaried employees (Danmarks Statistik 2016c). This would not be matched if providers followed the example on Ahandyhand’s website. In 2013, all wages below 183 DKK per hour were in the 25% lowest quartile and could thus be considered low-paid work (in line with EU definitions) (Danmarks Statistik 2014b). All of the hourly wages exemplified by Ahandyhand for non-specialized work on its website are in the 25% lowest quartile.

If a service provider chooses to rely on work facilitated through Ahandyhand as their single source of income, the person will be faced with the following conditions. Firstly, provider is solely responsible for self-reporting income and self-estimating working hours to the tax authorities, which can be time consuming and troublesome process for someone who does not have guaranteed working hours. The risk of tax evasion, whether intentional or unintentional, is significant, seeing as the platforms cannot require that income is reported (and would not want to be held responsible if income is not reported correctly). Furthermore, as mentioned, there are no requirements saying that platforms must report the providers’ activities to the authorities (yet). Secondly, if wages are assumed to be equal to basic levels, service providers might have a difficult time making ends meet, as they are not compensated for additional benefits and insurances, transportation time, or for scheduling (Kessler 2014; Walker 2015). These conditions can be considered thresholds or disincentives for using the Ahandyhand’s platform in its current form as a single source of income. This may hold true especially for those who do not already have a registered business, and lack the experience and infrastructure to manage those processes.

With regard to TrunkBird and GoMore, these platforms are based more on the idea of cost-sharing or breaking-even. It is possible that the drivers do not actually profit from engaging in these activities and that only the costs that they would have incurred anyway are covered. This scenario is more likely for GoMore’s supply-driven mode of matching. TrunkBird drivers can theoretically accept trips that they would not have embarked on, were it not for the possibility of getting paid. GoMore’s model limits this type of behavior, because it is the drivers who must post pre-planned trips17.

17 TrunkBird also has this functionality, but operates formally with a demand-driven mode, due to insurance policy.
Furthermore, a scroll through the top 40 available trips on TrunkBird shows that the vast majority of trips cover long distances, e.g. they cross the Øresund, Little Belt, or Great Belt Bridges in Denmark (TrunkBird 2016e). This anecdotal evidence suggests that it would be very impractical, and likely not profitable, for drivers to bid on long trips if they were not already traveling that way, seeing as they would have to return at their own expense. The CEO of GoMore has also stated that the average length of GoMore rides is 230 km (DR 2015). The way these two platforms currently operate, and their current user pools, would suggest that drivers are unable to live off of the payments received, because of the length of the trips, and for GoMore, also because of its supply-driven mode. This is in sharp contrast to the taxi platform Uber, in which drivers get the highest reward by taking shorter trips and by staying within the vicinity of the majority of customers, i.e. the city centers (Edelman and Geradin 2015). Wages are therefore likely to depend on platform functionality and policies.

5.2.3 Social protection rights

Under the heading of social protection rights is a long list of benefits that are regulated in the Danish labor market by either law or collective agreements (Mailand and Larsen 2011). Exactly how far service providers in the sharing economy, as solo self-employed, are covered will be examined. Approximately 74% of the private sector in Denmark is covered by a collective agreement (BM 2015). Since TrunkBird, Ahandyhand, and GoMore service providers are not employees, they are not covered by any collective agreement, and operate in the remaining 26%. Briefly stated, this means that the types of social protection rights and labor rights entitlements that are granted to salaried workers are unavailable to them.

**Health coverage** in Denmark is universal, which means that access to medical care does not depend on having a job or on a specific employment type (Mailand and Larsen 2011). **Family benefits** like child care is also a universal scheme (Eichhorst et al. 2013). **Pension rights**, in terms of care during old age and invalidity, is available to all residents, and access is not based on job, but on other requirements, such as the duration of residence in Denmark (Ibid; Eichhorst et al. 2013). **Occupational supplementary pension**, however, which makes up a significant amount of Danish workers’ pension benefits, are dependent on salaried work (Ibid.). Service providers in the sharing economy would likely be excluded from occupational pension schemes due to the legal criteria for wage-employment and working hours (Mailand and Larsen 2011). Ahandyhand has made an effort to inform its providers of this fact, as to preempt any questions about the legal standing of its providers, while TrunkBird has not (Ahandyhand 2014a). The share of self-employed that pay into this type of
pension scheme is below 46% (Mailand and Larsen 2011), and usually consist of previously salaried employees (Eichhorst et al. 2013). If sharing economy service providers have a background as self-employed, they are unlikely to have been part of this scheme. It is even questionable whether their wages are high enough to be able to set aside any amount for savings.

In the Danish labor market, unemployment insurance is a voluntary scheme. Membership of an unemployment insurance fund (α-kasse) and a union has historically gone hand in hand (Larsen 2011). Despite the fact that this picture is slowly changing, and more untraditional insurance funds and “yellow” unions are growing, the self-employed are underrepresented in unemployment insurance schemes (Ibid.). Even if a provider paid into an unemployment insurance fund, in the case of variable working hours, it is likely that the person would be excluded in some way from receiving the same benefits as a precisely salaried employee (Eichhorst et al. 2013). In case of accidents at work, the solo self-employed must opt into a private insurance scheme if they are to be covered by the legislation regulating this area (Arbejdsskadestyrelsen 2015). This is another example of a choice that providers must make voluntarily in order to obtain any protection.

Parental leave and sick leave are two examples of universal schemes where collective agreements grant covered employees far more favorable benefits. The self-employed have equal access to unpaid parental leave as every other Danish resident; however, access to paid leave depends on a number of criteria that would in practical terms be difficult for a sharing economy service provider with variable working hours to fulfill. If a provider does manage to live up to the working hours requirements, only the flat rate compensation is granted, which is not always equal to someone's full wage (Mailand and Larsen 2011). Paid sick leave is only granted to the self-employed after two weeks of sickness, if they fulfill the necessary requirements for minimum level of working hours (STAR 2016a). If further coverage is desired by the self-employment, private insurance must be purchased (Mailand and Larsen 2011).

5.2.4 Labor rights entitlements
The common set of relatively liberal rules for hiring and dismissing employees in Denmark mean that employees with different employment types face the same conditions (Larsen 2011). The difference between the self-employed and other employees’ job security is in this regard not as great as in other European countries. Labor rights entitlements also include notice period for termination, dismissal pay, and access to training during employment (Mailand and Larsen 2011).
Without the status as an employee and coverage by a collective agreement, providers will not automatically be granted any of these benefits, even though they work in a service industry where certain benefits are the norm. Vacation pay is another benefit from which self-employed is typically excluded, due to criteria concerning financial risk (Eichhorst et al. 2013; STAR 2016b).

With regard to termination, in the absence of an employment contract and collective agreement benefits, the only document that regulates termination of providers is the terms and conditions of the platforms. Ahandyhand has the most detailed grounds for termination, namely if providers repeatedly fail to show up for work, if users have invalid personal information, or if users do not follow rules about appearing as an individual on the site (Ahandyhand 2015a). TrunkBird has a simpler regulations document that does not go into detail about the relationship between the parties. The grounds for termination include any behavior where the platform operators deem that the site regulations have not been met: “4.1. If the user directly violates this Regulation or violates the spirit of this Regulation, or otherwise creates the risk of negative legal consequences for the Company [TrunkBird], or violates the rights of other users, or treated the Service as a whole, the Company reserves the right to unilaterally terminate the access to the Service for this user.” (TrunkBird 2016c). TrunkBird also reserves the right to terminate an account for any other reason, in which case the person will be notified (Ibid.). GoMore’s grounds for termination are much more broad and unspecific, stating that the platform operators can terminate any account, at any time, without warning: “2.5 GoMore has the right to, without consent, reject or terminate any membership without warning.” (GoMore 2014).

In all three cases, the platforms can unilaterally amend the policies. This means that providers must live with some level of uncertainty, not knowing when or for what reason their working conditions can alter concerning, for instance, termination and payment methods, as dictated by these documents. It is also stated that in case of a dispute between a user and the platform, resolution will take place in court. Ahandyhand and GoMore stipulates resolution in the Danish court system (Ahandyhand 2015a; GoMore 2014), whereas TrunkBird lists German law as default, due to the fact that its service is actually hosted in Germany (TrunkBird 2016c). These circumstances surrounding the work represent an unusual lack of transparency for the providers.
5.3 Are providers outsiders?

Most elements of the framework conditions are common for all solo self-employed in Denmark, while some are tied to the particular type of platform. The legal employment type means that several elements of standard employment relationships in Denmark, such as vacation pay, occupational pension, and paid parental leave, are difficult to obtain for the service providers in question. The number of working hours in a week particularly has an impact on a provider’s level of protection in the various schemes. We do not know enough about these providers’ platform work and their other activities, such as part-time work, caregiving responsibilities, or pension, to say anything more detailed about their level of protection. Judging from the legal conditions and practical platform conditions combined, however, there is a considerable insurance burden placed on the individual provider, in order for them to obtain the same level of protection as an employee in a standard working relationship. This includes insurance for workplace accidents, materials, sickness, and unemployment, some of which may be too risky not to have in place, regardless of the number of hours worked. Furthermore, every single provider must face the learning curve alone, both in relation to understanding and abiding by each platform’s rules, as well as concerning personal tax issues, business regulations, and conditions relating to the service provision. These burdens are not lightened by the potentially rather low and fluctuating wages that accompany work such as driving, cleaning, and other manual work.

In summary, the service providers are outsiders simply due to the lack of collective agreement coverage. Within the dimensions of social protection and labor rights, providers are outsiders due to the overall lack of protection and the fluctuating piecemeal nature of the work. It is more difficult to comment on the wage dimension, as there is not enough information available about these providers’ actual income. It is likely, however, that the fluctuating nature of the work will have a spillover effect on payment flows. It means that based solely on the platform work, the service providers examined are in the lowest end of the spectrum, with weak ties to the Danish labor market model, within more than one dimension. With more research into matters such as their employment history, family background, and other activities, we will know more about how likely they are to mobilize, and gain better working conditions, more favorable benefits, and higher paid work.
5.4 Are providers dependent self-employed?

The question of whether the legal status as solo self-employed accurately captures the true nature of the working relationship, i.e. whether the relationship between the provider and the platform is dependent, will be returned to here. Dependency in self-employment is characterized by the presence of financial risk, subordination, and insecure payment flows (Eichhorst et al. 2013). Since neither the platform nor the client is the employer of the service provider in a traditional sense, this is one of the central questions asked in the rather limited research on the sharing economy (see Aloisi 2016; De Stefano 2016). When asking these types of questions, ties to research mapping broader labor market trends such as casualization of work, precarious work, and disguised self-employment, should be recognized (De Stefano 2016; Mailand and Larsen 2011; Eichhorst et al. 2013; Eurofound 2015).

As dependent self-employment is not a legal term in Denmark, a set of dimensions offered by national industry experts who contributed to a European Parliament study on the subject can be used to test for the applicability of the term:

1) “Control mechanism: by which mechanisms is the work of dependent self-employed workers controlled by the employers? In terms of place and content of work?”
2) Amount of commitment: how do employers ensure the commitment of work?
3) Degree of flexibility: do the dependent self-employed workers have flexibility in fulfilling their tasks?
4) Degree of dependency: are dependent self-employed workers personally and/or economically dependent on their employers?
5) Industrial relations and dependent self-employment: how are industrial relations organised and/or changed by the prevalence of dependent self-employed workers?” (Eichhorst et al. 2013: 57)

The dimensions share similarities with those offered by the Danish labor market authority STAR (Styrelsen for arbejdsmarked og rekrutering) who assesses vacation pay entitlements according to The Vacation Act (ferieloven):

1) Can your employer manage your schedule and tasks?
2) Have you made a commitment to work, e.g. a set amount of hours?
3) Do you work in the name of an employer?
4) Wage characteristics and whether you incur direct or indirect financial risk in the business. (STAR 2016b)

The difference between STAR’s test (including the tax authorities’ assessment mentioned much earlier) and the test for dependent self-employment is that in the latter, financial risk can occur simultaneously to subordination, i.e. someone can be in a working relationship without independence while also carrying a considerable financial burden.

5.4.1 Control

Control mechanisms can take many forms, and the “terms and conditions” documents can be considered the most direct way for platforms to regulate users’ behavior. At present, none of the platforms in the case study are making use of so-called “enhanced independent contractor clauses” that have been found in many international and US-based platforms’ terms and conditions (De Stefano 2016). These clauses impinge on the relationship between the users, not just the relationship to the platform, by saying that providers are not working as an employee of the clients (Ibid.). This clause is a control mechanism, because, as a self-proclaimed third party, the platform should neither care nor get involved in the relationship between the users. Ahandyhand does not use any similar clauses in its “user agreement”, but mentions similar phrasing in its legal guides (Ahandyhand 2014a; 2014b). The main difference between Ahandyhand and its US-based counterparts, however, seems to be that Ahandyhand does recognize the possibility for users to engage in other contractual agreements, stating that in some cases “the requestor and the handyhander choose to formalize their working relationship through standard employment” (Ahandyhand 2014a).

Other control mechanisms used by all three platforms are the policies concerning payment methods, the timing of payments, as well as some of the conditions mentioned earlier about platform functionalities. In terms of more indirect subordination, Ahandyhand’s rules stipulate that providers must use a picture of themselves in their profile, and not a company name or logo (Ahandyhand 2015a; 2016g). This is done to mark that it is a peer-to-peer platform. As a control mechanism, the fact that every user is urged to appear as an individual may result in the clients (and potentially the providers themselves) thinking that providers are working in the name of Ahandyhand, in the absence of another identifiable business. This limits providers’ opportunity to build up their own business.
5.4.2 Commitment and flexibility
For all three platforms in question, in their current forms, providers make no upfront commitment to the platform and the degree of work flexibility is high. At the other end of the scale, some US-based platforms, such as Postmates, Uber, and Amazon Mechanical Turk, make more elaborate use of enhanced independent contractor clauses to regulate behavior. There are examples of platforms incorporating clauses into their rules stipulating exclusivity to the platform, as well as saying that service providers must accept a minimum amount of work (De Stefano 2016). Furthermore, certain platforms provide extensive guides about how providers are to behave and conduct themselves while doing the work, for instance, that providers must smile, provide beverages, and avoid shaking hands with customers (Walker 2015; Kessler 2015; Aloisi 2016). Danish platforms may, in the future, adopt some of these characteristics of their US-counterparts, in which case, a different assessment would be made concerning commitment and flexibility.

5.4.3 Dependency
A defining feature of most sharing economy platforms is the so-called trust-building rating system, which Ahandyhand, GoMore, and TrunkBird also use (Schor 2015). After the work has been completed, both the service provider and the client must rate the experience on a scale from one to five (in Ahandyhand, only providers are rated). These systems are meant to build trust between the parties, ensuring that accurate profile and work descriptions, as well as high quality service, is rewarded by high ratings (resulting in more work and potentially higher payments (GoMore 2016a)). The implications that this kind of mechanism will have on the level of trust between people is under investigation (Skytte 2014; Schor 2015), but nevertheless, it is interesting to assess its potential impact on dependency.

The rating system may cause a dependent relationship if performance and ratings are tied to a person’s name and not a company name18. The more work a provider does and the more positive ratings are received, the more economically dependent the provider can potentially become on the platform as a source of work. Whether a positive reputation from a sharing economy platform can be transferred to other aspects of someone’s work-life, or to other platforms, is still unknown. Time will tell what attitudes traditional employers have towards this type of platform work and if it will be regarded as valuable experience. By working through a platform, the provider foregoes time spent

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18 While exceptions to this inevitably do exist, the premise of the peer-to-peer economy is to remove the middleman, which is the background for this assumption.
gaining experience, and building up the reputation and brand of a “real” company. The rating system can thus be seen as another indirect control mechanism that may enhance dependency over time.

A final observation is that the platforms operate not just the online rating system, but also the user database and the payment system (in the cases of GoMore and TrunkBird). The platform operators therefore have a uniquely powerful position to surveil and potentially sanction deviant behavior. As established earlier, platforms reserve the right to terminate accounts based on their own assessment. This level of surveillance from a third party has been pointed out as contradictory to the claim that platforms take no part in the activities between users (Aloisi 2016; De Stefano 2016). Even though independent rating sites, like Trustpilot and Yelp, are not unfamiliar to many types of service industries, the platforms here have much more significant space for action.

In summary, certain characteristics of the relationship between the service providers and the platforms do align with those of dependent self-employment, although alignment is more obvious for the platforms’ international counterparts. For GoMore, TrunkBird, and Ahandyhand, the providers are currently taking on some financial risk and are in smaller ways limited to a certain type of behavior due to platform policies, but not necessarily enough to call the relationship subordinate.
6. Work in the operational service sectors

In this chapter, the cleaning and transport industries are examined, in order to show the points of intersection between service providers in the sharing economy and workers in the conventional service economy. The objective is to draw some conclusions about how much value is captured by the work in the sharing economy compared to the average work in the conventional sectors. One way to link the emergence of the sharing economy to potential segmentation in the Danish labor market is to see if these platform providers operate in areas that have the characteristics of secondary, as opposed to primary, sectors.

6.1 Characteristics of the cleaning and transportation industries in Denmark

The industries that provide cleaning and transportation services have been selected, because the sharing economy seems to have produced a large number of platforms that center around these types of services, including Ahandyhand, TrunkBird, and GoMore. The areas of the transportation industry that overlap with activity in the sharing economy are small, namely courier transport, removal services (DTL 2015), as well as taxis. Similarly, the cleaning of private homes is a small component of the larger cleaning industry, which includes cleaning of office buildings, specialized cleaning, window polishing, and cleanup after damage or floods (DI Service 2015b).

Both the cleaning and the transportation industries are highly vulnerable to competitive pressures and economic downturns (DTL 2015; DI Service 2015b). These areas were severely affected by the Great Recession during the 2000s, but have both recovered to roughly pre-crisis levels (Ibid.). Dominated by a few large players, both areas are characterized by having many small companies, accounting for approximately 75%, that have only one or a few employees (Ibid.). A relatively large number of small cleaning companies are headed towards bankruptcy, showing that the easily established companies are abandoned fairly easily as well, which is likely a result of the post-crisis environment that makes it difficult to get a foothold in the industry (DI Service 2015b). The transportation industry is in general a struggling area that currently has low profit margins (DTL 2015; DI Service 2015a). These are the characteristics of an economic segment that provides support to the primary industries, indicating that cleaning and transportation are secondary sectors.
Recently, the post-crisis stagnation has turned, and the cleaning area now accounts for a large amount of the increased productivity in operational service sectors (DI Service 2015a). Conventional cleaning services are increasingly moving to the area called facility management, which cover more professional, specialized, and packaged services (DI Service 2015b). In the transport of goods and materials, chauffeurs and business owners have taken an increased interest in digitalization in the workplace. These modernization efforts should be seen in connection with an increased pressure from the European Union’s legislation on trucking, which some drivers perceive as unfair competition and even social dumping (DTL 2015). These trends suggest that both areas are undergoing different types of market disruptions, not in the least due to digitalization.

The sizes of these sectors can be measured in terms of workers (see the section in Chapter 4 for the specific sector delimitation). The cleaning industry employed approximately 60,000 workers in 2013 (DI Service 2015b; Danmarks Statistik 2016a). There is a high turnover of workers in this area, compared to the rest of the private sector (DI Service 2015b). That is, first of all, an expression of the move to facility management services, but also that employers tend to dismiss workers upon expiration of a client contract, when the new contract tenders go out (Larsen and Mailand 2014). In 2013, trucking businesses had approximately 30,000 workers, while courier and postal businesses had around 20,000 (Danmarks Statistik 2016a). For comparison, the entire industrial farming and fishing area employed just over 70,000 people in 2014 (Danmarks Statistik 2016d), which makes cleaning and transport neither the largest nor the smallest industries in the Danish economy. Service jobs in general play an increasingly large economic role, employing nearly three out of four private sector workers, whereas the farming and manufacturing sectors now employ less than every fifth worker (Kildegaard Pedersen et al. 2014).

In terms of employment types found in these areas, full-time employees accounted for about 60% of the workers in 2013 (Danmarks Statistik 2016b; DI Service 2015b). The remaining 40% are a mix of different employment types, particularly solo self-employment and part-time employment. The number of full-time employed workers is calculated based on contributions to the occupational pension scheme, ATP (Danmarks Statistik 2016b), which means that a large part of the industries’ workers is not part of the scheme or have few working hours, thereby only contributing partly to the data. In the cleaning industry, around 80% work for a medium or large-sized company (Larsen and Mailand 2014), and 12% of workers are classified as self-employed business owners (including spousal coworkers) (Danmarks Statistik 2016a). The number is slightly lower for trucking and transportation services at approximately 11% self-employed (Ibid.). These numbers show that
chauffeurs and cleaners are more likely to be self-employed than other workers in the labor market (Danmarks Statistik 2015a).

The wages for a service provider cleaning private homes, which is the most comparable job function to a sharing economy provider, were approximately 163.74 DKK per hour for salaried employees and 148.37 DKK per hour for hourly-waged employees in 2014 (Danmarks Statistik 2016c). The wages for other types of more specialized cleaning services are higher. For chauffeurs transporting goods, packages and people (i.e. taxis), the wages were 213.10 DKK per hour for salaried workers and 163.10 for hourly-waged workers in 2014 (Danmarks Statistik 2016c). The numbers presented cover the standard hourly income including pension, holiday pay, and other benefits, but do not include the additional costs that employers incur when employees go on leave, such as paid parental leave (Ibid.). This means that the average wages for these types of services are among the lowest in the country (Danmarks Statistik 2014b).

Worker demographics in the conventional service sectors is another area that may bring us closer to understanding who sharing economy providers most likely are. Personnel in the cleaning industry are dominated by women (Larsen and Mailand 2014). A majority of cleaners, 60%, are over 40 years old (DI Service 2015b). Even though the area's educational levels have improved in the last 10-15 years, the share of these workers without educational credentials is just over 60%, which is significantly higher than for the rest of the private sector, around 35% (DI Service 2015b). The number of immigrants (including descendants of immigrants) in cleaning is three times higher than for the rest of the labor market, making up 38% of cleaning personnel (Ibid.). Where female immigrants tend to steer towards cleaning services, male immigrants are employed within different types of transportation. Out of all male immigrants from a non-Western country in Denmark, 13% work in the transportation sector (Danmarks Statistik 2014a). In total, immigrants make up approximately 9% of the workers in the area (Danmarks Statistik 2016d). Immigrants in the Danish labor market indeed tend to gravitate towards the operational service sectors (Danmarks Statistik 2014a), which is an area where we see an increasing share of workers with lower skills levels, which is often associated with poor educational levels and lower productivity (Kildegaard Pedersen et al. 2014).

Estimations for the level of collective agreement coverage in the industrial cleaning industry vary. Based on a study by FAOS, coverage is likely somewhere between 40-63% (Larsen and Mailand 2014). This figure corresponds with estimates of labor union density (Ibid.). In terms of organization rates, companies with more than 5 employees tend to be in an employers’ association, and/or to
have signed a collective agreement with a labor union (Ibid.). The many small companies, including the solo self-employed, tend to not be part of an association. The transportation industry used to be organized almost entirely through the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), namely in the union 3F. In just over 10 years, LO-membership rates have dropped from 90 % to 54 % of the industry, while the overall union density has stayed around 70-75 % (Toubøl et al. 2015). The trend is that workers move from the traditional unions, who engage in collective bargaining, to the “yellow” unions that offer some of the same services, such as unemployment insurance (Ibid.) These characteristics show that neither industry is “traditional” in the sense that the supply- and demand-side are not fully organized, and that non-standard employment types are more prevalent than in other segments.

6.2 Points of intersection with the sharing economy

6.2.1 Similar conditions

The first matter I want to address is how the service providers from Ahandyhand, GoMore, and TrunkBird fare in relation to other cleaners and chauffeurs who find work by traditional means. I therefore look at some of the similarities concerning labor market position.

It is clear that both the cleaning and transportation industries are highly competitive, whether you consider the “conventional” economy or the “sharing” economy. According to segmentation theorists, this alone is likely to negatively influence workers’ labor market position. The number of self-employed in both the cleaning and transportation industries is comparatively high. Solo self-employed sharing economy workers and other self-employed cleaners or chauffeurs in the private sector are faced with the same framework conditions detailed in Chapter 5. On the one hand, this could mean that already self-employed cleaners and chauffeurs with their own companies are comparatively well equipped to take on work through a platform, seeing as they are used to the same kinds of uncertainties, risks, and regulations. On the other hand, the way platforms expect self-employed providers to behave, i.e. not as professionals but as peers/individuals, could constrain providers’ opportunity to scale their business. Even if it is technically possible to operate a business with multiple employees that obtain work through a platform, the setting is not encouraging of it, and it could mean missed opportunities that other self-employed providers could have more easily jumped on.

With regard to the cleaning industry in particular, non-standard employment types are a common
occurrence. It is an area where workers are sometimes recruited only for a day as needed (Larsen and Mailand 2014)—a practice that is reminiscent of platform work. The prevalence of part-time and marginal part-time work means that many cleaners already find themselves in a position where accruing rights for the different social and labor protections is difficult. The levels of job security therefore seem to be similar for cleaners who find work by traditional means and cleaners who find work through these new platforms.

6.2.2 Mitigating inequality
The second matter that I want to address is if platform work will capture as much value as conventional work. I therefore look at some of the conditions that are different from conventional sectors compared to the sharing economy.

The presence of collective bargaining in the transportation and cleaning industries means that labor unions and employers’ associations regularly address concerns relating to their members. This ensures dialogue about potential problems and improves conditions for the workers. In the cleaning area, where 80% of workers are legally classified as employees, the social partners have acted to lower the thresholds for benefits to address the issues relating to part-time work (Larsen and Mailand 2014). Even though the entire sector is not bound by collective agreements and some workers do face precarious working situations, because of uncertain working hours and high rotation of personnel, there is a foundation for dispute resolution and a tradition of dialogue.

The operational service sectors are subject to what Rubery (2007) highlights as inter-capitalist competition. They are recognized as areas that act as a labor market cushion, because they can take in the least skilled workers (Kildegaard Pedersen et al. 2014), at the same time as they are extremely vulnerable to changes in demand from the stable sectors. Given the characteristics of the cleaning and transportation industries, the comparatively poor wages, the high number of immigrants, and a prevalence of solo self-employment, it seems that cleaners and chauffeurs work in, what segmentation theorists would call, secondary sectors. The support that the social partners provide companies and workers in these areas is significant to mitigate the problems relating to segmentation. The absence of these actors in the sharing economy could mean an amplification of these inequalities over time, and thus, these platform jobs may capture less value and provide less stability for the workers.
7. Towards a new form of labor relations?

In this chapter, the characteristics of GoMore, TrunkBird, and Ahandyhand are related to those of other labor market intermediaries, and the platforms’ potential functions in the labor market are assessed. The challenges of collective action in the sharing economy are identified based on secondary literature and expert interviews, and potential ways to overcome a lack of collective action are discussed. The objective is to approach the question of how the emergence of the sharing economy may have implications for the existing labor relations in Denmark.

7.1 Labor market intermediation

Common but understudied actors in the labor market are those trying to smooth transitions for workers and employers, namely labor market intermediaries (LMIs) (Autor 2009). A closer look at sharing economy platforms is an attempt to better understand a new form of LMI. The platforms examined in Chapter 5 share many similarities with the intermediaries examined by Bonet, Cappelli, and Hamori (2013), McDowell, Batnitzky, and Dyer (2008), as well as Peck, Theodore, and Ward (2005), which include temporary help agencies and employment recruitment agencies. In these examples, there is a similar triangular relationship enabling temporary work. They are different due to the fact that temporary staffing agencies take on the role and duties of an employer (Peck et al. 2005; Bonet et al. 2013), and that employment recruitment agencies are leading workers into other forms of employment with another employer (McDowell et al. 2008).

In orthodox market theory, there is no need for LMIs, as perfectly competitive and decentralized labor markets reach equilibrium naturally. Just like segmentation theorists, Autor (2009) rejects this view immediately. The fact is that intermediaries do exist, addressing and exploiting the contradictions and imperfections that arise in the labor market. These contradictions include that accurate information is costly to obtain and to communicate. It leads to periods of unemployment (in the supply-side) and job vacancies (in the demand-side). Another contradiction is the adverse selection, on both the supply- or demand-side. Adverse selection can mean that informational asymmetries may be exploited by one party, leaving the other party at a considerable disadvantage (Benner et al. 2007; Autor 2009).

The intermediaries mentioned, including platforms, all share the primary function of giving access to information. They also share the trait that the nature of participation is voluntary for both parties
(Autor 2009). The sharing economy platforms all primarily attempt to formalize and systematize activities that already occur locally (and sometimes in the informal sector). GoMore and TrunkBird do so by making people’s traveling patterns available online, thereby allowing users to cooperate and seize underutilized transportation options. The technology used by the platforms helps to bring down the search costs involved with finding a match, as exemplified by Ahandyhand’s system that alerts local providers to newly posted requests in their area. GoMore, TrunkBird, and Ahandyhand can theoretically, through information, provide more efficient allocations of resources in the labor market, and therefore partly resemble traditional job boards and partly temporary agencies.

Sharing economy platforms may solve another contradiction in the labor market, namely the problem of adverse selection. There is a risk that clients can misrepresent the nature of the work assignments posted on a platform, and that providers can misrepresent their qualifications. Examples of traditional LMI s that help to solve the supply-side adverse selection are the entities that provide criminal records or background checks (Autor 2009). This form of intermediation helps to verify the accurateness of information provided to employers, and is thus not voluntary for workers, who may have an interest in concealing a criminal background. The platforms’ rating systems are helping to mitigate this adverse selection that both sides experience when looking for a match. It incentivizes good behavior and enables sanctioning of users that provide false information with negative ratings or reviews. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, participation in the rating schemes are mandatory for both sides in the cases of GoMore and TrunkBird, and only mandatory for the supply-side in the case of Ahandyhand. These are new conditions that set the platforms apart from other LMI s.

Given that the sharing economy platforms perform some of the same functions as other LMI s, it is possible that platforms can help to smooth out contradictions in the labor market. The efficient technology makes it possible to orchestrate matches between supply and demand that are extremely short-term and small-scale. Proponents of these business models make two claims supporting the efficacy argument. Firstly, when providers are taking on these small-scale jobs, it may serve to cushion the effects of unemployment, both financially and by keeping people active (Dervojoeda et al. 2013; Thorup 2015). A recent case shows, however, that within the confines of the current Danish rules on unemployment insurance, unemployed workers must tread carefully in order to not lose
their financial assistance. The rules stipulate that unemployed workers receiving assistance must be fully available to work, which means that they cannot engage in any activity earning an income during normal working hours, such as service provision or rentals through a platform (Hansen and Bindesbøll 2016). The second view offered by proponents of platform work is that it is a convenient supplement to other activities, such as full-time employment, pension, studies, and so on (Dervojet al. 2013; Thorup 2015). Again, students in the State Educational Grant and Loan Scheme (SU) and pensioners receiving a state pension must pay attention to the rules, as income and working hour restrictions apply even for these groups.

7.2 Changing dynamics

Given that I am (self-)tasked with providing a more critical view of this phenomenon, two matters speak in favor of not leaving platforms in peace to remedy the market failures described above. Both of these matters have been highlighted by Schor (2014), as well as supported as areas of interest by my interviewees (personal communication Apr 2016).

The first matter links back to Chapter 2 and the issue of compensation. Recalling that compensation was treated earlier as the payment between providers and clients, it is now relevant to also consider payments to the platform. GoMore, TrunkBird, and Ahandyhand are examples of platforms that exist with the intention of growing and becoming commercially viable, i.e. they are for-profit-based intermediaries (Dalberg Research 2014; Ahandyhand 2016e; Benner et al. 2007). It lends support to the argument that certain LMIs exploit imperfections in the market (Autor 2009), as the platforms profit off of creating a technological infrastructure that brokers information. It means that platforms have the intention of continuing to use solo self-employed “peers” as providers and regular consumers as clients, and that the platforms will benefit from continuous relationships with both. On this path, it can be argued that platforms are moving further away from sporadic and friendly “sharing” and closer to the model of temporary work agencies. The potential for moving these platforms into peer-to-business markets is not unreachable either (in fact, Ahandyhand already does this in a small capacity). As Schor (2014) argues, some platforms have deviated far from idealistic models of empowering peers and letting them take part in redistributing value. The investments of

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19 During the period from December 2015 to March 2016, Gert Johansen received financial assistance from 3F’s unemployment insurance fund, meanwhile also using GoMore’s service to rent out his car 10 times, as he did not need it for his daily commute. The rental income meant that he was considered a business owner and that he was not available during working hours, as the rules require. His right to financial assistance therefore had to be revoked by 3F. (First reported by DR Østjylland, Hansen and Bindesbøll 2016)
venture capitalists into larger platforms, such as Uber and Airbnb\textsuperscript{20}, are a tell of changing dynamics. It raises questions concerning providers’ ability to capture more of the value derived from the apparent efficiency of platform intermediation (Ibid.).

The second matter stays on the topic of labor market intermediation, but addresses another form that is sorely missing from this picture: Labor unions. Unions can be considered a non-profit-based intermediary, as they broker between the supply- and demand-side, but do so with very different goals than a for-profit-based intermediary (see organizational typology of LMI in Benner et al. 2007: 12). The risk profile of the service providers outlined in Chapter 5 raises some red flags, which in turn raises the question of how providers could organize under present conditions to improve their labor market position. A closer look into the challenges of organizing is therefore provided.

7.3 Organizing sharing economy providers

Much like the other examples of LMI, the theoretical basis for labor unions is also to solve market contradictions (Autor 2009; Benner et al. 2007). Contradictions arise because full and perfect information, even if some of us had access to it, does not solve every market failure. With accurate information, we still face the problem of collective action, which can be understood by the following example: “Notifying a bank’s deposit holders that the institution faces a small risk of insolvency does not make a run on the bank less likely—rather, it spurs each depositor to withdraw his or her funds, thus ensuring collapse.” (Autor 2009: 10). By behaving in their own best interest, rational actors with accurate expectations about other people’s actions may cause damage to the greater good. Labor unions are examples of “workforce intermediaries” that respond to the needs of workers to level the playing field with employers (for the greater good), and create an environment where union members are dependent on one another (Benner et al. 2007).

7.3.1 Challenges for collective action

In this section, a non-exhaustive list of interrelated challenges for collective action that have become apparent in my research on the sharing economy will be explored. Some issues concerning the organizing of sharing economy providers and crowdworkers have been highlighted in research by Schor (2014), De Stefano (2016), and Aloisi (2016), whose views will be complemented by the

\textsuperscript{20} The companies are valued at a staggering 60 billion USD and 25.5 billion USD respectively (Rosoff 2016; Alba 2015).
perspectives of my interviewees. Their answers help to frame the discussion more firmly in a Danish setting, as most of the literature has had a wider perspective.

The first issue is an inherent lack of information. This concerns different sets of actors. First of all, onlookers (such as researchers, labor unions, and regulators) have poor access to data about the providers, both in terms of how many providers exist, how much platform work they take on, and what other activities they engage in (Andersen 2016, personal communication Apr 20). It makes assessment of the scale of the phenomenon and its potential impact challenging. Seeing as platforms are in possession of user databases and transaction history, it has been discussed whether the platforms should at the very least be obligated to report the income of providers to the Danish tax authorities (Skatteministeriet 2015; Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). Both the former and current Ministers for Taxation have expressed, however, that new regulation will not be pursued concerning obligatory reporting at this time, particularly as most platforms based in the US or abroad have no legal presence in Denmark (Skatteministeriet 2015; Lauritzen 2016). Another important aspect of this lack of information is that the providers have no knowledge about their fellow providers. In fact, they work in an environment where fellow providers are competitors (Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). This is reminiscent of temporary agency workers’ situation, who are likely to work odd hours and alternate between workplaces. These temporary agency workers are also sometimes regarded as competitors to permanent staff (Larsen 2011), and face challenges related to organizing in the private sector, due to the lack of a tradition for union shop stewards in the workplaces (Mailand and Larsen 2011). For platform providers, this could have consequences for how willing they are to strike deals with each other or to organize.

The second challenge for collective action is that the providers could belong to a very heterogeneous group (Aloisi 2016). If this turns out to be the case in Denmark, two consequences will follow. Firstly, labor unions that want to attempt to organize providers will find that the providers have very different needs. The wide variety of service types offered through a platform such as Ahandyhand means that its pool of providers will need different kinds of protection depending on their activity. An example is that certain jobs might involve a higher risk of physical harm, while others a more substantial financial risk. Providers also have different needs depending on their stage of life. An example is that certain providers might be unemployed or living on a state pension, while others might have recently immigrated to Denmark. Unions wanting to organize these providers might have difficulty in addressing everyone’s conditions jointly. The available information about who these workers are and which of them are in need of representation is simply too limited. Secondly, the
providers are linked only through the platform, which means there is no common workplace. Unions can have problems reaching this group and starting a dialogue, which is a necessary precondition for collective action (Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). This type of platform work, where providers are isolated from each other, could be evidence of the uneven terrain of possibilities for organizing mentioned earlier, which is not an unfamiliar situation for temporary agency workers. Some success with organizing temporary agency workers has been achieved (Mailand and Larsen 2011), but whether the same strategies can be applied to these solo self-employed is unknown.

The third issue concerns volume. If providers are to gain bargaining power, a large volume of providers is essential (Schor 2014; Aloisi 2016). Although, it may be particularly challenging for providers to gain bargaining power in the relationship with large US-based platforms that operate in the Danish market (Munkøe 2016, personal communication Apr 26). Some mixed success with provider-organizing in America seems to support this view. Without the necessary volume to impact the platforms directly, US-based chauffeurs from the taxi platforms Uber and Lyft and the delivery service Postmates have chosen the litigation route to challenge platform policies (Cherry 2016; Steinmetz 2016). An initial few Uber chauffeurs filed a lawsuit in the state of California, seeking better working conditions such as minimum wages and overtime pay, after which more drivers joined the class action (Cherry 2016). If the chauffeurs were to win these cases, it would mean being reclassified as platform employees (instead of independent contractors) in the eyes of US labor law. Despite the many lawsuits, of which most are still pending, there has been no definite precedent set in the matter of employment types yet (Ibid.). Uber settled several of its cases out of court in late April 2016. Despite these underwhelming outcomes, the accomplishment seem to be the raising of awareness among providers about their lack of protection and the potential need to become reclassified as employees (Whitford 2016). Kevin Lynch, a unionist who helped organize limousine drivers in the 1990s in New York City, has recently helped the city's Uber drivers to form a group, saying that "it won't be a union, but it could be a self-help organization. [...] If we band together we can keep them [the drivers] from getting picked on, and get the City and State to regulate them" (Ibid.). It has come to a point where dragging cases against large platforms through the US court system have proved to be a lengthy ordeal, where ambiguous and malleable legal tests for employment status make outcomes unpredictable (Chhabria 2015; Cherry 2016). Furthermore, the solo self-employed chauffeurs have encountered difficulties when trying to organize legally in the US. It would therefore seem that drivers are looking for other solutions, such as Lynch's “self-help organization”.


The fourth challenge is how to include the providers into the existing social partnership. The social partners will have to determine whether the solo self-employed and platform operators respectively can become a part of the existing membership structures—a challenging prospect highlighted by all interviewees (personal communication Apr 2016). The question of whether membership would only be granted to providers using platforms as a single source of income, or also to providers with a second job, will have to be determined as well (Andersen 2016, personal communication Apr 20). There are a few different routes, each with its own set of challenges, which can potentially lead to collective action: Full integration, gray-zone solutions, and a sharing movement.

7.3.2 Potential solutions

The first route, pursued by the providers in the American lawsuits mentioned above, is full inclusion into the existing system. These providers push for a reclassification as platform employees, thereby giving them access to basic rights and benefits, as well as unionization. In a Danish context, this route poses the challenge already encountered, which is that providers in the cases of Ahandyhand, GoMore, and TrunkBird do not fully pass the test for a subordinate working relationship. They seem to be in a gray zone, currently having the social protection needs of an employee, but with the potential to grow and expand their business (Andersen 2016, personal communication Apr 20). If platform providers were recognized as employees in Denmark, they would fare better in terms of labor market position, but would still, as part-time employees with fluctuating working hours and wages, have accessibility issues for different protections. An alternative could be that providers, being legally self-employed business owners, joined an association for companies, although it seems doubtful that they would gain the desired benefits from a membership in any of the established employers’ associations (Munkøe 2016, personal communication Apr 26). Currently, the organizations that accept self-employed members are mainly the “yellow unions” that offer relevant unemployment insurance and counsel.

The second route entails decoupling the platforms from the duties of an employer. It means finding other ways that collective action can help providers gain some of the protections that were found to be missing in Chapter 5, such as vacation pay and sick leave. The possibility for a support organization for the solo self-employed was highlighted by all interviewees (personal communication Apr 2016), and it is what I call a gray-zone solution. Examples of support agencies for solo self-employed

21 Depending on national context, employee status grants different rights and benefits. The need to reclassify providers may be more dire in countries that do not have as many universal benefits as Denmark.
professionals in artistic and creative industries can be found in many countries, e.g. Dansk Artist Forbund in Denmark and Künstlersozialversicherung in Germany. An organization that may be relevant for sharing economy providers is Teknik & Design in Denmark. This agency has existed, as a part of The Danish Association of Professional Technicians (Teknisk Landsforbund), since 1992 and gives freelancers the best of both worlds (Blankholm 2015). Freelancers are responsible for finding their own work and issuing invoices like any other self-employed, but will obtain all of the benefits tied to standard employment relationships as they are (legally) employed by Teknik & Design. If a provider wants to supplement a fluctuating income with unemployment benefits, the agency ensures that the requirements for working hours are fulfilled (Teknisk Landsforbund 2016). Due to the small size of this agency, for many years the 16-20 % transaction fee charged to freelancers did not cover the agency’s operating costs. With an increased interest in recent years, the agency is now financially sound with approximately 1,500 members, and has secured collaboration from other unions like HK, The Danish Union of Journalists (Dansk Journalistforbund) and The Union of IT Professionals (PROSA) (Blankholm 2015). This arrangement accepts the employment type of self-employed as is, and does not challenge platform policies or current regulation. It cleverly adapts to its surroundings and smoothens out many of the challenges faced by the solo self-employed—in that sense, it is a non-profit-based intermediary.

If providers from sharing economy platforms were to join or form an agency such as this, wages would have to be considered. Teknik & Design has mainly organized freelancers with a technician or IT background, although it is now open to everyone (Teknisk Landsforbund 2016). Skill levels and wages are higher for this segment than for chauffeurs and cleaners. It is doubtful that providers examined in this paper would be able to live off of their wages after the platform and the agency each take a cut of approximately 10-20 %22. In an ideal world, the providers would be able to up-charge for their missing protections and labor rights entitlements, such as additional training (Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). It does seem that some providers are taking note of up-charging for insurance costs, such as commercial car insurance (Kessler 2015; Walker 2015), but up-charging for any other protections have not received as much attention23.

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22 A Handyhand’s payment policy, where a flat rate of 69 DKK is charged to the requestor, is a rare case. Most international sharing economy platforms charge a 20 % transaction fee on the provider’s payment.

23 And in some case, the platforms control the pricing, eliminating the possibility to adjust for individual expenses.
The third proposed route is that providers and consumers should create a grassroots movement for more democratic market practices (Schor 2014; Kessler 2015). The efficiencies of the sharing economy and the direct contact between people are factors that speak in favor of using it as a tool to further a more equal distribution of value. Democratization can be challenging, however, when venture capitalists are backing the large platforms (Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). The social partners could aid the organizing process by getting involved with spreading codes of conduct and encouraging socially sustainable self-regulation practices (De Stefano 2016; Aloisi 2016; Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). Some activity surrounding crowdwork platforms24 would suggest that self-organized providers in collaboration with labor unions can successfully lobby for fairer conditions. An example is the website faircrowdwork.org started in Germany by providers and the union IG Metall, through which providers can rate and rank platforms according to pay and working conditions. They have created what can be considered a certification scheme, which can help to weed out the worst cases and discourage crowdworkers from joining the platforms where security and wages are poor.

7.4 Implications and potential solutions in a Danish context

The lack of collective action in Denmark has the immediate effect that providers potentially become precarious workers. The conditions that have been discussed in this paper can be roughly split into two: The protections that are universal for every resident, and the protections that are bound by having a certain employment type and/or voluntary schemes. The different types of safety nets give us two perspectives. On the one hand, the Danish welfare model is comparatively well-equipped to support providers, or anyone with a non-standard working relationship, seeing as the model is relatively inclusive and there are healthcare- and educational systems supporting everyone (Schulze Buschoff and Protsch 2008; Larsen 2011). Providers, and particularly any solo self-employed, are rendered more disadvantaged by the welfare systems in other Western societies where the differential treatment based on employment types is greater. On the other hand, crucial protections are built up around full-time employment and standard working relationships, placing some workers in a vulnerable position (Stark 2016, personal communication Apr 29). Furthermore, there is little protecting the providers from unpredictable changes that the platforms decide to make to its policies (such as changes to the payment system, site functionality, or the rating system), and no way for the

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24 Crowdwork platforms facilitate digital work, where the proximity between providers and clients is potentially global. Crowdwork platforms are placed on the right hand side of Figure 3 in Chapter 2, and have therefore not previously been discussed.
providers to complain about unfair treatment. The lack of collective bargaining means that it is harder to launch initiatives gathering more information about the phenomenon. In the past, the social partners in industrial cleaning have agreed that, in order to increase union density, the employers must send lists of all new employees who work more than 15 weekly hours and have a two month employment record to the unions (Larsen and Mailand 2014). This example from outside the sharing economy shows how the presence of collective bargaining could address a similar problem.

In the longer term, the lack of collective action could mean that the providers’ status as self-employed covers potentially subordinate work, resulting in a lack of political representation that employees in subordinate relationships usually have. As long as providers can be characterized as outsiders, there is a risk that their voices will not be heard (Larsen 2011). If the presence of these workers becomes more prevalent, and if participation in the collective bargaining system is not achieved, the current model could become less relevant. In an extreme consequence this could mean a delegitimization of the social partnership. This implies potentially drastic consequences for the well-being of the workforce, as well as changes to the division of responsibility between the social partners and the state, where the state may have to take a more active role in regulating minimum standards by law.

One dilemma can be traced throughout most of the discussion: The issue of employment type. In an American lawsuit against the taxi platform, Lyft, the judge remarked that the jury was “handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes. The test the [...] courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem. Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are ambiguous” (Chhabria 2015). When the disruptive effects of the sharing economy are brought up, the issue of whether providers are employees, solo self-employed, or something in between, must be addressed as a disruption to current labor market structures. On account of this apparent dilemma, an intermediate legal category for providers in the sharing economy has been proposed as a solution (De Stefano 2016; Kessler 2015). Several countries, including Germany and Italy, already have a gray-zone legal category for dependent self-employment relationships (Eichhorst et al. 2013). De Stefano (2016: 19) argues that “proposing a new legal bucket for grey-zone cases may complicate matters, rather than simplifying the issues surrounding classification”. In the Italian example of the so-called “para-subordinate” relationships defined legally in the 1970s, the workers ended up with poor protection and became “a cheap alternative” to regular employees (De Stefano 2016: 20). An intermediary legal category could be a step on the way to ensuring some protection, as this gives the
state a more defined role to play in ensuring the well-being of providers who are not within the model. However, if a set of criteria were to be developed, and potentially applied across the European Union, the outcomes may be very unpredictable given different platform, sectorial, and institutional setups.

Teknik & Design, the agency for freelancers discussed above, is an example of a practical gray-zone solution. If this solution was applied in the sharing economy in Denmark, it would attempt to make up for solo self-employed’s difficulty in accruing rights, by acting as a non-profit-based link between providers and for-profit-based platforms. It would thus be able to give workers access to the benefits that are dependent on employee status and on a certain number of working hours, without challenging the legal classification. In this relationship, there is no real employer, but there is still a demand for labor (coming from the clients, and partly from the platform, who receives revenue with every transaction). This solution could have implications for future labor market organization. It implies that the labor demand-side is no longer responsible for taking on the traditional duties of an employer, and that workers now have to establish their own ties to the welfare state. This, too, could be a disruption to the existing social partnership, and imply that the state may have to intervene more often.

The political question is whether to challenge the current legal status of providers in new intermediation business models (and for platforms to take on the duties of an employer), or to adapt to it with a new form of labor relations (such as the need for intermediary links). Providers, too, must know which solution they are fighting for (Walker 2015). It is possible that more than one solution can be optimal for the Danish labor market. This is because platforms specialize in such different areas, and broker many different types of services. Some platforms broker work with both specialized and general skills, which complicates provider organizing and any potential bargaining processes. These variations may also complicate a regulatory response, as it could be necessary to treat platforms differently, and to favor some over others. To visualize the different potential routes, a model from Chapter 2 can be adapted. In this tentative proposal, the three routes for organizing providers that have been discussed above are my point of departure. It is meant to illustrate the diversity and complexities in the sharing economy25.

25 In this example, more specialized skills are assumed to yield higher wages.
In the lower left-hand corner of Figure 5 are the providers whose locally-bound work only requires general skills yielding low wages. As shown in the figure, this group may need to be fully integrated into the existing social partnership, implying some sort of legal reclassification (either an intermediary legal category or in the same category as legal wage-employees). It would mean that new “sharing” business models cannot exploit the existence of legally self-employed providers whose social protections are, according to the current model, not accounted or paid for by the clients or the platforms in the triangular relationship. The providers who find work, that require general skills, through global crowdsourcing platforms are found in the lower right-hand corner. This group may need to follow the route of creating a democratizing sharing movement for online work, by taking steps to 1) organize workers online (and across borders), 2) by spreading codes of conduct in collaboration with unions, and 3) to engage in their own counter-rating schemes (as the Fair Crowdwork example from Germany). As this group of platforms and providers has not been a focus in this paper, I base this idea off of the fact that such a movement has already begun to grow, and that traditional organizing can be out of reach on a global scale. On the top are the providers with more specialized skills who work in global or local markets. Self-employed freelancers fitting this description, typically found in the creative industries, have existed on the edges of the labor market.
for a while. The gray-zone solution involving an intermediary agency ensuring social protection and labor benefits may be a good place to start for providers with more specialized skills. With higher wages, these freelancers could be well equipped to up-charge for the agency membership fees, and gain both protections and a meaningful independence in the process. Without a deeper understanding of the providers’ backgrounds and profiles, however, these solutions are speculative for the time being.
8. Discussion

In this chapter, I will discuss some of the practical implications of my findings, which center on the variations encountered in the sharing economy and the disruptions that non-standard working relationships can have in the Danish labor market. Some ideas for potential new theory-building are also given.

8.1 The (un)intentional platform lifestyle?

The “original” promise of the sharing economy has not taken up much space in this paper, i.e. when sharing is synonymous with social cohesion, environmental friendliness, and cost reduction. As I started out by stating, these values and alleged efficiencies were not my point of departure. Instead I have looked at the employment relations and derived potential effects from there. It becomes fairly clear the moment you start looking into the sharing economy that much of it holds on to the rhetoric of sharing, but is reminiscent of something else. Its power in confusing the actors involved with promoting, regulating, and debating this phenomenon should not be discounted.

From the findings, it is clear that there are differences between platform setups. Platforms that broker activities based on the idea of cost-sharing are more likely to hold on to some of the values mentioned above. If the goal of a platform is to build a sharing community, operators will have to consider which mode of matching can increase the amount of genuine sharing. In both GoMore and TrunkBird’s cases, a supply-driven functionality means that pre-planned trips can be entered into the system, perhaps limiting job-seeking behavior. Are the current setups of TrunkBird and GoMore then at all interesting from a labor market point of view? On the one hand, the platforms are still relatively small, and have limited impact. On the other hand, the current status of TrunkBird’s providers as legally self-employed means that they are labor market actors. In fact, any payment received can potentially put a provider’s unemployment assistance in jeopardy—whether it is “genuine sharing” or not. Despite the ideological undertones, there are ties to commercial and labor market activities, both on the part of the providers, and on the part of the platforms, who are for-profit intermediaries.

Other platforms are indisputably used as the means for providers to find work and for clients to find temporary help, such as Ahandyhand. The risks and exclusionary tendencies that come with the status as a solo self-employed provider imply that providers need to be aware of what they are engaging in. Providers must know that platforms are profiting, and they, too, must ensure that they
are compensated well-enough for their services. Platforms that use a bidding-process to establish pricing for individual jobs could put pressure on the providers’ wages. It is important that workers are not pricing their labor and commodities (such as the use of cars or tools in the service provision) too low, as to create a form of unintentional price dumping (Colbjørnsen 2016). The sharing rhetoric can serve to obscure that this is actually happening.

I also find differences related to fixed versus hourly wages, and payment systems. Ahandyhand’s lack of an online payment eases its administration, and is perhaps meant to emphasize its intermediary status. The new measures saying that providers must fill out work-sheets, that have to be shown to Ahandyhand upon request, are contradictory to its initial approach and self-image. The mismatch between these platforms’ self-images and reality is clear. Inconsistent communication and lack of transparency regarding platform policies and ratings can lead to misinformed providers, who risk having vulnerable labor market positions as a consequence.

In order to reach a conclusion about the different platform setups and their potential negative consequences in the labor market, a few perspectives are important. On the one hand, it must be recognized that there could be a desire for flexibility on the part of the providers. There will inevitably be solo self-employed providers who choose this particular lifestyle. On the other hand, it may be the case that providers lack understanding about their labor market position and the costs of flexibility. The categorizations used to divide the sharing economy into smaller spaces have been effective, but the implication of the findings could be that there is a need for another dimension concerning motivations. At the moment, this seems to be the hardest dimension to detect, and it poses a challenge for further research.

The challenge will be to find out if providers are treating platform work as a real alternative to full-time employment, or only as ad hoc activity. This is related to familiar questions concerning temporary work, namely if this type of work is a staircase leading to upward mobility, or if it is a treadmill for the most vulnerable groups in society (Benner et al. 2007). But in order to move forward, in Denmark and at the EU-level, statistical sources must be able to account for this phenomenon. To learn more about these new forms of employment (like platform work and other casual working arrangements that share its characteristics), surveys must be able to detect who these workers are, the amount of work they do, and other information about their lifestyle and history.
8.2 The disruption of dependent self-employment

The findings show that the sharing economy is tapping into operational service sectors, where wages and educational levels are typically low, and where non-standard employment relationships are prevalent. As mentioned in the introduction, the parallels to broader transformations concerning technological and industrial changes are relatively clear. On the one hand, the sharing economy’s use of digital technologies is enabling efficient communication and matching. If these efficiencies are real, in the sense that they are not based off of circumventing industry safety or labor standards, then the innovations of the sharing economy could be adopted by incumbents as well as new market players. It could be an expression of how digital technologies improve upon the status quo, and capture more value than the former setups. On the other hand, these new technologies could introduce changes faster than the labor market structure can adapt. The way in which supply and demand can be matched seems to bring employment relationships that no longer have an employer taking on the responsibilities of establishing ties between the workers and the welfare state. The severity of the need to regulate will depend upon the particularities of national welfare systems.

The findings imply that there is a need to mitigate the negative effects of digital transformations that cannot immediately be reconciled with the Danish model. At the same time, a hasty response must not rely only on arguments of technological efficacy and notions of sharing. These arguments are missing an important component, namely the potential disruption that dependent self-employment or disguised employment can have in the Danish labor market. The level of stability needed could, on the one hand, come from the social partners, if a common understanding of the risks and opportunities surrounding the phenomenon is reached. The social partners could participate in all three of the potential solutions that were mentioned in the previous chapter. On the other hand, a political response could be necessary to manage these changes here and now.

The European Commission has announced that guidelines on how to manage the sharing economy within existing EU-legislation will be unveiled in June 2016 (Valero 2015). We are also currently awaiting the European Court of Justice’s ruling (expected Fall 2016) on the legality of activities conducted by Uber in Spain, which could set an EU-wide precedent for how to treat these types of chauffeur and taxi services in all EU jurisdictions. On the one hand, precedent such as this is needed to move forward. It will be essential for both the Danish government and the social partners’ courses of action to have more legal tests of the sharing economy’s activities and of its employment relationships. On the other hand, the findings show that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems deriving from these triangular relationships, seeing as both platforms and national contexts
differ. This could mean that any cross-country solutions are less optimal, and that the Commission’s goal to not favor some business models over others is unrealistic (Valero 2016).

8.3 The theoretical fit

As this phenomenon is still in its early phases of development, I would generally speak in favor of treating it as part of a larger context. Therefore, I found the segmentation approach to be an effective way to understand the consequences of employment relations with attributes that significantly differ from the ones on which the Danish model is built. Nevertheless, the sharing economy phenomenon could introduce something new to typologies of LMIs. The findings show that platforms have a different mode of operation than temporary help agencies and job boards. The fact that platforms claim to be information-based intermediaries, but operate with non-voluntary-based rating systems, does not match the current typologies, and could therefore speak in favor of studying these actors on their own, as a new type of LMI. The element of flexibility could be introduced here as something potentially desired by both the clients and providers (Wilthagen and Tros 2004).

As potential cross-border LMIs, an addition to new theory-building could be the element of adaptability. On the one hand, it is functional for large international platforms to expand into new countries with more or less the same approach (and technologies) as in their home country. The element of brand recognition has already proven to be of great importance to platforms like Uber and Airbnb. On the other hand, the findings show that platforms will likely have to adapt to each cultural and jurisdictional context. It may not be a coincidence, for instance, that US-based platforms adopt more control-based approaches than what was found for the Danish platforms in the case study.

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26 An interesting observation, and one that was made by the European Parliament in a new resolution, is that these platforms are particularly popular in tourism (European Parliament 2015).
9. Conclusion

Before it can be determined whether the emergence of the sharing economy is indeed a recipe for growth, the elusive notion of “sharing” must not serve to obscure that there are workers in the sharing economy, whose unusual working relationships raise a lot of concern. This paper has shown that the sharing economy is a heterogeneous field that cannot be addressed in one fell swoop. The platforms all mainly mobilize solo self-employed workers, but their operational boundaries differ greatly. The fact is that, after having looked into a smaller area of the sharing economy, namely the peer-to-peer platforms that broker service jobs in Denmark, I find variations that could be crucial to understand the potential labor market impact of this phenomenon. The first matter is the risk that some activities in the sharing economy are not formally or practically treated as work. The second matter is the more significant risk that providers will find themselves in a subordinate, dependent working relationship despite being legally solo self-employed. These strongly emphasize the need for more detailed data about platform work to understand the severity of the risks.

The paper has shown that providers who find work through a sharing economy platform in Denmark face the legal realities of solo self-employment, which mean a lack of access to social protection and labor rights that are commonplace for most Danish employees in standard employment relationships. What is more, these providers engage in an unusual triangular relationship, where a for-profit-based platform dictates aspects of providers’ behavior, their payment methods, and how providers are effectively matched with their clients. The cases of Ahandyhand, GoMore, TrunkBird have shown that providers are outsiders in the Danish model, but are not currently in very subordinate working relationships. Nevertheless, the forces behind platform work (such as the rating systems) lack transparency, and serve to constrain providers’ independence and transfer significant risks onto them. There are differences between platform functionalities, which could impact how likely providers are to use these platforms as a single source of income. The exclusionary tendencies, including obstacles for collectively organizing, are reminiscent of those found for some cleaners and chauffeurs who find work by traditional means in the operational service sectors in Denmark. Although the transportation and cleaning industries have lower rates of organization than other areas in the labor market, the social partners ensure institutions that help to mitigate the negative effects of competitive product markets and non-standard employment relationships. These institutions are missing in the sharing economy.
The emergence of a labor market segment with the following characteristics could be the recipe for more inequality in the Danish labor market: The workers are solo self-employed, yet in a somewhat subordinate relationship; they find work through a platform, yet have no workplace and can be hired and fired during the course of an hour; they are part of “a sharing community”, yet have no colleagues, no unions, and could not stand more alone in the labor market. The sharing economy introduces practices and employment relations that cannot immediately be reconciled with the Danish model. Consequently, the social partners’ legitimate role in regulating labor standards could diminish over time, if the state has to step in to protect more and more outsiders who are not collectively organized. This change in responsibility between the state and the social partners could potentially have drastic consequences for labor standards.

The paper has discussed ways to overcome this lack of collective action. Solutions will likely depend on the severity of the risk that workers are being exploited, as well as on the types of different workers and in which jurisdictions they operate. It is safe to say that there is no one-size-fits-all response. In the Danish context, the workers with the lowest wages, who therefore have poor chances of being able to carry the insurance burden of solo self-employment, may need to be reclassified as employees. Workers with higher wages have better opportunities to make ends meet through platforms while still retaining security and meaningful independence, by for instance voluntarily joining agencies that ensure social protection and labor rights. Of course, neither solution is free of challenges. It implies that the possibility for European efforts could be limited, seeing as the risk profiles of outsiders differ based on institutional setup.

If we are indeed experiencing the transformation forecasted as The Fourth Industrial Revolution, the mechanisms inherent to the sharing economy are undoubtedly part of it. The technological imperative has led to the emergence of these business models, where demands for ever more flexible work can actually be met, and where it is currently possible to take advantage of the regulatory turmoil by circumventing existing labor standards. Therefore, the unveiling of the various strategies, guidelines, and court rulings that I have mentioned are impatiently awaited by enthusiasts and skeptics alike. Given the complexities of the challenges posed by the sharing phenomenon, I expect that collaboration between different authorities and institutions will be the most logical and most fruitful next step.
References


Skatteministeriet (2015) SAU alm. del - svar påspm. 368 om at redegre for ministerens overvejelser om tredjeparts-inderberetninger til SKAT for deleøkonomi-tjenester som Uber, AirBnB, m.fl., fra


Appendix 1: Interview guide


Kort om mit speciale: Fokus er på dele-service-økonomien og hvordan dens udbredelse kan påvirke arbejdsmarkedet i Danmark. Det jeg kæder for dele-service-økonomien er når individuelle (ikke-kommercielle) personer finder hinanden via en online platform med formålet at købe/sælge en serviceydelse, f.eks. rengøring, transport, grafisk design. Jeg er interessert i såvel arbejdsforhold for tjenesteydere som arbejdsmarkedspartnernes rolle i fortolkning og håndtering af denne arbejdsform (selvstændige der finder jobmatch gennem en online platform). I min afhandling undersøges konkrete firmaer i deleøkonomien der formidler serviceydelser som transport/fragt og rengøring, samt tjenesteyderernes position på arbejdsmarkedet i forhold til samme ”konventionelle” service sektorer.

Udbredelsen af deleøkonomien i Danmark

− Har udbredelsen af deleøkonomien optaget jer i din organisation?
  ○ Hvor længe og hvordan?
− Hvad mener du “det nye” ved deleøkonomien er?
− Efter din opfattelse, hvad kendetegner deltagerne i dele-service-økonomien?
  ○ Tror du, at det er den samme type personer der fungerer som både køber og sælger af serviceydelser i deleøkonomien?
− Er der behov for at organisere tjenesteyderne der arbejder i deleøkonomien?
  ○ I så fald, hvad er udfordringerne ved dette,
  ○ og i hvilke organisationer hører disse aktører hjemme (fagforeninger, arbejdsgiverorganisationer, organisationer for selvstændige erhvervsdrivende)?

Atypiske ansættelser og selvstændige

Efter min opfattelse, er tjenesteydere i deleøkonomien juridisk set (og i forhold til skattereglerne) selvstændige.
− Kan man håndtere denne gruppe deleøkonomi-tjenesteydere på samme måde som andre atypiske ansættelser?

Bl.a. EU-Kommissær Thyssen har påpeget, at det bliver stadig sværere at skelne mellem selvstændige (self-employed) og ansatte (employed).
− Hvilken rolle har din organisation i at definere (eller fortolke) skellet mellem selvstændige og ansatte?
  ○ Hvis ansvar er det egentlig?
  ○ Hvilke udfordringer er der for selvstændige (uden ansatte) på det danske arbejdsmarked?

Arbejdsmarkedspartnernes rolle

− Efter din opfattelse, kan deleøkonomiens forretningsmodeller (eller koncept) forenes med arbejdsmarkedets nuværende struktur (partssamarbejdet) og f.eks. arbejdsmiljølovgivningen?
  ○ Er der behov for ændringer fremover?
− Hvad mener du bør være partnernes rolle i forhold til deleøkonomien? “