ABSTRACT

Within the Danish scenery, the American inspired model of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ has been rapidly adopted within the last couple of years and shown an impressive increase in numbers: In the fall semester 2013 the number of provided entrepreneurial courses increased with 10 percent compared to the prior year and, in addition, the number of enrolled students increased with 7.5 percent - undoubtedly making it one of the fastest-growing academic fields today.

The present thesis finds a general curiosity in the far-stretching and all-encompassing fields of innovation and enterprise, by examining the emergence of the entrepreneurial university as a single expression of this general trend. In doing so, the study engages in the notion of ‘entrepreneurial universities’ in a Danish local context, as to examine how the entrepreneurial university rests on a particular moral domain of enterprise and links to certain imperatives of neo-liberal governing.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION

The following thesis is written in completion of my enrollment in the Political Communication and Management master program, Copenhagen Business School. The program describes itself as providing a cross-sectional view on our contemporary society, characterized by the perception that ‘traditional sectors are in decay’ \footnote{free translation, CBS 2015}. Through the inclusion of a series of leading theorist within politics, sociology, communication and network-analysis, the program aspires to certain competencies of observation, reflection and action, and advances a social scientific approach to cross-sectional questions of structuring and managing institutions, organizations, networks, companies, and etcetera \cite{CBS2015}.

Through my participation in the program, I have had the possibility of elaborating my understanding of a post-structural frame of theory and found a particular interest in the writings of French Michel Foucault. Thus, a primary motivational factor of the thesis has been to push my boundaries of familiarity and independency in respect to navigating through Foucault’s authorship as a last academic accomplishment that finalizes a little more than five years of study. In this, I owe a great thank-you to Mitchell Dean. His extensive knowledge in the field and patient guiding has allowed- and encouraged me to take experimental tours (and detours) around the authorship of Foucault, which, despite at times being cause of frustration, has given me a more thorough understanding than I would have, if I had not taken on this explorative approach.

Although I consider to have focused my studies on the writings of Foucault, I do not flatter myself to think that I have reached a point of full understanding of Foucault’s comprehensive writings. Nevertheless, I have taken the liberty of proposing an independent reading, which only covers a small part of his entire authorship and may even be cause for disagreement by others. However, for what it is worth, I have found a great pleasure in immersing myself in the field once again; discovering and re-discovering theoretical texts, and turning them into the writings of the present thesis. It is my hope that this enjoyment will be reflected in my writing for the reader to share, when reading through the present study.
1.2 PROBLEM AREA

INNOVATION, ENTERPRISE & POLITICS

Ever since the recession got a firm hold of the Danish economy in 2008, several areas have been recast, reformed and changed. Some would argue for the better while others would disagree. Whereas the recession undoubtedly had severe implications for many, it also served as point of discussion, reflecting upon the prospects of a variety of areas in Danish society; from discussion of banking to debates on the structuring of households and work-life balance; from political intervention to environmentally sustainable solutions, etc. Multiple aspects of hitherto conduct have been re-discussed, though this time, perhaps with a certain earnestness to future conditions, which the recession brought to a different light.

Despite ascribing the recession to that of subversiveness, it did bear with it a completely new centering of attention towards the active- and solution-oriented attitudes of innovation and enterprise. While innovative- and enterprising strategies have existed for decades within the private sector (particularly within the technology-based industries), they seemed slowly but surely to take a hold in the political- and public sphere as well as the establishment of the voluntary sector in the beginning of the 21st century. Within these settings, ideas of innovation and enterprise were warmly welcomed as a means in overcoming bureaucratic inertia as well as social- and environmental challenges, from the contention that ‘well-timed and targeted innovation boosts productivity, increases economic growth and helps solve societal problems’ (OECD 2015).

However, enterprise and innovation is not solely reduced to being a preoccupation of governments and other institutions. They go far beyond the confines of laboratories, the corridors of government and the hierarchies of organizations. Enterprise and innovation have come to flourish as general and forward-looking attitudes, accessible for us to undertake even in our everyday work-lives. We are either faced with them at our workplace as the aspired enterprising employee, who motivates herself through personal achievements and who poses a particular set of attributes of; self-confidence, creativity, willingness to work hard and willingness to take risks. At the job center, we enter as the entrepreneurial unemployed who is supported and trained through various enterprising and self-realizing programs. And even at universities we educate ourselves as ‘entrepreneurs’ by participating in educative courses on innovation and enterprise as well as entering the wide range of case competitions. A whole set of aspects seem to have been recast and rethought, though, this time placing innovation and enterprise in the forefront of our future conduct.

While it would be incorrect to ascribe this concern for innovation and enterprise to only that of politics, it is, nevertheless, reflected in a certain political will to
promote attitudes of enterprise and innovation within the Danish society. In 2012, the very first Innovation Strategy was formulated by the government of the time. Here we are able to read how innovation and enterprise are presented as relevant to a far-stretching range of conditions that insists on new and innovative solutions:

In the preface of the strategy we are presented with the fact that the general wealth of the population is improving, which, despite its positive message, causes pressure on our environmental situation (UFM 2012: 3). Moreover, the wealth of Western populations is not the only thing that is improving: New countries and markets are sprouting, creating an increased competition and ‘pressure on companies and employees to constantly innovate, develop and improve themselves’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 3). Meanwhile, at the same time we are faced with the fact that the Danish economy ‘has been exposed to a rupture ever since the recession set in, in 2008’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 3).

From the perspective of politics it is clear that in order to withstand the global competition, Denmark needs to maintain its competitive edge by ensuring ‘that the Danes are the most competent and innovative people’ (free translation, Statsministeriet 2011: 16). The ability to make the Danish work force as competent and able-bodied as possible is, thus, the aspired outcome of the Innovation Strategy (2012). In achieving this, the government at the time adopted a strategy that somewhat resembles the tenet of a ‘Triple Helix’ model, advancing the cooperation between government, academia and industries. Convictions of a Triple Helix model are reflected in the strategy, which particularly stress the advancement of cooperation between universities and industries – or specifically, between the acquisition of knowledge and to a conversion of knowledge:

"Innovation is a central driving force for our growth and job creation. Innovation is knowledge and ideas that are converted into products and processes, which creates new business opportunities and generates value for our society. Access to knowledge and well-educated employees is thus paramount for the innovation of industries and businesses" (free translation, UFM 2012: 4).

According the Innovation Strategy, hitherto investment in knowledge and education has not lived up to the pay-off expectations in form of growth and job creation in the private sector; ‘there are simply too few positions that are established on the basis of new knowledge and research’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 5). With a broad political endorsement, the Innovation Strategy thus presents an ambitious and innovative plan for advancing Danish society’s ability to convert knowledge into growth, by adjusting focus to a mutual exchange of knowledge between educative institutions and industries.

In this respect, universities have come to play an enhanced role in the production of knowledge and innovation. By instilling the spirit of enterprise, the universities’ traditional mission of teaching and research has gradually been expanded from not only sustaining and supporting economic growth to also encompassing a
contribution to the economic growth. In light of this spirit of enterprise we are presented with the idea of the 'entrepreneurial university' in continental Europe for the first time: A promising institution that is capable of re-thinking itself and it’s conduct in a more responsive way with respect to the surrounding labor market.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY

Whereas the idea of the 'entrepreneurial universities' has existed for decades in the United States (some would even argue centuries), it is a rather newly emerging phenomenon in Europe, triggered by technological revolution, the emergence of a knowledge economy, and the turbulence of the economy and financial crisis (EC 2013).

Within the Danish scenery, the American inspired model of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ has been rapidly adopted within the last couple of years and shown an impressive increase in numbers: In the fall semester 2013 the number of provided entrepreneurial courses increased with 10 percent compared to the prior year and, in addition, the number of enrolled students increased with 7,5 percent - undoubtedly making it one of the most fast-growing academic fields today (Vintergaard 2014: 1).

Today we find that all Danish universities offer - if not entire educational courses - than at least elective courses on entrepreneurship and innovation. Course headers and course descriptions asking; ‘Do you have a true entrepreneur within?’ are becoming more frequent in the list of offered graduate studies and electives, and more students seem to be inclined to participate in educational courses of innovative and entrepreneurial character.

While the term of entrepreneurship is frequently applied to cover those individuals who may not have taken a university degree but still been able to innovate and enterprise themselves and their businesses, there appears in recent terms to be established a strong link between the degree of education and the ability of innovation. Hence, according to former Minister of Education, Sofie Carsten Nielsen, educational background is not of complete irrelevance when speaking of entrepreneurship, since:

“Entrepreneurs from universities have shown to be better at creating workplaces and improving the productivity than other entrepreneurs. Companies established by entrepreneurs with an educational background from the university has in average shown a better growth within the first three years of living in comparison to companies established by other entrepreneurs. Moreover they have raised the productivity with a 7 percent increase each year, whereas other entrepreneurs struggle with improving the productivity within their companies” (free translation, UFM 2014a).
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY: AN OBJECT OF CURIOUSITY

The present thesis finds a general curiosity in the far-stretching and all-encompassing fields of innovation and enterprise, where the enthusiastic and almost unobstructed adoption of innovative- and enterprising strategies has triggered my interest in engaging in the general terms of the terms.

Without ascribing the study a representative character, the present thesis thus seeks to examine the emergence of the entrepreneurial university as a single expression of this general trend. Moreover, I have found a particular interest in the conception of the ‘entrepreneurial university’, since how we frame the course of education in our presence, seems to offer a political extension as to influencing and shaping our future. For those reasons, the entrepreneurial university will serve as point of departure in the present study.

In doing so, I will propose a study that engages and explores the conception of the entrepreneurial university in our local context, instead of proposing a normative assessment of the relevance and implementation of entrepreneurial universities, as appears to be the preoccupation of the majority. By this, I mean that the present thesis seeks to examine how the entrepreneurial university has emerged as an institution that rests on a particular set of values and advocates certain imperatives of action, rather than judging its validity and compatibility.
1.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION

How are we able to understand the entrepreneurial university as an expression of a moral domain of enterprise that links to a certain scope of intelligibility, strategy and moral practice?

1.4 WORKING QUESTIONS

1. What are the terms under which, the university is traditionally discussed and practiced?
2. In which way does the entrepreneurial university seek to problematize the terms of discussion and practice?
3. How does the entrepreneurial university invite individuals to recognize and reflect upon themselves as capable and accessible to a realm of enterprise?
CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERPRETIVE ANALYTICS

Before engaging in the specific analytical set-up of the thesis, I find it noteworthy to state that the thesis has admittedly found a high inspiration in the thoughts of French Michel Foucault, who has been read as both an idealist, nihilist, as a ‘new philosopher’, an anti-Marxist and even a new conservative. And further, whose writings have been ascribed to both the disciplines of history, philosophy and sociology within structuralist and post-structuralist movements. Certainly, the different readings can be ascribed to the eyes of the reader, however, Foucault’s authorship does entail twists and turns, analytical shifts, and different approaches to the analysis, which may be cause to different interpretations. One thing seems consistent though; a form of triangular relation between 1) a reference of intelligibility, 2) the organization and administering of power and 3) the role of the individual. Nevertheless the focus and approach to each of these elements has changed and been modified over time from the study of knowledge, relations of power and a question of subjectivity, to the study of science, politics and ethics, or even; truth, governmentality and modes of subjection.

In the present thesis, I intend to adopt a reading of Foucault’s later authorship, which I will argue entails a three-fold shift from 1) the study of bodies of knowledge to the analysis of ‘games of truth’, 2) the study of relations of power to the analysis of governmentality, and finally 3) the study of processes of subjectification to modes of subjection (Foucault 2010: 41-42). It is my contention that such reading enables a greater emphasis on the ways in which individuals are led to focus their attention on themselves, to recognize, acknowledge and shape themselves as ethical subjects, rather than merely relying on an analysis of how relations of power seek to shape certain forms of subjectivity. As I will argue, this is however, neither conflicting nor contradicting to the analytics of governmentality as an art of conducting the conduct of others. Rather, it suggests that we are able to reach a different understanding of the style of governing by shifting focus to the subject with respect to how he is asked to govern himself; what substance he is asked to govern within himself; which position he takes in a particular form of governing; and finally, out of which aspirations this governing takes place.

It is my hope that the general inquiry of the thesis (being an analysis of how the entrepreneurial university links to a certain scope of intelligibility, strategy and practice) will support the theoretical ambition of bringing an interpretation of Foucault’s later authorship into play.

In the section to come I will present the analytical framework of the thesis, which will cover an introduction to the methods of genealogy and problematization and, hereafter, an introduction to the analytics of the study of morality and practices of the self. While I intend to introduce these three themes as the general
theoretical lens through which the analysis will be conducted I have also taken
the liberty of supplementing with other more specific theoretical concepts, which
will be introduced in alignment with where they will be applied within the analysis.

2.2 THE GENERAL THEME OF A ‘HISTORY OF THOUGHT’

Though Foucault’s authorship is known for its comprehensiveness; for its picking
up on several concepts, abandoning some and elaborating others; for its twist and
turns and different epochs, it is likewise known for its rich and far-reaching
historical groundings. Whether it is the exploration of emerging institutions such
as those of penalty and psychiatry, the experience of a man’s sexuality and desire,
or the practices of ascetic lives in Ancient Greece, we find without doubt a
transcending stipulation of a historical perspective throughout his authorship.

This favoring of a historical conditioning should, however, not be mistaken as
‘classical’ historiography. In the present thesis I will somewhat submit to French
Robert Castel’s view when he writes that two apparently contradicting demands
need to be reconciled in order to propose a rigorous alternative to the established
discipline of history:

“On the one hand is the need for humility toward historical work and history as
a profession. No one who has not worked with primary sources and followed
the rules of historical methodology has any right to claim to offer a ‘better’
interpretation of the materials studied by historians. On the other hand, the
interpretation provided must be different” (Castel 1994: 240).

Addressing the first demand, I acknowledge that I have never worked with
primary sources according to the rules of historical methodology, and this is also
not the case in the present thesis. Therefore, I do not propose that the following
section is read as superior to more ‘classical’ ways of writing history. Nevertheless,
it does pose the possibility of thinking differently about the established, as well as
bringing with it a distinguished reading of history. In order to understand this
imperative differentiation we can perhaps start off with the conception of a
‘History of thought’, which Foucault claimed to be the general theme of his
research (Russell 2014).

‘History of though’ was first and foremost formulated as an alternative to what
Foucault perceived as the often legitimated and legitimating ‘history of ideas’:

“I would like to distinguish between the ‘history of ideas’ and the ‘History of
thought’. Most of the time a historian of ideas tries to determine when a specific
concept appears, and this moment is often identified by the appearance of a new
word. But what I am attempting to do as a historian of thought is something
different […] The History of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic
field of experience, or a set of practices, which were accepted without question,
which were familiar and ‘silent’, out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises
While the historian of ideas tries to determine when a specific concept appears, analyzing its genesis, development and context, Foucault proposed a slightly different entrance to the line of history by exploring the way in which institutions, practices, habits and behavior have become problematic or reached a point of inadequacy and therefore been subjected to a rethinking and reinvention (Foucault 2001: 74).

In spite of Foucault pronouncing ‘History of thought’ as the general theme of his research, it is a phrase that only appears in his later writings where it, in return, turns up quite frequently. Thus, the phrase ‘History of thought’ does not suffice as a leitmotif to the totality of his authorship since it does not figure as a point of reference throughout his research. However, the inquiry of a ‘History of thought’ must surely be present even in his early writings, when claiming it to be the theme of his research. Here it is my suggestion that we need to look for the methodological approaches of genealogy and problematization to fully comprehend the operationalization of a ‘History of thought’.

As for most parts of his authorship Foucault reflected upon the record of a ‘History of thought’ as a ‘long and tentative exercise that needed to be revised and corrected again and again’ (Foucault 1992: 9). It was an analytical approach that did not take it’s final form in its original- and early formulation but, rather, it was revisited and revised repeatedly. From such consideration I propose that we read the workings of a genealogy as the premature tenet of a ‘History of thought’, which was later to be supplemented, corrected and finalized by the study of problematization. Thus, it is my contention that both the workings of genealogy and the study of problematization should be read as operationalizations of a ‘History of thought’ – each of them taking place in different parts of his authorship.

When treating the two approaches as expressions of the very same, it would make no sense to separate these two methodologies from each other; they intersect with one another and build upon each other. Following this line of arguing, I intend to propose a chronological reading of a ‘History of thought’ in the sections to come – starting from the workings of genealogy and moving on to the study of problematization.
The workings of genealogy

The formulation of a ‘genealogical’ approach has been interpreted and put into use in various ways: Some emphasize its characteristics by contrasting it to that of ‘archaeology’, suggesting that ‘while the former emphasized discontinuities, the latter might be seen as stressing continuities’ (Russell 2014). Others, by distinguishing the genealogical approach as examining continuities and discontinuities within practices, while the archaeological approach examines regularities and dispersion within discourses (Andersen 1999; Villadsen 2006).

The ways of interpreting and putting a genealogical approach into use surely depends upon the scheme of understanding in which it is presented. Within this introduction I find it worthwhile reiterating that I intend to present the genealogical approach as an early formulation of a ‘History of thought’, which was – as I have already argued for – to be elaborated by the study of problematization.

When setting off to formulate a genealogical approach, Foucault found an inspiration in Nietzsche and his challenging of the ‘pursuit of the origin’:

“This search [followed by a pursuit of origin] is directed to ‘that which was already there’, the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity” (Foucault 1997: 78).

The ‘pursuit of the origin’ and the image of a ‘primordial truth’ is likewise confronted within the genealogical approach. Here it is neither a question of examining an object’s true origin, nor is it a question of studying relations a priori in order to demonstrate lines of transcendence or ‘that the past actively exists in the present’ (Foucault 1997: 81). Rather the objective is to ‘show how the object of investigation emerges from several elements, which have been passed on and re-combined’ in haphazard ways rather than studying anticipated lines of development (free translation, Villadsen 2006: 90):

“[…] it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations or conversely, the complete reversals the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (Foucault 1997: 81).

Hence the critical task of genealogy is to illustrate the coincidental and arbitrary constitution of ‘things that continue to exist and have value for us’ (Foucault 1997: 81). And further, it is to ‘dismantle’ objects as taken-for-granted essences by showing their historical heritage and relations of contingency (Goldstein, R. James 1991: 28).

In doing so, the notions of ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ become important analytical tools: Continuity signifies the elements, which are passed on through
history, though perhaps taking new shapes and entering new constellations. Discontinuities, on the other hand, signify those elements that are marginalized and slowly disappear or lose their significance. The notions of continuity and discontinuity are put into practice in order to view the preceding conditions that have enabled the emergence of new objects as well as examining how these emerging objects demarcate and distance themselves from prior conditions. In the present thesis, I will employ the notions of continuity and discontinuity with the specific objective of bracketing off the familiar terms under which the university is traditionally being discussed and practiced; to become familiar with the lines of continuity and discontinuity in traditional discussion and practices of university – both across a scale of opinions as well as across a delimited period of time.

Although the genealogical approach has directed our attention to a reading of the arbitrary and contingent course of history, it is my argument that Foucault’s later formulation and elaboration of a study of problematization propose a more tangible analytical framework in reaching such reading.

THE STUDY OF PROBLEMATIZATIONS

While it is difficult to locate a central place for the notion of problematization within Foucault’s authorship it appears to figure as an important term in his last academic work and interviews. Even though the study of problematization seems to share far more similarities than differences to the workings of genealogy, it does bring a particular focus to the way in which we are able to ‘problematize’ a question of our present (Castel 1994: 237). This particular concern for questioning our present seems to be a distinct feature of the study of problematization, which demarcates itself from the more classical ways of reading history by taking point of departure in a present situation rather than one of the past. The inclusion of a historical perspective is, hence, not out of aspirations of historical objectivity as if the study is conducted in a quest for what ‘really happened’. Rather it is included (as it were in the case of a genealogical approach) in order to consider a present situation as a conjunction of elements that are inherited from the past.

However, the manner in which the study of problematization seeks to detect a legacy of the past is perhaps slightly refined and more precise than that of genealogy. As I will argue, the study of problematization takes us further with respect to specifying the inquiries and entrance points to an analysis of the unexpected and contingent lines of our history.

The primary entry point to the study of problematization is to examine the way in which current proposals, whether political or not, attempt to overcome propositions of the past that consequently are constituted as problematic. Or as Australian Carrol Bacchi simply puts it:
“[…] what we say we want to do about something in our present indicates what we think needs to be changed and hence how we constitute the ‘problem’” (Bacchi 2012: 4).

In this respect, a significant inquiry to the study of problematization is to identify a historically rooted tension, which we are able to read – or at least get a trace of – from the way in which the present proposals are presented. It is to analyze how those elements that are accentuated as providing a positive change cast a shadow over a previous conduct, which consequently is constituted as a problem. In an interview that took place with Foucault, shortly before his death in 1984, he explains:

“To one single set of difficulties, several responses can be made. And most of the time different responses are actually proposed. But what must be understood is what makes them simultaneously possible it is the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their contradictions” (Foucault 1998: 6).

Here we see how several proposals, which may at first sight appear as far remote from one another, and even oppose each other, may very well be mutually conditioned by a shared historical problematization, which each proposal seeks to respond to in different ways. An important question to ask in an analysis of problematization then becomes; how do objects of the present seek to offer solutions to a preceding problem. Or perhaps even better in reverse; which problem of the past do emerging objects of our present seem to offer themselves as a solution to?

In order to get hold of this historically rooted tension I propose that we include the notions of ‘epistemological obstacles’ or ‘epistemological breaks’. In the present thesis I intend to refer to epistemological obstacles as the unthought and unconscious structures that are immanent and taken for granted within our realm of understanding. From such a definition, epistemological breaks then become moments of rupture with an existing realm of understanding that do not simply entail the addition of new knowledge, but the complete reorganization and rethinking of the conditions under which we define, by and large, what can be known. In this respect, the study of problematization is the analysis of the way in which an unproblematic field, which has previously been accepted without question, becomes a problem that ‘raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habit, practices, and institutions’ (Foucault 2001: 74).

From such perspective, we see how a constitutive element of our historical progression is a calling-into-question of previous conditions that have reached a point of inadequacy and sought a response to through several diverse responses. Thus, when identifying this epistemological obstacle and the existence of a rupture, we are able to decode our history in a manner that allows for a
differentiated understanding of the contradicting, contingent and accidental courses of history (Castel 1994: 241). Or as Castel writes:

“There’s ‘epistemological break’ is the necessary condition for revealing and exploring a level of rationality that eludes the point-by-point, or synchronic analyses of the present” (Castel 1994: 244).

In this respect, it is my contention that the study of problematization proposes a much clearer inquiry to the ways of capturing relations of contingency and arbitrariness, than was the case of genealogy. That is, insofar the study of problematization specifically requests the researcher to: 1) ask the question of how present propositions and proposals seek to problematize previous conditions of our past; 2) identify epistemological obstacles that may aid the researcher to propose a different decoding/reading of our historical progression, and further 3) to conduct a study that holds the potential of revealing inherent contradictions of present practices that otherwise may appear as taken-for-granted matters. Or as Foucault recapitulates, the study of problematization is to:

“[…] rediscover the root of these diverse solutions the general form of problematization that has made them possible – even in their very opposition; or what has made possible the transformation of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions” (Foucault 1998: 7).

POINTER AND PERILS OF A HISTORY OF THOUGHT

Summing up, I have argued that the workings of a genealogical approach as well as the study of problematization should, or at least can, be read as operationalizations of what Foucault presented as a ‘History of thought’ by the end of his academic contributions. Moreover, I have suggested that a ‘History of thought’ opposes the more classical doctrine of ‘history of ideas’ in several ways. This alternative approach to the lines of history is, however, not without constraints and has likewise been target of critique. In what follows, I will thus briefly summarize some of the distinctiveness of a ‘History of thought’ as well as reflect upon some of its shortcomings.

First and foremost the ‘History of thought’ proposes an imperative differentiation from a ‘history of ideas’ insofar it does not seek to present a total reconstruction of history by identifying objects’ point of origin, examining their genesis, disclosing their original nature or, illustrating their linear lines of development. Rather the task is to show how objects emerge in haphazard ways, showing the contingency and arbitrariness to the ways in which elements from the past are carried on and re-combined in innovative ways. However the abandoning of aspirations of historical objectivity and conventional ambitions of recreating the past, has led to a critique of the indefinite nature and incapability of providing a complete story telling. ‘History of thought’ provides no beginning or end, which
often results in a rather fragmented historical observation. This has prompted a
dispute of whether it is possible to avoid making an arbitrary or careless selection,
when choosing the historical contributions of the study (Castel 1994: 239-240).

Secondly, ‘History of thought’ also propose a present reading of history, which,
instead of being concerned with ‘what really happened’, wishes to decode history
along the lines of a present understanding. This entering into the lines of history
has been cause to a critique of ‘presentism’, which means ‘sticking onto the past
a concern that holds true only, or principally, for our time’ (Castel 1994: 239).
This critique further prompts the question of how it is possible to write a history
of the present that is not merely ‘a projection of today’s preoccupation onto the
past?’ (Castel 1994: 239).

And finally, I would also like to recognize the extensive work a genealogy or study
of problematization requires and, in this respect, acknowledge that the limits of
the present thesis will not allow for a historical unraveling in comparison to those
conducted by Foucault. Foucault was a great reader of archival material and his
proposals of methodologies to a ‘History of thought’ are ambitious and difficult
to replicate in the sense that they cover a long span of time and are ideally
completed from ‘primary sources, unpublished discoveries, or ‘historical scoops’”
(Castel 1994: 240).

By these recognitions, I intend to include some of the same materials used – and
even written - by historians themselves. Besides easing the restrictions to the
included empirical material, I also find that the inclusion of more established and
recognized works of history will enable the avoidance of an arbitrary and careless
selection of historical contributions as well as the risks of ‘presentism’. Hence I
will to some extent include the work of historians who have dealt with the
historicity of the university and lean against some of the points of impact that are
largely recognized as being significant to the constitution of our present
university. This is, however, not tantamount to a complete absence of primary
and prescriptive texts, which I still intend to include within the analysis as much
as possible.

Additionally it is also my argument that it is still possible to bring forth a different
reading of established history (in spite the inclusion of more recognized texts and
less historical ‘scoops’) by following the methodology of genealogy and
problematization. That is, insofar the genealogical approach will be employed in
order bracket off the familiar terms under which the university is traditionally
discussed and practiced; to bring forth nuanced and diverse thoughts rather than
seeking to reject all, except for one valid predecessor of our modern institution.
In the case of problematization, I will examine how the diverse ways in which the
university is traditionally being discussed and practiced is bound together by a
shared denominator as well as proposing an analysis of how the entrepreneurial
university is presented as offering a response to prior problematic conditions.
2.3 GOVERNMENTALITY, MORALITY & PRACTICES OF THE SELF

Up until this point, the introduction to a ‘History of thought’ has to a great extent dealt with certain steps of methods and a specific approach to the lines of history. Although I will argue that the workings of this approach can take us far in terms of analyzing the historicity of the university as well as the emergence of an entrepreneurial university, I find it worthwhile supplementing with a theoretical grid that will allow for a closer engaging in the entrepreneurial university as a current figuration that links to a certain scope of intelligibility, strategy and practice.

While Foucault claims a ‘History of thought’ to be the general theme of his research, there also appears to be a consistent structuring of his analysis around the elements of knowledge, power and the subject. In the forthcoming section, I intend to propose a reading of Foucault’s later writings on the conjunction of these three elements, which he, in an opening lecture in 1983, described as constituting a particular ‘focal point of experience’:

“These three elements – forms of possible knowledge, normative frameworks of behavior for individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects – these three things, or rather their joint articulation, can be called, I think, ‘focal point of experience’” (Foucault 2010: 3).

To study ‘focal points of experience’ is, thus, to study the matrix between knowledge, types of normativity and subjectivity, and how they constitute an experience, or a moral domain of a particular culture at a particular time. In order to analyze the entrepreneurial university as the setting of a certain moral domain, I believe it is worthwhile sharing some thoughts on each of the elements of power, knowledge and the subject and, further, clarify the interpretation that I intend to bring to the analysis. Starting with the relation of power/knowledge and subsequently moving on to the propositions of the subject.
THE INTERPRETIVE ANALYTICS OF POWER & TRUTH

Foucault has become fairly known for having said that knowledge equals power and admittedly he recognizes that “everyone knows this, that I am always saying it, rearguing it, and repeating it” (Foucault 2014: 4).

However, Foucault’s dense analytics between the relation of power and knowledge has led to several misreadings of offering little possibility for human agency, e.g. by Popkewitz and Brennan amongst other American Scholars (Mayo 2000: 113; R. Keith Sawyer 2002: 433). In this respect, it is imperative to make a few clarifications to Foucault’s concept of power and the interpretation I intend to bring to analysis, so as to avoid the risk of a misreading of the present study.

An important premise when entering a Foucauldian line of understanding is a recast of popular and partisan conception of power as oppressive: One has to try to rid oneself from the connotations of oppression, violence and restrictions that we logically employ when speaking about the nature of power. Though power may take the form of domination, restriction and oppression, Foucault used a great deal of his authorship arguing that power also, and for the most part, takes differentiated and positive forms. As he explained in a discussion with Bernard-Henri Levy in 1977, the general terms of power – ‘the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition’ – are far from ‘being essential forms of power’ (Kritzman 1977: 118). These characteristics of power are, however, expressions of power ‘in the most frustrated and extreme form’ that, if anything, rather reveal the very limits of power, than express it’s general nature (Kritzman 1977: 118). Instead Foucault claims that ‘the relations of power are, above all, productive’, which means that power takes a productive form that; allows, encourages, makes and creates rather than forbids, confines and oppresses. Thus, it is my contention that Foucault argued for a diverse formulation of power, whose temper stretches from the extremes of oppression to aspirations of prosperity, and it is further my intention that the later form of a productive power is employed in the present study.

A central entry point to an elaboration of the productive traits of power is the concept of *governmentality*, which was initially thought of with a particular eye for the governing of the State. However, as Foucault shows in a lecture from February 1978, this new art of government crossed the threshold of political science, so that governing of the state merely became one particular mode of governmentality (Foucault 2009: 93-107). In general terms, governmentality is often characterized as an art of governing that seeks to ‘set about the conducting the conduct of others’ (Foucault 2010: 4). Particularly the wording of ‘conduct’ seems to have a significant double-folded meaning in the definition of governmentality: On the one hand, ‘conduct’ directs our attention to a particular form of guiding, leading and urging the conduct of others. On the other hand, ‘conduct’ also signifies the behavior of a single individual. Thus, as we see, to
‘conduct the conduct of others’ is to guide and direct the behavior and attention of others.

Key to the workings of governmentality is a premise of knowledge and a recognition of the necessity to know the habits, customs and dispositions of the individuals, one wishes to govern. It is to turn human conduct into a field of observation and knowledge in order to govern in an effective- and rational manner in step with the actuality of human conduct. But, it is also a liberal form of governing that seeks to govern as close as possible to the actuality of human conduct in aspirations of minimalizing exterior governing and maximizing self-governing. In this respect, governmentality brings us to the very core of modern liberal governing, which, instead of relying on the principals of prohibition and restriction, sets up a moral domain of normative and prescriptive codes in which individuals are ‘led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves’ as well as others, as subjects of a moral domain (Foucault 1992: 5). At this point, it is my argument that we are able to detect an almost fusion between the elements of power and knowledge, insofar governing rests upon a paradoxical principle of; the closer governing is connected to the truth, the less it would have to govern:

“If truth can succeed in constituting the climate and light common to governors and governed, then you can see that a time must come, a kind of utopian point in history when the empire of the truth will be able to make its order reign without the decisions of an authority or the choice of an administration having to intervene otherwise than as the formulation, obvious to everyone, of what is to be done […] Governors and governed will be as it were actors and co-actors, simultaneous actors of a drama that they perform in common and which is that of nature in its truth” (Foucault 2014: 14).

As we see, a modern form of governing seeks to cancel out the line between governor and governed, which makes it difficult to speak of suppression and resistance when the response to the question, which a conventional understanding of power logically would produce, namely – who is in the position of power? - becomes the subject.

Instead, I will argue that it is more interesting to ask, how ‘things’ – in this case, how innovation and enterprise within the entrepreneurial university – have entered a game of truth and error, and come to compose moral domain of recommended values, rules and actions, in which individuals are capable of recognizing themselves and others as accessible to the experiences of innovation and enterprise? In order to propose an analytical framework, capable of enlighting this question, it is my suggestion that we take a closer look at the potential ways in which individuals conform their behavior.
‘Morality’. “Everyone is aware of the word’s ambiguity. By ‘morality’ one means a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals […] But ‘morality’ also refers to the real behavior of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them” (Foucault 1992: 25).

As Foucault describes in the selected quote, and as briefly touched upon in the previous section, to study morality, is to examine the set of values, knowledge and rules that together constitute a moral code for individuals to undertake. These moral codes, however, may take different forms:

“[Although] it is sometimes the case that these rules and values are plainly set forth in a coherent doctrine and an explicit teaching […] it also happens that they are transmitted in a diffuse manner, so that, far from constituting a systematic ensemble, they form a complex interplay of elements that counter balance and correct one another, and cancel each other out on certain points, thus providing for compromises or loopholes” (Foucault 1992: 25).

While there may be cases where ‘morality’ is proposed in a rigid and unmistaken form, it also happens that they are ‘transmitted in a diffuse manner’ that inflicts ambiguity and inconsistency and, which consequently provides the possibility of different forms of interpretations and ways of conformation. Thus, ‘morality’ also draws the attention to how individuals ought to conduct themselves in reference to a prescriptive morality; how they make use of the ‘compromises and loopholes’; and how this ambiguity invites for different practices of forming oneself as a subject in compliance with a prescriptive moral code:

“In studying this aspect of morality, on must determine how and with what margins of variation or transgression individuals or groups conduct themselves in reference to a prescriptive system that is explicitly or implicitly operative in their culture, and of which they are more or less aware. We can call this level of phenomena ‘the morality of behaviors’” (Foucault 1992: 26).

In order to grasp the different ways – the ‘margins of variation’ – in which individuals conform their behavior in alignment to prescriptive codes, Foucault proposes suggestive pointers to which we are able to detect a differentiation in ‘the morality of behaviors’.

The first point, Foucault refers to as 1) the ethical substance, which is the substance that individuals are asked to govern within themselves. It is the prime material which moral codes seek to work upon and which individuals direct their attention to, when wanting to conduct themselves with respect to a prescriptive system (Foucault 1992: 26). It may be areas of the body or the mind, intellect, or the state of health, or, it may be certain dispositions, whether social or genetic. For those familiar with Foucault, examples from his authorship could be such as ‘the pleasure or aphrodisia in Greece, the flesh in Christianity, or sexuality in contemporary liberation ethics’ (Dean 1995: 564).
The different ways of conforming to morality can, however, also have to do with 2) a mode of subjection, which concerns practices and techniques through which ‘the individual establishes a relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice’ (Foucault 1992: 27). Familiar examples of these techniques and practices of the self could be ‘dialogue, listening, meditation, prayer, training of memory, mortification rituals, diary-keeping, self-examination and, of course, confession’ (Dean 1995: 564-565).

A third point to which we are able to detect margins of variation is 3) the elaboration of ethical work, which signifies the work ‘[…] that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior’ (Foucault 1992: 27). The third point brings us to the very heart of an important distinction between morality and ethics, which Foucault insisted on: While, as we have seen, morality relates to an assemblage of rules and codes, and further, the way in which individuals recognize their moral obligations; ethics, on the other hand, relates to the work one performs on oneself in order to become the person one strives to be. It is, thus, an inquiry of ascetism that questions, which kind of person one wants to become and, further, a form of ‘self-activity’ in which one takes a deliberate position in turning oneself into an ethical being. Whether it be to ‘live a noble and beautiful life in antiquity, to submit to God’s law in Christianity, to become rational beings in Kantianism, or to fulfill our potential in contemporary liberation movements’ (Dean 1995: 565).

Finally, other differences to ways of conforming to a domain of morality, may be detected in what Foucault calls 4) the telos. Telos concerns the mode of being that we hope to produce in ourselves and others i.e. ‘self-mastery through moderations for the Greeks, salvation through self-renunciation in Christianity, the emancipation of the self for contemporary liberation movements’ (Dean 1995: 565). Or as Foucault describes, it is:

“[…] the establishment of a moral conduct that commits individual, not only to other actions always in in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject” (emphasis added, Foucault 1992: 28).

As we see, to study morality is not simply to study the more or less prevalent codes of conduct which individuals conform to. It also entails a study of ethics and asceticism, which implies an examination of the way in which individuals not only become aware of their moral obligations, but also relates to their moral obligations in processes of self-transformation:

“In short, for an action to be ‘moral’ it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, a law, or a value. Of course, all moral action involves a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’, a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position
relative to the percept he will follow, and decide on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal” (Foucault 1992: 28).

In closing, what we are able to say then, is that the study morality, in the broad sense, consists of two elements: On one hand there is the study of a moral code as the assemblage of a collective of rules and values that function as moral obligations of the individual. On the other hand, to study morality is also connected to the individual aspect ethics and asceticism, which concerns the relation one has with oneself, and the processes through which one tries to transform oneself as an ethical subject.
2.4 STUDY OUTLINE

From the purpose of preparing the reader of the chapters to come within the analysis, the following study outline will notice the theoretical elements, which have been introduced in previous sections, and show how they are thought of as coming together within the analysis. As presented in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), the general inquiry of the study is to examine:

How we are able to understand the entrepreneurial university as an expression of a moral domain of enterprise that links to a certain scope of intelligibility, strategy and moral practice?

The forthcoming analysis will be structured around the subsequent three working questions (section 1.4), which together, once elucidated, will provide a point of reflection from which it is my hope that we will be able to respond to the general inquiry of the study.

Beginning with the first working question, concerning the terms under which the university is traditionally discussed, I intend to install the concepts of continuity and discontinuity in order to bracket off the familiar terms under which the university is traditionally being discussed and practiced. Taking point of departure in the present debate, fueled by several political reforms, I intend to examine the lines of continuity and discontinuity in historical material that dates back to the beginning of the 18th century with the writings of Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Although I will employ and lean toward writings of recognized Danish historians – particularly for the first one and a half century – it is my ambition to include a majority of primary texts, including texts written by Kant and Humboldt themselves. What I expect from the inclusion of these texts, is to reach a point from which it will be possible to reflect upon the present debate as diverse responses to a single set of difficulties that nourish them in their diversity and perhaps even contradictions.

Once a historical grounding of the traditional discussion of the role of the university has been laid out, the second working question prompts the study of the way in which the emergence of the entrepreneurial university seeks to problematize the identified terms of discussion and practice. At this point of the analysis, I intend to analyze how the proposal of an entrepreneurial university accentuates specific positive traits that, consequently, cast a problematic light upon previous propositions. Once the specific traits of the entrepreneurial university have been reflected upon, it is my intention that the analysis will furthermore provide a study of how the entrepreneurial university, in spite of its demarcation as a new way of conducting university, is likewise rooted in the general terms under which the university has been discussed throughout Modernity.
And as a final contribution to the analysis, the third working question prompts
the inquiry of how the entrepreneurial university invites individuals to recognize-
and reflect upon themselves as capable and accessible to a realm of innovation
and enterprise. In this final part of the analysis, I intend to study how the specific
traits of the entrepreneurial university constitute a form of morality of
recommended rules, values and actions that, in return, function as moral
obligations of the individual. Finally, I intend to examine the margins of variation
that we are able to detect in the ways in which individuals are able to transform
themselves into innovative and entrepreneurial subjects.

2.5 EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although the present study takes point of departure in the contemporary
emergence of entrepreneurial universities, I acknowledge that my study is far from
unique amongst the comprehensive amount of writings on the field. For those
reasons, I find it worthwhile to reflect upon how the present study positions itself
in the literary field on the entrepreneurial university. In doing so, I find it
necessary to recognize that the following review will only be scratching the
surface of the massive literature, where I, at the most, will be able to draw
attention to some of the most cited and leading authors within the field as well as
point out some of the most frequent ways of analyzing the entrepreneurial
university. When conducting the following literary review, Google Scholar has
been used as the primary searching tool enabling certain search criteria with
respect to typed words, period and number of citation. Given the extensiveness
of the field, I have searched from 2000 and onwards - yet even this timely
demarcation has not allowed for an exhaustive review of the literature.

When going through literature on the entrepreneurial university it becomes
evident that, in spite of its rather recent emergence in the Danish scenery, it is a
phenomenon that has existed for a long time within the American setting.
Consequently, the majority of the literature relates to an American practice,
historicity and a political- and social setting, where particularly authors such as
Burton R. Clark, Henry Etzkowitz, Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie appear
as conspicuous authors.

Furthermore, what generally seems to characterize the field and approach to the
study of the entrepreneurial university is a normative assessment of the
implementation whether with respect to the complications (Deem, R., Mok, K.
H., & Lucas, L.), organizational difficulties (Philpott, K., Dooley, L., O'Reilly, C.,
& Lupton, G.), discursive formation (Clark, B. R.), motivational factors (D'este,
P., & Perkmann, M.) or implementation and assessment of specific institutions
Studies conducted by either Danish authors or studies, which have a particular eye on examining the entrepreneurial university in Denmark, appear to be more limited in comparison to e.g. American studies. Nevertheless, there obviously exists literature on this matter as well, where most of the literature stems from one of the eight Danish universities’ subdivisions on innovation and entrepreneurship – either as a direct product hereof or in collaboration:

- Aalborg University (AAU), *Centre for Research in Entrepreneurial Processes*
- Aarhus University (AU), *Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation* (AU CEI)
- Copenhagen Business School (CBS), *Copenhagen School of Entrepreneurship* (CSE)
- Copenhagen University (KU), *Innovation and Entrepreneurship Lab* (CIEL)
- IT University of Copenhagen (ITU), *ITU Innovators & ITU Business Development* (both centers/organization’s are voluntary driven by students)
- Roskilde University (RUC), *Centre for Social Entrepreneurship* (CSE)
- Technical University of Denmark (DTU), *Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship* (DTU Diplom)
- University of Southern Denmark (SDU), *IDEA Entrepreneurship Centre*

Characterizing the most propagated Danish studies is a normative assessment of the implementation of entrepreneurial universities, and most frequently, studies that appear to advocate for the development of entrepreneurial universities, typically arguing:

“It is our claim that the educational system at the university level at present is not capable of developing students’ motivation, competences and skills concerning innovation and entrepreneurship. Instead, entrepreneurship education requires learning methods, pedagogical processes and frames for education, which universities at the moment have not mastered” (Blenker *et al.* 2008: Abstract).

From this perspective, most of the literature is an expression of professors and other researchers within the field of entrepreneurship and innovation, who make their offer on how to succeed in developing enterprising universities. Examples are such as P. Blenker, P. Dreisler, H. M Færgemann and J. Kjeldsen’s contribution on how to develop a framework for entrepreneurial education published in the magazine ‘Entrepreneurship and small business’ volume 5 (Blenker *et al.* 2008), or H. Neergaard & J. P. Ulhøj’s handbook on qualitative research methods in entrepreneurship (Neergaard & John Parm Ulhøj 2007).

While the mentioned literatures are obvious and significant contributions to the field, it is my hope that the present thesis will take a rather different approach to the analysis. Instead of engaging in the field of entrepreneurial universities from aspirations of assessing the unanimous advantages, or complications of
implementations, the present study aims to study the knowledge and thinking that the entrepreneurial university bears with it, as well as engaging in a familiarizing with the creation and re-creation of the university as a promising institution that is capable of re-thinking itself and its conduct. Having no professional investment in the appearance of entrepreneurial universities in our local setting, I intend to take the liberty of reflecting upon its theoretical premises rather than engaging in the practical contemplations of implementations.

THE INTEGRATION OF EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

As presented in the outline of the present study (section 2.4), the analysis will be structured by the formulated working questions (section 1.4), since they each propose different levels of inquiry to a certain perspective of historicity, institutional mode of operation and practices of the entrepreneurial university. In this respect, I have found it logical to carry on this division, when presenting the material that will come to constitute the empirical foundation of the study. For those reasons the following section will be divided into three parts; one, concerning the historical material of the thesis; two, material describing the workings of the entrepreneurial university at general institutional level, and; three, prescriptive text, that discloses a certain ‘practice’ by offering rules, opinions, advices and suggestions to conduct within the setting of the entrepreneurial university.

HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY

When studying the historicity of the university, or specifically, the terms under which the university is traditionally discussed, I intend for the most part to include articles, interviews and other material from forums where the university is often publically discussed. Moreover, I intend to include a series of selected government platforms in which we are able to read the political course and ambitions on the subject of education in each period of governing, reaching back to the earliest electronic declaration available at the Ministry of the State of Denmark (Statsministeriet 1993; 1998; 2001; 2011; 2015).

Besides these rather ‘recent’ materials, I will employ the original writings of Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose thoughts are regarded as constitutive for our modern University. Specifically these are the texts of What is Enlightenment? (Kant 1784) and The Conflict of Faculties (Kant 1784) by Kant, and Humboldt’s text ‘On the Internal and External Organization of the Higher Scientific Institutions in Berlin’ (Humboldt 1810).

When including these texts I will lean against other recognized historians with respect to drawing inspiration to ways of reading and entering the writings as well as pointing out their significance to our modern understanding of the university.
Here particularly the anthology on ‘Ideas of a University’, edited by Jens Erik Kristensen et. al. has been a great inspiration, as well as the editors interpreting sections of the book (Kristensen et al. 2007).

THE CONDUCT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITIES

When moving on to an engaging in the concept of entrepreneurial universities from the objective of examining how the emergence of these new institutions seek to problematize the prior identified terms of discussion and practices, I intend to primarily employ the very first government-formulated Innovation Strategy presented in 2012.

The previous social-democratic Government introduced in 2012 the very first and still valid Innovation Strategy, which received a broad political endorsement and was formulated in close cooperation with national and international experts (UFM 2015). The Innovation Strategy consists of 27 concrete initiatives within three key areas of 1) innovation-driven solutions to societal challenges, 2) the conversion of knowledge into societal value and, 3) increased innovation capacities within educational institutions (UFM 2015). With the promising title, ‘Denmark – the country of solutions’ (free translation, UFM 2012), the innovation strategy was, thus, formulated to ensure a closer connection between research, education and innovation within the private market, which will be of benefit to growth and job-creation.

The reason for including the Innovation Strategy as primary source of the analysis comes from the consideration that this specific proposal is as close as it gets to a political suggestion and encouragement of developing entrepreneurial universities within our local setting. Although the strategy never refers directly to the specific concept of ‘entrepreneurial university’, it undoubtedly proposes the means for developing enterprising universities with innovation and entrepreneurship as constitutive elements. And further, the development of universities in terms of innovation and enterprise appear as a particular concern of the Innovation Strategy, which success ‘requires a fundamental cultural change in within educational institutions’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 23).
CONSULTATION OF INDIVIDUALS

When addressing the inquiry of how the entrepreneurial university invites individuals to recognize- and reflect upon themselves as capable and accessible to a realm of enterprise, I intend to include an original and perhaps even, peculiar, set of empirical material: The material originates from a so-called ‘Baton of Entrepreneurship’ in which nine professors and lecturers affiliated with Copenhagen Business School have invited each other for a discussion and reflection upon the notion of entrepreneurship. Although the choice of empirical material naturally relinquish the thesis a representative character, I have found this particular set of material productive insofar it compose the testimonials of individuals who, in some way or the other, are related to the field of entrepreneurship in their professional working. Precisely the fact this material disclose testimonials of individuals, who have both a theoretical- and practical acquaintance with the notion of entrepreneurship, suggests that they compose what Foucault denoted as ‘prescriptive’ texts:

“[…] that is texts whose main objective, whatever their form (speech, dialogue, treatise, collection of precepts, etc.) is to suggest rules of conduct” (Foucault 1992: 12).

Formalized as a baton, each participating professor or lecturer are asked five questions, whereof the final question asks to whom the person in question wish to pass on the baton to. The five questions asks goes as follows:

1. What is your understanding of entrepreneurship?
2. What characterizes an entrepreneur as an individual?
3. What is the role and function of entrepreneurship for private companies and for the public sector?
4. In what sense is entrepreneurship important for society?
5. To whom do you pass on the baton?

Toke Reichstein, Professor at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics, launched the baton and, hence, initiated the sequence of following participants:

1. Toke Reichstein  
   Professor at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics
2. Anders Sørensen  
   Professor at the Department of Economics
3. Ulrich Kaiser  
   Guest professor at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics
4. Wolfgang Sofka  
   Associate professor at the Department of Strategic Management and Globalization
5. William B. Gartner  
Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy

6. Asma Fattoum  
Assistant professor at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics

7. Ester Barinaga  
Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy

8. Thilde Langevarg  
Associate professor at the Department of Intercultural Communication and Management

9. Camilla Bartholdy  
External lecturer at the Department of IT Management
CHAPTER 3: THE TRADEJECTORY OF UNIVERSITIES
Education has been a high priority on the political agenda in recent years and it has without doubt become a highly politicized subject from the conviction that, how we frame the course of education in our present offers a political extension as to influencing and shaping our future. As a result, political measures are under sharp vigilance: Not only by politicians of the opposition, but also by other stakeholders from the academic world itself and from the surrounding labor market.

Some of the most recent political measures that have brought a host of different opinions to life are the so-called dimensioning- and progression reforms. What these reforms have in common is a political encouragement of a certain mode of ‘preparedness’ for the labor market (in Danish: a certain mode of ‘arbejdsmarkedsparathed’), which is either encouraged by reducing seats at university programs with high unemployment rates or, by limiting the individual student’s ability to prolong her studies and hereby expediting her entrance to the labor market. As the responsible minister at the time, Sofie Carsten Nielsen, explains:

“Neither the government nor the Danish universities wish to educate the youth into unemployment. We are now able to ensure a better balance between the admission of individual programs and the demand of the labor market” (free translation, UFM 2014a).

Thus, the two reforms stand as moderate changes to a previous conduct of university, which is problematized as being a direct cause of high unemployment rates as well as holding onto the future labor force for too long.

While many have warmly welcomed the reforms, they have also been target of critique. On the one hand, we find those, who strongly support the presented reforms, advocating for a better balance between education and the labor market through a more labor-oriented approach in the teachings at universities. This perspective critiques the university of being too theoretical and lacking basic factual knowledge (Thunø 2012). Following this line of arguing, knowledge should not be pursued for its own sake, leading to abstract or metaphysic suppositions, but should rather ‘support growth, welfare and the development of society’ as it is stated in the consolidation act of universities from 2003 (Rønhof & Hart 2009). On the other hand, we find those, who argue that the reforms obstruct an intellectual immersion and the formation of an independent outlook by reducing the matter of education to a mere question of promoting careers and businesses. Viewing the reforms as one part of a greater vocationalizing of universities, this perspective contest the acceleration of fields of research that are
in direct continuation of the labor market, arguing that innovative minds and scientific breakthrough takes time and is often reached in unforeseeable ways.

When engaging in the arguments of the proponents, it is contended as a matter of fact that education, and particularly at level of university, is paramount in securing of the Danish society’s competitive edge. The typical course of arguing goes something along the lines of:

“Knowledge is the golden way to growth, and scientific research, education, and knowledge-sharing amongst universities will play a key role for the development of the Danish society” (free translation, Holm-Nielsen et al. 2010).

These words, which have been repeated again and again, are typically voiced by politicians, even across the political scale. One of the most recent versions of this position is expressed no later than in the constitutive government platform of the present right-wing government, which was elected in June 2015. Here we are able to read how scientific research and new knowledge is a central driving force for Danish society:

“Scientific research of high quality is a paramount prerequisite for our labor market to develop new products and services, which ensures knowledge-based workplaces” (free translation, Statsministeriet 2015: 20).

Although at first hand, some would argue that an aspiration of strengthening the market is almost a mandatory measure of a right-wing government, it is my contention that the ambition of strengthening the prosperity of society through educational policies crosses party-politics. As an example, we are likewise able to detect a similar expression from the previous social-democratic government, who, from their government platform, view that:

“Better and more education and scientific research is principal for ensuring growth and prosperity in the future. For the individual education ensures employment, higher wages and better opportunities. And a higher educational level forms the fundament for the development of the entire society […] Denmark’s competitive edge should be that the Danes are the most competent and creative people” (free translation, Statsministeriet 2011: 16).

And further, if one reads through the various government platforms, dating from today and back to 1993, the aspiration of advancing a useful and productive relation between the teachings of universities and the demand of the labor market prevails as a rather consistent ambition across the political landscape: Either it is expressed in form of well-known mantras such as ‘from scientific research to invoice’ or in political headers such as ‘A coherent educational- and labor reform’ (free translation, Kristensen 2007: 15; Statsministeriet 2015; 2011; 2001; 1998; 1993).

Although there may be several mutual explanations to why a politicized subject such as educational policy has found an almost unequivocal tone, it is my suggestion that the concept of The Competition State has had a particular impact in Danish politics, which several politicians openly and publically have endorsed.
Among these, the most prominent are former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen from the Social Democrats; followed by the consecutive Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, from Denmark’s Liberal Party; and most recently by the previous Finance Minister, Bjarne Corydon from the Social Democrats (Fischer 2007).

The concept of The Competition State also takes a particularly local origin with its formulation by Danish professor, Ove Kaj Pedersen (Haabet 2014). In an interview, Ove Kaj Pedersen explains:

“The Competition State in Denmark is a welfare state with greater ambitions than the classical model. The Competition State strive to achieve as competent a work force as possible so that it becomes competitive with other countries' workforces […] [since] the characteristics of the our present international situation is that nations compete on their ability to make their workforce as competent and able-bodied as possible” (free translation, Ove K. Pedersen in: Gronne 2014).

In light of The Competition State, we are able to interpret how its rationale and line of arguing undoubtedly has resonance to the way of thinking educational politics today, in which knowledge appears as a central means for achieving a competitive edge. Indeed converging with the fact that “a given part of The Competition State is an investment in more and better education from the assumption that such investment will strengthen the competitiveness” (free translation, Illeris 2014).

Although the concept of The Competition State has found a great resonance among Danish politicians and in present educational policies, it has also been the target of a great critique, particularly voiced by antagonists from the academic world. In a contribution to debate from 2014 professor emeritus Curt Sørensen from Aarhus University contests The Competition State:

“The autonomous, scientific university has become a factory that produces trained soldiers of The Competition State’s production apparatus, unconscious consumers and of course, the dominating ideology” (free translation, Anton Grau Larsen et al. 2015: 153).

In elaboration, Sørensen explains the ‘dominating ideology’ as a predominating political aspiration of preparing for an ‘increased competition on a global scale’, which insists on an ‘evermore dominating business world, market-thinking and growth-ideology that should be accelerated’ (free translation, Anton Grau Larsen et al. 2015: 153).

While the critique of Sørensen is formulated in a slightly provocative fashion, it does strike down on at least two essential critiques to the contemporary political development of universities. At first, it stresses a jeopardizing of the universities’ autonomy, which is conventionally perceived as a constitutive element of our modern university (Kristensen et al. 2007; Red. KU 2014; Gyldendal 2009). From such perspective, the present advancement of labor-oriented teachings at
universities puts the democratic ability to critique our contemporary society at stake. And, converging with the second point of critique, this jeopardizing of institutional autonomy is argued to consequently result in the ‘production of unconscious’ students who are incapable of using their own reasoning.

Notions of autonomy and an ability to critique, thus, play a key role in the formulation of this counter-response. In a conference held at Aarhus University on the theme of ‘The Competitions State’s demand of personal maturation’, Laura Louise Sarauw, Postdoc in the field of educational sciences is, in a summary, referred to as having proposed the following caution:

“We are terrible wrong if we think the Danish educational politics should be puppets for the labor market. Narrow-minded target management of competencies is not the right path to success in a modern knowledge-society. There is a need of broader knowledge, critique and democratic perspective, and education programs should weigh independent thinking, personal maturation and academic immersion” (*free translation*, Grandjean 2013: 2).

Besides arguing for a different path than the present political route, Sarauw’s point also provides a quite common distinction of the debate between the teachings of specific skills and competencies that are useful for the labor market versus a broader formative knowledge that enables an independent- and critical thinking.

In this respect, it is my contention that two contradicting poles of contrasting ideals and aspirations for the future conduct of Danish Universities can familiarize the present debate. Alexander von Oettingen, associate rector at University College of Southern Denmark, reflects upon these two oppositions, in which he argues the former to be an expression of an Anglo-Saxon perception that view individuals in their particularity and asks: “What should I master, here and now?” (*free translation*, Oettingen in: Ortmann 2015: 15.45-15.47). The antithesis to an Anglo-Saxon perception is what Oettingen denotes as the Danish notion of ‘dannelse’, originally descending from the German ‘bildung’, which refers to a notion of personal formation. Or as Oettingen explains:

“It is a notion that indicates that the individual has to give himself his own authority and enter into a solidary community. In this way it is – I would say – a notion of authority, both in respect of a individualistic responsibility towards oneself as well as a co-responsibility when entering a community” (*free translation*, Oettingen in: Ortmann 2015: 12:43-13.10).

Put in a greater perspective, Oettingen thus argues that we are able to understand the polarized debate as expressions of an Anglo-Saxon tradition versus a German tradition rooted in the notion of ‘bildung’. A distinction that the think tank SOPHIA likewise submits too, when arguing that the recent reforms and political measures in the field of education are expressions of a paradigm shift from a prior German tradition towards a prevailing Anglo-Saxon tradition (Mortensen *et al.* 2014: 4):
“We are dealing with a paradigm shift in Danish educational politics and pedagogies from a European educational tradition that took point of departure in wide concept of educational purpose and content, to an Anglo-Saxon curriculum-thinking, having objectives and means as the first priority” (free translation, Mortensen et al. 2014: 4).

From this perspective, I suggest that we enter the approaching analysis by bringing the distinction between a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition to the forefront of the analysis in order to reach an understanding of their constitutive base of emergence as well as their mutual relation. In doing so, I propose that we provisionally start by following the footsteps of historians as to engage in the German tradition and analyze its emergence, characteristics and aspirations.

### 3.2 THE COURAGE OF OWN REASONING

**What is Enlightenment?**

Although the question is more than 200 years old, it is a question that nearly every student of social science has come across through his studies - even today. And further, one which has been revived and repeated by several theorists from Hegel and Nietzsche to Max Weber, Horkheimer and Habermas (Foucault 1984: 32).

The question of ‘What is Enlightenment?’ is the title of a famous, yet short text, written by Immanuel Kant as a response to the question originally posed by Reverend Johann Friedrich Zöllner (Hess 1999: 19-20). In the very first line of his text, Kant responds to the question as: ”Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” (Kant 1784: 1). What is meant by a ‘self-incurred tutelage’ is a self-inflicted *immaturity* that rests on man’s lack of courage to use his own reason instead of merely relying on external directions and dogmas (Kristensen 2007: 36). In this respect, Kant’s well-known motto of the Enlightenment became ‘*Sapere aude!* – Have courage to use our own reason!’ (Kant 1784: 1).

Although Kant’s famous text on ‘What is Enlightenment?’ has undoubtedly been given great significance with respect to our present understanding of ‘Modernity’, his well-known publication on ‘The Conflict of The Faculties’ (Kant 1979) is likewise acknowledged as having a great influence of our conception of the ‘modern university’. In his publication on ‘The Conflict of the Faculties’, Kant proposes a restructuring of universities that takes point of reference in a centralization of the hitherto ‘lower faculty’ of philosophy on behalf of the prior and predominant ‘upper faculties’ of theology, law and medicine. The reason for arguing as such is from the contention that while the purposes of the upper faculties are closely linked to the objectives of Government, the faculty of philosophy rests on a certain principle of autonomy.
According to Kant, the objectives of the upper faculties are direct extensions of the Government either by ensuring the eternal well-being (theology), civil well-being (law) or physical well-being (medicine) of the population. In a rather ironic tone, Kant thus contests the status of the upper faculties as being canonized teachings, as if there exists no other guidance than the dogmas of an authority:

“All three higher faculties base the teachings which the government entrusts to them on writings, as is necessary for a people governed by learning, since otherwise there would be no fixed and universally accessible norm for their guidance” (Kant 1979: 33)

Philosophy, on the other hand, operates through its own premise of pursuing the truth, whether it be in alignment with governing or criticizing it. As a response to the structuring of faculties at the time, Kant thus advocated for the enhancement of the philosophical faculty, as a faculty that rests upon the principle of an independent and individual reasoning, evidently having resonance to his motto of ‘Sapere aude’:

“So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government” (Kant 1979: 43).

Once the faculty of philosophy takes the predominant position over the faculties of theology, law and medicine, it is to function as a check and balance between the objectives of governing and an autonomous university in which the philosophical pursuit of truth is the main thing, whereas the utility the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance’ (Kant 1979: 45):

“A modern university must put truth, or at least a will to truth, above all, including objectives of utility. Hence the influence of the State should be confined meanwhile any teachings, courses, faculties and scholars must tolerate the critique of reason and truth” (free translation, Kristensen 2007a: 37).

Kant’s publication on ‘The Conflict of the Faculties’ proposes an, at-the-time, revolutionary and ‘modern’ form of conducting universities that takes point of departure in the philosophical faculty as the institutionalization of a critical reason and an independent scientific realization, which is only constrained by a will to truth. While his texts accentuate the ability to critique and use of own reason as the aspired assets of a ‘new’ university, the text undoubtedly casts a shadow on the previous scholastic and Christian-Catholic dogmatic teachings whose legacy the upper faculties continue to be bearer of.

Although Kant’s thoughts on a ‘new’ university never resulted in a reformation within his lifetime, they paved the path for Wilhelm von Humboldt, who has come to be known as the founder of the modern university with the establishment of the Berlin university in 1809 (Kristensen 2007a: 42).
THE HOMBOLDTIAN CONCEPT OF ‘BILDUNG’

Wilhelm von Humboldt’s reformation of the university in Prussia shares, to a great extent, continuities to the preceding thoughts of Kant whom he found a great inspiration in. The hierarchy of faculties was hence, in tune with Kant’s ideas, reorganized around the philosophical faculty which central placing was to ensure the conduct of autonomous research, independent from the workings of the State.

Present for Humboldt’s reformation of the university is a clear distinction between the university as a higher educational institution and other educational establishments. As he writes in a publication ‘On the Internal and External Organization of the Higher Scientific Institutions in Berlin’ (Humboldt 1810: 1), the characteristic of the university is its treating of science as ‘a problem that has still not been fully resolved and therefore remains constantly engaged in research’ (emphasis added, Humboldt 1810: 1), whereas other educational establishments, on the other hand, only deal with the teaching of ‘finished and agreed-upon bits of knowledge’ (Humboldt 1810: 1). When considering the statement of viewing science as ‘a problem that has still not been fully resolved and therefore remains constantly engaged in research’, it strikes down on two essential points worthwhile reflecting upon: At first the statement of ‘remaining constantly engaged in research’ undoubtedly has resonance to Kant’s prior formulation of a ‘will to truth’. Secondly, the statement of ‘treating science as a problem that has still not been fully resolved’ brings connotations to what we have become familiar with today as a certain pursue of innovation: That it insofar encapsulates a will to remain questioning to established orders and a determination to break new grounds by viewing truth as something that is never fully resolved. In this respect, we see how Kant’s aspired ‘will to truth’ as well as a certain spirit of innovation became a grounding principle of the modern university, which is to differentiate itself through its weighting of research and a constant openness to the question of truth rather than merely relying on the dissemination of authoritative and unchallenged knowledge.

However, whereas Kant’s occupation with a ‘new’ university was primarily to ensure the autonomy and independency of ‘free sciences’, Humboldt had another objective of instating ‘bildung’ as the primary objective of the modern university. Signifying a practice of self-formation, in which education enables a process of personal and cultural maturation, ‘bildung’ came to be a central component of the Humboldtian reformation and the so-called German tradition.

The concept of ‘bildung’ was formulated from a liberal-political philosophy which, through enlightenment, wished to liberate the individual’s autonomy and ability to form oneself as a reasonable and independent person (Kristensen 2007a: 44). Thus, ‘bildung’ is not as much a clearly defined pedagogical theory to be employed with excellence, as it is a life-long exercise of oneself through the
activity of continuous learning. In this respect, although it may not have been the primary focus of Kant, it does have resonance to his motto of Sapere aude! insofar it seeks to liberate human agency from the dogmas of authorities through the encouragement of using one’s own reason. The ideals of universities, thus, came to compromise an aspiration of individual emancipation in which ‘bildung’ fosters holistic worldviews and ‘activates’ an independent decision- and opinion making, which contrasts the mere relying on authoritative directions.

From these considerations the constitutive principles of our modern university became, internally, to connect objective and autonomous sciences with a subjective education and formation, and, externally, to bridge the canonized teachings of agreed-upon knowledge in schools to a study that includes research under one’s own guidance (Humboldt 1810: 1).

3.3 CONTROVERSIES OF GERMAN AND ANGLO-SAXON

Although the German tradition has had a prevailing influence on European universities, the distinction between a German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions has existed for long within the fields of pedagogics.

Here the Anglo-Saxon tradition is often unraveled through its contradictions to a German tradition and rarely unraveled from its own historicity or linking to certain ideals of ideology. Thus, as a kind of token of its nature, the Anglo-Saxon tradition is often presented in a pragmatic manner, by contrasting its objective, measures and means to a German tradition, which I will briefly comply with in what follows.

At first, the Anglo-Saxon approach has a rather pragmatic objective, which, in opposition to the German tradition, neither rests on certain ideals or ideology, other than to pursue utilitarian purposes. Instead of aspiring transcendental ideals, the Anglo-Saxon tradition takes a more changeable approach of seeking to maximize the applicability of learning only determined by its usefulness at a given point in time.

Secondly, the Anglo-Saxon tradition, by large, measures skills and competences over a personal cultivation of the students. It proposes no aspirations of interfering with personal aspects of students but instead seeks to endow students with useful knowledge in order to become as successful as possible within the frame of efficiency, productivity and utilitarianism. Thus, rather than asking ‘What should the student become?’ the Anglo-Saxon tradition asks ‘What should they know?’ (Hamilton 2002: 80).

Finally, the Anglo-Saxon approach has a certain curriculum tradition that contrasts the unpredictable ways of learning under independent guidance through research. This curriculum tradition rather entails:
“[…] that understanding has to be developed within a frame of before-hand determined learning goals, which, with the help of efficient training, aspires a fixed and measurable teaching and, where understanding is viewed as an ascending linear movement” (free translation, Wiberg 2011: 59).

In this respect, the Anglo-Saxon tradition takes a flexible and changing form that, as a kind of economy, relies on the laissez-faire principal of seeking to maximize the outcome of learning in terms of productivity and efficiency. Although the tradition shows a degree of flexibility in terms of the content of learning, which varies in accordance to whatever may be the most useful knowledge at the time; it also has a certain static nature in form of fixed, linear and measureable teachings.

Comparing the Anglo-Saxon tradition to the German tradition, we are then able to summarize with the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German tradition</th>
<th>Anglo-Saxon tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad cross-disciplinary perspective</td>
<td>Discipline-specific skills and competencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental ideals</td>
<td>Changeable utilitarian purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should the student become?</td>
<td>What should the student know?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning through research</td>
<td>Curriculum-thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpredictable ways of learning</td>
<td>Fixed measurable teachings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Self-)understanding as life-long exercise</td>
<td>Understanding as ascending linear movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent guidance</td>
<td>Training by superiors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instead of ceasing the analysis at a point of exclusive oppositions from where it is only possible to proclaim one valid over the other, I find it appropriate to examine how these different forms of knowledge enter into a game of truth and error, by studying how the responses are related to a single set of difficulties that ‘nourish them in their diversity and in spite of their contradictions’ (Foucault 1998: 6).

FEATURES OF LIBERALISM

As for the case of the German tradition, it is my contention that we are able to reduce its emergence to a general matter of institutional- and individual independency. Bearing traces of the general device of the Enlightenment, the German tradition’s most noble ambition in its uprising was to separate the university, its professors and students from the directions of an authoritative governing. Thus, the German reformation is, when deconstructed point-by-point, reducible to the fundamental question of – if not the State – then at least the frugality of government. Such insertion converges with Humboldt, who openly wrote:
“[The State] must not demand from them [universities] anything that relates directly and straightforwardly to itself, but must nurse the inner conviction that when they achieve their final purpose, they will also fulfill its purposes, namely from a much more elevated perspective, one from which much more can be brought together and very different forces and levers can be applied than the state is capable of setting into motion” (Humboldt 1810: 3).

In this respect the right of institutional autonomy and individual independency, inevitably led to the question of the frugality of governing, which, in other words, ‘indeed is the question of liberalism’ (emphasis added, Foucault 2004: 29).

Exploring the thought of liberalism as a potential denominator, we may view the Anglo-Saxon tradition as likewise resting upon a liberal principle insofar it imitates an economic discourse and a free market logic that seeks to maximize the outcome of learning. The logic of the ‘free market’ links to liberalism insofar the market constitutes a site that obeys ‘natural’ and spontaneous mechanisms and which, through the continuous counter balance between supply and demand, reveals a sort of liberated truth:

“In other words, it is the natural mechanism of the market […] that enables us to falsify and verify governmental practices when, on the basis of these elements, we examine what government does, the measures it takes and the rules it imposes. In this sense, inasmuch as it enables production, need, supply, demand, value and price, etcetera, to be linked together though exchange, the market constitutes a site of veridiction” (emphasis added, Foucault 2004: 32).

From such line of arguing, we are able to understand the German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition as two heterogeneous responses to the problem of liberalism. Having been preoccupied with the field of liberalism and liberal governing, Foucault proposes in a lecture at Collège de France in January 1979, two quite different routes to the question of liberalism, which I will argue to have relevance to our hitherto understanding of a certain German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition. Foucault denotes these as a ‘revolutionary approach’, which refers to the revolutionary period of Enlightenment, and the other as the approach of ‘English radicalism’, which is inherited with the Anglo-Saxons (Foucault 2004: 39-41).

What binds these two approaches together is the question of how to limit the State, however, their ways of responding are quite contradictory: As for the first instance, the revolutionary approach seeks to delimit the influence of the State by taking point of departure in general revolutionary ideals of a liberated subject, whose autonomy was to be secured through reformations, conventions and legislation.

“[…] this approach consists in starting from the rights of man in order to arrive at the limitation of governmentality by way of the constitution of the sovereign. I would say that, broadly speaking, this is the revolutionary approach. It is a way of posing right from the start the problem of legitimacy and the inalienability of rights through as sort of ideal or real renewal of society, the state, the sovereign, and government” (Foucault 2004: 39-40).
Relating this to the educational perspective of a German tradition, we see how the autonomy and independency of research is likewise sought to be secured as a constitutional and inalienable right of professors and students, certainly bearing continuities of a general revolutionary approach.

However, while the German tradition sought to determine the limits of the State through the constitution of law, ‘English radicalism’ takes on a rather pragmatic, or even utilitarian, character, in which ‘radicalism’ designates a ‘position which involves continually questioning government, and governmentality in general, as to its utility or non-utility’ (Foucault 2004: 41). Instead of being fixed in terms of legislations, the limits of the State are continuously discussed in the case of ‘English radicalism’ and determined from a calculation of where to draw the line between advantageous and disadvantageous outcomes of governing:

“The question addressed to government at every moments of its action and with regard to each of its institutions, old or new, is: Is it useful? For what is it useful? Within what limits is it useful? When does it stop being useful?” (Foucault 2004: 41).

In this way ‘English radicalism’ is no more than the projection of a utilitarian ideology (Foucault 2004: 41), which is likewise reflected in the educational sphere and prompts the question of which competencies and skills students should possess as to master the most useful knowledge of the time. The need for producing specific knowledge as well as the conversion-value, which this knowledge poses, imitates the natural mechanism of the market as a site of veridiction that enables a falsification or verification of the measures, which government takes and the rules it imposes.

With this exposition of liberalism as a common denominator in mind, we are able to bring the previous study of forms of knowledge to a broader understanding of game of truth and error, which the previous educational traditions are expressions of. While the German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions may direct their attention at university-practice, they also relate to broader rationales of a revolutionary approach and the approach of English radicalism that each compete on the true kernel of liberalism.

Having the assertion of a common aspiration of liberalism in place, as well as a theoretical conception of differentiation, it is my contention that this particular analytical grid may hold the potential of revealing inherent oppositions of present practices, when related to the current structuring of universities.
When turning to the actual structuring and workings of the universities of today, it is evident that the denounced German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions exist side-by-side in the daily conduct of universities. As an example, one only needs to think of the obligation of research, which professors in Denmark are assigned, to find continuities to Kant and Humboldt’s ideals of placing research at the very heart of the operation of universities (FM 1998). Meanwhile, we are also more or less aware of the growing tendency of inviting guest lecturers and external lecturers directly from the business world, who do not have the same obligation of research, but possess valuable and empirical know-how knowledge (FM 1998).

In order to understand how the two traditions, in spite of their antithetic relation, balance each other and fuse in daily practices it is my suggestion that we must direct our attention to the inherent inadequacy of each tradition and examine how they supplement each other in daily practices.

Inaugurations have been made with regards to the German tradition contesting its elitist premise by arguing that the more disseminated university-educations becomes, the more it requires a specialization of teachings. The German sociologist and philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, wrote about the traditional German universities’ inadequacies in transforming from elitist universities to mass universities in his text ‘The Idea of the University’ published in 1987 in the German journal *New German Critique*. In this publication, Habermas wrote:

“[The] cooperatively structured, fundamentally egalitarian and complementary relationship […] soon became irreconcilable with the more formal organization which quickly developed in the hierarchically designed research institutes of the natural sciences” (Habermas 1987: 12).

Hence, the egalitarian refuge in universities negated the ‘universalist intent of the university idea and the promise it had held for an emancipation of society as a whole’ by revealing the class structure, which the Humboldtian ideals of ‘bildung’ builds upon. The philosophical imperative, which Humboldt argued for, was not only conditioned by the philosophical faculty as superior within the structuring of universities but also as the imperative for ‘the top of the nation’s moral culture’ (*free translation*, Habermas 2007: 202). From this perspective it became unclear how the enlightening and emancipatory assignment of universities could go hand-in-hand with the growth of universities and ‘a differentiated occupational system [which] required academic preparation for more and more professional careers’ (Habermas 1987: 12). The logical conclusion then became that universities have to:
“[…] legitimize their existence with reference to society and external economical- and political criterion that perceive research at universities as a means in achieving political- and economical ends with respect to increasing globalization and competitiveness” (free translation, Kristensen 2007a: 65).

Once university education becomes an affair of the majority, there is a greater need for legitimizing its relevance in society as well as specializing its teachings so that it prepares students to enter different vocations. From this course of events the ‘sciences forfeited their role of providing a world view in favor of producing technically useful knowledge’ (Habermas 1987: 12-13), which served as an invite for the Anglo-Saxon tradition to emerge as a response to the refuge of the masses with the specific ability of specializing teachings in accordance with utilitarian principles.

From such consideration, it is my argument that we find a paradoxical relation between form and content insofar a limited number of students enables a broader scope of educations, whereas in reverse, large quantities of students insists on a more narrow scope of teachings. Such contention reflects in today’s continuous debate on how to balance specialized teachings with broader perspectives of education. A specific example worth considering is the introduction of Philosophy of Science in the beginning of the century, which was implemented as mandatory course at the level of bachelor from the concern that the evermore specialization of teaching, which was seen from the 70’s up until today, were too narrow-minded and only eyeing own disciplines (Christensen 2005: 45). In this respect, the objective of Philosophy of Science became to bridge specialized teaching of different fields with a greater perspective that enables openness to different disciplines in between. Thus, although specialized knowledge is argued to have been given the upper hand on behalf of general studies of philosophy, we find with the introduction of Philosophy of Science a re-constellation of Artes liberales, which seeks to form broader perspectives and more holistic understanding.

The balance between specialized teachings and broader perspectives of education leads on to a second inadequacy or limitation of the scope of governing, which we are able to detect in the traditions of the German- and Anglo-Saxon approach. On the one hand, I will argue that the German tradition sets up a ‘normative’ yet broad form of governing that is based on certain ideals of, let’s say, ‘freedom with responsibilities’ (Oettingen in: Ortmann 2015: 12:43-13.10). In daily practices, we find such form of governing in the relation that individuals are inclined to create with their co-workers, whether it be students, or professors in between. Let us take the perspective of students for instance: Here we find cooperative networks, collective exams and group work, which offer processes of astonishment, frustrations and openness that illustrates a current example on how personal maturation merges with education in Humboldtian ideals of ‘bildung’ (Wiberg 2011: 59). The supplement of an Anglo-Saxon tradition that seek to install a
detailed- and target management, on the other hand, is reflected in individual
exams, or at the very least, individual defenses, as the general procedures where
grading is weighted as the predominant response. This form of examination
relates to an Anglo-Saxon tradition insofar it is a way of testing and quantifying
the acquisition of knowledge and competencies. In return, statistics on allocation
of grades are available for the student to margin her own performance and from
this information assess the return on invested hours of study and the overall
performance, which is likewise in line with the utilitarian logic and an economic
rationale of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

As we see from these examples, we are able to unravel, if not more or less direct
continuities, than at least relics of both a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition in
daily practices of the universities. What these examples also disclose is a co-
existence of the two traditions that supplement in daily practices with respect to
the relation between form and content and different levels of accepted governing.
Although the two traditions of a German- and Anglo-Saxon approach may be
presented as opposition, the examples laid out in the analysis show simultaneous
practices, which might lead one to question whether this traditionally thought- of
opposition has reached a point of inadequacy?
In responding to the inquiry of the ways in which the university is traditionally being discussed and practiced, the analysis has shown how political measures of encouraging certain ‘preparedness’ for the labor has propelled the debate of present practices of universities: On the one hand, the analysis engaged in the arguments of those who advocate for a better balance between education and the labor market by supporting a more labor-oriented approach in the teachings at universities. On the other hand, the analysis has likewise voiced proponents, who argue that these political measures obstruct intellectual immersion of the formation of independent outlooks. From these discussions, the following analytical conclusions can be added:

1. The analysis has established that the university is traditionally being discussed and practiced within the margins of a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition: Whereas the former aspires institutional autonomy, individual independency and the ideals of ‘bildung’, the latter is characterized by seeking utilitarian- and economic purposes.

2. While the distinction between a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition is presented with an antithetic relation with one another, the analysis has raised the question of whether their oppositions can be problematized as proposing different responses to the question of the frugality of the state:

3. That is inasmuch the German tradition seeks to confine the influence of governing through legislative means of securing institutional autonomy and an ability of ‘own reasoning’, while the Anglo-Saxon tradition imitates an economic discourse and a free market logic that seeks to maximize the outcome of learning with respect to whatever may be the most utilitarian knowledge at a given point in time.

4. By these emphases, the analysis has questioned the historical contestation between a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition by bringing them together in a game of truth and error in defining the true kernel of liberalism.
CHAPTER 4: THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY
4.1 THE PROPOSAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITIES

In the recent years the ‘entrepreneurial universities’ have insisted on a discussion of its concept and practice in continental Europe. Although entrepreneurial universities have existed for decades within the United States, it is a rather newly emerging phenomenon in a European setting, where it in return has been given a great endorsement of higher institutions such as the European Commission. Consider, as an example, the propositions of following statement, proposed by the European Commission in a press release from 2013:

“European higher education systems increasingly have to change the way they operate due to the revolution in information and communication technologies, the financial crisis, global competition and pressure on budgets. One of the most significant changes in response to these challenges has been the development, both in concept and practice, of the ‘entrepreneurial university’” (EC 2013).

The position encapsulated in the statement ‘European higher education systems increasingly have to change’ followed by the proposal of entrepreneurial universities ‘as a significant response’ certainly implies a problem with the hitherto conduct of universities. While the entrepreneurial university is accentuated as a significant prospective response, the emergence of a new form of conduct likewise indicates an inadequacy of prior practices, which we have become familiar with as the oppositions between German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions. For those reasons, in what follows, I will engage in the inquiry of how the entrepreneurial university demarcates from this antithetic relation.

In doing so, I suggest that we examine three key aspects through which we can elucidate how the entrepreneurial university seeks to problematize the terms of hitherto discussions and practices. These aspects being the forms of acquired knowledge, relations of tutelage and the autonomy of the subject.

4.2 THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE

Strong patenting innovation has been vocalized within heavy industrial and technological fields for years: Attending to research and the development of new technologies in close cooperation with industries, fields of natural sciences are serving as a prime example on how to conduct innovative research that are likewise beneficial for specific business and consequently, likewise in the interest of the State. Prime examples are found within pharmaceutical or engineering fields where there exists a strong tradition and mutual willingness to enter cooperation projects and shared terms of employment.

Although it is arguable that the government paradoxically struggles to set an innovative example, we are able to read a political aspiration of bringing this logic
and spirit of enterprise to various creative and social fields of universities\(^1\) (UFM 2012: 6). In this respect innovation and entrepreneurship has escaped its narrow and technological connotations and resulted in dispersing into concepts such as commercial innovation, economic innovation, and innovation within pedagogics, management and even design.

Succeeding in such widening of the concept and practices of innovation, the development of universities is presented as a significant and strategic event:

> “Higher educational institutions are paramount in ensuring increased innovation with broad and flexible frames. Such achievement should be obtained by developing the content and form of education, new learning goals and preparation as well as new forms of examination that substantiates the development of innovative competencies and key professional competencies” (free translation, UFM 2012: 26).

Besides indicating the need for developing universities in order to substantiate broader political aspirations of innovation, the statement likewise captures compatible relations between broader flexible frames and key professional competencies.

Pursuing such a proposition we find, on one hand, aspirations of fostering students’ ability of thinking ‘creatively, innovatively and supporting a multi-faceted developing of their personality’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 26). Thinking innovatively requires the ability to think differently, which further requires certain modalities of openness, curiosity and creativity accommodated by multi-faceted personalities. It is not solely a question of being able to do things by-the-book as this would simply lead to a practice of repetition but rather, it is a question of being able to think in a new way, which obviously includes curiosity to test and question already established orders and decided-upon knowledge. Education then comes to entail a certain personal scope, which is sought to be facilitated through broad and flexible structures that are considered adequate for the maturation of creative and polyvalent identities. What we are getting a hold of, I would argue, is the modality of the entrepreneurial student, which features specific personal resources and a particular way of approaching the experience of education.

However, in spite of the concern for a process of personal maturation through education, the utilitarian purpose of the entrepreneurial university is unmistakable. The very definition of innovation from the Innovation Strategy 2012 implies a fundamental utilitarian premise given that:

> “Innovation is knowledge and ideas that are converted into products and processes, which creates business related and societal value” (free translation, UFM 2012: 2).

\(^1\) A political platform identifying areas for strategic government investment inarguably reveals an inadequacy of thinking the entrepreneurial university beyond the field of natural science (FIVU 2013).
When considering the proposed definition of innovation, it differentiates from its traditional etymological origin by further encompassing prevailing enterprising aspirations. In its original etymology, innovation, simply suggest the introduction of a change to something already established. However, in the presented quote we see how innovation is directly linked to a converging of ideas into actions that creates business related and societal value, consequently merging innovation with an enterprising- and growth rationale. Thus within the setting of the entrepreneurial university, innovation and enterprise appear to be two sides of the same coin, in which it is difficult to separate the two imperatives from one another.

Converging with such persuasion, certain innovation skills ranked alongside professional and practical competencies figure as high priorities when wishing to ensure that:

“[…] substantial investments in research, innovation and education are, to a higher degree than today, converted into growth and job-creation in the private sector” (free translation, UFM 2012: 2).

Adopting the tenet of a Triple Helix model, universities are urged to take an entrepreneurial course in order to ensure that the ventures of governments are paid off and converted into utilitarian research and education, which, as a return on investments, results in economic growth and job-creations. Resting upon a laissez-faire principal of seeking to maximize the outcome of learning in terms of its conversion-value, the entrepreneurial university likewise imitates an economic discourse by accommodating the acquisition of skills and competencies of whatever may the most useful in the market at a given point in time.

Although the vicissitude of the market logically would direct ones attention at the inconsistency with teachings of specific bound skills, this problem seems obliged by an understanding of education as a life-long exercise that stretches beyond just a few years of study:

“It requires a strong professionalism and continuous update of knowledge to be able to contribute to processes of innovation. The competencies of employees should be strengthened through regular education, further training, development of competencies or workplace training that prepares the employees for an inclusion in decision processes and innovative courses” (free translation, UFM 2012: 25).

Considered in this context, we see how the cultivation of certain modalities of openness, curiosity, and creativity come together with utilitarian purposes by ensuring continuous acquisitions of new knowledge and new skills. The line of arguing being that, to maintain innovative competencies, it requires a receptiveness and eagerness to pursue new knowledge. However in reverse, to be truly innovative it requires the ability of converting knowledge into ‘growth and job-creation within the private sector’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 2).
When relating these propositions to previously identified terms under which the university is being discussed and practiced, there clearly exist continuities as well as discontinuities of both the German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions. In terms of continuities to a German tradition, there is primarily a concern for the fostering of certain modalities of openness, curiosity and creativity through the course of education, which, in contrary, opposes the Anglo-Saxon tradition of not interfering in aspects of personal formation. However, as we have seen, this concern for a personal maturation is pronounced simultaneously with-, and even overshadowed by, a wish of teaching specific and transferable skills that can be converted into specific societal value.

Hence, though the acquisition of knowledge within enterprising universities breaks with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of viewing ‘understanding’ as an ascending linear movement, the modality of ‘openness’ only holds valid insofar innovative aspirations demand a simultaneous and continuous learning and \(_n\)-learning of utilitarian competencies and skills. Thus, although the aspiration of exercising certain personal capacities may not be completely assimilated to the utilitarian perspective of acquiring professional and applicable skills, it may perfectly be reconciled under the mark of an economic rationale. From such consideration the ideal of Kantian rational beings in the modality of entrepreneurship fuse together with \textit{homo economicus} who seek to maximize own means of utility and hence, crosses the previous epistemological obstacle of viewing these propositions as belonging to two antithetic traditions of a German- and Anglo-Saxon approach. It is a complete rethinking of the terms under which we define the conduct of universities that reorganizes the previous antithetic imperatives of economy and reason by merging in the modality of entrepreneurship.

In what follows I will move on to consider the relations of tutelage and further, the interactions in which learning is acquired within the domain of entrepreneurship.

4.3 RELATIONS OF TUTELAGE

As already briefly touched upon, the entrepreneurial university constitutes a significant corner stone of the Triple Helix model, which seeks to advance innovation through a cross-sectional cooperation between government, academia and industries. While the Innovation Strategy 2012, definitely bears resemblances to the convictions of the Triple Helix model, the strategy stresses the cooperation between universities and industries as being particularly productive. Consider in this regard the three key areas for increasing the Danish innovation capacity:
“The Innovation Strategy emphasizes three areas:

1. Societal challenges shall drive innovation: The demand for solutions on specific societal challenges should be prioritized by the public innovation initiatives

2. More knowledge shall be converted into value: Focus on mutual exchange of knowledge between businesses and knowledge-institutions and more efficient innovation agreements

3. Educations have to increase their innovation capacity: A cultural change in the educational system with more focus on innovation” (free translation, UFM 2012: 8).

Considering all three points together, it is clear that knowledge, and particularly an innovative form of knowledge, should emerge from a mutual cooperation between industries and academia. Besides ensuring the right framework conditions of such cooperation through e.g. political measures (such as the Innovation Strategy itself) or, the right prioritization of public investments, the State appears to have very little aspiration of influencing the content of teaching of universities, which rather is to be decreed by the market. While the industry appears to be exempted from pervasive changes, the academic sphere is viewed as the greatest hindrance, hence urging universities to undertake a cultural change with respect to fostering a certain innovative nature or, a certain spirit of enterprise.

If academia is to undertake a cultural change, it is, according to the Innovation Strategy, at best something to be cultivated by opening up towards the surrounding labor market and becoming more susceptible to its dynamics in terms of both practice and theory. Treating the market as a site of veridiction, universities are to adopt a quasi-market rationale and direct their teaching according to where there is a utilitarian demand of the labor market. In doing so, the relations of tutelage between professors and students and their interaction with the surrounding labor market, appear as significant means in forming bearers of an enterprising change of universities.

Considering, at first, the role of the student, they are featured as constituting a significant and hitherto ‘inactivated’ resource:

“The student should be activated and put into play as an independent resource that can strengthen the connection between knowledge-institutions and businesses” (free translation, UFM 2012: 23).

Through greater cooperation between students and companies with respect to examinations, study related papers and internships, the students are to promote the advancement of innovation and enterprise within their respective educational programs as well as within their own specific educations (UFM 2012: 23; 27). Rather than treating students as entirely passive entities, the enterprising university aspires an activation of the students from the contention that they
possess a significant potential of bridging between their educational institutions and the surrounding labor market. By giving the students co-responsibility in converting acquired knowledge into specific value, the entrepreneurial university wishes to foster conscientious students that take responsibility for their own learning and understanding instead of merely relying on institutional directions of universities (UFM 2012: 26).

Such milieu, however, requires managerial responsibilities, where students ‘to a larger degree than today, are educated by professors who have the right competencies to structure and develop tuition that enhances innovative skills’ (free translation, UFM 2012: 27). As a response, the Innovation Strategy suggest that this is achievable through:

“[…] attractive carrier paths and increased recognition of researchers, professors and other employees, who, through their work, support a more innovative student, a greater conversion of knowledge and a closer cooperation with the business life and authorities” (free translation, UFM 2012: 24).

The logics of the statement certainly reflect a carrier-driven and acknowledging mode of motivation, which we are perhaps most familiar with today within the private sector.

From such considerations what is at stake is not merely new innovative collaborations between academia and industries, but a break with the traditional professor-student relationship, in which industries becomes the new conductor which both students as well as professors are expected to cooperate with. Relations of tutelage then become more flux in which students are asked to take a greater responsibility of converting their educational skills into concrete value and where professors are encouraged to enter cooperative collaborations with students in respect to specific and practical challenges of businesses (UFM 2012: 24). However, subsequent to the prevailing utilitarian purpose of converting knowledge into specific- and even commercial value, we find relations of tutelage that advocate for an independent guidance rather than strictly relying on the training of superiors and further, an understanding of learning as a process which comes through practical research rather than teachings of agreed-upon bits of knowledge, encapsulated in a certain curriculum-thinking. By these emphases we see how a new relation of tutelage emerges within the entrepreneurial setting which is neither a direct extension a German tradition nor an Anglo-Saxon tradition. Rather the two traditions merge in a complex resolution that in first instance secures utilitarian objectives through a close corporation with the labor market and only hereafter, cultivates a personal maturation through practical research under own guidance.

This brings us to the question of the autonomy of the subject and the significance education is ascribed in terms of the subject.
“We are at the crossroad of a global readjustment. The global middle class is growing. More and more people are educated; they have a better health and are given possibilities of living a better life. For the millions of people who now have possibilities, which their parents did not have, it is, of course, a happy narrative of a more resourceful world” (free translation, UFM 2012: 3).

The blissful narrative found within the preface of the Innovation Strategy tells us that the increased ability of educating oneself links to a certain liberty of possibilities, which previous generations were not necessarily given. In this, education links to a certain form of occupational emancipation from which the individual through education is able to break free from pre-determined paths of profession. Meanwhile the innovative mind-set, which we have seen aspired within enterprising universities, entails the idea of thinking free and breaking with what we already know. It encourages the courage of thinking independently and differently and, a tenacity of spirit in order to persistently continue in the face of all odds. Education then becomes a significant milestone in reaching the liberty of pursuing one’s own dreams, in which individuals are given the means of actualizing themselves as independent pieces of enterprise.

To evaluate this aspiration of liberation we might simply compare its intelligibility and understanding with the alternative accounts of a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition. As we have seen the two traditions responds quite different to the question of the frugality of the state. While the German tradition seeks to limit the state through the constitutive right of man, the Anglo-Saxon tradition responds to the question by instating the market as the limits of the state. As for the case of what we could perhaps denote as an entrepreneurial path to liberation, we find, however, both continuities and discontinuities to each traditions. Though the Kantian ‘pursuit of truth’ which was to be secured through institutional autonomy may be disputed by the labor market as a new conductor, we find a similar concern of installing ‘man’ with all his potential, his own reason and possibilities of self-actualization as the true kernel to liberalism. On the other hand, a quasi-economic rationale of being opportunistic and mastering of one's own fate, breaking free of predetermined paths and maximizing one's own potential likewise prevails within the entrepreneurial setting. Bringing these considerations together, the question of liberation within the entrepreneurial setting lies within the potential of man, who is offered the promise of liberty insofar he is able to treat himself as an artifact of enterprise that only has his own limits of thinking innovatively as a restraint. The task of governing in this respect becomes reduced to an ensuring, sustaining, and improving the possibilities of each and every one in which education appears as an essential technique (Foucault 1988: 67).
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial movement of liberty of endless possibilities reaches further than the individualistic project of self-actualization insofar it is also a way of acting as one part of a collective. Pursuing such inauguration, we are able to read in direct continuation of the happy narrative of the before-mentioned statement that the increase of wealth on a global scale also generates challenges:

“A high population growth and an increased consumption create an increasing pressure on our environment, sparse resources and our raw material. Economies with a high growth are meanwhile also given a higher significance. New markets and partners generate new sources of knowledge and investments. This results in an intensified competition and a higher pressure on companies and employees to constantly innovate, develop and improve themselves” (free translation, UFM 2012: 3).

Facing the challenges of increased pressure on the environment as well as intensified competition, the Innovation Strategy approaches the question of how to collectively handle these challenges in new and innovative ways. From the contention that government alone cannot solves these problems, the strategy calls out for strong minds and innovative solutions in which universities come into play as key in overcoming these challenges:

“With the recent years loss of Danish industrial workplaces there is a need for creating a better coherence across knowledge, innovation and productions and in between knowledge institutions and companies with production” (free translation, UFM 2012: 21).

In doing so, the Innovation Strategy clearly formulates the necessity to create a milieu in which individuals find it attractive to involve in the possibilities of society by larger, and later within ones place of employment (UFM 2012: 26). Such societal outlook, or even modality of responsibility, should already be fostered within the educational establishment in terms of thinking innovatively and problem-solving about the general challenges of society. The individualistic emancipation through education is, thus, turned into the liberty of responsible citizens insofar it starts to re-think the ways in which it is possible to act as one part of a collective.

Considering these points brought together, we find a fusion between the enterprising projects of the subject with the innovative empowerment of the society: All the innate and acquired skills, talents and capacities that the enterprising subjects compromise are mobilized as human capital as the strongest means in ensuring the prosperity of the future (Statsministeriet 2011: 16). For the individual, education thus ensures ‘employment, higher wages and better opportunities’, while a higher educational level of the population ‘forms the fundamnet for the development of the entire society’ (Statsministeriet 2011: 16). While the interest of the individual comes strikingly close to the interest of the State, we find a form of neo-liberal governing that seeks to minimize exterior
governing by setting up an entrepreneurial modality that corresponds to the interest of the populations’ wealth and well-being.

Pursuing such perspective of neo-liberalism, we may see how the individual quest for emancipation is resolved under the mark of a market rationale insofar the market figures as an essential component, which, with its ‘natural’ mechanisms, compose an unbiased and liberated site of veridiction for falsifying or verifying the measures, which government takes and the rules it imposes. Here liberation becomes a question of minimizing exterior governing from the contention that the susceptible and enterprising individual is at best left alone as an ‘object of laissez-faire’ whose entrepreneurial aspirations will in the end also foster the strength of the State (Foucault 2004: 270). From such contention the well-being and liberty of the entrepreneurial subjects fuses with the care of the economy, in which social and fiscal rationalities become mutually reinforcing.

However, although the neo-liberal path to individual emancipation is sought through the constraint of exterior governing, it would be incorrect to mistake such individual latitude as insignificant or even detached from that of governing: Rather the will of the entrepreneurial subject converges with the interest of the State as an ‘incidental plus’ within a market rationale, where governors and governed almost figure as ‘simultaneous actors of a drama that they perform in common’ (Foucault 2014: 14). Put in other words, we find within the entrepreneurial setting a correlation between the general strength of the State, which benefits from the aspirations and free will of the entrepreneurial subject. Having these propositions in place, I suggest that what we are getting hold of is the transformation of neo-liberal form of governing, which works through the install of a moral domain of entrepreneurship in which a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to the entrepreneurial subject.

Having such inauguration in mind, I believe a relevant question to ask then become ‘how the moral domain of enterprise invites individuals to recognize- and reflect upon themselves as capable and accessible to a realm of entrepreneurship?’ In what follows it is my intention to examine such inquiry by turning the analysis to the level of the subject and study the constitution of a certain morality of behaviors.
4.5 PROVISIONAL POINTS

The given analysis has been conducted to examine the ways in which the entrepreneurial university seeks to problematize the terms under which the university is traditionally being discussed and practiced. With this inquiry in mind, the analysis has been conducted as to examine the ways in which the entrepreneurial university destabilizes the traditional distinction between German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions and examine the ways in which elements of each tradition comes together in a particular way within the entrepreneurial universities. From this examination, I suggest that the following analytical points can be added to the study:

1. While the entrepreneurial university reorganizes the previous antithetic imperatives of economy and reason in the modality of entrepreneurship, the analysis has suggested that, although, the Kantian rational being may not be completely assimilated with the notion of *homo economicus*, it certainly reconciles under the mark of an economic rationale within the entrepreneurial university. Such conclusion is reached from the observation that although the acquisition of knowledge within enterprising universities breaks with utilitarian imperatives of viewing ‘understanding’ as an ascending linear movement, ‘own reason’ and questioning of acquired knowledge only holds valid insofar innovative aspirations demand a simultaneous and continuous learning and *re-*learning of *utilitarian* competencies and skills.

2. Moreover, since the entrepreneurial university is neither a direct extension of a German- nor an Anglo-Saxon tradition, the analysis has suggested that the emergence of the entrepreneurial university questions the hitherto antithetic relation by bringing elements of each traditions into a meaningful cohesion in which a market rationale appear to have been given the upper hand. Hence, the entrepreneurial university emerges as a complex resolution in which utilitarian objectives are first and foremost secured through a close corporation with the labor market and where secondly, the concern of personal maturation is cultivated through practical research under own guidance.

3. Finally, although the analysis has suggested that the entrepreneurial university problematizes the previous terms under which the university has been discussed and practiced, it likewise share a mutual concern for the question *liberalism*. By viewing the entrepreneurial university as an expression of a greater transformation of *neo-liberalism*, we have seen how the market compose an unbiased and liberated site of veridiction in which the will of the entrepreneurial subject spontaneously converges with the interest of the State. The analysis has, thus, given rise to an examination of the how the entrepreneurial university sets up a moral domain of recommended rules and
actions for the subjects to undertake when entering into a neo-liberal game of balancing between liberties and governing.
CHAPTER 5: THE MORALITY OF ENTREPRENEURS
5.1 MORALITY OF BEHAVIORS

As previous analysis has shown, the entrepreneurial university seeks to create a milieu or, what we could convey as a certain moral domain, in which the individuals’ aspiration of self-actualization complies with a development that also fosters the strength of the state. If such a proposition is regarded as valid, we see how the line between governed and governor is diminishing within the entrepreneurial setting. This consequently obviates any conventional analysis of the possession of power and suppression by rules. Instead it is my contention that it becomes much more pertinent to ask, how ‘things’ – in this case, how innovation and enterprise within the entrepreneurial university – have entered a game of truth and error, and come to compose a moral domain of recommended values, rules and actions, in which individuals are capable of recognizing themselves and others as accessible to the experiences of innovation and enterprise?

In doing so, I suggest that we include Foucault’s suggestive pointer to which we are able to examine a certain ‘morality of behaviors’ within the entrepreneurial university. These aspects being 1) the aspects of the ethical substance, 2) modes of subjection, 3) the ethical work and finally 4) the aspired telos.

5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTREPRENEUR

How can society foster more entrepreneurs? (CBS 2015).

When considering the proposed question, we find an ambiguity in the tension between society and the individual. While the question features an interest of society, it likewise reveals aspirations of fostering certain individualities. By these propositions, a particular interest in getting to know the entrepreneur at the level of individuality appears to better understand how to develop and foster this particular type of entity. The question posed is found on the CBS Entrepreneurial Platform, hence the following analysis will take point of departure within this specific setting in which nine professors and lecturers have invited each other to enter a discussion of the notion ‘entrepreneurship’.

Reflecting upon the quest to get-to-know the entrepreneur, Toke Reichstein, Professor at the Department of Innovation and Organization inserts:

“Multiple research streams (psychology, sociology, economics, neurobiology, etc.) have found the entrepreneur interesting and worth studying” (Reichsten 2015).

Several disciplines have been preoccupied with an identification of the prime material that constitutes the entrepreneurial individual. Whether it be a specific mentality, certain psychological traits or even, a specific set of genetic
propositions. In what follows I intend to propose an examination of the ethical substance, in which individuals direct their attention, when wanting to conduct themselves with respect to the prescriptive morality of entrepreneurship (Foucault 1992: 26).

Noticing the search for a certain set of genetic dispositions, Ulrich Kaiser, Guest lecturer at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics, inaugurates:

“Research has not been able to show that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs differ genetically. It has, however, been shown that they differ in terms of their personal traits. Most importantly, entrepreneurs have a lot of passion for their businesses and are willing to make a big sacrifice to get their business up and running” (Kaiser 2015).

As we see from the included statement, Kaiser dismisses the idea of ascribing a certain entrepreneurial spirit to a certain pool of genetic propositions. Rather he suggests that the entrepreneur possesses compelling enthusiasm of passion, which shows as a characteristic feature of their personalities. Asma Fattoum, Assistant professor at the Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics, somewhat submits to such a view when elaborating that entrepreneurs are ‘passionate, creative and determined’ persons (Fattoum 2015). However, Fattoum inserts a caution towards the excessive passion and determination, which is often praised as positive features. According to Fattoum such characteristics ‘may reflect other cognitive biases such as high locus of control and over-optimism [which] may instead be sources of problems for the entrepreneur’ (Fattoum 2015).

By the emphases of Kaiser and Fattoum, we are presented with the idea of the entrepreneurial individual as a creative and enthusiastic person, whose passion for what he does instills a determination and tenacity that drives a high level of productivity but potentially also comes with dangers of over-optimism.

Others are, on the other hand, more hesitant towards defining specific characteristics of the individual entrepreneur. Such hesitance is amongst others vocalized by Ester Barinaga Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, whose own take is to ‘restrain from identifying entrepreneurship with a single individual and instead focus on the process of coordinating efforts to create, materialize or set in motion a particular idea” (Barinaga 2015).

Barinaga’s proposal of shifting focus from the traits of entrepreneurs to the process of entrepreneurship is substantiated by Thilde Langevang, Associate professor at the Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, who elaborates:

“It has proven difficult to determine the key characteristics or personality traits of entrepreneurs. It could be argued that not too much effort should be put into trying to answer this question since much entrepreneurial activity is not being enacted by isolated individuals but by groups of people, organizations and communities. Instead of focusing so much on the individual entrepreneur and
his/her traits I support the move towards focusing on the process of entrepreneurship, its features, the various factors that influence it, and the types of value created” (Langevæng 2015).

From such a proposition, we see how being an entrepreneur cannot stand alone in its singularity but is dependent on surrounding circumstances such as collaborators, offered opportunities and timing. Following this line of arguing, being an entrepreneur appears to be a question of acting as one part of a collective rather than a particular type of personality with its own set of originalities. When shifting focus to the process of entrepreneurship, Langevæng further argues that we are able to reach a comprehension of the entrepreneur that breaks with the glorification and mystification of ‘hero individuals’ who are out of reach of our disentanglement:

“In my view, it is important that the concept of entrepreneurship is not delimited to the activities of hero individuals who introduce radical innovations to the market, but also include the more mundane undertaking of a variety of actors. Most entrepreneurship research has focused on business elites in the global North while there has been a tendency to ignore or disregard the entrepreneurial activities of ‘ordinary people’” (Langevæng 2015).

Encapsulated in the statements of ‘more mundane undertaking’ and ‘activities of ordinary people’ is an indication of an everyday trajectory of entrepreneurship that de-mystifies the elitist and enigmatic connotations that entrepreneurship often brings to our minds. Such a proposition is somewhat substantiated by Barinaga who argues that such ‘view moves entrepreneurship away from a strictly business definition’, which allows for a decomposition of the word entrepreneurship to the French word ‘entreprendre’, simply meaning to set in motion or to initiate, whether it be comprehensive and revolutionary, modest and mundane, business related or culturally connected (Barinaga 2015). Hence according to Barinaga, entrepreneurship simply is the ‘process of planning, organizing and implementing efforts to create and innovate within any sphere (may this be social, cultural, economic, digital…’)’ (Barinaga 2015) and further, a ‘process that starts with turning problems into opportunities, and then exploiting these opportunities by combining required resources, knowledge and people’ (Fattoum 2015).

Bringing these considerations together, one can relate the individual aspects of the practice of entrepreneurship to the observations of passion, creativity and determination in the very acts one accomplishes. On the other hand, one can also relate the collective aspects of the practice of entrepreneurship to the observation of opportunistic processes of planning, initiating and implementing in creative and innovative ways. What we are getting hold of is a certain margin of variation that ranges from the level of individuality to the level of collectivity. However, what brings these elements together is a certain entrepreneurial attitude or even, a certain entrepreneurial spirit (Fattoum 2015), cultivated within individuals and fostered through collective processes. Thus, when viewing the ethical substance as a
certain mind-set or attitude, which individuals are encouraged to direct their attention to, when wanting to conduct themselves in compliance with the prescriptive morality of entrepreneurship, the course of entrepreneurial education appears as a specific technique through which ‘the individual establishes a relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice’ (Foucault 1992: 27). Within this setting ‘students can learn and experience to think like entrepreneurs’, as Wolfgang Sofka, Associate professor at the Department of Strategic Management and Globalization, remarks, since universities ‘can provide opportunities and knowledge for students who decide for themselves whether they want to become entrepreneurs’ (Sofka 2015).

Having such line of arguing in mind, I suggest we move on to an examination of the university as a setting in which the individual establishes a relation to the domain of enterprise and recognizes himself as obliged or, at the very least, capable of putting such imperatives into practice.

5.3 HOW TO FOSTER ENTREPRENEURS?

As previously discussed, we find today a continuous debate on how to balance between specialized teachings and broader perspectives of education. Meanwhile we find a parallel discussion of whether innovation and entrepreneurship are best fostered within frames of autonomous and disconnected research or, in tune with the surrounding actuality of obstacles and demands. In what follows I intend to examine, with these propositions in mind, how specific teachings, practices and techniques are adopted within the entrepreneurial university as to invite individuals to establish a relation to themselves in which they are capable of recognizing themselves as accessible to a realm of enterprise. Such examination thus compose the inspection of the second aspect, mode of subjection, which concerns practices and techniques through which ‘the individual establishes a relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice’ (Foucault 1992: 27)

Picking up on previous analysis, Kaiser acknowledge that universities ‘cannot really change personal traits’ (Kaiser 2015). He argues: ‘what we can do, however, is endow students with the skills that facilitate becoming and – more importantly – being an entrepreneur. (Kaiser 2015). Exemplifying such skills, Kaiser propose that students:

“ […] clearly need to learn how to write a business plan. They also need to acquire more mundane skills like accounting, which most people with traits discussed above [e.g. being passionate and having a huge amount of tenacity] would disregard. Knowledge about human resource management will also help, as will courses in strategy. Most importantly perhaps, however, is that students learn how to express themselves orally and in writing” (Kaiser 2015).
As we see, the featured skills and knowledge all serve utilitarian objectives insofar they compose applicable measures that are directly transferable to practical purposes. Thus, the acquisition of such skills requires a specialization of teachings to prepare the students to enter vocations of business development, accounting and resource management. However, although all of the abovementioned skills have utilitarian purposes relating them to the field of specialization, both Kaiser and Anders Sørensen, Professor at the Department of Economics, endorse American Edward Lazear’s ‘Jacks-of-all-Trades’ theory, which argues that ‘entrepreneurs must be jacks-of-all-trades who need not excel in any one skill but are competent in many’, consequently arguing that while entrepreneurs should be generalists, wageworkers should be specialists (Lazear 2005: 46). Encouraging such disposition, Sørensen argues:

“To be successful, entrepreneurs need both theoretical skills obtained through schooling and practical skills acquired through wagework. In other words, formal schooling and wagework experience are complementary types of human capital for entrepreneurs” (Sørensen 2015).

What the quote in question seems to imply is a margin of differentiation in the techniques and practices through which the individual established a relationship to himself as an entrepreneur: On one hand schooling acts as a specific technique through which students are endowed with the right set of field-dispersed knowledge with the aim of furnishing an understanding of the ‘necessary techniques, methods and tools to be able to orchestrate, plan, manage and effectively combine resources, knowledge and people in order to successfully implement the project’ (Fattoum 2015). Thus, schooling composes a disciplinary technique of training, which encourages certain forms of behavior by generating the necessary strengths for individuals to realize themselves as entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, practical skills acquired through wagework can, as Sofka remarks ‘provide learning environments in which students can immerse themselves in an entrepreneurial experience without exposing themselves’ (Sofka 2015). Internships, collaborative thesis and research thus stand as specific practices in which students can explore themselves through entrepreneurial experiences and establish a relation to the sphere of entrepreneurship. Within these collaborative matrices, certain imperatives of organizing and producing meaning are offered the students – not as external determination – but as an experience that allows the formation of an entrepreneurial opinion.

These two types of skills acquired through field-dispersed knowledge and practical experiences, thus, together combine a pedagogic that seeks to ‘push the student to experiment with new ideas, that encourage her to discuss and test them, that foster looking out for partners and that contribute to frame and strengthen collaborations’ (Barinaga 2015). While the course of education does not stand as a determining and rigorous path to entrepreneurship, it certainly imposes entrepreneurial imperatives for the individual to experiment with. With a kind of
built-in-mechanism, the entrepreneurial domain, hence, has ‘refusal’ as a vital component, making its workings tolerable and encouraging rather than impeding. From such perspective, education then composes a certain technique that – imbued with certain aspirations of shaping the entrepreneurial individual – endows individuals with the right set of capacities and experience to effect, through their own means, a set of entrepreneurial operations.

However, while certain skills can be fostered within the frames of universities, several of the consulted professors and lecturers point at certain traits and characteristics of the entrepreneur, which cannot simply be taught. Returning to the quote of Wolfgang Sofka, universities ‘can [only] provide opportunities and knowledge for students who decide for themselves whether they want to become entrepreneurs’ (Sofka 2015). Pursuing such linkage between provided opportunities and knowledge at universities with the personal decision of wanting to become an entrepreneur leads to an examination of ethical work that individuals perform upon themselves in order to bring their conduct in compliance with certain entrepreneurial imperatives in order to transform themselves as true entrepreneurs.

5.4 THE ETHICS OF ‘RISK’

Returning to the question posed, asking ‘What characterizes an entrepreneur as an individual?’, William B. Gartner, Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, brings an interesting perspective which might turn productive when understanding the relation between the ‘entrepreneur’ as an identity and the personal decision of wanting to become an entrepreneur. When responding to the question, Gartner commences:

“The question assumes an essentialist perspective on individuals that differentiates people based on who and what they are, rather than what they do. A ‘process perspective’ would see that someone who plays soccer is a soccer player, and when they aren’t playing soccer they are not soccer players. Identity is transitory, depending on action rather than being. Entrepreneurship involves actions, that, at some point, end, and people become something else” (Gartner 2015).

From such propositions, Gartner contests essentialist perspectives of entrepreneurs as a fundamental and ontological category of being, which some individuals belong to while others do not. Rather the citation of Gartner brings us to an elaboration of the ethical work, which entrepreneurs performs on themselves in order to bring their conduct into compliance with entrepreneurial imperatives in aspiration of becoming a true entrepreneur. Hence, although the entrepreneurial subject can partly be cultivated through external circumstances in which he recognizes himself as accessible to a realm of enterprise, the cultivation of the entrepreneur – as a state of mind – is essentially a process of asceticism; a
self-training and determination of arranging, adjusting and modifying one's action so that they reflect an entrepreneurial mode of being that serve as a moral goal. Consequently, Gartner contests, that to be an entrepreneur is not simply an essentialist proposition; rather he remarks ‘identity is transitory’, which implies a perspective that emphasizes actions prior to being. From such perspective being an entrepreneur, hence, becomes conditioned by:

“[…] those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria” (Foucault 1992: 10-11).

By these emphases, to become an entrepreneur encompasses a practical- and action-oriented activity that promotes the individual’s ability to ‘delimit that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, define his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decide on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal’ (Foucault 1992: 28). As suggested in previous analysis on the determination of the ethical substance, we see how the process of becoming an entrepreneur, thus, requires a cultivation of a certain attitude or spirit of mind that seeks possibilities in situations where others see challenges and further, a mindset that seize opportunities with passion and determination.

While the course of education is composed of a certain technique that endows the individual the right set of skills to effect entrepreneurial operations, several of the consulted professors and lecturers point at a specific part of the entrepreneurial mindset, which cannot be taught at universities. This being the ‘huge amount of tenacity’, that prevent entrepreneurial subjects from giving up as ‘soon as they encounter the first set-back’ (Kaiser 2015). Reflecting upon this, Gartner elaborates:

“What is under-appreciated about this phenomenon [entrepreneurship] is that the likelihood of successfully organizing is less than 30% of all attempts. So, the experience of entrepreneurship most likely involves failing. Entrepreneurship, then, is primarily about having things go wrong more often than not. Education tends to be about ‘right answers’ while entrepreneurial processes are about trying and not having things worked out. Success is the wrong metric for entrepreneurship education” (Gartner 2015).

Although Gartner’s statement might imply an inherent critique of the educational premise of searching for the ‘right answer’, it likewise indicates that the cultivation of an entrepreneurial attitude through failure is a solitary activity, which only the individual can undertake for herself. Such proposition is substantiated by Sofka who states that ‘certain characteristics are not teachable’ exemplifying with the ability to accept risk (Sofka 2015). While, as Sofka argues, universities can facilitate a learning environment in which the students can test themselves in entrepreneurial experiences without putting themselves at risk, the process of shaping a willingness to take risks, to seize opportunities where others see dangers
and to proceed with determination and tenacity when the prospects should set the warning bells ringing, is a position that only the individual can take. Hence we see how the acceptance of risks features a ‘self-activity’ in which one takes a deliberate position, not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into an entrepreneur (Foucault 1992: 27).

From such proposition, it is my contention that the specific feature of ‘risk’ brings us to the very heart of the distinction between morality and ethics, which Foucault insisted on. While ‘entrepreneurship’ compose a moral imperative of aspired actions, values and behavior, ‘risk’ crystalizes the transition from morality to ethics insofar it relates to the work one performs on oneself in order to become an entrepreneur. Adding to such point, Sofka argues that the decision of becoming an entrepreneur expediently belongs to the sphere of ethics rather than the directives of moral since ‘schools and universities would be ill-advised to push students into entrepreneurship, given the substantial failure rates’ (Sofka 2015).

5.5 EMANICIPATING PROMISES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Up until now, several analytical points have been brought to the analysis: From the personal traits of the entrepreneur to collective aspects of the practice of entrepreneurship and further; from the question of how to foster entrepreneurs to the ethical question of risk. In what follows, I shall try to bind together the proposed elements in an examination of the telos, which implies the mode of being and aspired ends that follows the moral domain of entrepreneurship. In doing so, I suggest that we return to the question of liberalism, which, as shown in previous analysis, composes a transcending aspiration of education.

Pursuing such perspective, Camilla Bartholdy, external lecturer of the Department of IT Management, suggests that the entrepreneur ‘is an individual who is driven by freedom to control his or her own life’ (Bartholdy 2015). The featuring of freedom is likewise voiced by Kaiser, who states that ‘the option of starting an own business gives people the option to be their own boss and do what they actually wish to do’ (Kaiser 2015). When considering the postulate of entrepreneurs seeking ‘the option to be their own boss’ and to ‘do what they actually wish to do’, we find a somewhat liberal imperative insofar the process of becoming an entrepreneur holds the promise of becoming master in one’s own house: To decide for oneself, to decide over oneself and further, to actualize oneself and one’s business as an independent piece of enterprise only having one’s own innovative abilities as a constraint. Thus, insofar entrepreneurship draws continuities to the liberal project of self-emancipation; we see how the ambitious aspiration of internal and independent agency legitimizes and facilitates the need for external and educational guidance, which acts to ‘free’ the subject.
However, while we have so far been preoccupied with the individual’s active decision of becoming an entrepreneur and further, with the tolerant and encouraging mode of entrepreneurship, these features of freedom cast a problematic light on those individuals who are not attracted by the emancipating promises of entrepreneurship:

“The call for self-emancipation […] implicitly allows for the possibility that those who have not emancipated themselves can be understood to lack their own agential capacity for choosing freedom and to require development through external agency to enable them to make better choices. The lack of freedom or autonomy is not due to external oppression or material deprivation, but a ‘sort of deficit of autonomy to oneself’” (Sandro Mezzadra et al. 2013: 71).

The inability, or even sluggishness, to build a gap between moral imperatives of entrepreneurship with ethical transformation of oneself then simply becomes an expression of laziness, inadequacy or a ‘sort of deficit of autonomy to oneself’ (Sandro Mezzadra et al. 2013: 71).

On the other hand, the quest for self-emancipation is not presented as merely being a self-centered act in aspiration of seeking to maximize one’s own means of utility but is, on the contrary, accompanied by aspirations of ‘making the world a better place’ (Kaiser 2015). The noble ambition of making the world a better place, ‘to make a difference in personal life and the lives of others’ (Bartholdy 2015) or as Gartner puts it in a slightly jagged tone; to find ‘a solution for mankind’s problems’ (Gartner 2015), implies a negation of the socio-politico status quo. Such negation, hence, comes with the responsibility of not only mobilizing one’s abilities in order to be master of one’s own fate but likewise to engage in a constructive critique of society and, ultimately, to contribute to an actualization of society’s full potential. This ability to upset status quo is likewise featured by several of the consulted professors and lecturers, whereof Reichstein, as an example, expresses that entrepreneurs challenge ‘status quo by being an engine for change, challenging the traditional and entrenched ways of operating and the habitual perception of reality’ (Reichsten 2015). When consulting the participating professors and lecturers of the importance of upsetting status quo – asking; what productive measures it might bring with it – the answers find an almost univocal tone. Here initiated by Sofka who replies:

“Entrepreneurship fills an important need in society to provide new solutions to problems which are not or insufficiently covered by the status quo. It allows societies to adjust and adapt to changing needs. Finding these new solutions in new organisations ensures that resources are used productively and efficiently” (Sofka 2015).

From the reflections of Sofka, we see how upsetting status quo links to a market rationale of ensuring the maximization of resources in as productive- and effective manner as possible. While Sofka may express the market rationale rather implicitly, others express such linkage quite explicitly, such as Bartholdy, who
directly links entrepreneurship with the creation of ‘new business opportunities and new jobs’:

“Entrepreneurs are job-makers and not job takers. The entrepreneurship process – its tools and methods – is a new, agile and iterative way of identifying business opportunities. This is important if we want to understand how we can create socially valuable business solutions” (Bartholdy 2015).

The view of Bartholdy seems somewhat substantiated by Fattoum who regards entrepreneurship as playing ‘an important role for society by providing creative solutions […] economic value, creates jobs and enhanced welfare through social profit projects’ and even goes to the length of endorsing ‘that public regulation should encourage entrepreneurship’ (Fattoum 2015).

What we find in these selected quotes is a linkage of the collective and solidary telos of entrepreneurship where the entrepreneurial aspirations of making the world a better place coincide with the objective of society. One might even go as far as saying that the entrepreneurial aspiration coincides with the objective of the State insofar it either concurs with the aspirations of The Competition State to extend society’s edge or, the well-fare State’s aspiration of ensuring job-security. With the risk of reiterating a previous point, we find an almost univocal tone in which social- and fiscal rationalities becomes mutually reinforcing and in which, governors and governed figure as almost ‘simultaneous actors of a drama that they perform in common’ (Foucault 2014: 14). The reason for bringing this point to the analysis once again comes from the contention that it holds the potential of challenging the aspirations of self-emancipation, which entrepreneurship foreshadows. Instead of viewing the path to liberation as coincidental converging with the interest of governing, we might bring forth an understanding that accentuates the similitudes to a modern form of neo-liberal governing that, instead of relying on the principals of prohibition and restriction, sets up a moral domain of entrepreneurial imperatives in which individuals are ‘led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves’, as well as others, as subjects of a moral domain (Foucault 1992: 5).

From such propositions, we see how liberation becomes a built-in mechanism in which ‘freedom’ composes a vital component of neo-liberal governing: By governing in compliance, or even through, the oldest dream of emancipation, this form of modern governing succeeds in minimalizing exterior governing by maximizing self-governing. In such neo-liberal climate, liberation of the individual is sought resolved under the sign of market rationale insofar the market compose an unbiased and liberated site of veridiction for falsifying or verifying the measures that government takes. By complying with the liberated truth of the market as a susceptible and enterprising individual, the entrepreneurial individual is subjected to the neo-liberal principle of laissez-faire from the contention that an unleash of human potential in the end also fosters the strength of the State. Thus the entrepreneurial aspirations of self-actualization and the imperatives of treating
oneself as an independent piece of enterprise may be worthwhile viewing as an entrepreneurial form of *homo economicus*, who, as 'an entrepreneur of himself' seek 'the object of economic analysis with any conduct whatsoever entailing an optimal allocation of scarce resources to alternatives ends' (Foucault 2004: 226, 268). What such perspective may bring with it, is the possibility of disclosing how the entrepreneurial domain relies on an inherent paradox of 'the more you allow freedom of thought, the more sure will be that the people’s mind will be shaped by obedience' (Foucault 2010: 38). That is insofar the entrepreneurial form of *homo economicus*:

“[…] is the person who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. *Homo economicus* is someone who is eminently governable” (Foucault 2004: 270).

Hence we see how freedom, emancipation, liberation, self-actualization and other similar notions of human agency, compose a mischievous component of modern governing: By governing through freedom rather than in spite of it, modern forms of liberal governing seeks to diminish the line between governor and governed, which, in the end, makes it tricky to speak of suppression and resistance when the response to the question; who is in the position of power? becomes the subject. Although such a conclusion may at first sight be cause to a dystopian reading, it is my contention that it does not necessarily have to cease on such note. If modern individuals insist on perceiving themselves as being repressed by totalizing power, we see how they will constantly seek to liberate themselves. From such expectations, the entrepreneurial domain becomes an attractive path to liberation. However, if one tries to rid one’s self from the connotations of oppression, violence and restrictions that are logically employed when speaking about the nature of power, we might reach a point from where it is possible to appreciate the productive traits of power and enter the game of multiple liberties which are offered. In doing so, ‘freedom’ then becomes a continuous practice of assessment rather than an inalienable and seldom goal:

“[W]hat I mean by power relations is the fact that we are in a strategic situation toward each other […] we are in this struggle, and the continuation of this situation can influence the behavior or nonbehavior of the other. So we are not trapped. We are always in this kind of situation. It means that we always have possibilities, there are always possibilities of changing the situation. We cannot jump outside the situation, and there is no point where you are free from all power relations. But you can always change it. So what I've said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always free-well, anyway, that there is always the possibility of changing” (Foucault 1984: 167).
5.6 PROVISIONAL POINTS

The present analysis has been set out to examine how the entrepreneurial university invites individuals to recognize and reflect upon themselves as capable and accessible to a realm of enterprise. Such investigation has resulted in the following intermediate conclusion, which can be added to the overall examination:

1. At first, the analysis has shown that the ethical substance of an entrepreneurial domain compose a certain attitude or mindset. While the component of a certain entrepreneurial attitude or spirit of mind has brought a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of its cultivation within the institutional frames of universities, the discussion has likewise suggested that the economic risk, which entrepreneurship entails, crystalizes the transition from morality as a set of recommended imperatives, to the question of ethics, as the voluntary work one performs on oneself in order to become an entrepreneur.

2. The component of ‘deciding for oneself’ gave rise to an examination of the connotations of freedom and liberation, which are presented within the moral domain of entrepreneurship. Here the analysis has suggested that the entrepreneurial university sets up a neo-liberal climate in which the susceptible and enterprising individual is subjected to the neo-liberal principle of *laissez-faire* from the contention that an unleash of human potential in the end also fosters the strength of the State.

3. From such perspective the analysis has challenged the promise of self-emancipation which the entrepreneurial domain holds, by examining how the entrepreneurial university figures as an expression of a neo-liberal form of governing that precisely seeks to govern through freedom rather than in spite of its existence, as if ‘governing’ and ‘freedom’ were of exclusive measures. Thus by setting up an entrepreneurial domain in which individuals recognize and reflects upon themselves, we find a neo-liberal form of governing that works in an effective but mischievous way of minimizing exterior governing through the maximizing of self-governing of man and all his potentials.
CONCLUSION

While the several empirical findings are made throughout the study, the analytical points I would like to bring to the conclusion, revolves around the relation of education as a path of liberation.

Here the study has examined a traditionally thought-of opposition between German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions, which each seek to respond to the question of the frugality of the State, though resorting in quite different manners. While the German tradition seeks to confine the influence of governing through legislative means of securing institutional autonomy and an ability of ‘own reasoning’, the Anglo-Saxon tradition imitates an economic discourse, where the ‘free’ market figures as a site of veridiction that enables a falsification or verification of the measures, which government takes and the rules it imposes. Hence, although the German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition has been presented as opposition, even in present debates, the analysis has questioned such historical contestation by bringing them together in a game of truth and error in defining the true kernel of liberalism.

In addition to such problematization of the contestation between a German- and Anglo-Saxon traditions, the entrepreneurial university emerges as an institution that breaks with the hitherto antithetic perception by bringing elements of each traditions into a meaningful cohesion. Nevertheless, while the entrepreneurial university reorganizes the previous antithetic imperatives of economy and reason in the modality of entrepreneurship, the analysis has likewise suggested that; although, the ideals of own reasoning may not be completely assimilated with the notion of *homo economicus*, it certainly reconciles under the sign of an economic rationale within the entrepreneurial university. Following this line of arguing, the entrepreneurial university appears as a complex resolution that in first instance secures utilitarian objectives through a close corporation with the labor market and only hereafter are concerns of personal maturation is cultivated through practical research under own guidance. Hence, while the entrepreneurial university problematizes the contestation of a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition, the distinction appears to be resolved in a particular way within the entrepreneurial university, where utilitarian and economic rationale seem to have been given the upper hand.

Despite proposing a new conduct of universities, the entrepreneurial university likewise share a mutual quest of liberalism. Imbued with possibilities of self-actualization, the moral domain of entrepreneurship holds the promise of liberation insofar the entrepreneurial subject is capable treating himself and his own existence as an independent price of enterprise. Inasmuch as the entrepreneurial subject is capable of responding and imitating the unbiased and liberated logics of the market, the susceptible and enterprising individual is
subjected to the neo-liberal principle of *laissez-faire* and the exemption of governmental interventions. By these arguments, the analysis has shown how the entrepreneurial university emerges as a novice in defining the true kernel of liberalism.

Once these propositions were in place, the analysis gave rise to a challenging of the promise of self-emancipation, by examining how the entrepreneurial university figures as an expression of a *neo-liberal* form of governing that precisely seeks to govern *through* freedom rather than treating ‘governing’ and ‘freedom’ as if they were of incompatible measures. By seeking to cancel out the line between governor and governed, the entrepreneurial university set up an attractive domain of enterprise for individuals to recognize and reflect upon themselves as accessible and capable of the realm of entrepreneurship. By these emphases, the analysis established a perspective that views the entrepreneurial university as an expression of a neo-liberal form of governing that works in an effective but mischievous way of minimizing exterior governing through the maximizing of the governing of the self.

Since the analysis has dealt with the political aspirations and early formulation of the entrepreneurial university in our local context, I recognize that the analysis has examined the entrepreneurial university in an ideal and pure form, which might give rise to a reading of closure. By this meaning that, although the analysis has attempted at pointing out an asymmetry of the merging of a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition within the entrepreneurial university, the analysis has likewise illustrated how the entrepreneurial university seeks to resolve the contestation between the prior antithetic relation between a German- and Anglo-Saxon tradition. However, as we have come know, freedom for modifications and resistance compose a vital component of modern governing, which continuously give rise to the possibility of change. Following this line of arguing, I would like to install, as a final remark, that the present analysis give rise to a further analysis that takes the theoretical examination of the entrepreneurial university as a stepping stone as to studying the notion of the entrepreneurial university and its final forms in practice. Following the thoughts of Foucault such analysis would ‘suggest another way to go further towards a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between *theory and practice*’ (*emphasis added*, Foucault 1982: 221):

“It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies” (Foucault 1982: 221).
It is my contention that while such analysis holds the potential of revealing the margins of variation of the ways in which the entrepreneurial university takes form in practice, it likewise holds the potential of examining how the margins of variation give rise to new contestations and potentialities of our present situation.
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