Systemic Risk with Multiple Central Counterparties

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Systemic Risk with Multiple Central Counterparties

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Title: Systemic Risk with Multiple Central Counterparties
Author: Rosenlund, Thomas Hoppe; Barth-Stenersen, Jonas
Abstract: This thesis studies nancial stability and cascading defaults within nancial networks with multiple central counterparties. We propose a multiple-CCP framework, which incorporates the cyclical interdependent nature of interbank payments and enables the evaluation of systemic risk in di erent network structures. As part of the framework we propose an algorithm, similar to the ctitious default algorithm of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], which simulates cascading defaults of CCPs and yields a unique clearing vector of interbank payments. Recent legislation of over- the-counter derivatives markets has incentivized the existence of multiple CCPs. In order to illustrate the use of the proposed framework we apply it to the market for single-name OTC credit default swaps, illustrating the trade-o between bilateral and multilateral netting. We show that the network with a single CCP outperforms the network without central clearing as well as those of multiple CCPs in terms of the chosen systemic risk measure. We nd that introducing an additional CCP to a network where central clearing already applies increases systemic risk.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10417/5466
Date: 2015-12-08
Pages: 155
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