SHOOTING WHERE THE DUCKS ARE
- THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY OF LISBON ON THE BEHAVIOUR OF ORGANISED INTERESTS

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Executive Summary

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the legislative powers of the European Parliament were further strengthened to reduce the perceived democratic deficit of the European Union. Specifically, the former co-decision was renamed the ordinary legislative procedure and extended to further policy areas. Taking point of departure in the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, this thesis analyses the extent to which the shift in applicable legislative procedures influence the behaviour of organised interests. To analyse the changes, the thesis builds on an exchange perspective, where lobbyism is seen as an exchange with European institutions seeking to obtain information from organised interests and organised interests seeking political influence. Empirically, the findings indicate that the behaviour of organised within the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries policy has fundamentally changed in response to the shift to the ordinary legislative procedure in these areas. Specifically, organised interests had changed the lobbying strategies in response to the increased legislative powers of the European Parliament with respect to four measurable parameters; who lobbies; why lobby; whom to lobby; and how to lobby. In contrast, the findings suggest that the behaviour of organised interests within the EU’s environmental policy and internal market policy remained largely unchanged on these dimensions. This was in line with the expectation of no change, as the ordinary legislative procedure had applied to these policy areas before Lisbon. Consequently, the findings indeed suggest that the behaviour of organised interests fundamentally changes in response to the shifts in the applicable legislative procedure. Further findings were identified with respect to learning processes, changes in the relationships between organised interests and the other European institutions and differing importance of nationality within the different policy areas. Theoretically, the findings of the thesis suggest that rational choice approaches provide an excellent lens to understand the behaviour of organised interests. Furthermore, the findings indicate mixed effects on democratic legitimacy that in turn was a raison d'etre of the Lisbon Treaty.
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List of Abbreviations

(CCP) Common Commercial Policy
(CFP) Common Fisheries Policy
(COD) Co-decision procedure
(CoM) Council of Ministers
(EC) European Commission
(ENVI) Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
(EP) European Parliament
(EU) European Union
(IMCO) Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection
(INI) Own Initiative Reports
(INTA) Committee on International Trade
(Org/Orgs) Organisation/Organisations
(OLP) Ordinary Legislative Procedure
(PECH) Committee on Fisheries
(SEA) Single European Act
(TFEU) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
1 Introduction

“Continue, continue, there is no future for the people of Europe other than in union”
- Jean Monnet (in Trichet 2011)

Change is an eternal opportunity as well as a challenge to systems, institutions, nations, organisations (orgs), and individuals. The causes of change are multitude: ideological crusades, epiphenomenal events, deliberations, consensus on moving in a certain direction, and so forth. Intentional as well as unintentional, change is, thus, an inexhaustible source of academic research.

Within political science fields such as international relations, systems of government, and systems of governance few phenomena have (re)shaped and influenced theoretical thought over the last four decades as much as the European Union (EU). Its *sui generis* nature not only challenges comparative analysis but also more fundamentally provokes the predictability of cause and effect and, hence, demands continuous scrutiny of the consequences of change. This thesis sets out with the modest goal to investigate one niche of cause and effect relating to change in the EU.

The famous words of Jean Monnet above epitomises the continuous drive towards a supranational EU – a drive amongst others constituted in numerous treaty changes since the Treaties of Rome in 1957 established the foundations of the EU (EU 2012). Each Treaty revision since then have had its individual *raison d’être* (CoM 2012), but with time, democratic legitimacy and transparency as well as effectiveness have come to the fore. With the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the European Union), European integration was deepened and widened substantially, and the need for addressing effectiveness and democratic concerns became pertinent. The introduction of the co-decision (COD) procedure between the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the European Parliament (EP), effectively establishing a bicameral legislature with direct election of one chamber, was seen as fundamental. The Treaty of Lisbon (hereafter simply referred to as Lisbon) was no exception to this increased democratisation according to the European Commission (EC) President, as “Lisbon will reinforce the democratic nature of the European Union” (Barroso 2007). Hence, from this logic it was a decisive choice to transfer further competences to the EP – the only directly elected body of the EU to reduce the perceived democratic deficit.
Nonetheless, according to the European Ombudsman “acceptance of the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens constitutes a prior condition for the smooth operation of a democracy. In fact, I would take this proposition one step further and, following Dahl, argue that if a state is not perceived as legitimate, then democratic elections cannot rectify this problem” (Diamandouros 2006). Acknowledging that the EU indeed has a legitimacy deficit, several initiatives have been taken, not least the attempt to improve input legitimacy in the legislative process (besides elections) via mandatory public consultations; throughput legitimacy via transparency initiatives; and output legitimacy via strengthened effectiveness and efficiency (Scharpf 1999; Risse and Kleine 2007).

Since Montesquieu originally coined the concept *corps intermédiaires* in ‘*de l’Esprit des Loix*’ in 1748 and argued that some form of organised intermediaries are necessary buffers between the public and its executive, many scholars have advanced the idea of a democratic system with some intermediate functions (besides directly elected officials) so as to facilitate the voice (input) and bargaining (throughput) of interests (Tocqueville 1835; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Dahl 1989; Hirst 1990). Most explicit is Dahl’s theory on polyarchy, which “is distinguished from classical monistic democracy [referring to Rousseau] by the salience, power, and legitimacy of autonomous organizations in political life and decisions on public matters”, adding that, “[t]he advantages of organized cooperation make organizations desirable. Indeed, the existence of relatively autonomous political organizations is necessary to the practice of democracy on a large scale” (1984:234). To this the European Ombudsman notes that this conceptualisation of democracy:

“is characterised by a pluralist logic, whose overriding preoccupation is the search for an optimal balance between institutions alternatively expressive of egalitarian and libertarian principles. Such an overarching balance, which relies on the generation of a dense network of institutional checks and balances or counterweights, akin to Montesquieu’s “corps intermédiaires”, provides better conditions for the observance of the rule of law and for the quality of democracy” (Diamandouros 2006).

The outcome of this is the legitimacy that organised interests provides the democratic political systems of Europe and the EU system, in the latter case via primarily input le-

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1 Rousseau was especially vary of organised interests in his ‘Discourse on Political Economy’ (1755), exclaiming that “The will of these particular societies always has two relations: for the members of the association it is a general will: for the large society, it is a private will, which is very often found to be upright in the first respect and vicious in the latter” (in Dahl 1984:233).

2 Both nations with pluralist as well as more corporatist forms of organised interest representation in the representative democracy – or polyarchy (Hirst 1990).
gitimacy. This rather long argument for an introduction is pivotal and interesting as it puts organised interests at the fore of the discussion on treaty revisions.

We set out to investigate the impact of treaty change on organised interest representation, as it, following the argument of Dahl, it is increasingly important for the legitimacy (and there through democracy) of the EU as a whole. Hence, achieving the goals or fulfilling the raison d’être of Lisbon is not solely dependent on its extension of power to the EP, but arguably the impact of this extension on the functioning of representativeness of organised interests in civil society. Henceforth, our research question (RQ) is:

To which extent did the change in the EU’s institutional power balance resulting from the shift in legislative procedure in the Treaty of Lisbon affect the behaviour of organised interests?

Using the term ‘organised interests' indicate that the focus of this thesis is to capture what happens with the intermediaries between the governing corps (or elite) and civil society. Thus, organised interests are both those popularly referred to as public and those referred to as private in this thesis. The behaviour of organised interests are best epitomised by its formally structured representatives – the interest organisation (org) as a unit. This more or less professional org is in other words the organised interests’ representative in the political system. The organised interest representative is by nature a lobbying org as soon as it enters the realm of the political system in one form or another (Truman 1951). Hence, we use the term organised interest representation and lobbyism interchangeably in this thesis. Furthermore, the agents hired by the orgs to practically perform the task of representation are referred to as lobbyists. Needless to say that in many societies the words ‘lobbyism’ and ‘lobbyists’ has not the best of reputations. However, using the logic of Dahl lobbying should rather be seen as necessary intermediary facet of modern democracy, hence, used in its most positive sense.

The primary independent variable of this thesis, Lisbon, entered into force in December 2009. With it came further changes to the scope of the COD procedure, extending it to almost all policy-areas of EU competence and renamed the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). The procedure itself remained largely unchanged; however, the extension of OLP to new policy-areas gives a unique opportunity for research. Changing behaviour in poli-

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3 This thesis focuses furthermore exclusively on organisations consisting of several members, each having their own legal status. Thus, e.g. individual companies are not in our scope.
4 Here we simply use the OECD (2010) definition of lobbyism “the oral or written communication with a public official to influence legislation, policy or administrative decisions”.
cy-areas with new competences given to the EP can be assessed against policy-areas where legislative procedures remained unchanged. Hence, qualified scrutiny of the consequences of the legislative procedure’s extension to new policy areas can be performed comparatively, so as to better answer the RQ. Thus, this also implies that we will only investigate behavioural changes and events connected to the OLP and the shift to this.

Behavioural changes can be observed, traced, measured, and identified using multiple methods and on multiple populations deemed relevant. In this thesis, we take the practical and actual behaviour of organised interests and the lobbyists performing the lobbying functions assuming that they are indeed rational actors as exclaimed by Hall and Deardorff, “If there is a class of actors for whom rational choice - even complete information - models should do good explanatory work, lobbyists ought to be it.” (2006:70). We do this in line with the asking’s of Held: “Democratic institutions and practices have to be articulated with the complex arena of national and international politics, and the mutual interpenetration of the national and international must be mapped. Political understanding, and the successful pursuit of democratic political theory, are dependent on the outcome of these tasks” (Held 1995:22), hoping to make such a modest contribution to this articulation of practices.

1.1 Delimitation

An important delimitation is needed at this point. It is clear that the raison d’être of organised interest representation – lobbying – is the attempt to promote one’s cause so as to “influence legislation, policy or administrative decisions” (OECD 2010). However, in this thesis the issue of influence is not a variable. Van Schendelen (2010:51-52) asserts that lobbying “is only an effort to create [real influence] (...). In academic language, the effort is neither sufficient nor necessary for success”. Hence, related to the EU political system, a prerequisite for the legitimacy of EU democracy is the ‘effort of creation’ or ‘presence of lobbyism’ in the political system. Following this reasoning, we focus on the efforts of organised interests to attempt to create influence, which may be a necessary precondition for influence, not investigating influence itself⁵, which is a subsequent and potentially more interesting task. This task, however, must be performed elsewhere.

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⁵ The question of whether such attempts result in influence may be contingent on a wide range of empirical factors that are as mentioned not sought further investigated in this thesis. The literature has indicated that influence is contingent on a wide of range factors (see Dür 2008; Michalowitz 2007; Kluver 2011). Consequently, the issue of whether lobbying efforts influence legislation is another empirical matter.
1.2 Reading guide

This introduction sets the scene for the thesis, but some further guidance on the structure and content of it will here be outlined. Next, in order to give some basic insights into the core concepts of the thesis a short background chapter (chapter 2) will present the EP and its internal functioning, as well as explain shortly the OLP, and then the four policy areas at the centre of this analysis will be presented in conjunction with the respective changes Lisbon inferred on them. After this we will present a literature review (chapter 3), more specifically situating this thesis in relation to exiting strands and research agendas of EU interest representation and integration theories. With this established, a chapter on the theoretical framework (chapter 4) of this thesis will follow, taking a rationalist approach to our research. The framework also outlines the ideas on how to conceptualise the theoretical framework into something ‘measurable’. How we go about this task is then presented in the chapter on our methodology (chapter 5), which outlines very clearly which methodological choices we have taken and describes the extensive fieldwork performed. Thus, how we get from the RQ and theory to practically retrieving answers to this. Having established the method used, we then present in chapter 6 the inductive descriptive findings of our fieldwork in eight sections. The implications of Lisbon on organised interest behaviour is then analysed and discussed in depth in the following chapter (chapter 7) in light of the presented theoretical framework in chapter 4. This chapter, thus, presents the answer to our RQ. Notwithstanding the results presented in chapter 7, chapter 8 will move on to discuss the most relevant findings. Towards the end we shall in chapter 9 conclude, discuss the wider democratic implications of the findings, which is at the heart of the ‘scene’ of this thesis outlined in the above introduction, and present some suggestions for further research.
2 Background

This chapter seeks to give the reader a short insight into the most fundamental issues of this thesis. Hence, in the next section the functioning of the EP and its institutional functions will be elaborated. Next, the OLP will be presented and explained briefly. And lastly, the four policy areas investigated in this thesis will be presented with a short historic insight in addition to their most prominent features today.

2.1 Functioning of the European Parliament

Essentially, the EP remains the only European institution that is directly elected by the citizens of the Member States (MS). Since the founding of the EU, the EP has been transformed from an institution with limited legislative powers to a powerful legislative body. With Lisbon, the EP under the OLP has gained full co-legislative powers within almost all areas of EU legislation and, thus, plays a pivotal role in EU legislation. (Wallace 2010). The following section serves to provide key background information on the functioning of the EP and its institutional functions for the use of rest of this thesis.

2.1.1 The MEPs

The EP is composed of 736 members (MEPs) that are elected nationally. In the smaller MS, constituencies usually remain national, whereas constituencies in the larger MS tend to be regional. MEPs remain key actors within the EP, as they formally have to vote through the EP’s position on a given issue and also undertake various roles, as explained in the sections further below. Pursuant to the EP’s rules of procedure, MEPs are not bound by any instruction and are free to vote on an individual basis. The MEPs of the EP are given a budget to employ personal assistants that support the EP. The role of the assistants differs from MEP to MEP to include everything from extensive political responsibilities to logistical tasks. Assistants also support their MEP when he has been nominated as rapporteur on a dossier (Corbett et. al. 2011).

2.1.2 Political Groups

Political groups play an essential role in the EP. Most MEPs join political groups and largely follow the collective positions agreed by the given political groups. For instance, in the middle of July, VoteWatch (2012) demonstrated that party cohesion was 91.32% overall for the five main political groups in the EP. Consequently, political groups remain essential to the functioning of the EP to build political majorities on specific dossiers. Each political group receives financial support from the EP to hire a number of staff to...
support the work of the political group. The policy advisors of the political groups play an important role in preparing discussion within the political groups, collecting background information, drawing up whips, assisting in finding intra-party consensus, maintaining contact with individual MEPs to ensure their support in votes, also making the voting lists (guiding MEPs on what to vote on each specific point) ahead of Committee and Plenary votes (Corbett et. al. 2011).

2.1.3 The Committee Structure of the European Parliament
The vast majority of the work of the EP is conducted in several standing Committees, where the individual MEPs have the opportunity to set their footprints on the specific dossiers. In 2009, the number of Committees was set at 20 with membership being decided on the basis of the Political Groups to reflect the political balance in Plenary. Normally, an MEP serves as full member of one Committee and as a substitute member of a second Committee. The Committees are specialised in different policy areas that to a large extent follow the treaty basis of the EU. The main business of the Committees remains the adoption of legislative reports and opinions with respect to the legislative role of the EP. Proposals received from the EC are referred to the responsible Committee that consequently is vested with the responsibility of drafting the EP’s opinion on a given dossier. In some cases, other Committees also have to deliver their opinion on the legislative proposal. The legislative reports prepared by the rapporteurs have to be voted through the Committee, before the Plenary may consider the dossier (Corbett et. al. 2011). In addition to the legislative work, the Committees may also prepare their own initiative reports (INI), where the Committee examines an issue at its own initiative. INIs may cover a wide range of issues such as when the EP suggests that the EC considers submitting a legislative proposal, when the EP draws up reports independently from other institutions or respond to the EC’s green papers.

Over the years, several different institutional roles have evolved that performs different key roles in the Committees. These roles will be explained in the sections below.

2.1.4 Chair and vice-chairs of the Committees
Each Committee elects a chair and vice-chair that have the main responsibility for the Committee. Specifically, the Chair presides over meetings and may speak on behalf of the Committee in plenary on sensitive issues. The Chair also represents the Committee in meetings of the Committee of Chairs (where dossiers are distributed between the Committees as well). In addition to these formal roles, they also play a central role in shaping
the agenda of the Committee and in representing the Committee outside the EP. Chairs are elected for 2½ periods (Corbett et al. 2011).

2.1.5 Committee Coordinators of the Political Group
The political groups are represented in the different Committees through a selected MEP, who acts as a coordinator. Subsequently, the coordinator acts as the main spokesperson of the group within the Committee. Furthermore, the coordinators play a crucial role with respect to the working of the Committee. The coordinators meet regularly to agree on the nomination of rapporteurs on the specific dossiers, discuss the agenda of the Committee, forthcoming votes, and engage in discussions on possible compromises. Once a rapporteurship has been given to a group, the coordinator specifically may have a decisive role in naming the specific rapporteur (Corbett et al. 2011).

2.1.6 Rapporteurs
Once the Committee is set to prepare a legislative report or opinion, the Committee nominates a rapporteur. The rapporteur plays an essential role, as he or she vested with the responsibility of drafting up the legislative report of the Committee. In drafting the report, the rapporteur may seek the assistance of their own assistants, the Committee Secretariat, the staffing of the political groups, or other relevant actors. The legislative reports contain the specific amendments to the EC’s proposal and Council’s position on a given dossier. Rapporteurs are thus the EP actors with the responsibility for formulating the EP’s wishes. Very significantly, rapporteurs have to ensure sufficient support for the legislative reports and consequently in drafting the legislative report they have to take account of the general opinion within the Committee. As explained in section 2.2, rapporteurs are imperative with respect to the trilogue, where the EC, EP and CoM attempt to strike an early compromise (Corbett et al. 2011).

2.1.7 Shadow rapporteurs
The different political groups have also started to nominate shadow rapporteurs on dossiers. The evolution of ‘shadows’ reflects the need of trying to reduce the workload of the coordinators of the political groups. ‘Shadows’ are selected to represent the political group with respect to the specific dossier. Furthermore, the shadow rapporteur may speak on behalf of the political groups on the dossier, where they have been nominated shadow rapporteur. On important dossiers, rapporteurs regularly meet with the shadow rapporteurs to built support for their legislative report (Corbett et al. 2011).
2.1.8 The Committee Secretariat
A Committee Secretariat also assists the Committees. The Secretariat consists of a limited number of administrators that assists the MEPs of the Committee by providing information to them on the Committee’s activities and past positions. Furthermore, administrators may also play more direct role in the legislative reports by undertaking background research or drafting texts when the rapporteurs request them to do so. The administrators are usually generalists (Corbett et. al. 2011).

2.1.9 Plenary
Once the legislative reports have been adopted in the Committees, the Plenary has to consider the issue at hand. Plenary is the forum, in which all MEPs meet to discuss and vote on specific issues. Due to time considerations, the individual MEPs only have limited time to present their views on the dossiers. When a dossier has been put on the plenary agenda, the MEPs discuss the report, before they move on to vote on the report prepared by the Committee. Political groups, the responsible Committee, or 40 Members may also propose amendments that the plenary also votes on (Corbett et. al. 2011).

2.2 The ordinary legislative procedure
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, legislative proposals are only adopted, when the CoM and the EP adopt completely identical legislative acts. The procedure entails that the Commission presents a proposal that is considered by the CoM and the EP in up to two readings. If the institutions fail to adopt identical texts, a conciliation committee is conveyed, where the EP and CoM meet to agree on a compromise text that subsequently may become legislation. The procedure is largely unchanged by Lisbon.

To facilitate the adoption of legislative proposals, the European institutions have developed a practice of trilogue. The practice of trilogues was formalised through an inter-institutional agreement between the three institutions in 2007 (OJ C145 of 30.06.2007). Here, the institutions explicitly agreed to cooperate to reconcile their position as early as possible to clear the way for early adoptions of legislative acts. Concretely, the institu-

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6 For further information on the procedure see EP 2012.
7 As a new element under Lisbon, national parliaments have eight weeks from a proposal has been tabled to scrutinise proposals under the OLP. Pursuant to protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, if national parliaments deem that the proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity, they may force the EC to review its proposal (the yellow card) or alternatively the CoM and EP may vote on terminating the legislative procedure (the orange card). However, since Lisbon became effective national parliaments have only once presented a yellow card to a legislative (S&D 2012). Consequently, the importance of this initial step should not be exaggerated.
tions meet informally to land a compromise in the first reading stage of the OLP. In response to the transparency concerns, the EP has formalised their practice with respect to trilogues through a Code of Conduct (Annex XII of the EP’s rules of procedure) that lay down the general framework for the EP’s engagement in trilogues. Accordingly, the EP’s decision of entering into negotiations with the CoM should be represented by the appointed rapporteur to the responsible Committee that take the decision to engage in the trilogues. The decision also stipulates that the negotiation team should respect the political balance. The EP delegation normally consists of the Committee Chair, the rapporteur, and shadow rapporteurs or coordinators from other political groups. Furthermore, a meeting between rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs is held before trilogue meetings to ensure coherence in the negotiations. The Committee Secretariat and the advisors of the Political Groups also attend these preparatory meetings. Feedback on the status of trilogues is normally given to group coordinators or through meetings held in camera to avoid revealing sensitive negotiation positions publicly. In autumn 2010, the Conference of Committees assessed that the codes of conduct on trilogues had improved transparency and accountability considerably, but nonetheless maintained that first reading agreement should be the exception (Corbett et. al. 2011). In spite of this, the number of first reading agreements has steadily increased over the last legislative periods. In the period 1999-2004, first reading agreements constituted 28% of all adopted co-decision dossiers. In the period 2009-2011, this had increased to 78% (Pittella 2011). In this sense, the informal inter-institutional negotiations in the practice of trilogues have become central to the legislative process under the OLP.

The former consultation procedure implied that the EP only had weak formal powers to influence legislation. Specifically, the EC proposed legislation to which the EP would have to give its opinion. Subsequently, the EC could decide to amend its proposal to include the EP amendments, but were under no legal responsibility to do so. In the final step, the Council adopted the legislative act (Corbett et. al. 2011). As explained, in contrast, under the OLP, proposals are only adopted, when the Council and the EP adopt the same text. Thus, the transition from the consultation to the OLP implies a substantially higher degree of power of the EP in the legislative process.

2.3 The policy areas investigated
This section will give a brief introduction to the main policy areas that are under the responsibility of the EP Committees that are investigated in this Thesis. The explanation
why the legislative work done by Committee on International Trade (INTA), the Committee on Fisheries (PECH), the Committee for Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO) have been selected as the case policy areas is provided more thoroughly in chapter 5. The introduction will focus on the evolution of the substantive dimension of the policies and the role of the EC, EP, and CoM within the respective policy areas.

2.3.1 The Committee on International Trade: The Common Commercial Policy
The main responsibilities of INTA are the establishment and implementation of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and wider external economic relations. Traditionally, the CCP has been a key competence of the EU. Already with the original treaty of Rome, the MS were set to develop common positions within international trade (Woolcock 2005). Under Lisbon, the CCP constitutes an exclusive EU competence implying that only European legislation can be adopted within this policy area. Thus, the CCP remains one of the most integrated policy areas of the EU. The scope of the CCP has changed considerably since the treaty of Rome: from being originally focused on establishing cross-border tariffs, the exclusive competences of the CCP as of Lisbon include trade in goods, services, commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, and foreign direct investment (Vanhoonacker 2011). Historically, the EC and the CoM of the EU have been the key players within this policy area. The EC has maintained the exclusive right of initiating policy proposals and trade negotiations that the CoM subsequently has to approve by qualified majority voting (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). In contrast, the EP only played a consultative role before Lisbon. This changed with Lisbon, where the EP gained extensive formal powers with respect to the CCP. Under article 207(2) TFEU, the OLP now applies to the implementation of the CCP, whereas the EP has to give its consent to international trade agreement (TFEU article 218). Thus, the EP has gained substantial powers under Lisbon. The Committee was established in the EP in 2004 after it for a period had been included in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.

8 The policy areas demarked by CCP, CFP, environmental policy, and internal market policy are the variables of investigation as these reflect the Treaty base on which the legislative procedure applied is given. However, due to the high confluence with the committee structure of the EP, we will use the terms INTA, PECH, ENVI, and IMCO interchangeably with the CCP, CFP, environmental, and internal market policy in the remainder of this thesis.
9 The implementation of the CCP specifically includes issues such as trade barrier regulation, trade defence instruments, trade preferences programs, and EU foreign direct investment policy (Kleimann 2011).
2.3.2 The Committee on Fisheries: The Common Fisheries Policy

The Committee on Fisheries (PECH) deals with a wide range of aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). In contrast to the CCP, the original Treaty of Rome did not explicitly foresee the development of the CFP. It was not until 1970 that the EU introduced specific measures for the fisheries sector by creating a common market organisation for fisheries policies, structural aids to modernise the sectors, and free access for fishing vessels to the waters of all MS. In 1976, MS decided to create an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and authorise the Commission to conclude international fisheries agreements with countries and international agreements. In 1983, the CFP was extended to include a Community regime of conservation and management of fisheries including the introduction of total allowed catches and quotas (Lequesne 2005). Fisheries management, relation with third states, structural funds, and the organisation of a fisheries market now constitute the foundation of the CFP that are dealt with by the PECH in the EP. As with the CCP, the main actors within the CFP were the EC and the CoM before Lisbon. The CoM was the principal decision-maker that adopted the main EU legislation on the basis of proposals by the EC through a qualified majority vote. However, with Lisbon the EP was transformed from a consultative body to a co-legislator by the extension of the OLP to the CFP as well (TFEU 43(2)). In late 2011, the Commission presented a reform of the CFP that currently is being processed in the EU.

2.3.3 The Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety: European Environmental Policy

ENVI is responsible for environmental, public health and food safety policy. As with the CFP, the initial treaty of Rome did not explicitly foresee the development of a European environmental policy. In 1973, the EC adopted the first environmental action plan stressing environmental priorities that later has been followed by five others. It was not until the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) that the environment was explicitly recognised as a community competence under two provisions. Since the start of the 1990es, the environmental aquis communautaria has increased substantially with the adoption of several different directives e.g. on air quality, water and chemicals. As Benson and Jordan (2010) note this development may be seen as “nice illustration” of the EU as a regulatory state. SEA had important consequences for the institutional power balance within EU environmental policy. SEA introduced the cooperation procedure to envi-

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10 The EP has to give its consent to international fisheries agreements (TFEU 218) but does not retain formal powers with respect to some specific fisheries measures such as the total allowed catch (TFEU 43(3)).
11 The focus of this thesis is on Committee’s work on environmental legislation.
ronmental legislation with a single market dimension, whereby the EP gained direct for-
mal powers on such dossiers. Nonetheless, the EP did not obtain formal powers over
environmental legislation without a direct link to the internal market, as this was guided
by the consultation procedure. The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam further en-
hanced the power of the EP on environmental policy. With Maastricht and Amsterdam,
the EP became co-legislator with respect to almost all environmental legislation
(Lenschow 2005; 2010). Lisbon did not directly influence the powers of the EP on envi-
ronmental policy. Thus, in contrast to the CCP and CFP, the EP has for more than a
decade been co-legislator with the CoM and has therefore retained formal powers that
enable the EP to influence EU environmental policy directly. In this sense, environmen-
tal policy is a policy area, where the EP traditionally has had the formal powers to play a
strong role.

2.3.4 The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection: The In-
ternal Market Policy
The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO) deals with im-
portant aspects of the internal market, namely the free movement of goods and services,
the right of establishment, the removal of barriers for the functioning of the internal
market, and attending to consumer interests. Already with the Treaty of Rome, the
Community gained competencies within the areas of the IMCO’s current portfolio. It
was not until the early 1960s, when the creation of the custom union had led to the re-
moval of tariffs making other barriers for trade apparent that the EC started pushing for
harmonisation of national rules and therefore greater activity towards the creation of
genuine common market. However, these efforts proved difficult to realise in practice
and consequently integration stalled during the 1960s and 70s (Young 2010). Neverth-
everless, the European Court of Justice played an important role in removing certain non-
technical barriers through important legal rulings (Egan 2010). In 1986, the adoption of
SEA and the endorsement of the goal to complete the internal market by 1992 funda-
mentally changed the stalemate. SEA introduced qualified majority voting in the CoM on
single-market measures that also began to focus on the mutual recognition principle. As
a consequence, the legislative output arising out of the Single European Market “has
been impressive, with over 1,500 measures adopted by 2008” (Young 2010:125). As with
the EU environmental policy, SEA also implied a changed institutional power balance, as
the EP gained legislative powers through the cooperation procedure that was introduced
for single-market measures. The consequent Maastricht treaty introduced the co-decision
procedure that has applied to single-market measures ever since (Young 2010). Therefore, similarly to the environmental policy, the EP has traditionally enjoyed strong formal powers to influence EU legislation on single-market measures that remain a keystone of the EU. The IMCO was not established as an individual Committee in the EP until 2004 (Corbett et. al. 2011). Previously, Internal Market Policy had been distributed between mainly the Committee on Industry, Research and Technology, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Policy, and the Committee on Legal Affairs.
3 Literature review: Integration and organised interests

This section will review the relevant literature on how the role and behaviour of organised interests have been studied within the EU.

Within the two dominant theories on European integration, organised interests were seen as playing important roles with respect to integration. In Haas’s neofunctionalism, interest groups would shift their allegiance from domestic institutions to European institutions, as they realised that their material interests would be better served through further integration (Haas 2004). However, intergovernmentalists generally criticised this perspective for neglecting the role of states’ interests in integration (Hoffman 1966). In the early forms of intergovernmentalism, little focus was on the impact of organised interests on European integration until Moravcsik (1993) presented his argument of liberal intergovernmentalism. To explain integration, liberal intergovernmentalism suggested that interest groups in the different MS create a demand for economic integration that MS subsequently supply through interstate bargaining. In this process, European institutions remain a passive structure facilitating interstate interactions by helping them to achieve gains from interstate cooperation (Moravcsik 1993). Liberal intergovernmentalism was criticised for overestimating the degree to which MS are in control over the process of integration and scholars emphasised how the European institutions influence the integration process independently (e.g. Pierson 1996; Pollack 1997a; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Consequently, the current system of the EU has been described through the notion of multilevel governance where policy-making powers are shared between different levels rather than monopolised by MS governments (Hooghe and Marks 2001). In contrast to what liberal intergovernmentalists argued, states would not monopolise the links between domestic and European actors under multilevel governance. On the contrary, subnational actors operate at both the national and supranational levels and may create transnational alliances (Marks et al. 1996). In this vein, Mazey and Richardson (2006) argued that as interest groups have increasingly targeted the European institutions directly, they circumvent national governments, which consequently may lose the ability to control their own agenda. Thus, interest groups may indeed become an independent source of integration.

Whereas integration studies focus on institutions as the dependent variable, governance studies have gained increasing predominance in the study of the EU, where the Europe-
an institutions are taken as given, and rather explore the impact of European integration on policy making i.e. as a dependent variable (Jachtenfuchs 2001). In this respect, the literature on European interest representation highlights how the multilevel system of the EU implies that there are multiple points of access for interest groups that want to influence EU policy-making (Pollack 1997b; Princen and Kerremans 2008). Some scholars have in this way argued that the EU system of separated powers resembles the American federal system and consequently that our understanding of interest representation may be enhanced through comparative studies (Woll 2006; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008). In the context of EU interest representation, the literature distinguishes between several different ‘routes’ for how to influence EU policy-making. The ‘national route’ implies that organised interests attempt to influence individual MS through the applicable national decision-making structures. The ‘Brussels route’ covers direct interest representation vis-à-vis the European institutions, where the EC and the EP are emphasised as the main institutional targets (Greenwood 2011). The use of litigation strategies by bringing cases to the European Court of Justice has also been identified as a mean to influence EU policy making (Bouwen and McCown 2007; Coen and Richardson 2009b). Thus, the literature emphasises that in the multilevel polity of the EU organised interests have multiple routes to influence EU policy-making.

Several scholars have also sought to investigate how organised interests increasingly have been ‘Europeanised’. Early studies focused on the emergence of the so-called European interest groups consisting of national member orgs, and how they consequently sought to influence policy-making in the European Community (SidjANSki 1967; Kirchner 1977). After the adoption of the SEA, Kohler-Koch (1994) noted that there had been an explosive growth in the number and types of actors that had entered the Brussels scene. Coen (1997; 1998) specifically investigated why large firms, one of these new actors, increasingly had begun to follow the ‘Brussels route’. Greenwood (2011) describes and analyses several different types of actors including business and professional, labour, citizen, and territorial interests that seek to lobby the EU institutions. However, research has also found that a division of labour has developed between the different orgs. Specifically, Eising (2004) found that European interest representation was beginning to reflect a system of multilevel governance, where the different interest groups interact at the different levels with the different institutions. Based on a large dataset on national orgs, European orgs, and large firms, he noted the development of a division of labour where national orgs concentrate on the ‘national route’ (primarily CoM), whereas European orgs centre
their attention on the European institutions i.e. the ‘Brussels route’ (the EC and the EP). Furthermore, Beyers and Kerremans (2007; 2011) found that the Europeanization not only depends on the institutional opportunities at the European level, but also the domestic embeddedness of national orgs. The European institutions are far from being passive targets for interest groups, but also, in particular the EC, play an active role in stimulating the Europeanization of organised interests. Scholars have argued that the EC proactively shapes European interest representation through financial support, informal rules for interactions with private interests, and its governance system of consultations with organised interests (Mahoney 2004; Bouwen 2009). Mazey and Richardson (2001) has further investigated the process of the ‘institutionalisation’ of European interest representation as being spurred by the organisational needs of the EC. This may also explain the growth of exchange perspectives in the study of European interest representation that will be advanced in the theoretical section.

A stream of the literature has also developed that specifically seeks to analyse the pattern of interest representation that is evolving with the European Union in light of the sui generis nature of its political system and the different national political systems from which it originates. The literature is outlined on a continuum ranging from corporatism to pluralism (Hix 2005; Andersen and Eliassen 1995; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008). In one end of the continuum we find the (neo)corporatist theories. Best framed by Schmitter (1974) corporatism is in essence a political system where interests are vested in hierarchies and lead orgs. The traditional divide is between labour and capital interests and then the state. In later theories on neocorporatism, this absolutist view of the three, labour, capital, and state is widened so as to encompass other societal interest - framing it ‘Community, Markets and States’ (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). At the other end of the continuum, we find the pluralist tradition originating with Bentley (1908), but most prominently with Truman (1951). In essence, the pluralist models prescribe open access for all actors interested in engaging in the political game. This is in order to secure countervailing special interest of certain groups and those interests of the state itself. Hix (2005:210) identifies two models in a continuum between corporatism and pluralism. In later years scholars such as Kohler-Koch (1999) and Michalowitz (2002) have redefined the debate and argued that coexistence of the different interest representation models in the political system of the EU are possible. We shall elaborate on this in the theoretical section.
Treaty revisions have been especially pertinent for the literature above as the major steps of integration and changes occur in these periods. The literature has highlighted how consecutive treaties with the increasing powers vested in the European institutions have influenced organised interests. The figure below illustrates how the numbers of organised interests at the European level has increased in response to the different treaties:

**Figure 1: European Interest Groups according to Domain and Year of Foundation from 1843-2001 (Cumulated Frequencies). Source: Beyers et al. 2008**

As increasing competencies have been shifted towards the EU, the number of interest groups has continued to increase. Similarly, on the basis of a large-scale quantitative analysis, Wessels (2004) indeed conclude that waves of interest group formation have followed institutional reforms.

On a more general level, the literature also analysed how the institutional power balance has changed as a result of the increased legislative powers of the EP under the OLP. Scholars have advanced formal models to understand how different legislative procedures influence the relative ability of the EP to influence EU policy-making (Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001; Crombez 1996, 2000). For instance, under a Tsebelisian model of legislative politics, a transition from the consultation procedure to the OLP implies that the EP gains veto- and agenda-setting powers and, thus, becomes *de facto* co-legislator with the CoM (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Furthermore, others have empirical-
ly measured the degree to which EP has influenced EU legislation under the different legislative procedures quantitatively and qualitatively (Maurer 1999; Kreppel 1999; Tsebelis et al. 2001). Consequently, Judge and Earnshaw (2003:291) assert “there is little doubt, empirically, that the EP is a genuine co-legislator with the Council under the co-decision procedure”. Hix (2005:110) echoes this and argues that the EU has evolved into a system resembling bicameralism. Thus, the extension of the OLP signifies a major change in the institutional power balance between the European institutions.

Organised interests have responded accordingly to the gradual increase in the powers of the EP. For instance, Duff (1994) noted that interests groups quickly responded to the formal powers that the EP gained under the Cooperation procedure to influence EU policy-making directly. This is indeed echoed by Lehmann (2009: 50), who notes “after the institutional position of the Parliament had been upgraded (...) pressure groups intensified their action with the Parliament as a new channel of influence”. Furthermore, in a study of business lobbying, Coen (2009) found that business allocation of resources to the EP and MEPs had increased from approximately 5% in 1984 via 10% in 1994 to 20% in 2005. Consequently, this underlines that the EP with its increased powers have become increasingly important target for organised interests groups. Thus, as Coen and Richardson (2009a:x) stress “development since the 1993 (...) have been unidirectional confirming that groups, generally being rational actors, understand that it is best to ‘shoot where the ducks are’”. On the other hand, the literature has not as such sought to investigate the extent to which a single treaty influence the behaviour organised interests. On the contrary, the above-mentioned literature has had a more general scope to investigate general trends in the behaviour of organised interests. Consequently, this paper will seek to enhance the understanding of how organised interests respond to changes in the institutional power balance by investigating how organised interests change their lobbying strategy, as a result of treaty changes.

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12 Co-decision 2 denotes the co-decision procedure as of the Treaty of Amsterdam, where the co-decision procedure introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht was altered.
4 Theoretical Framework

The above literature review indicates that there is a gap within the literature. No study explicitly has sought to analyse how a change from the consultation procedure to the OLP influences the lobbying strategies of organised interests. The following section will suggest a theoretical framework of how to analyse the institutional change influences the behaviour of organised interests. The causality suggested in this thesis is accordingly:

![Figure 2, Outline of the theoretical causality of this thesis](attachment:image.png)

Note: Δ indicates ‘change’.

In the first step, Lisbon implies that the legislative procedure is changed from the consultation procedure to the OLP for the concerned policy area. In the second step, this leads to a change in the institutional power balance, as the EP gains increased formal powers to influence legislation. In the third step, the exchange perspective suggests that the incentive to lobby the EP increases, as they may offer increased influence on legislation. Fourthly, as a result of venue shopping and competitive interest group pressures, organised interests would lobby the institution to maintain or change status quo. Finally, as a result of this, changes should be reflected in organised interests’ lobbying strategies.

With respect to the suggested causality, the theoretical section focuses exclusively on step 3 to 5. The literature review above showed that it has been shown both theoretically and
empirically that the transition from the consultation procedure to the OLP has implied that the EP has gained increased influence over EU legislation. Consequently, the theoretical framework focuses on the latter steps of the causality that address the impact of these changes on the behaviour of organised interests.

4.1 An exchange perspective on lobbyism

Within the literature, scholars have recognised the mutual resource dependency between the European institutions and interests groups (Coen 1997; Pappi and Henning 1999; Michalowitz 2004; Bouwen 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Eising, 2007; Coen and Richardson 2009b). Accordingly, a resource dependency exists between the institutions and organised interests that depend on each other to achieve their political goals. Consequently, the orgs are in the need of exchanging with other orgs. Specifically, exchange has been defined “as any voluntary activity between two organisations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives” (Levine and White 1961: 588). Thus, the orgs would make a cost-benefit analysis of whether to engage in a given exchange. Exchange relations would only be durable, when both sides see benefit from the given interaction (Bouwen 2002). Taking such an approach implies that lobbying is an exchange between the European institutions and organised interests. In the EU context, the currency exchanged is information (Bouwen 2002; Eising 2007).

The exchange approach in some respects resembles the resource dependency approach advanced by Pfeffer and Salanick (2003). Both approaches build on the recognition that orgs depend on the environment to achieve their goals. However, the approaches are fundamentally different in that the resource dependency perspective takes point of departure in orgs and focus on their dependency on resources from the environment and how resources consequently is the source of power vis-à-vis other orgs. Furthermore, the resource dependency approach stresses how the dependency can be manipulated to reduce the dependency on other orgs. In contrast, the exchange perspective implies that the focus is on the exchange rather than on orgs and their dependency on the environment. Subsequently, the exchange perspective stresses the incentives and needs to exchange rather than the consequences of such an exchange for the interdependence between the orgs. Therefore, taking an exchange approach implies that the focus below is on the incentives for exchanging and how Lisbon will influence them rather than on the consequences on the interdependence between the orgs and the institutions. To explain this, the section below will provide further theoretical explanations of why the European
institutions exchange with civil society. The next section will explain the interest of organised interests groups to exchange with the institutions. On the basis of these explanations, the subsequent sections will focus on how Lisbon influences the incentives of organised interest groups to exchange with the European institutions.

4.1.1 Exchanging with civil society: European institutions’ interests

As explained above, the exchange perspective implies that institutions would engage in an exchange with interest groups when it benefits their goals. This section explains that the institutions exchange with organised interests to obtain information and legitimacy.

To explain the interests of the EU institutions in exchange relations, Eising (2007) has emphasised that the regulatory functions and the organisational features of the EU institutions make them dependent on interest groups. The EU institutions lack resources and are separated from the implementation of EU policies and therefore become dependent on feedback from those who are affected by the legislation. They need information that enables the institutions to design policies that solve the issue at hand and can win political support (Eising, 2007). Moreover, Bouwen (2002) explicitly links the institutions’ need for legitimacy13 to their interest in exchanging with interest groups. Input legitimacy is enhanced by including civil society actors in the legislative process, which ceteris paribus implies that the institutions would have an interest in ‘exchanging’ with civil society actors. In addition, interest groups may provide technical information that enables the institutions to devise policies that work efficiently and, thus, provide output legitimacy (Bouwen 2002). This latter legitimacy is particularly important in regulatory politics (Maione 1997). Thus, the institution’s interest in exchanging with interest groups is the result of the legislative role of institutions, the institutional features, and a need for legitimacy.

Exchange scholars agree that the three main legislative institutions i.e. EC, EP and CoM within the EU have different ‘demands’ with respect to information provided by interest groups as a result of different institutional roles. The EC, vested with the powers to initiate legislation, primarily need technical information to formulate the specific dossiers and then to make impact assessments. The EC also seeks to maintain contact with interest

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13 Scharpf (1999) has argued that legitimacy as a concept can be understood in two complementary perspectives. On the one hand input legitimacy is achieved by including people/groups that are affected by a policy, to search for a solution to which everybody agrees. On the other hand, legitimacy can be seen in the sense of governing for the people. Accordingly, output legitimacy is derived from devising policies that solve the policy issue at hand efficiently (Scharpf 1999: 7-13). Later scholars have also added throughput legitimacy as an additional perspective on legitimacy, where the focus is the process of decision-making (Risse and Kleine 2007).
groups to enhance legitimacy and build support for legislative proposals (Bouwen 2002, 2009). Scholars disagree with respect to the informational demand by the EP. Bouwen (2002) argued that the EP as a supranationally elected body would primarily seek to gain the European encompassing interest on legislation, whereas information of national interests would be secondary to this. However, Bouwen (2004b) actually found that national and European associations enjoy almost equal access to the EP, which was seen to reflect the fact that national parties are in control of the candidate selection process.

Lehmann (2009) underlined this by emphasising that the logic of lobbying the EP is different from the logic of lobbying the EC – the other supranational body of the EU. Lobbying the EP is more political, as interest groups need to provide political capital that enhances the MEPs’ reputations in their constituencies and within the European institutions, in addition to technical information. Michalowitz (2004) underlined that the EC consists of civil servants which makes it more technical compared to the EP. In contrast, the EP consists of politicians whose chances of re-election depend directly on voters in their constituency. Therefore, MEPs are more likely to be attentive to groups that originate from or can provide information on their constituency and thereby influence the prospects of re-election (Michalowitz 2004). Thus, this suggests that when lobbying the EP the information demanded by the EP is predominately political and nationally inclined focusing on the narrow interest of the MEP’s constituency. In contrast, the information demanded by the EC is generally more technical and concerns wider European interests. However, obviously, the EP also needs technical information and vice versa for the EC. With respect to the CoM, the consensus within the literature is that it mainly requests national information, technical as well as political, as it represents MS (Bouwen 2002; Michalowitz 2004; Hayes-Renshaw 2009; Eising 2007).

4.1.2 Institutional features and access: Integration of political systems into a sui generis system.

Interest representation and lobby-strategies are influenced by the political system in which they operate (Truman 1951; Schmitter 1974). Therefore, investigating the effects of procedural and institutional shifts on interest group behaviour also entails understanding the political system in which they operate. A continuum from pluralism (Bentley 1908; Truman 1951) to corporatism (Schmitter 1974; Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Bouwen (2002, 2004a and 2004b) presented a theory of access goods and hypothesized the degree of access for different organizations to the European institutions.
Streeck and Schmitter 1991) has been advanced in much literature on lobbyism (Hix 2005; Andersen and Eliassen 1995; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008).

According to Andersen and Eliassen (1995) the two theoretical frameworks have both been challenged by the European integration process where lobbying has been elevated to the EU level. They pointed out and were echoed by among others Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) and Michalowitz (2002) that the EU is a completely new political system, and therefore models of lobbyism originating in different national political systems cannot merely be transferred to the European level. There are two responses to this.

Kohler-Koch (1999:6) developed a full typology of systems of governance, where network governance is comparatively contrasted to pluralism and neo-corporatism. She posits that in network governance “[t]he public administration is an actor which mainly organises the arena for political exchange and agreement” (Kohler-Koch 1999:26). Thus, “[t]he core idea is that politics is about problem-solving and that the setting of policy-making is defined by the existence of highly organised social sub-systems” (Kohler-Koch 1999:25). In this sense, network governance is a stage after either pluralism or neo-corporatism. Coexistence of several systems of governance does take place in the same issue area at the same time in transition periods, but in essence they will become full systems of network governance in time. On this later point, Michalowitz (2002) differs from Kohler-Koch as she in her attempt to move away from the dichotomy between pluralism and neo-corporatism, and in her non-acceptance of network governance as anything but a confluence of the former, proclaims that, “policy network analysis should not be construed as a replacement for the previous approaches [pluralism and corporatism]. It is, rather, an umbrella concept, which can redress some of the deficiencies of existing research perspectives”, (Michalowitz 2002:37) adding that, “[i]t may be time to cease looking for either pluralist or neocorporatist features and admit their coexistence.” (Michalowitz 2002:42). This is fundamental for our understanding of how lobbyism reacts to institutional change. Mainly because governance systems can, thus, vary within a political system such as the EU both at a sector level (policy-area) and at an institutional level. The implications of this are the possible differing features of access besides informational needs from society in the supranational EU institutions – the EC and EP.

Some empirical studies have indeed found the EP to be more pluralist than the EC, which is often identified as neocorporatist (Michalowitz 2002). Important for lobbying theories is the presumption corporatist theories make on access to the policy-making
process. In general access is considered limited and confined to the accepted players in the ‘formal’ hierarchical structures. Thus, lobbying is limited to take place within these limits, and lobbying from outside the hierarchy will by definition be inefficient, as it will not be taken into account by policymakers. On the other side, in essence, the pluralist models prescribe open access for all actors interested in engaging in the political game, hence, leading to intense competition between organised interests over policy-makers’ votes. On this basis, if the EP is indeed more pluralist than the EC, it could be expected that more players will be present in the EP, and that the ‘established’ organised interests present in the more corporatist EC will not have predominance of influence.

4.1.3 The interests of organised interests: Influence on EU policies

On the basis of the idea of lobbyism as an exchange relation, this section will argue that it is crucial for organised interests to seek access to influence EU policy-making.

In his seminal analysis on interest groups, Truman (1951) provided a clear explanation why political interest groups seek to influence policy-makers. In this analysis, interest groups were defined as “a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society” (Truman 1951: 37). In essence, shared attitudes form the basis of a given interest group’s interest. Whereas there may exist several different interest groups, these interest groups “inevitably” seek the assistance of governments to realise their goals to establish and maintain an equilibrium that benefits their respective members. As power is concentrated in the hands of governments, interest groups have to resort to governments to achieve their goals. In this respect, Truman emphasises that access to policy-makers indeed becomes a necessary objective for interest groups to achieve their goals. As “power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups” (Truman, 1951:264). Thus, Truman’s argument suggests that interest groups essentially seek to influence policy-makers to establish or maintain an equilibrium benefitting their members.

Truman’s analysis also had a wider sociological focus to understand the role of interest groups in politics. In this respect, Truman (1951) argued that the equilibrium between the different interest groups would be reached, as new political interest groups would arise to restore a balance that was distorted by another interest group. However, Olson (1965) provided a severe criticism to this latter aspect of Truman’s enterprise in the ‘logic of collective action’, where he outlined why special and minority interests often prevailed
over public majority interest. Simply put, the problem of free-riding in interest formation can impede interest group formation since some interest fail to group efficiently. Nevertheless, Olsson shared Truman’s assumption that interest groups indeed exist to further the interest of its members. This perspective is also pertinent in the literature on contemporary EU-lobbying. Eising (2007) argues that business interests seek to influence the development of EU regulation as they carry the costs and obtain the benefits of EU policies and therefore have an interest in influencing the content of these policies, or in the words of Truman, the resulting equilibrium. However, in this respect, it is added that also information about the EU may be an incentive for interest groups to seek access to EU policy-makers. Interest groups that regularly are in contact with EU policy-makers have an advantage with respect to influencing policy-makers. Collected information can be processed and passed on to the org’s members or other potential allies that in turn increase the probability of influence (Eising 2007). Michalowitz (2004) emphasises that as regulation relevant for interest groups have shifted to the EU-level, interest groups have to follow suit to influence the content in accordance with their organisational goals. Thus, this would suggest that interest groups would have an incentive to seek to influence EU-policy making to the degree to which EU regulation affects their interests.

4.1.4 Exchanging information: Impact of resources on the demand for access

The preceding discussion emphasised that interest groups seek access to potentially influence EU legislation. The institutions grant access to organised interests to gain legitimacy. However, due to their different roles, the institutions demand different forms of information. In this sense, both parties would see benefits in entering an exchange with the organised interest groups providing information to the European institution.

In the EU, the legislative power is shared among the institutions that have to cooperate to legislate and therefore the potential influence that the institutions can offer depend on a wide range of issues including the decision-making procedure. The influence-seeking interest group’s demand for access is likely to be dependent on the potential influence that the three institutions can offer. Whereas most exchange perspectives recognise that different lobbying orgs have different capacities, Michalowitz (2004) adds the important issue of resources. Interest groups have to collect and prepare information that can be passed on to the lobbied. Thus, lobbying requires resources. Hence, the rational interest group operating under scarce resources would primarily allocate resources to lobbying the institutions that potentially have the largest influence on a given issue. In this sense,
an organised interest group’s demand for access should be seen as increasing according to the potential impact that a given institution has on the legislative process. Even if influence cannot be guaranteed, the organised interest group would still have an interest in seeking access. As Michalowitz (2004) explains, simply the opportunity for gaining influence makes lobbyism attractive. The incentive to lobby is further enhanced if countervailing interests are seeking to push the legislation in an unfavourable direction, as the interest group would consequently need to work against this change (Michalowitz 2004). Therefore, in spite of no guarantee of success, the interest group working under scarce resources would seek to influence the institutions having the largest say on a given issue.

However, this does not imply that interest groups only allocate resources to lobbying a single institution. On the contrary, an institutional setup with multiple access points implies that this would be a risky strategy, as influence gained in one institution may be countered by the actions of another institution: “Rational action demands direct lobbying in multiple venues [...] The EU policy system – characterised by uncertain agendas, shifting networks and coalitions, and unstable procedural rules – encourages interest groups (and other actors) to behave promiscuously” (Mazey and Richardson 2006:255). Therefore, an interest group seeking influence would have the incentive to allocate resources to lobby all the relevant institutions that may influence a given issue so as to reduce the risk of influence obtained in one institution becoming cancelled by another institution.

4.1.5 The impact of increased powers on the behaviour of organised interests: Opportunities and Threats

This section will explain how the formal powers of the EP would increase the organised interests’ incentives for exchanging with the EP. For the organised interest groups seeking to obtain policy changes, the increased powers of the EP may be an opportunity to adjust the current equilibrium. On the contrary, for organised interests satisfied with the current equilibrium, the new powers of the EP may constitute a threat that may alter status quo. Thus, organised interests’ regards of their specific interests would have an incentive to exchange with the EP either to alter or maintain the current equilibrium.

Scholars use the notion of political opportunity structure to explain how the institutional setup enables and constrains lobbyism (Princen and Kerremans 2008). Based on the above reasoning, the fact that the EP is changed from being a mere consultative body to a legislative body in effect implies that it ceteris paribus becomes a more attractive access point as it gains formal powers in the EU policy-making. With the creation of an addi-
tional access point, a crucially important issue is to determine why interest groups lobby a given institution. To explain this, we can turn to the notion of venue-shopping. The notion was originally coined by Baumgartner and Jones (1991) and advanced amongst others by Richardson (2000) to explain how interest groups may initiate political change. The concept builds on the recognition that political actors undertake strategic actions, where interest groups shop for the venue that remains most sympathetic to their interests (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Building on this logic, Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 106) argue that “[... t]he numerous policy venues characteristic of a pluralist system provide opportunities for those on the losing side of a policy debate to find a more favorable venue [...].” With the emergence of a new access point, a new opportunity arises that potentially may change status quo. Interest groups seeking to change the equilibrium would then have an incentive to exchange with the ‘new’ institution, if they believe that this institution is favourable to their interests and has the ability to initiate policy change.

While the concept of venue-shopping highlights how the institutional change can be an opportunity for some interest groups, scholars have emphasised competitive interest group pressures as an important factor that influence the need for lobbying a given institution. Mazey and Richardson (2001; 2006) have suggested that the competitive pressures indeed necessitate the need to lobby new institutions. If a set of actors begin to lobby a given institution other actors have to follow suit, as the venue otherwise would be left for a competing interest which could tip the existing equilibrium in the Trumanian sense. For instance, trade unions’ decision to organise at the EU level was deeply influenced by the need of countering the perceived strength of employer orgs that were already active at the EU level (Kirchner 1977: 30-33). Thus, this would suggest that there might also be defensive reasons for why interest groups would shift resources to lobbying the EP. Inter-interest group competition ceteris paribus increases the incentive to exchange with a new institution, as the new institution otherwise has the power to change the equilibrium in an undesired direction. In this sense, increased powers of the EP may constitute a threat. Consequently, lobbying the EP may be done as a means of risk management where organised interest groups lobby the EP to maintain the existing equilibrium.

Building on the above discussion, the extension of the OLP to the EP may be seen as both an opportunity and a threat for the influence-seeking interest groups. Thus, interest groups regardless of their specific interest with respect to the current equilibrium would be expected to allocate increased resources to lobbying the EP.
4.2 Lobbying in practice

The preceding section suggested that interest groups devote increasing attention to lobbying the EP. To identify how this is translated into lobbyists’ strategies, the following section examines crucial elements of lobbying strategies taking point of departure in the literature targeted at practitioners. This literature will give a micro-level perspective on how interest groups formulate and define their lobbying strategies. Therefore, this literature gives specific tools for analysing how and to which extent lobbying practices respond to institutional change.

Early handbooks on lobbying maintained an almost exclusive focus on the decision-making procedure of the different political systems (e.g. Miller 1990; Gardner 1991; Club de Bruxelles 1994). Questions such as ‘who is wielding powers in the political system?’, the nature of these political institutions and the legislative procedure dominated these handbooks but with little direct focus on the formulation of lobbying strategies. To overcome this, we shall in the following explore different practical approaches of how to formulate lobbying strategies taken from different political systems and try to synthesise them into some generic practices or parameters of lobbying strategies based on which we can measure the behaviour of interest groups more concretely.

Van Schendelen (2006; 2010) has published a handbook on the art of lobbying the EU. In effect, public affairs management in the EU is separated into three different areas: management of arena, the home front, and the fieldwork. Firstly, “an arena is […] not a physical place, but the virtual collection of all the stakeholders, including the officials, together with their issues regarding a specific dossier at a specific moment” (Van Schendelen 2010:162). Thus, this issue relates to questions such as whom to lobby – that is who are potential targets – and on what to lobby – that is the issues that an org has. Managing the arena includes identifying stakeholders and pinpointing those that are relevant. Relevant stakeholders, including officials, are those that intervene actively or/and have influence on a given issue. Obviously an enhanced role of the EP in the power-game of EU policy-making alters the relevance of the actors within the EP that, thus, become more prominent. Managing the arena also includes identifying issues that form the basis of the current state of affairs in the EU arena. The time dimension (life-cycle of a dossier) and the boundaries of the arena (new issues added and actors present) are highlighted as two additional factors that potentially may be altered and therefore need to be managed. Thus, arena analysis demands a dynamic approach with the arena being far from static, but
continuously changing (Van Schendelen 2010). Esbensen (2007) and Thompson and John (2007) echo these points, with Esbensen especially noting the key importance of stakeholders that can indirectly influence an issue.

Van Schendelen (2010:173) outlines several ways of collecting information on the arena and managing it practically; the Internet; debriefs with ‘friends’; and visiting the corridors. Hence, changes to arenas also mean finding new sources of information and building relations with the actors in the arena. Esbensen (2007) even finds that having e.g. official meetings can be beneficial at this stage as it would be arrogant to think that a full solution package can be presented from the beginning. Having identified the relevant stakeholders, the org has to engage in dialogue with the aim of understanding the external stakeholders’ interests and priorities. The stakeholder strategy remains highly relevant for our purpose as it specifically provides guidance on who is to be the targets of the lobbying strategy. Stakeholders should be mapped against two criteria e.g. whether they are positive or negative towards the issue and, more importantly for our thesis, if they may influence the given issue.

Management of the home front, the second area mentioned by Van Schendelen, is highlighted as an equally important issue for public affairs management. Home management specifically concerns asking such questions as: who lobbies, why the org lobbies, and the goals that it wants to achieve. Successful lobbying of the EU requires that orgs not only makes the goal of its lobbying efforts clear, but also to manage internal issues such as securing internal cohesion, acquiring relevant knowledge, managing resources and skills, and managing the image to build a good reputation and trustworthiness (Van Schendelen 2010:200-210) – i.e. clarifying who lobbies. Esbensen (2007) underlines that an org’s allocation of resources is deeply dependent on a preceding stakeholder mapping. We have already explained above how the relevant knowledge of the arena can be obtained. Van Schendelen (2010:205) refers to resources as “the capacity for action”. Such framing allows us to broaden the issue beyond the mere financial means to also include the skills necessary to lobby, the expertise required to be efficient and effective, the informal networks possessed by the org, and the external positions it holds in e.g. formal advisory

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15 In the context of Danish policy-making, Esbensen (2007) has suggested a seven step model to formulate public affairs strategies, from which important generic elements can be drawn to complement and illustrate Van Schendelen’s approach

16 Thompson and John (2007) also provided guidance with respect to putting lobbying strategies into practice. In spite of being written in the context of the political system in the United Kingdom, their approach basically shares the same elements as Esbensen’s approach, and thus, also provides complementarity and further reflection to Van Schendelen’s approach.
groups or intergroups. As Lisbon changes the *modus operandi* of lobbying in the policy areas that are affected by Lisbon, the question of the capacity for action is naturally affected. Hence, both allocation of resources and obtainment of new skills and knowledge may require adaptation. A changing institutional setting may involve changes in image management as the new institution may operate on a different logic that necessitates different images, reputations, and the establishment of trustworthiness.

The question of *why lobby?* is the next aspect of managing the home front. It relates closely to the above theory on opportunity structures, entailing identification of opportunities and threats to the org or its members. This involves analysing and understanding the range of themes, logics, and systems that create and sustain the political process central to the operation of the org. It is important that themes are only relevant if they influence the org directly (Esbensen 2007). Furthermore, Van Schendelen (2010) stresses the process of identifying the nature of and managing challenges that both pose opportunities and threats. The long-list of challenges must then be downsized from a range of assessments. This can “be organised as a *rational method* and even be computerised” (Van Schendelen 2010:219) not least as a cost-benefit analysis of challenges (positive or negative) versus actions (resources) required. On the individual issue, the same process must be undertaken to evaluate whether something is an opportunity or threat or whether it has just been perceived as such. Thompson and John (2007) underline how opportunities and threats arise not just in relation to legislative acts, but also in the process before and after, and, hence, are not limited in time and space.

Another pressing question is *when to lobby?* Striking your messages, ideas, wishes etc. at the right time is crucial for the lobbying strategy (Esbensen 2007; Thompson and John 2007; Van Schendelen 2010). Mistiming can in itself lead to defeat. Thus, assessing the life cycle of a dossier or an issue is an important practice as well assessing when to forge to get something on or off the agenda (Van Schendelen 2010; Esbensen 2007). New entrants to the arena means a new life-cycle assessment and new possibilities of affecting the agenda setting in case the new entrants can influence agenda setting in general.

The above paragraphs focused on why, what, when, who, and whom to lobby. The issue is now *how* these questions are dealt with at the practical level (Thompson and John 2007). One of the most pertinent tools of a lobbying strategy is the communication strategy linked to it. This includes how to communicate one’s position e.g. through position papers and the use of mass media, specialised arena media, or issue-media. These things
must be based on conscious selections of what best facilitates the desired goals of the communication (Esbensen 2007; Thompson and John 2007). Closely linked to this is the type of information that is to be communicated not just to mass recipients as media, but also directly with stakeholders. Here, it is extremely important to be aware that different stakeholders require different types of information as the best information is that which also facilitates that the recipient stakeholders can reach their goals, e.g. information that will help a politician facilitate re-election (Van Schendelen 2010). However, gathering the right type of information is not sufficient. The information must also be passed on in an appropriate manner. Besides restricting information to a minimum vis-à-vis the amount of resources the recipients will want to spend receiving the information, the information must also be accessible and understandable for the recipient. In case new stakeholders enter the arena or in case an org wishes to raise a new issue, awareness, knowledge, and in the last instance intelligence must be ‘created’. Teaching, educating, and cultivating are ingredients in the correct passing of information that are – in many instances of not least new issues – key. The passing of information should happen under the most appropriate form of interaction. This interaction can be formal or informal, direct or indirect, in the form of a meeting, e-mail, conference, inter-group, phone calls, etc. In order to be efficient and effective the correct interaction form/type should be consciously chosen (Esbensen 2007; Thompson and John 2007; Van Schendelen 2010).

The nature of the relationships with stakeholders is also crucial (Van Schendelen 2010). Trust is often fundamental for a beneficial exchange and for continued access to targets. Thus, establishing stable relations, especially before needed, are an efficient method of lobbying – especially for the lobbyist dealing with several dossiers in the same policy-area. Another practical tool is the formation of alliances and coalitions with other stakeholders/interests in the arena (Esbensen 2007; Thompson and John 2007; Van Schendelen 2010). In a highly competitive policy arena, the formation of alliances and coalitions enhances the probability of access and acceptance as the legitimacy of messages is often considered more strongly (Van Schendelen 2010:332). A last very important tool, which indeed is also the foundation of most of the other parameters/questions of a lobbying strategy, is the monitoring of the meta-arena (the ‘whole’ EU-arena) (Thompson and John 2007; Van Schendelen 2010). Monitoring includes media outlets, press releases, websites, speeches, official agendas of institutions, minutes, etc. The monitoring system is the “eyes and ears of the organisation” according to Thompson and John (2007:22).
The system must provide the org with all the basic information needed in order to know whom, what, when, and why the org should consider lobbying.

The fieldwork and its management relates to many of the above questions, such as whom, what and when. However, the fieldwork management is oriented towards the techniques used on a specific dossier. Some techniques are so-called old-fashioned advocacy and argumentation whereas others include more strategic and tactical thinking in relation to dilemmas such as whether to simplify or to complicate a dossier, whether to mobilise or demobilise stakeholders on a dossier and so forth. Common to this is the very dossier specific and time specific nature of this, which cannot be captured except by in depth case studies of given individual dossiers. Hence, these are not in focus in the remainder of this thesis.

Together, the three authors’ approaches seem to suggest that a lobbying strategy should answer the following key questions (the points under each dimension only indicate relevant examples, but are not as exhaustive lists of all relevant variables):

Table 1, Synthesis of generic parameters of a lobbying strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies: This issue relate to internal organisational factors such as managing resources, skills and knowledge necessary to lobby.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Management of resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Management of skills and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Image management</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cohesion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Why lobby: The org identifies and manages challenges that influence the need for lobbying</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identifying and managing opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying and managing threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whom to lobby: The identification and understanding of stakeholders in the arena that have the capacity to influence the issue and the agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying and mapping stakeholders such as politicians, civil servants, network actors, issue-specific actors with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. High relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Least relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engaging in dialogue with stakeholders so as to understand their motives and goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On what to lobby: Identifying and managing and consequently selecting the issues to tackle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying issues relevant for the org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managing and prioritising these issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Selecting limited priorities to lobby on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How to lobby: Determining how to realise the goals – implementation

- Communication e.g. medias and position papers
- Gathering the right type of information to be provided
- Passing on information – incl. education.
- Interaction form with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups
- Relationships, stability or specificity
- Coalition/alliance building
- Monitoring

When to lobby: Timing the lobbying effort providing the right input to the right actors at the right time

- Legislative procedure/phase
- Prediction of events

This synthesis of the three different guides to the formulation of lobbying practice suggests a picture of lobbying strategies that have to address a wide range of parameters. Internally, the lobbying org has to manage issues such as skills building, allocation of resources, image, etc. The org has to define what its goals are for instance by identifying relevant threats and opportunities. Having done so, the org has to identify actors that have an impact on the given issue. Actors that have a higher potential influence remain key targets. In the next phase, the org specifically selects the issues and specifies what to lobby for. Hereafter, the issue of how to lobby is to be decided including issues such as when the lobbying has to take place.

What remain to be said is that the above parameters are only meant as guidance. Thus, in the later empirical analysis the parameters will be used flexibly to best capture where expected changes do not occur, but also where unexpected changes do indeed occur.

4.3 Empirical expectations

The expected causality was highlighted in Figure 2. The presented theoretical framework suggests that the specific dimensions of the lobbying strategy should change as a result of the institutional change. Hence, it is by measuring the changes on each of the parameters presented above that we shall answer our empirical investigations to answer our RQ.

More specifically, the theoretical framework may suggest the following with respect to the presented dimensions of lobbying strategies: a transition from the consultation procedure to the OLP implies that the EP becomes a more attractive exchange partner for organised interests as the EP may offer direct influence on EU legislation under the
OLP. Consequently, organised interests would be expected to allocate increasing resources to lobbying the EP i.e. a change in the dimension of who is lobbying.

To explain why lobby the EP, the concept of venue shopping and the resulting inter-interest group competition stresses that organised interest may do so both in response to opportunities and threats. This is especially relevant for the EP as it has a more competitive environment due to its suggested pluralistic characteristics. For organised interest groups seeking to obtain a change to the current equilibrium, the increased powers would be an opportunity to obtain policy change and vice-versa for the organised interest groups seeking to maintain the current equilibrium.

On the question of whom to target, the organised interests would be expected to target the actors that have the largest influence on a given dossier. However, the presented theory does not provide any concrete indication on whom that could be. Section 2.1 opened the black box of the EP and explained that in particular rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs were key players in the adoption of the EP’s stand on the specific dossiers. Consequently, it would be expected that they would the primary targets for organised interest.

On the question of how to lobby the EP, the presented exchange perspective would suggest that the EP would have a different informational demand than the EC and CoM. Therefore, the means by which the interest groups seek to influence the EP is expected to be different. Concretely, the presented perspective suggests that the EP in particular needs political information and information on the MEP’s constituency to improve the MEP’s prospects of re-election. Consequently, orgs would be expected to primarily provide this information to the EP. Furthermore, as explained, the EP may also need technical and European information that the org should provide, albeit to a lesser extent.
5 Methodology: From theory to empirical analysis

To recap, the purpose of this thesis is to understand how the shifts in the EU’s institutional power-balance resulting from Lisbon have affected the behaviour of organised interests. To understand this, the preceding theoretical section suggested different factors that are likely to influence how and to which extent Lisbon has affected organised interests. This section will present the methodological considerations behind the devised research design to investigate this causality further. The first subsection will outline our research design. The second subsection will explain why a multiple embedded case study approach was devised. The third subsection will explain and provide further details on the undertaken interview approach. The fourth subsection will conclude by summarising the strengths and limitations of the research design. Furthermore, Appendix III briefly presents our reflections on the lessons that we have made during this process.

5.1 The Research Design

In order to answer our research question, the following research design has been chosen in accordance with the theoretical approach and empirical findings of existing literature in the field. Figure 3, The research design of this thesis illustrates the research design.

In summary, the empirical investigation of this paper is based on a multiple-case approach, where the behaviour of organised interests is investigated within four different policy areas on the basis of a replication logic enhancing the external validity of the findings. Furthermore, an embedded case approach is applied, where the findings of two different levels/units of analysis, i.e. 1) behaviour of a limited number of orgs and 2) the perception of the targets of interest groups’ behaviour in the EP are compared which ceteris paribus provides construct validity.

Data was collected through interviews providing important benefits as to understanding whether Lisbon had influenced behaviour within the given case areas and thus strengthens internal validity. To overcome potential interviewee biases, six individuals within each area where interviewed – three from the organisational side (sub-unit 1 of analysis) and three from the EP target side (sub-unit 2 of analysis), totalling 24 interviews.
In the following section, we will elaborate on the chosen research design whilst reasoning the choices made by drawing on the relevant literature on research methods.

### 5.2 Research Method: A Case Study Approach

On the basis of the theoretical argument presented in the previous section, the behaviour of organised interests is expected to change in accordance with the legislative procedure and the resulting power balance. Thus, to investigate the impact of Lisbon in the policy areas where the legislative procedure has been changed to the OLP, it becomes essential to base the empirical analysis of interest group behaviour in these areas. As Yin (2009) argues, a case study approach gives distinct advantages when seeking to investigate the causal links between two variables that at the same time constitute a contemporary phenomenon over which the research has little or no control. In this case, it is obviously not possible to manipulate the relevant variables. Furthermore, the case study approach gives the benefit of allowing the researcher to understand the issue under investigation in depth and in its real life context when contextual factors are highly relevant for the study (Yin 2009).
As there are different definitions and discussions on the nature of case studies, it should be noted that our research design was devised following the case study approach presented by Yin (2009). In this approach of case study research it is highlighted that case studies can vary with respect to two dimensions: firstly, the number of cases that are under study and, secondly, the number of units under analysis. The below section will explain the considerations behind the selected research design that concretely include multiple cases and two embedded units of analysis.

5.2.1 The Number of Cases under Study
The first dimension focuses on the number of cases that are under study where the choice essentially is between studying a single case or multiple cases. In particular, single case studies are likely to suffer from a wide range of issues e.g. selection bias or being unique which are likely to reduce the external validity of the results produced by this method (King et al. 1994). In contrast, the evidence of multiple-case designs is likely to be stronger, in particular, when the conclusions of several cases independently of each other confirm the same proposition. Therefore, we chose a research design of multiple cases to enhance the external validity.

The selection of the cases was based on the replication logic. Here, the idea is to conduct several case studies that are compared to predicted results. If the case studies turn out as predicted, the results provide more compelling evidence for the initial proposition than a single case study. This is the case as the initial proposition is confirmed in more instances. When applying the replication logic, cases have to be selected carefully as either a literal replication i.e. that the case predicts similar results, or as a theoretical replication i.e. as a case that predicts contrasting results, but for anticipated reasons (Yin 2009). For this thesis, it implies that the cases have to be selected on the basis of whether the Treaty basis has changed within the given case. Within the given constraints of this research process, we decided to conduct four case studies with two of the cases being literal replications and the other two theoretical replications.

The selection of the relevant policy areas was made on the basis of the committee structure of the EP. As explained above in section 2.1, the Parliamentary Committees assume a central role in the EP and are specialised within different policy areas that largely follow

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17 Yin’s approach is somehow different from other scholars in that he considers “single case and multiple-case designs to be variants within the same methodological framework” (Yin 2009:53). In contrast, Lijphart (1971), for instance, distinguishes between the case study method and comparative method (i.e. multiple-cases) as two different methods.
the Treaty basis. The selection of the two literal cases was based on the degree to which the committees had experienced the largest proportional shift in dossiers under the OLP from the 6th (2004-2009) to the 7th legislative period (2009-2014) i.e. from pre- and post-Lisbon. By identifying the committees that had experienced the largest change, it was expected that the impact of Lisbon on the behaviour of organised interests would be best captured. The figure below shows the number of files adopted under the OLP during the 6th legislature and the two first years of the 7th legislature for the committees that have mainly gained new competencies under Lisbon:

Figure 4, Number of AGRI, PECH, INTA, LIBE and ECON co-decision files adopted in the 6th and in the first two years after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

![Figure 4](image_url)

Source: Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou 2011

Figure 4 shows that in particular the number of dossiers under the OLP within PECH and INTA has surged. Specifically, INTA has undergone the largest proportional change compared to the other relevant committees. The INTA only adopted two COD files during the 6th legislature whilst they had already adopted 15 COD dossiers at the end of 2011 which implies that the number of dossiers have increased more than sevenfold. PECH has undergone the second largest proportional change with the number of dossiers adopted under the OLP having increased more than threefold from two to seven. On this basis, these two committees’ policy areas were selected as the literal replication cases where it is expected that the behaviour of organised interests have changed. The two other Committees were selected on the basis of the logic of theoretical replication. Specifically, ENVI and IMCOs’ policy areas were selected as the theoretical replication cases, as they have been vested with the OLP powers for an extended time period as explained in sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. As the legislative procedure largely remains the same
under Lisbon, no change in the behaviour of organised interests towards these committees is expected in the OLP dossiers.

5.2.2 The Number of Units of Analysis: Embedded Design
The second issue relates to the number of units under analysis where Yin (2009) distinguishes between two different designs; holistic designs where there is a single unit of analysis; and embedded designs with multiple units of analysis. It was decided to undertake an embedded research design where multiple units of analysis are analysed. In this thesis, the main unit of analysis is the behaviour of organised interests.

However, it was decided to include two ‘subunits’ of analysis as a consequence of the selected method of collecting information and the nature of lobbying. The first ‘subunit’ of analysis is the interest group that naturally provides insights to their own behaviour. Specifically, we decided to investigate the behaviour of a limited number of interest groups within each case policy area through interviews. Furthermore, the orgs may also suffer from unknown unique characteristics that potentially reduce the external validity of their behaviour. Therefore, to further verify the findings suggested by the analysis of the orgs’ behaviour, we also included the perception of the expected targets of lobbying as a second ‘subunit’ of analysis with the aim of enhancing external validity of the thesis. The targets of lobbying were expected to provide further information and insights on a more general level with respect to the behaviour of organised interests within their policy field, as organised interest groups will have attempted to influence them.

It should be emphasised that these two units of analysis should be seen as complementary. On the one hand, the orgs may provide more detailed insight to the factors that directly influence their own behaviour. On the other hand, the targets within the EP may give more general insights to the behaviour of organised interest groups, but only to the extent that they are being targeted by organised interest groups. Furthermore, the two subunits of analysis also provide construct validity, as they essentially remain two different sources of evidence that may capture the behaviour of organised interests. Therefore, by comparing the findings of two different sources of evidence, findings become more robust.

5.3 Method of Data Collection: Interviews
To measure the two units of analysis described above, a decision was made to conduct semi-structured interviews. Interviewing was chosen as the data collection method as it
provides distinct benefits. Qualitative interviews remain a powerful method of collecting information by seeking to capture the experience and meanings of the people interviewed by allowing subjects to convey their views to the interviewer (Kale 2007). For our purpose, this enabled us to gain a clear and in-depth understanding of the interviewees’ perceptions and assessments of whether Lisbon had changed the behaviour of organised interests within their respective case areas. Interviewing the orgs also enabled an in-depth understanding of their considerations of whether they had themselves changed behaviour as a result of Lisbon. The targets from the EP would provide further information with respect to whether they had witnessed any changes and what they perceived as the likely cause for this change. In this respect, the interviews may potentially provide strong internal validity with respect to ensuring that Lisbon indeed was the cause of any change.

However, interviews are verbal reports and can suffer from certain biases such as the interviewees recalling events poorly, imprecise articulation, etc. (Yin 2009). To attempt to reduce potential detrimental issues from interviews, it was decided to interview three interest groups and three potential targets of lobbying within each case area, i.e. 24 interviews in total. This provides further construct validity in that it allows for data source triangulation where different sources of information can be compared (Yin 2009). Therefore, in the analysis, the information provided by each of the interviewees will be compared with that of the others to identify the degree to which there is convergence or divergence in the information provided from the different interviewees.

Furthermore, an interview is an interpersonal situation where knowledge is created through the interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer at a specific moment in time. In this process, both parties reciprocally influence each other and create a unique situation (Kale 2007). Thus, the findings may be difficult to replicate by other researchers, as the information provided is the result of a concrete interaction at a specific point in time. Therefore, reliability is likely to be compromised by this method. However, compared to the benefits that interviewing provides this was deemed as an acceptable choice. Nonetheless, to strengthen the external reliability, this section will as far as possible explain the procedure applied in collecting the evidence.

5.3.1 Criteria for the Selected Interviewees
This section will briefly explain the criteria for the selected interviewees. A key requirement applying to the interviewees selected was that they needed to have been working within the respective policy areas as well as being able to identify any changes in the be-
behaviour of organised interest from pre-Lisbon until the study was undertaken. Hence, ideally, the interviewee should have four to five years or more of experience within the given policy case area.

5.3.1.1 Criteria for the Interviewed Individuals from the Interest Groups

An essential criterion for the selected interviewees’ respective orgs was that the orgs were active within the given policy areas. Research has found that a division of labour has developed where European level interest orgs predominately target European institutions (EC and EP) while national orgs focus on their national governments (CoM) (Eising 2004). To eliminate this potential bias of this division of labour, we decided only to interview European orgs. Due to this division of labour, European orgs are furthermore more likely to have changed behaviour as a result of Lisbon and would therefore give the best opportunity to investigate how Lisbon influences the behaviour of organised interests. On the other hand, this choice may imply that the observed change in their behaviour not only reflects the institutional power balance, but also a division of labour that makes them more inclined to change behaviour. Therefore, this latter criterion limits the ability to generalise the findings of these orgs beyond European orgs.

5.3.1.2 Identification of Relevant Lobbying Targets

As explained above, the second level of analysis includes lobbying targets that may provide information about more general aspects as regards the behaviour of organised interests. With the institutional change, potential influential actors within the EP should expectedly be able to detect changed lobbyist behaviour. Specifically, the interviews in each policy area included three populations; a MEP; a staff member of the Committee Secretariat; and finally, an adviser of the political party groups in the given policy areas. As section 2.1 explained, they undertake different roles with respect to defining the EP’s position on a dossier. Therefore, it was expected that these three targets would be natural lobbying targets that consequently may provide information with respect to the behav-

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18 All of the interviewees had been working within their respective policy areas for at least five years. However, two of the interviewees had only been working within their current organisations for respectively two and three years. Nonetheless, due to the difficulties of identifying relevant individuals in the European organisations, it was decided that these two interviewees alone with their long experience in the policy areas (one with 20 years), were satisfactory.

19 In this paper we include MEP assistants in the MEP category, as they function as the prolonged arms of the MEPs often drafting reports, taking meetings, etc. on behalf of the MEPs (Corbett et al. 2011). The MEP in PECH was a substitute member. This was necessitated as only four MEPs had been in PECH in both the 6th and 7th legislative periods —that is pre- and post-Lisbon. However, as the status of substitute member both indicates that the MEP can be rapporteur, shadow, table amendments, and occasionally vote (and that the chosen MEP had indeed been so several times), we evaluated that he would be representative for the MEPs in PECH.
 behaviour of organised interests. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that only one individual within each of the three different populations of potential lobbying targets within each policy area was interviewed. A wide range of other factors that relate to these populations may influence their impression of lobbying behaviour. Consequently, the answers given by the three different targets will be compared and contrasted in order to draw more general conclusions within each policy area.

To identify and establish contact with the relevant people, the personal knowledge and contacts of one of the authors who is a full-time Brussels-based lobbyist were partly utilised. In addition, some orgs were identified through desk research where we *inter alia* checked whether a given org was a member of the EC’s advisory Committees within the relevant policy areas. However, it proved difficult to find interviewees that would be relevant and willing to participate, in particular within the areas of ENVI and PECH. This also applied to identifying relevant people in the EP who had been working within the same policy area since before Lisbon. Therefore, a procedure akin to the snowball sampling was also used in some instances i.e. where one of the interviewees provided information enabling the identification of additional relevant individuals that subsequently were interviewed. An interview was conducted with an additional org within INTA. However, during the interview, it became clear that the internal structure of the org implied that no relevant people within the org would be able to provide insights to whether the org had changed behaviour. Therefore, we decided to replace the org with another org within INTA.

### 5.3.2 The Type of Interview: Semi-structured Interviewing

All the interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews. The benefit of semi-structured interviewing is that it allows researchers to ask a number of pre-defined questions that enable comparisons between the units of analysis. Concurrently, the flexibility of the semi-structured interviews allows the interviewer to adjust his questions to the specific interview situation e.g. change the order of questions to account for the natural flow of the interview, change the phrasing of questions, or by asking unscheduled clarifying questions. The format also enables the researchers to discover new areas that were not necessarily foreseen, but spontaneously emerge during the interview (Berg 2009).

In Appendix I, the interview guides are attached with the suggested areas that were to be covered during the interview. Three different interview guides were developed to account for the different information that they were expected to be able to provide on the
behaviour of organised interest groups. Specifically, separate interview guides were formulated for the interviews with the orgs, and two slightly different interview guides for the MEPS and for the policy advisors and the staffing of the Committee Secretariat. To facilitate the flow of the interviews, the ordering and the exact phrasing were changed in accordance with the specific interview situation. As most of the questions asked were open questions, answers were not always directly comparable. In section 6, we have as far as possible attempted to compare the answers provided by the different interviewees in spite of this by categorising the answers received from the orgs in accordance with the dimensions highlighted in the theoretical sections on lobbying strategies. With respect to the answers from the EP side, they have been categorised in accordance with the general trends that were discerned from the interviews. However, in the analysis below, a category of not mentioned factors was included to account for the fact that the interviewees highlighted some factors that were not necessarily addressed by others. Furthermore, another issue was that the answers provided by interviewees were not always easy to interpret. This may reflect the nature of interviews, where interviewees answer questions ambiguously by for instance giving contradictory statements (Kvale 2007). In such instances, this will be indicated explicitly by a question mark (?) in the summary tables below.

In total, we conducted 24 interviews. At the request of some of the interviewees, it was decided to extend confidentiality to all interviewees. In Appendix II, we have provided an overview of the interviewees, their aliases, and their experiences within the given org and policy areas. The interviews within the different policy areas were conducted in spring and early summer of 2012 with most of the interviews being conducted in March and April.

The duration of the interviews varied quite substantially. Typically, the interviews with orgs active within PECH and INTA lasted on average approximately 45 minutes, whereas the interviews with the orgs within ENVI and IMCO lasted roughly 30 minutes. Furthermore, the interviews with EP targets within all policy areas lasted on average 30 minutes. As a general note, some interviews, in particular with MEPs, were constrained by the fact that the interviewees generally are busy people that consequently only had limited time available for being interviewed. By far, the most of the interviews were conducted as face-to-face interviews. However, due to logistical issues including limited availability of the interviewees, four of the interviews were conducted as telephone interviews. As the interviewees work in an international environment, it was deemed to be a
less salient issue as they expectedly would be accustomed to conference meetings etc. All of the interviews were recorded. 23 of the interviews were conducted in English, whereas one was conducted in Danish. In two cases, the interviews were conducted with two interviewees. However, in the analysis, they will for sake of simplicity be treated as one individual.

5.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Chosen Method and Design
Overall, the research design is expected to have strong validity. Taking a multiple-case study approach based on the replication logic has strengthened the external validity. Construct validity has been enhanced by including two different levels of analysis and by interviewing multiple people within each level of analysis that allow for triangulation of different data sources. The conducted interviews improve the internal validity by allowing us to ask about the interviewees’ perception of the cause of any changes reported. However, the main limitation of the research design is low reliability as semi-structured interviews are inherently difficult to replicate. But compared to the benefits with respect to enhanced validity this was deemed as more than acceptable.
6 Findings: Inductive description

In this chapter we will present the findings of the conducted interviews. With 24 lengthy interviews, we collected an enormous amount of individual statements. Consequently, we have in the following included the findings that were the most relevant for our purpose. In the following sections findings will be grouped based on firstly policy areas, secondly whether it is from the organisational or the EP side, and thirdly on the basis of the parameters found above which displayed significance during the interviews. In the two control areas, ENV and IMCO, the findings are presented to be comparable to the findings within INTA and PECH, irrespective of whether this was the major part of the interviews. Further interesting findings specific to these areas, are also presented in the text.

With relation to the parameters, it became evident relatively early in the interviewing phase that the issue of when to lobby was not easily discerned as interviewees continuously related it to individual dossiers when asked. Hence, a typical answer would be that they start lobbying the EC, and then move forth to the EP and then CoM (the last two somewhat parallel), thus, concluding that there was no change in the fact that they went to the EC in the initial phase and so forth. However, none of the interviewees irrespective of the framing of the question were able to unshackle themselves from individual dossiers and clearly indicate whether the increased number of contact points (which they identified) in a cumulated number of dossiers running in parallel caused a change in when they lobby in general – that is whether they had less time e.g. for the initial phase in the EC, as a consequence of more time spent in the EP later on.

On the issue of what to lobby some external factors were so pertinent that we gave up measuring the effect of the transition to OLP altogether as a dependant variable. Most prominently was the issue of a new Commission College and EP legislative period colliding with the entry into force of Lisbon in late 2009. This caused an increase in legislative initiatives in its own right thereby vastly influencing the number of dossiers that orgs had to choose from. Also prominent and mentioned by the INTA interviewees were the breakdown of the WTO negotiations, which have led to more work within INTA due to the increased focus on bilateral trade agreements in the EU. In PECH, the revision of the CFP played a prominent role. Hence, these parameters are not dealt with further.

In this chapter we shall also present findings that are not strictly related to our chosen parameters. These evolve around the environment in which the lobbyists are situated.
Thus, whether they actually believe the EP has more power or influence may be able to prescribe their subsequent behaviour vis-à-vis that institution. Also more importantly the issue of availability of resources from the environment (linked to the above discussion on resource dependence theory vs. exchange theory) cannot be disregarded. Thus, it could have a vast influence on our findings if the individual interviewee in an org had not changed his area of work due to the employment of new resources that would deal with this issue in the EP. Thus, to correct for possible biases in the findings we shall also elaborate on these aspects so as to set a reliable scene for the analysis.

With respect to the interviews undertaken with actors in the EP, we only present the findings that reflect the parts of the interviews that shed light on the work of lobbyists in the EP. It should be noted that many interesting things were revealed that were not directly linked to the behaviour of organised interests, but which facilitated our overall understanding of the area, the functioning of the EP, and the interaction with stakeholders and lobbyists. However, due to the scope of this thesis these aspects were left out.

6.1 Changing lobbying behaviour: Experience of organised European interests within the Common Commercial Policy

Before entering into the analysis of change in the interest groups lobbying the EP, we will first present the views the orgs working within the CCP had on the changes in their environment so as to set the context for the behavioural changes. That is, the changes concerning the political system they seek to influence and the resources their environment endows them in order to carry out this task. We will then analyse the specific investigated practices of their strategies, so as to see to which extent Lisbon influenced these.

6.1.1 Changing environment of organised European interest within the Common Commercial Policy

Overall all three orgs clearly concurred that the EP’s role in the legislative process has increased since Lisbon, as would be expected by the mere fact that the OLP was extended to cover the CCP. Furthermore, they also noted that especially in the area of international trade agreements the EP has now also to give consent under the consent procedure\(^\text{20}\). Hence, all the orgs found that the EP had gained more power, and therefore subsequently will gain more influence in the future. The present situation of influence is unclear.

\(^{20}\) In this thesis, as mentioned before, we focus on the shift towards OLP within CCP. However, as all interviewees (organisations and the EP) mentioned it independently and on their initiative, it should be noted that this is part of the overall picture in their daily work. Therefore, the distinction we make between extensions to respectively OLP and consent procedure is somewhat constructed vis-à-vis the interviewees’ perceptions of the overall situation.
The three interviewees were a bit unclear on the question of whether the EP has actually gained in influence. Though this is not the focus of this paper, it relates to the rationality of the orgs lobbying the EP. For all three orgs, it seemed that the fact that the EP has more formal power with the OLP transcends into their lobbying, regardless of the influence of the EP. They are so to say unsure of the direct influence of the EP but have no doubts about their power.

Laura from O1 for example noted about the OLP that, “I think that they know that they have a lot of power, but I don't know how much they realise that by having or selecting one word in a regulation, the impact that they can have”. The implication was that all other actors, including her org and the EC and CoM had to take the EP into consideration despite the fact that the EP was still in a phase of learning how to utilize their formal power in Lisbon into influence on the outcome. This was much in line with comments made by Richard from O2 who stated, “the EP is trying to get more influence and, therefore, they learn how to get it” adding that, “I think that in 3, 4, 5 years that the picture will be clearer than today” indicating that the jury were still out on the degree of influence so far. Mary Ann from O3 had a slightly different take on it, as in her view “now after some time we have realised how important the EP is”, implying that she certainly already saw the risk of influence in specific dossiers which posed a risk to the sector she represented. “When you have a specific issue, where we know it goes to EP and where we do have the risks that the interests are not so favourable to us - we must lobby”. However, she concurred that the EP was not at the end of the journey towards more actual influence, as she foresaw more EP dominance/influence to some extent, and therefore she would continue to shift towards the EP.

Naturally, the issue of available resources given by the environment (member orgs) plays a key role with respect to this. In O2, Richard reported that they had gained an additional employee, in the form of a seconded expert from a national member org, to work on trade issues. However, this seemed to be more linked with internal human resource management of that member org than with Lisbon. For the two other orgs, there had so far not been an increase in overall resources for the orgs. Thus, Lisbon has not so far had a clear-cut impact on the available resources for the three orgs.

In order to categorise the interviewees’ views on the role, power and actual influence of the EP in the CCP, and to see how resources have been allotted to the orgs from the environment, we constructed the following table:
Table 2, Findings on the changes and expected changes in the environment due to Lisbon within the CCP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Laura – O1</th>
<th>Richard – O2</th>
<th>Mary Ann – O3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more formal power after Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more actual influence now and have had since Lisbon</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP will have more influence in the future due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall available resources from environment due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, and ? demarks ‘unclear/ambiguous’, and Δ demarks ‘change’.

The following analysis will focus on the changes the orgs have specifically undertaken as a consequence of the above perceived and actual changes. Whether the changes that will be shown below are rational, as neither of the interviewees seemed to be certain so far of the influence of the EP at present, can be questioned. However, they seemed more confident that the EP will learn to ‘fulfil’ its role created by Lisbon over the course of some years. By learning to fulfil the role, it was implied that the EP will gain significant influence in the law-making process. The following analysis on changes in lobby practices will cast some further light on this issue.

6.1.2 Who lobbies?

The analysis in this subsection suggests that the institutional change had a profound impact on the allocation of resources. Increasing resources are allocated to the EP at the expense of the EC and CoM. The orgs also acquired additional skills and knowledge to lobby the EP successfully – the means, however, differing. Managing the image vis-à-vis the ‘new’ institution was an implication of Lisbon for two of the orgs.

While the impact on the amount of resources made available was ambiguous, the orgs’ allocations of available resources had clearly been influenced by Lisbon. Laura reported that O1 was in the process of shifting resources towards policy development within the CCP from other areas with Lisbon being the main cause. Also, as expected from the theoretical section, orgs recognising the increased legislative powers of the EP had allocated increasing resources to lobbying the EP within the existing resources allocated for CCP (i.e. retracting resources from e.g. the EC). For instance, Laura explained that even before O1 had more resources for CCP overall they had shifted the existing resources from
the EC towards the EP. She gave the examples of now spending time listening to INTA meetings and attending more bilateral meetings with EP actors. Mary Ann primarily mentioned spending more time where the EP has become co-legislator. That is, meetings, contacts with rapporteurs, MEP assistants, etc. Richard was very specific on spending more time sending general messages to the EP so that they would understand the basic priorities of the sector. Richard emphasised that networking was a key priority.

After Lisbon, the EP has supplanted the CoM to become the second main important lobbying target. While the EC still remained the primary lobbying target, the orgs recognised that Lisbon implied fewer resources for lobbying the EC. This even applied to O2 that had seen an increase in resources. In this sense, this suggests that Lisbon had a clear influence on the orgs’ allocation of resources, where the resources allocated to the EP had increased at the expense of resources for the EC and CoM.

The orgs also reported additional need of managing skills and image to navigate within the EP successfully. With regards hereto, the orgs emphasised that they had to learn how the new institution works and also improve their skills in communicating more politically. Mary Ann explained that they e.g. had organised a seminar to improve their knowledge of how the EP works internally, in terms of processes and actors, adding, “We are still learning”. Furthermore, Mary Ann and Laura highlighted to a varying extent the need of increasing the visibility and knowledge (image) of their org in the EP, especially right after Lisbon. For Richard, it was a clear priority to increase the visibility of the org, as this could be a means to improve their access to policy makers in other instances. In conclusion, this indicates that the management of skills and image are influenced by institutional change, as the orgs have to lobby a ‘new’ and different institution.

6.1.3 Why lobby?

In essence, this question relates to the issue of determining the goals of the orgs’ lobbying efforts and, thus, the specific reason why they lobby. In this section, the findings indicate that all three orgs perceive potential threats arising from the enhanced role of the EP, while two of the orgs also saw new opportunities.

The interviews indicated that the institutional change had an impact on how the orgs perceived their opportunities and threats within the political system affecting their desired goals. For both Laura and Mary Ann, the EP was seen as an opportunity to influence issues that they had not succeeded in influencing in the ECs’ proposals. Laura
spoke several times of the increased potential the EP presented for their lobbying efforts. She also, however, mentioned how this fundamentally turned around her work “I think they [the EP] have potential - a lot - but it requires, from an internal point of view for the lobby orgs, restructuring and rethinking; how you follow, how you monitor the dossier and of course with that more resources”. She had already used the opportunity on a specific OLP dossier. Mary Ann echoed, “It actually gives you an extra opportunity to readdress an issue that is not so good for you”, however importantly adding, “but of course it can also be a risk”. Thus, the EP was not seen just as an opportunity, but also a risk of an undesired policy outcome. Laura explained, “It is a new actor. You need to keep two eyes on them. You must make sure they do not change the whole thing”, referring to the EC proposals. In contrast, Richard did not mention the opportunities of the EP at any point during the interview. On the contrary, he continuously stressed that O2 had to re-explain issues that the EC had finally understood after years of hard work.

6.1.4 Whom to lobby?

In this section, we investigate whom the orgs target in the EP and in the immediate arena surrounding the EP. We find that certain types and positions in the EP, which have a specific institutional function with relation to the policy-formulation, are indeed the primary targets of the orgs. Strong, and charismatic personalities are also an important factor, while civil servants and political groups are utilised differently by the orgs. In the immediate arena we find a bigger diversity in the EP compared to the EC affecting two of the orgs’ work. A further finding is that all three orgs have experienced changes to varying degrees to already existing relations with actors outside the EP due to Lisbon.

Overall, all three orgs have changed their stakeholder mapping towards including many more actors from the EP. The clearest indication of the enlarged stakeholder mass and mapping exercise that the EP constitutes was from Laura and Richard. Here they had started mapping all MEPs in INTA, mapping the MEPs’ political positions, friendliness towards the orgs’ views and so forth. However, this was just the identification of one bulk of new stakeholders within the EP.

The primary univocal targets of the three orgs were the rapporteurs in general, regardless of their political convictions. Shadow-rapporteurs were second in the hierarchy for all three orgs, as well. Individual MEPs without any formal role in a given dossier were also more often contacted, mainly those that were identified as having capabilities such as being ‘strong’ and ‘heavy advocates’ for specific issues, or being e.g. strong players in an in-
tergroup. The orgs congruently noted that they primarily target those MEPs that they perceive to be sympathetic to their cause. Interestingly, none of the interviewees mentioned the Committee Chair or Vice-chairs when asked who they lobby. Thus, without prejudice to the fact that they might indeed have contact to the chair and vice-chairs, it did not seem they were very far up the list of important targets on the specific dossiers. Another institutional function besides the chair and vice-chairs are the political group coordinators. Along with the political party group advisors they form the party dimension of the committees. Towards this population/group of ‘party-representatives’ the orgs were more split. In O1, Laura found coordinators to be important for their work and had frequent contact with the party-group political advisors. In O2, Richard explained that they had contact to party-group advisors, however, adding, “But they are not very useful”. In O3, Mary Ann interestingly had actually very little contact with neither coordinators nor party-group advisors. It seemed that since they are not directly involved in most dossiers, they were very rarely on the list of targets for O2 and O3.

Of the civil servants working in the EP the primary target seemed to be the INTA secretariat staff. All three orgs had established contacts here. Laura had used them in multiple ways: inviting them to internal committee meetings as an educational tool21 to explain O1’s members how the EP worked; contacting them to get practical information on dossiers, such as timelines, dates of conferences, and so forth; and lastly as lobbying targets, when the secretariat staff was assisting MEPs with advice or writing the EP reports. For Richard, the important issue was the possibility of explaining the more technical issues, as well as getting practical information. Furthermore, he added that the secretariat organises hearings, workshops, etc. in the EP, and therefore is a crucial point of access to MEPs. Thus, the preceding analysis suggests that the interest groups mainly target MEPs with formal roles such as rapporteurs. Civil servants of the EP administration overall remain the secondary target, while ‘party-representatives’ and chairs and vice-chairs seem to be the least important lobbying targets when working on specific dossiers. Individual MEPs with no formal roles in the process can be very important, but difficult to place as it seems to vary vastly from dossier to dossier.

All three orgs saw new players in the CCP area in the EP arena, but to varying degrees. Richard only mentioned universities, whereas Laura also mentioned sector orgs and third

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21 Internal committees are the national organisations’ experts meeting with O1s policy advisor chairing, where decisions on O1s position is taken, and the strategy to reach certain outcomes are approved.
country delegations, concluding that the EP is more open. Contrary, both Richard and Laura specifically used the phrase “the same usual suspects” when speaking of the EC arena. Mary Ann was somewhat different in her view of this saying, “Well, we are increasing [in the EC] because there are more and more lobby orgs and sometimes you have also lawyers and consultants working for it [a given dossier]. So I mean the lobby structure is increasing”. However, she clearly stated that “the EP is much more diverse” explaining that the EC is in a much better position to evaluate who has the legitimacy to be heard, and who should not be listened to. In the EP, this differed in her opinion, as MEPs were less bound to functioning of the policy area, being more bound to their constituencies. Thus, she did agree that even though the lobby structure was also increasing in the EC, there was a much more stable network compared to the EP. The implications of these findings are that the stakeholder mapping and not least stakeholder analysis entails understanding and knowing many more interests in the EP. For two of three of the orgs, this seemed to have a very high impact on their work.

All of the orgs pointed out that with Lisbon and the increased role of the EP; they had also incurred changes to their relations with already familiar stakeholders. One of the primary changes for both Laura and Mary Ann was the fact that the EC had started lobbying the EP, not just directly, but indirectly through them. Thus, both told that since Lisbon the EC had on several occasions contacted them, to tell them what they could do vis-à-vis the EP. Consequently, this seemed to reshape somewhat their relations with the EC, as they were suddenly allies and not just stakeholders. O1 had also increased its level of cooperation with other orgs on e.g. writing amendments to the EP. Mary Ann had increased her contact with other stakeholders in the EP arena to share intelligence, since it seemed to be impossible to cover the EP adequately with her available resources. Likewise O2 more actively engaged with known and new stakeholders to search for alliance partners and to understand them. Only Richard did not feel any difference with relation to the EC. Why the EC had not contacted O2 proactively has not been investigated.

6.1.5 How to lobby?
The findings below suggest that the means of lobbying the EP are different from those for lobbying the other primary target, the EC. The orgs highlighted that they had learned that effective lobbying required other types of information as well as a different approach to how it is passed on. The orgs also interacted more physically directly with EP actors and strategically built up stable or personal relations with them. Alliances and coalitions
are important tools, but Lisbon’s direct impact on this aspect was not clear. The orgs’ roles remained the same in the EP as they had been in the EC. Agenda setting via the EP in the EU policymaking process was in focus by two of the orgs. Also, all three orgs changed towards monitoring the EP.

The orgs apply a wide variety of means to concretely lobby the EP. Furthermore, the orgs stressed that lobbying the EP was different from lobbying the EC. Very concrete means of communicating broadly targeted messages were position papers or media coverage. All three orgs had changed their way of going about this. Broadly targeting the EP through mass communication varied greatly from communicating with the same means when the EC was the target in the view of the orgs. O1 had adjusted their position papers to the EP to include more technical issues, than had been the case before Lisbon where only overall political messages were shortly presented. Another example was the way in which Mary Ann had consciously adapted her use of media to target the MEPs more efficiently with relation to content and number of articles, comments, etc. Also, the orgs noted how the communication overall had to be more ‘sellable’ or ‘sexy’, not least towards MEPs’ constituencies as MEPs had to communicate to exactly this group.

In general, the type of information provided had changed somewhat. Obviously, much of the information on a dossier already existed, and therefore much of the changes were related to how it was passed on to the new targets. However, the three orgs very clearly indicated that they had had to increase their efforts of what information was provided and therefore also gathered to include information was relevant to the individual MEP’s or rapporteur’s constituency or nation.

Another change on what was actually gathered and processed was the technical information. As the orgs agreed that the EC was by nature much more technical, it seemed that actually some technical information had not per say been processed by the orgs, as the EC already knew it. Hence, when now being oriented more towards the EP, which did not have this knowledge at all (in their view), the orgs also had to process this information. Mary Ann noted that especially the rapporteurs were demanding on the volume and quality of technical information. One of the main findings with respect to how information was passed was the univocal mentioning of the educational aspects of passing on technical information to the EP. They concurrently explained that as the EP had gained more power and influence, the EP had also to be more technical and get more involved in the details – simply because the EP had a responsibility to do so. The orgs
agreed that this was a learning process not least for the MEPs, and that it would take time before they were sufficiently knowledgeable about the technicalities. However, whilst spending much time on passing on and educating on technical information, the EP is obviously also more political according to the orgs, or as Richard said “In the EP you have to do politics”, with Mary Ann more elaborately saying “With MEPs you have to have an approach which is at the same time; they have to understand the technical part; but it is much more political”. Another example of the combination of political and technical information was the tabling of amendments and voting recommendations.

One aspect of how you pass on information another is how you interact with the targets. In the case of O1, it was very evident that face-to-face meetings were high on the agenda. Other more informal contacts with the MEPs were also utilised. Richard preferred informal face-to-face meetings. Actually, he found the method of ‘running-into-people’ e.g. at receptions as more effective. If, however, formal face-to-face meetings were organised, he tried to bring real technical experts or real cases (companies), which had proven to be very effective. Furthermore, he worked with the secretariat so as to be invited to speak at e.g. hearings; a form of direct interaction with many recipients.

Related to how one decides to interact with targets is whether one decides to build stable or personal relations with targets. All three orgs mentioned that it was crucial to maintain contact with the MEPs that they perceived as more important than others. Therefore, it was crucial to have stable relations with those (the interviewees mentioned the same four-five names of MEPs independently). However, they also mentioned that it was resource demanding to maintain stable relations with all MEPs in INTA.

Furthermore, another interesting point was the level of proactive contact from the EP side. The three orgs felt a substantial increase of proactive contact from the EP as they sought more information. Mary Ann estimated that on strictly technical aspects this was the case for 30-40% of all EP contact. In all, nevertheless, the high level of proactive contact from the EP could help foster even more stable relations as the exchange is mutually beneficial. This was not only the case with MEPs but also with the civil servants of the EP. All three orgs reported having established stable or personal relations with the secretariat (only with the personal relations of Mary Ann was it unclear if it was due to

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22 The distinction between stable and personal relations is not easily defined and is not detrimental to the point of whether these types of relations are sought or not. Some practitioners would argue that strategically deciding to establish personal relations is not possible, whereas others would say it is.
None of the interviewees mentioned stable relations with party group advisors as being a priority. In summary, it seems that communication, information type and the passing of it, interaction type, and the level of stable and personal relations substantially changed how the orgs work on a daily basis.

Interestingly, despite the EP being perceived as much more political, there was no clear change towards more coalition building compared to the EC. O1 had increased its efforts, mainly when writing amendments, whereas Richard did not find it had changed as O2 had always done it when possible. With O3, it was unclear if the use of alliances had changed due to Lisbon. In all, there was no clear position to whether alliances are particularly beneficial when lobbying the EP.

Acknowledging that lobbying the EP was substantially different from lobbying the EC, the orgs were asked whether they then perceived their role (as a European org) to be different in the EP compared to the EC. The orgs concomitantly felt no difference in the orgs’ roles as they felt that the EP was a natural lobbying venue for European orgs. Laura noted, “Because of our type of organisation, of course what is linked to the CoM, we also have our subsidiarity concept, it is something that belongs more to our members, because it is the national level. So for us it is the EP and the EC”. Hence, in the EP and the EC the role of O1 was the same, though more national information was needed in the EP. Richard completely agreed and noted that as a European org O2’s main institutions were the EP and the EC, whereas the CoM was for national members. The same was the case for O3, Mary Ann saying that CoM was for members, and that their role was the same in the EP and EC.

It is conventional wisdom that one of the exclusive competences of the EC is their right of initiative with relation to legislative proposals. However, it seems that with the increased importance and power of the EP, the orgs have also noted that the EP’s own initiative reports (INI) are becoming increasingly important. As Laura explained, “We follow the EC work plan, but you need to look into what the EP is going to do at INTA, if say there is an INI, of course it is not legislative, but it can have an impact”. Mary Ann was even more direct by saying, “Sometimes MEPs have their own initiative reports, and this can lead to legislative initiatives – you never know”, continuing, “INTA is, I think,
becoming aware it is important”. None, of the two orgs seemed to have used the INIs to try and set the overall community agenda, however, they were very aware that this was a possibility – but for the moment they saw it more as a risk, as they are used to dealing with the EC when it comes to specific initiatives to be put on the agenda. In the interview with Richard, INIs were not mentioned at all, whereas the two other orgs brought it up on their own. The direct implication for the two orgs that mentioned INI was an increased level of monitoring of the EP.

One of the clearest findings during the three interviews was the practical way in which they had had to change completely their internal monitoring procedures to encompass a long series of agendas, meetings, etc., which had not previously been monitored systematically before Lisbon. This had implications for the allocation and use of resources.

Summing up, this section indicates that how the orgs go about their task of lobbying have changed quite substantially after Lisbon as the EP has entered the arena with its own characteristics and nuances that must be adapted to.

6.1.6 Concluding remarks on findings of organised European interest’s behaviour in the Common Commercial Policy

The above highlighted several aspects of how the EP had influenced the orgs’ lobbying strategies. In line with the expectation of a change in behaviour, all orgs had begun to allocate resources to lobbying the EP. None of them had evidently, as a consequence of Lisbon, seen an increase in their overall available resources though one org had transferred from other policy areas to the CCP area. Table 3 summarises how this also influenced several other aspects of their lobbying strategy.

Table 3, Findings in interest group behaviour within the CCP area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies:</th>
<th>Laura – O1</th>
<th>Richard – O2</th>
<th>Mary Ann – O3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in resources towards CCP from other policy areas due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in allocation of resources towards EP within CCP due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in management of skills and knowledge due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in image management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power an opportunity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power a threat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Whom: - due to Lisbon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>O1</th>
<th>O2</th>
<th>O3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards actors in the EP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rapporteurs, Shadow-rapporteurs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chairs, Vice-chairs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual MEPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EP civil servants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The political groups, coordinators and party-group advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in stakeholder population – arena – compared to EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in other stakeholder relations than EP actors– incl. EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### How: - due to Lisbon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>O1</th>
<th>O2</th>
<th>O3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall communication strategy – incl. media use, position papers etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in type of information provided</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets – incl. educating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in interaction type with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with EP actors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of alliances/coalitions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in org’s role in the EP compared to EC – incl. more national</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of agenda-setting possibilities – incl. INIs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ of internal monitoring procedures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, and ? demarks ‘unclear/ambiguous’, N/M demarks not mentioned, and Δ demarks ‘change’.

The findings indicate that the institutional change indeed challenged the orgs in several aspects. In 16 of 23 of the parameters we identified as important for lobbying strategies from the induced data, we found a clear coherence in the results within the CCP. Between O1 and O2, and O1 and O3 the coherence was marginally higher with 18 of 23 parameters. This, however, leads to no inference of any outlier org, and indeed this was not the impression we had after the interviews.

For all the orgs, the EP had surpassed the CoM to become the second most important institution. With the increased power of the EP, the orgs had to lobby an additional institution where successful lobbying requires different skills than what had previously been necessary. Henceforth, a process of learning had been, and is still, on-going in the org vis-à-vis the orgs’ lobbying towards the EP. All three orgs also agreed that the EP pose a new threat for the orgs in relation to desired outcomes of the policy-making process as
the EP potentially might move things in ‘the wrong direction’. The three orgs also completely agreed that rapporteurs and shadows were key targets. Certain civil servant groups were of more importance than others because they are channels to access or influence MEPs – either as information interlocutors or as access facilitators. The orgs also agreed that the EP was more pluralistic than the EC. Furthermore the transition towards the EP also had an influence on their relations with other already known contacts. None of the orgs mentioned the ‘party-group representatives’ as important targets.

The orgs coherently had changed their mass communication strategies. At the same time the information type provided to targets changed for all the orgs. Especially the ‘constituency information’ was necessary. All the orgs also had to adapt the way they passed on information. Developing stable relations was important for the orgs and, hence, they have sought strategically to build more of these. After Lisbon, all three orgs experienced that the EP proactively contacted them for further information and specific information.

None of the orgs retained a different role in the EP compared to the EC. Thus, the EP acted as a supranational institution in the same way as the EC, and subsequently granted the European orgs the same role they have in the EC. As a consequence of the EP being an EU level institution seen by the orgs as their responsibility vis-à-vis member orgs, the monitoring efforts for the orgs also changed towards monitoring heavily the EP.

The three orgs only displayed different behaviour in three areas of inquiry. Two of three orgs saw the EP as an opportunity for reaching their desired outcome, which had not been obtained in the EC. Also, two of three orgs strategically engaged with the ‘party-representatives’ in the EP. The methods of interaction with the EP actors had been changed by two of the orgs whereas the last did not mention this at all. Lastly, only one org did not use the EP to try and influence the agenda setting of the EU. This was the same org that did not find the EP to be an opportunity.

6.2 Changing perception from recipients: Experience of the European Parliament actors within the Common Commercial Policy

This section summarises the findings of the interviews undertaken with actors in the EP that shed light on the work of lobbyists in the EP. In short, the interviewees reported increased attention from interest groups, spending more time on consulting stakeholders and finally changes with respect to the their informational needs.
Firstly, the three interviewees concurrently stated that in their opinions the role of the EP with relation to the CCP had increased after Lisbon. Thibault, a party-group advisor, stressed that indeed INTA was becoming increasingly successful in the trilogues and mentioned a dossier, where the EP had managed to secure 80-85% of its amendments in the negotiations. Rene, an MEP, echoed this, and mentioned their veto-power as important for their influence. The direct consequence was increased activity both from lobbyists and the EC. In fact, a main finding was that one of the big anticipators of the increased role of the EP was the EC. Since before Lisbon, they had started working more directly and proactively with the EP. From the lobbying side, it seemed that the increasing activity had primarily occurred after Lisbon and more gradually from issue to issue.

Another important finding was that not only did the amount of lobbying towards the interviewees increase, they also spent more time listening to the stakeholders as they had an increased need for information. The type of information they requested had also changed. For Jean Luc from the secretariat, it was an increased need for political information as he had been used to dealing with the technical side since before Lisbon politics was only marginally important for his role – now he needed a basic understanding of this game. He also received much more information from the EC after Lisbon, however, this information he had verified via stakeholders from time to time. For Rene, technical information had become much more important, especially when being rapporteur, despite the increased flow of information from the EC which he also wanted to verify via stakeholders. The same was the case for Thibault in general. Especially Rene and Thibault had more face-to-face meetings and in general interacted more actively with the stakeholders. They also more proactively contacted stakeholders. However, none of the three interviewees seemed to build more stable relations with stakeholders, saying that stakeholders varied greatly from dossier to dossier, why it was hard or unnecessary to maintain stability. Hence, they neither tried to foster specific stable relations nor found that there was a stable fixed network of actors in general. This was somewhat in contrast to what the orgs said, as they actively tried to foster more stable relations with the EP.

With relation to the quality of the lobbying efforts undertaken Rene and Thibault found that it had indeed increased after Lisbon, whereas Jean Luc did not mention it at all. However, both Thibault and Rene mentioned that both the lobbyists as well as the EP itself are still in a learning phase since Lisbon. Hence, the legislative game with the lobbyists and within the EP (and towards the other institutions not least in trilogues) is far
from a *modus operandi* yet. As it seemed that the EP were indeed still learning the OLP game it was not surprising that none of the interviewees mentioned INIs – that is the non-legislative agenda-setting game. This was, nevertheless, not in line with two of the orgs’ focus on INIs as agenda setting opportunities (and threats).

The interviewees did not mention whether European orgs were more preferred over national or regional orgs. In general, they mentioned a few of the European orgs and that they of course represented the compromise views, which could be easier to tackle. However, it did not seem that these were given specific preference. On the question of whether the interviewees saw any first-movers among the lobbying orgs the replies were mixed. Rene did see especially one first-mover, whereas Thibault first stated he did not, where after he mentioned the same org as Rene. The replies are summarised in the table below to better give an overview of the findings:

**Table 4, Findings in EP actors’ perceptions/experiences within the CCP area.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- due to Lisbon in the CCP area</th>
<th>Jean Luc – Secretariat</th>
<th>Rene – MEP</th>
<th>Thibault – Party-group advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from lobbyists e.g. meetings, phone calls, letters etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more time listening to lobbyists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ type of information requested</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed e.g. face-to-face meeting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More proactively contacting stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foster specifically stable relations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fixed network</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality of lobbying efforts</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning process still on-going</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inside the EP</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Orgs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use or importance of INIs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference to European orgs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-movers identified</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, and ? demarks ‘unclear/ambiguous’, N/M demarks not mentioned, and Δ demarks ‘change’.

Table 4 shows that the interviewees from the EP side confirmed that Lisbon had caused several changes in line with the answers received from the organisational-side. Concur-
rently with the orgs, the interviewees from the EP side confirmed that they perceived that organised interests had increased their lobbying activities towards the EP. Furthermore, the interviewees also suggested changes with respect to the information that they request from stakeholders and more proactive contact with stakeholders.

6.3 Changing lobbying behaviour: Experience of organised European interests within the Common Fisheries Policy

As done on the CCP, we will firstly present the views the orgs working within the CFP had on the changes in their environment so as to set the context for the behavioural changes. Consequently, we shall present findings on the extent to which Lisbon has influenced the orgs’ lobbying practice.

6.3.1 Changing environment of organised European interest within the Common Fisheries Policy

Overall, the orgs operating within the CFP clearly concurred that the EP’s role in the legislative process has increased since Lisbon. However, the interviewees were not clear whether this also had lead to increased influence for the EP.

Again, in relation to rationality of the orgs lobbying the EP on the question of whether the EP had actually gained in influence, the three interviewees were diverse and uncertain on the immediate influence of the EP after Lisbon. All three orgs repeated that the fact that the EP has a more formal role in the legislative process transcends into the need of lobbying the EP, regardless of the influence of the EP. When asking Jane from O4 whether Lisbon changed their work she replied, “Yes, it changes everything actually, because the whole power-game between the institutions changes, so that the balance of power is completely shifted”. But asking further whether the impact of Lisbon had already implied more influence for the EP, she continued somewhat more vaguely “you can feel both for us on the advocacy side, and also for the institutional actors – the game is not defined – this is very clear. The CFP is a prime example […] so we are trying to find our way - how to best structure our advocacy. And on the other hand, the institutions are finding their way on how best to play the game”. In all, Jane left the impression that O4 saw the EP’s real influence as undoubtedly increasing in the future. Similarly, Liza from O6 noted, “The EP wants to grasp the new opportunities and use the increased powers [for increased influence]”. She too, thus, left a somewhat blurred impression of whether the EP had actually already gained influence, but also seemed convinced that in the future, they would learn to play the game and, thus, achieve real influence. Michael
from O5 on the other hand was much more hesitant. Despite agreeing to the increased role and formal power of the EP, he sincerely doubted their real influence, saying that “the EP sort of feel that they have more power. But we regret, if you like, mainly that the EP is very ignorant about the details they are involved with” explaining that “If you are only looking at technical issues, there is absolutely no point going to the EP”. Furthermore, he added the rhetorical question “does lobbying the EP have any influence whatsoever? - Even though they have co-decision”, referring to the highly complicated and complex area of the CFP that O5 mainly deals with. On the future prospective for EP influence, Michael was also somewhat negative compared to his peers. He avoided the question only to answer that the only thing OLP would bring was a delay of things. Table 5 presents a somewhat more dubious view with respect to especially the current influence of the EP in the eyes of interviewees compared to those from the CCP area.

Compared to the CCP, there was also a much more divergent picture in the CFP area with relation to overall amount of resources made available from the environment (member orgs). O4 clearly made a strategic choice to make more resources available as a response to Lisbon. In fact, the decision to increase the staff from four people working on fisheries to five, hiring a new employee to the org was taken already previously to the entry into force of Lisbon as an anticipatory move. In O6, no additional resources had been made available from their members since Lisbon. Hence, O6 remained a one-woman operation in relation to lobbying the political system. In O5 there had also not been an overall increase in resources. However, this may be a conscious decision, as Michael did not seem convinced of the value of lobbying the EP doubting their influence.

Summing up this section, the below table tries recapture the responses discussed above:

Table 5, Findings on the changes and expected changes in the environment due to Lisbon within the CFP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</th>
<th>Jane – O4</th>
<th>Michael – O5</th>
<th>Liza – O6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more formal power after Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more actual influence now and have had since Lisbon</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP will have more influence in the future due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall available resources from environment due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, and ? demarks ‘unclear/ambiguous’, and Δ demarks ‘change’.
As above on the CCP, the following section will focus on the changes the orgs have specifically done in response to the above perceived changes. Whether these changes are rational can be questioned, as Jane and Liza were uncertain so far of the influence of the EP, and Michael was dismissive of it. Liza and Jane, however, seemed more certain that the EP will gain in influence in real terms as they ‘learn to play the game’. The following analysis on changes in lobby practices will cast some further light on this. Consequently, we return to it in combination with the answers given in the area of the CCP.

6.3.2 Who Lobbies?

The findings in this section suggest that the institutional change had a profound impact on the allocation of resources for two of the orgs. One, where increasing resources are allocated to the EP at the expense of the EC and CoM, whilst the other due to the increased overall amount of resources made available did not have to sacrifice resources allocated to the latter two. The third org was somewhat more self-contradictory during the interview. The orgs also had to acquire additional skills and knowledge to lobby the EP successfully – the means, however, were differing

The question of reallocation of existing resources was less clear-cut than the amount of available resources. In O4, Jane was very clear saying O4’s focus had already started shifting before Lisbon and that consequently they had been allocated resources to hire an additional person. Hence, the increased allocation of resources towards the EP did not come about on the sacrifice of the two other institutions. In O5, the EP was second after the EC, but this was not a change since the CoM was for the national member orgs of O5. Michael did state that O5 lobbied “a little bit more the EP [after Lisbon]”. This seems contradictory to his somewhat strong position regarding whether the EP has gained influence after Lisbon, however, his explanation to why he lobby the EP was shortly “mainly because the EP sort of feels that they have more power”. He did maintain that he spend no less time in the EC despite the somewhat increased presence in the EP, explaining that new technology, such as e-mails, meant that he could do more in less time. Nevertheless, when questioning Michael on specific practices he did elaborate that they now did more practical things in the EP, such as meetings, while at the same time spending more hours on working with national member orgs to make them lobby the EP where relevant. Liza in O6 had sacrificed some time spend with the EC in order to move towards the EP. Previously Liza had not been preoccupied with the EP, but this had changed completely with Lisbon. In fact, the degree to which this happened was a con-
cern for her saying, “The EP is so political [and time consuming] that the org’s attention is drawn away from other technical areas such as delegated acts”. On the effects of the presence in the CoM, O6 tried to play the “national card” by stimulating and coordinating the lobbying efforts of their national member orgs towards the EP. Overall, however, the conclusion was that the CoM had become third in the hierarchy, whilst the EC, still first, had suffered a setback in the amount of time spent lobbying it.

All three orgs concurrently agreed that how to lobby the EP was a learning process they had been going through, and are still going through, to obtain the necessary skills. The learning process, however, seemed to be very different from one interviewee to the other. In O5 and O6, it had been “learning the hard way” as Michael said. In O4, the org with most resources, the process had been more ‘managed’ e.g. by taking a courses, and by anticipating the move towards the EP in advance of the entry into force of Lisbon, already starting to build stable relations with EP actors in 2007. An aspect which was quite different from the CCP area was the fact that all three interviewees mentioned they spent more time and resources educating national member orgs on how to lobby the EP.

With relation to image management of the orgs, the picture was mixed. Org O4 and O5 had indeed been managing their image towards the EP for a number of years, unrelated to Lisbon. Michael mentioned a big yearly event they had been doing with other stakeholders for around 8-10 years. Jane, however, also reported that they had further increased the number of awareness activities in the wake of Lisbon. During the interview with Liza, it was never mentioned despite several opportune moments. It was more implicit that Liza relied on her professionalism to build a good image – though a long process, especially with the high turnover of assistants in the EP.

In conclusion, the analysis of the interviews points in the direction that the management of skills and image are influenced by institutional change, but also extremely dependent on resources as those with least available resources could have a longer period of learning and image building than those with more resources.

**6.3.3 Why lobby?**

In this section the findings below indicates that all three orgs saw potential opportunities arising from the enhanced role of the EP, while two of the orgs also recognised that the change posed a potential threat.
For Michael in O5, the EP was actually seen as a possible opportunity, despite the overall lack of confidence in their influence. Nonetheless, he stressed it is completely dependent on whether you can get the EP’s (and the right MEPs) attention. As such Michael did not perceive the EP as a threat, or at least every time asked, he responded by mentioning other problems and threats, e.g. from the EC. For Liza, the picture was more nuanced. In her opinion the risk and opportunities in the political system were “linear between the institutions”. However, importantly, despite this being the case, this actually presented a problem to the resource scarce org as risk mitigation was more predominant than opportunity seeking. Liza said, “We have to be there […] because of the threat that they come up with something else [than the EC]”. Thus, in terms of resources, the threats arising from shift in power-balance towards the EP seemed to confiscate more time and resources than spent on pursuing opportunities for O6. For Jane in O4, the view was different, as there was a general hope that the EP could become an ally moving e.g. the CFP reform in O4’s desired direction. Actually Jane saw the increased role of the EP as “a great opportunity [to influence policy making]”. However, again, echoing Liza, the EP is also seen as a threat that could change EC’s proposals in an unfavourable direction.

Summing up, within the CFP orgs tended to have a more favourable view towards the opportunities that the increased role of the EP represents. Two out of three, however, did mention the threats arising. Especially for the org with the least resources the need and focus on risk mitigation, actually somewhat perverted the initial potential for more opportunities into to a constraint, which confiscated more time and resources, with implications for the sector this org represented. The last org did not see many threats arising from the increasing role of the EP; however, this org was also the least optimistic with relation to possible opportunities arising.

6.3.4 Whom to lobby?

In this section, we investigate whom the orgs target in the EP and in the immediate arena surrounding the EP. We find that certain types and positions in the EP, which have a specific institutional function, were indeed the primary targets of the orgs. Strong, and charismatic personalities were important for two orgs, whilst the last did not have the resources to pursue this opportunity. Civil servants were primarily used for practical information. Political groups were only important to one org. In the EP arena, we find a bigger diversity compared to the EC arena. Only one org mentioned having experienced changes to already existing relations with actors outside the EP due to Lisbon.
Overall, all three orgs had changed their stakeholder mapping to include more actors from the EP. None of the orgs specifically spoke about stakeholder mapping, but all mentioned several groups they had specific focus on in the EP, which indicated that indeed the mapping exercises had increased significantly due to Lisbon.

The primary univocal targets of the three orgs were again the rapporteurs in general. Shadow-rapporteurs were also primary targets in the hierarchy for all three orgs. Only Michael from O5 mentioned the Committee Vice-chairs when asked whom he lobbies, recognising their role as high in the hierarchy between the MEPs. Jane did much along with Michael firstly seek those MEPs who rank high in the internal hierarchy (though more the unofficial hierarchy independent from the official of vice-chairs etc.). She spoke about “door-opening” MEPs capable of potentially impacting a dossier or issue. O4, nevertheless, did also target MEPs in PECH broadly. Liza did not have the resources to target MEPs broadly and worked with national member orgs to make them do it. Michael did not target broadly, being the competence/responsibility of the national members associations of O5 to target the MEPs without a formal role on a given dossier. All three orgs, nonetheless, explicitly mentioned that going through national member orgs to reach MEPs were often more useful, as constituencies mattered a lot in PECH.

None of the orgs focused on the coordinators. Jane and Michael did not mention them, whereas Liza explicitly said, “For the moment national players [MEP national cross-party coalitions] have a greater role than the political parties”. This was strongly echoed by Michael who was very clear about the fact that O5 as a principle did not speak to parties since O5 in that sense was a-political. For O4 Jane said some party group advisors were absolutely key and therefore primary targets, while others were never really approached. With relation to the civil servants of the EP, the picture was relatively clear. All three orgs used the PECH secretariat. For Liza, it was clear that the relation with the secretariat was only used for gathering procedural and practical information. As she framed it, she did not spend time ‘lobbying’ the secretariat. Jane used it for gathering practical and procedural information but also as an entry point to MEPs as they arrange PECH briefings, workshops, etc. It was, however, not seen as a means to influence the content of the dossiers for O4 and O6. Whether Michael used the secretariat to influence content was unclear. In total, however, what remained was that the civil servants were clearly secondary targets for the orgs compared to the MEPs with institutional functions. Furthermore, in conclusion to the above findings, the ‘party-representatives’ overall played a
very minor role (with one notable exception) and clearly were not even targets for some orgs. Individual MEPs with non-formal roles were targeted by one org, left out by another only due to lack of resources, while not targeted by choice of the third.

The actors in the immediate arena of the EP were also a point that all three orgs said had changed compared to the EC. For Jane and Michael, the extension seemed to be most prominent with relation to NGOs present, whereas from Liza the remark was that there are more players, but in the end the same interests were represented. One thing that was very clear was indeed that in the EP all the national orgs were also present as indicated by the fact that all three interviewed orgs also used and cooperated with their national member orgs with relation to how to lobby the EP. Thus, as European orgs, the arena had obviously expanded to also including more national interests directly present in Brussels\(^24\). The implications of these findings are clearly that the stakeholder analysis entails navigating the many national interests present as well as understanding and knowing about the other new players in the arena.

Extensions/changes in direct relations with other already familiar stakeholders from other arenas did not seem to have been very prominent due to Lisbon. Only Jane mentioned that O4 as a direct consequence of Lisbon had increased their efforts in relation to coalition building. The two remaining orgs did not seem to have changed their already existing relations with formal or informal partners. None of the three had noticed any changes in their relation with the EC. When asked, Liza was actually very surprised of the question and after being explained that in other policy areas this practice was not uncommon, she was very interested to hear more about it and how this specifically worked. Indeed, overall shift in arena have not had a high impact on the relations with already established contacts outside the EP for two of the three orgs. The third org did though strengthen relations to coalition partners.

**6.3.5 How to lobby?**

The findings below suggest that the means of lobbying the EP are different from lobbying the other primary target of the org, the EC. The orgs highlighted that they had learned that effective lobbying required other types of information and a different approach. However, how Lisbon affected the overall communication strategy to mass recipients was unclear. The orgs also interacted more physically with EP actors and strate-

\(^{24}\text{Not necessarily physically present.}\)
gically build up stable or personal relations with them. Alliances and coalitions were important tools, but Lisbon’s direct impact on this aspect was not clear. The orgs’ roles are quite different in the EP compared to the EC. Agenda setting via the EP in the EU policymaking process was in focus by one org. Also, all three orgs systematically changed towards monitoring the EP.

The interviewees said that they use a wide variety of means to lobby the EP. One common thing for all three orgs was that they find lobbying the EP very different from lobbying the EC. However, as a consequence of Lisbon, none of the interviewees were very clear on whether the orgs had changed their overall way of communicating broadly to mass recipients. When asked, all three responded to changes in the information provided and not least how it was provided to the EP. And, thus, results for mass recipients were not clear. However, one inference we could make from this was the big change in type of information and how this information was passed to the EP compared to the EC. Said otherwise, speaking on communication broadly, the most important thing to address then was not mass recipients but individual targeted recipients.

One of the most predominant and common messages from the interviewees was the fact that the type of information provided had changed. They all pointed to the fact that the CFP was very dominantly controlled by national interests in the CoM, but also now in the EP. Hence, national information seemed not just to be effective, but even more so necessary. Therefore, all three orgs had liaised extensively with national orgs vis-à-vis the EP to take the constituency interests of the MEPs into account.

Another change on what was actually gathered and processed was the technical information. As the interviewees agreed that the EC was by nature more technical, it seemed that actually some technical information had not been processed by the orgs earlier, except for O5, as the EC already knew it. Hence, when now orienting more towards the EP, which did not have this information type/knowledge at all (strong view from all three interviewees), the orgs also now had to process this information. In fact, Michael, despite having the information, stated that in his view the MEPs were “ignorant” indicating that it was a task to provide (educating) the information to the MEPs, explaining, “They are not technocrats – they know nothing. They are politicians”. All three interviewees certainly found the EP to be more political than the EC. Therefore, providing more political information was also necessary. O5, however, was not very political by na-
ture according to Michael, and therefore less political information seemed to be passed from them. This was instead left to national member orgs of O5.

With relation to how the information was passed things had also changed. In the EP educating the actors played a big role for the orgs. Especially O4, spent time and resources on this according to Jane. The less resourceful orgs had the same experience, Michael noting that one had to simplify and explain ‘Adam and Eve’ to MEPs. Both Michael and Liza were forced to educate MEPs but seemingly saw it more as a constraint, whereas to Jane it seemed to be a strategic opportunity for fundamentally influencing MEPs’ views. It became evident that not just the type of information was important, but also the way in which the arguments were constructed etc. As Jane noted when speaking of the move from meetings in the EC to the EP “it affects the way you present the facts”.

All the three orgs mentioned that they had more face-to-face meetings in the EP after Lisbon. All of them used national orgs extensively to undertake some of these meetings. Jane and Michael mentioned several times the importance of their presence in the intergroups of the EP as this was good for educating MEPs and presenting your org and more importantly its views.

The only actors where all three orgs held and maintained stable relations were in the committee secretariat. This did not mean that they did not point to MEPs as important stable relations; however, with national divides and the big inclusion of national member orgs, only O4 really seemed to be spending resources and strategically building stable relations with MEPs. According to Liza, O6 simply did not have the resources, especially not in light of the high turnover of persons in the EP. In her opinion it was much easier to retain stable relations with the EC. Michael added that especially the fact that many MEPs only spoke their national languages meant that it was difficult to speak with them. Only O4 had stable relations to ‘party-representatives’ in the form of the party group advisors. It seemed that stable relations were not built with individual MEPs by Michael and Liza, but established whenever an MEP became target on a specific dossier.

Furthermore, a very interesting point with relation to the relations with MEPs was that all three orgs had seen an increase in the level of proactive contact from the EP. Jane from O4 noted that proactive contact from the EP only came after O4 had taken the initial time to establish contact in general with the MEP. However, Jane estimated that now some MEPs even came more often to O4. The proactive contact from the EP could in-
dicate that a dual process of interaction was taking place after Lisbon. This could further increase the stability of the relations with the EP actors.

In summary, it seems that communication, information type and the passing of it, interaction type, and the level of stable and personal relations change org’s work on a day-to-day basis to practically reach the desired outcomes defined by the overall lobby strategy.

Interestingly, despite the EP being of a much more political nature (according to the interviewees) there was no clear change towards more coalition or alliance building compared to the EC. Only Jane was clearly taking more advantage of already exiting alliances, thus, also spending more resources on it.

Acknowledging that lobbying the EP was substantially different from lobbying the EC the orgs recognised that they perceived their role (European org) to be different in the EP compared to the EC. For Jane, it was closely connected to their type of org, which allowed them to be more “flexible” in the EC, whereas they had to speak more with one voice with their peers in their sector in the EP. For both Michael and Liza, it seemed that their roles were quite different due to the vast focus on national lines in the EP. In the EC, it seemed the European orgs were natural ‘inhabitants’, as Liza elaborated, “Because in the EC they have more the European approach”. As mentioned, Liza was also frustrated to be surpassed by national orgs at EP hearings, since this to her knowledge was not the usual method of the EP in other policy areas.

Michael pointed out that using MEPs to ask formal questions to the EC was a way to try to influence the initiatives of the EC; a practice Michael had used more extensively after Lisbon, indicating the increased role the EP in the EU institutional landscape. Ironically Michael, the most sceptical with relation to EP influence, was the one to point this out.

One of the clearest findings during the three interviews was that the orgs also had changed their internal monitoring procedures to encompass a long series of agendas, meetings, etc., which had not previously been monitored before Lisbon. This also had implications for the allocation and use of resources. Liza even noted that there were very technical dossiers in the EC, outside the OLP that the org no longer could monitor.

Summing up, this section indicates that how the orgs go about their task of lobbying have changed quite substantially after Lisbon, as the EP has entered the arena with its own characteristics and nuances that must be adapted to.
6.3.6 Concluding remarks on findings of organised European interest's behaviour in the Common Fisheries Policy

The preceding findings highlighted several different aspects of how the EP had influenced the orgs' lobbying strategies within the CFP. In line with the overall expectation of a change in behaviour, all orgs had begun to allocate resources to lobbying the EP. One org had gained additional manpower to deal with this, whereas the other two orgs evidently had no further resources, and therefore reallocation within the existing bulk of work was done. Table 6 summarises that Lisbon also influenced several other aspects of their lobbying strategy:

Table 6, Findings in interest group behaviour within the CFP area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies:</th>
<th>Jane – O4</th>
<th>Michael – O5</th>
<th>Liza – O6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in resources towards CFP from other policy areas due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in allocation of resources towards EP within CFP due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ management of skills and knowledge due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in image management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Why: | | |
| EP increased power an opportunity | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| EP increased power a threat | 1 | 0 | 1 |

| Whom: - due to Lisbon | | |
| Δ towards actors in the EP | | |
| - Rapporteurs, Shadow-rapporteurs | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| - Chairs, Vice-chairs | N/M | 1 | N/M |
| - Individual MEPs | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| - EP civil servants | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| - The political groups, coordinators and party-group advisors | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Δ in stakeholder population – arena – compared to EC | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Δ in other stakeholder relations than EP actors – incl. EC | 1 | N/M | N/M |

| How: - due to Lisbon | | |
| Δ in overall communication strategy – incl. media use, position papers etc. | ? | ? | ? |
| Δ in type of information provided | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets – incl. educating | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Δ in interaction type with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Δ towards more stable relations with EP actors | 1 | 1 | 1 |
The findings indicate that the institutional change indeed have challenged the orgs in several aspects. In 15 out of 23 of the parameters identified as important for lobbying strategies in general from the induced data, we found a clear coherence in the results within the CFP. For two of the org, O4 and O6, there was actually coherence between 20 of the 23 parameters. This, in light of Michael’s view of the EP after Lisbon and his subsequent somewhat self-contradictory behaviour vis-à-vis the institution, may not be so surprising. Hence, without this potential outlier, the CFP area might have shown even stronger overall coherence than is the case now.

In the wake of Lisbon, the three orgs had seen a change in the type of skills and knowledge needed. The orgs saw the ‘new’ institution as an opportunity for their lobbying strategies. All three also changed towards actors in the EP, primarily the institutionally important function of rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs. Furthermore, they also coherently utilised the civil servants of the EP. Another point of agreement was the fact that more players were present in the EP. The impact of Lisbon on their communication strategies to mass recipients was unclear for all three, showing low clarity in the area as a whole. On the contrary, it was much more evident that all three orgs had to work with another type of information, and in some cases gathering these types, due to the different characteristics of the EP, e.g. the importance of MEP constituencies. All three subsequently also changed their way of passing this information where especially the educating of EP actors is a resource demanding task. All three also changed the way in which they physically interacted with the EP. Common to this approach was also a strategic move towards building more stable relations with EP actors.

An interesting finding, which all three interviewees strongly expressed during the interviews, is the fact that the CFP is more divided according to national ‘lines’ than the supranational party politics of the EP. Hence, the inclusion of national member orgs in the lobbying efforts, much like the strategy devised towards the CoM being the ‘domain’ of
the national org, was key for efficiency and success. However, the orgs had still changed monitoring procedures substantially, to also cover the EP, despite the effort of lobbying the EP is shared with the national member orgs.

The orgs as mentioned had differing views on nine parameters. Five of these might be explained by the view of Michael towards the EP in general. Three of the ‘outlier’ parameters of O5 were on the populations the orgs utilised in the EP. They were the only org not using ‘party-representatives’ and individual MEPs, whereas they were the only to use vice-chairs. Stating that the EP has not been influential so far and doubting it will be, however, corresponds well with the fact that threats from the EP after Lisbon was not a concern. It does, however seem a bit at odds with the statement that the EP is an opportunity, and especially towards the last parameter where O5 differs from the two others – attempt to use the EP as a way of setting the EU agenda through EC questions in the CFP area. Nonetheless, as the self-contradiction here seems to become complete, nothing can be inferred on this at a more or less general level. Thus, even though Michael had especially many answers differing from the two other orgs, correlating this back to the overall view in the EPs influence is not possible.

On the three remaining parameters the orgs also differed in their answers. Image management has increased by one org that already did it in the EP, maintained the same by a second org that also already did, while for the third it was not something that was mentioned at all. Only one org felt that they had started interacting more or differently with other stakeholders after Lisbon. This could be seen in relation to the fact that this was also the only org stepping up its efforts with relation to alliance and coalition building, whereas the other two remained the same or were unclear.

6.4 Changing perception from recipients: Experience of the European Parliament actors within the Common Fisheries Policy

This section summarises the findings that shed light on the work of lobbyists of the interviews undertaken with actors in the EP. In short, the interviewees reported increased attention from organised interests, spending more time on listening to stakeholders a change in their informational needs in line with the findings from the CCP.

First, the three interviewees concurrently stated that in their opinions the role of the EP with relation to the CFP had increased after Lisbon. It was nonetheless clear that all
three interviewees were not of the perception that the EP was yet playing ‘the game’ fully. On the contrary, all three agreed that they were at the beginning of a process, implying that as they learned the game, the EP would gain in influence. They also pointed out that the CoM/MS have been very reluctant and ‘surprised’ of how much power the EP has gained with Lisbon. Hence, in their view it had taken time for the CoM to realise this, and thus, there has been some battles and blocking from the EP before the procedure (OLP) could start working properly. Another interesting comment came from Vincent from the PECH secretariat, stating that as the MEPs took PECH more and more seriously, the secretariat had decreased in importance since the MEPs had started drafting the reports themselves. As a direct consequence of the increased role of the EP, the interviewees perceived an increased activity of lobbyists and to a lesser extent also the EC. From the lobbying side, it seemed that the increasing activity had primarily occurred after Lisbon, and gradually (and quite slowly so from the business side compared to NGOs who had been there already before Lisbon in anticipation according to one interviewee).

Another important finding was that they also spent more time listening to stakeholders as they had an increased need for information. The type of information they requested had also changed. For Vincent from the secretariat, it was an increased need for political information, as he had been used to only dealing with the technical side but now also had to understand the political side of the game. For Pierre, an MEP, technical information had become much more important, especially when being rapporteur or shadowrapporteur. Guillaume, a party-group advisor, stressed that the needed information was indeed becoming more technical, as well as more political. Previously, he did not have to check all the MEPs’ amendments; but with the increased power comes responsibility, and therefore this had now become necessary, requiring further information.

There was also a vast change in the interaction with the lobbying side. Many more face-to-face meetings were taking place according to all three interviewees. All three interviewees, furthermore, clearly spent much more time proactively contacting orgs to retrieve the knowledge, information, ‘legitimacy’ etc. that they needed. They also stated that they were trying to maintain more stable relations with lobbyists. E.g. Vincent mentioned how he actively fostered relations with smaller orgs in MS so as to get more than just the European point of view from the big orgs (especially when going on Committee trips to MS). However, it did seem that in the case of Pierre and Guillaume that the rela-
tions fostered did not grow into a ‘fixed’ network. On the contrary, relations were fostered from dossier to dossier and issue-to-issue. Vincent was unclear on this point.

With relation to the quality of the lobbying efforts undertaken the picture was very unclear. Guillaume was certainly not satisfied and expressly stated that they needed better and more lobbyists in the EP to fulfil their needs. Pierre, nonetheless, felt he got what he needed from lobbying orgs to a high degree. Again Vincent seemed indecisive.

It was clear that the EP was still in a learning phase after Lisbon. Hence, many examples were given on specific issues where they had been struggling and where they were still learning. In fact, this seemed to still be so novel that they had very little focus on the process undergone in the orgs. Hence, only Pierre mentioned, in a subordinate clause, that of course the orgs were also in a learning phase. As it was very clear that the EP was indeed still learning the OLP game, it was not surprising that none of the interviewees mentioned INIs – that is the non-legislative agenda-setting game.

An interesting finding was that neither Pierre nor Vincent seemed to have preferences towards European orgs. They maintained contact with them, but they were not important, and Vincent even explicitly said he preferred the national orgs. For Pierre, his constituent orgs seemed extremely important. He spoke several times of the balance between the environment and protection of jobs. For Guillaume, the situation seemed ambiguous, resulting from the fact that he seemed personally to prefer national orgs, but that his job was exactly to find the European compromise, and that he therefore maintained much contact there. Only Pierre had seen first-movers, being NGOs, whom he thought had seen an opportunity in the EP anticipated already before Lisbon stepped into force (completely coherent with what Jane from O4 reported).

The findings are summarised in the table below to give an overview of the findings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vincent – Secretariat</th>
<th>Pierre – MEP</th>
<th>Guillaume – Party-group advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>- due to Lisbon in the CCP area</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from lobbyists e.g. meetings, phone calls, letters etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from EC</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more time listening to lobbyists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Generally, the findings from interviews from the EP correspond extremely well with the findings from the interviews with the orgs, as the interviewees reported several changes due to Lisbon. In line with the answers reported by the orgs, the EP side also indicated that organised interests had allocated more resources to lobbying the EP. Furthermore, the EP side also confirmed other changes with respect to their relations with stakeholders and the information obtained from stakeholders.

### 6.5 Changing lobbying behaviour: Experience of organised European interests within the environmental policy of the European Union

Three interviews were conducted with three interest groups that have been active within the EU’s environmental policy. The findings will be split into two subsections: The first section will focus on the orgs’ perceptions of whether the role of the EP within environmental policy has changed since Lisbon. The second section is set to analyse the lobbying practice of these orgs. The findings are clear as none of the orgs experienced any changes due to Lisbon, as summarised in Table 8.

#### 6.5.1 Impact of Lisbon on the European Parliaments role within the environmental policy of the European Union

This subsection presents the interviewees’ perceptions of whether Lisbon has influenced the area they work in. The findings suggest that the orgs did not perceive any changes in their lobby strategies due to Lisbon. Also, the amount of resources was unchanged. In
spite of Lisbon not having changed the legislative procedure, two of the orgs, however, did recognise that the legislative process had changed somehow.

On the question of whether the role of the EP had increased after Lisbon, the interviewees agreed that the Lisbon had not changed the role of the EP within environmental policy. None of the orgs saw an increased role of the EP due to Lisbon. Amanda from O8 did note, however, that the EP had – not linked to Lisbon, but in general – taken increasingly more power in the ENVI field. She explained that the EP had become stronger simply because they have strong MEPs, who “fight” for the environment. Thus, in Amanda’s opinion because the MEPs are willing to ‘fight’ more, they get more power.

On the question of whether the available resources had increased, the orgs all noted that they had not seen any change in the available resources. Therefore, this would suggest that the environment of the three orgs had remained unchanged.

Two of the orgs recognised that there had been a change not linked to Lisbon. Specifically, Amanda and Donna (O7) said that the process between the tabling and the adoption of a proposal (the trilogue) had become more intense in spite of the legislative procedure remaining the same. They highlighted that the EP is eager to get ‘things done’ in first reading. Amanda noted, “In the past going to a third reading was never a problem. Nowadays they always want to get first readings”. Consequently, the final discussions between the institutions have become more closed and more difficult to access.

Table 8, Findings on the changes and expected changes in the environment due to Lisbon within the environmental area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Donna – O7</th>
<th>Amanda – O8</th>
<th>Peter – O9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more formal power after Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more actual influence now and have had since Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP will have more influence in the future due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall available resources from environment due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 0 demarks ‘no’. Δ demarks ‘change’.

As summarised, the orgs agreed that Lisbon had neither changed the role of the EP nor their available resources in the field of ENVI. The sections below will discern whether they had undertaken changes in their lobbying strategies due to Lisbon.
6.5.2 Who lobbies?
The three interviewees reported that their allocation of resources was unchanged. Also, none of the three reported any changes in the way they manage their skills and knowledge due to Lisbon, whereas e.g. Amanda recognised that they were always trying to improve their lobbying strategy towards the EP. Similarly, no changes were reported to their image management due to Lisbon, with Peter from O9 noting that some changes had happened in this area due to the nature of this org.

6.5.3 Why lobby?
In relation to opportunities and threats the interviewees concurrently did not mention changes due to Lisbon. They all generally referred to the EP as being more green, which to the more business-oriented orgs sometimes implied more risks according to Peter and Amanda. However, this was completely decoupled from Lisbon.

6.5.4 Whom to lobby?
Overall, the orgs did not report that Lisbon had influenced whom they target. However, from the interviews there are findings, which are interesting vis-à-vis the perceptions of the orgs in the CCP and the CFP areas that will be presented here.

First, the interviewees agreed that the rapporteurs followed by the shadows were the most important to lobby in the EP. The ‘party-representatives’, coordinators and party group advisors were less important to varying degrees, with the advisors ranking lowest. Peter noted that intergroups and the like were better than ‘party-representatives’. Individual MEPs who are ‘friends’ of the orgs ranked just below the rapporteurs and shadows, but their ranking also depended highly on the dossier. The ENVI secretariat was used when resources allowed for it, or when they were indeed (rarely) drafting the reports. Only Amanda saw an increased value in the secretariat as an access point to the rapporteurs etc. and, therefore, spend some time strategically on meeting them.

Amanda saw a general trend not caused by Lisbon in the number of lobbyists in Brussels, noting, “There are more and more people on the Brussels-scene”, and “more diversity in different players”. However, Donna and Amanda did not find substantially different networks in the EP compared to the EC. Peter found the EP to be more pluralist and therefore used more alliances in the EP in general. On this point, Donna explained that stakeholder mapping had become increasingly more important. One must know who is there, saying what, doing what, etc. Based on this one must build alliances with
those where it is possible. This apparently was a prerequisite in the EP compared to the EC. In general, O7 and O9 used more alliances in the EP as a tool in their strategies.

6.5.5 How?
As with the above findings the three interviewees saw no change in how to conduct their lobbying. Hence, as seen in Table 9 below, there is no change registered in any of the parameters. However, as in the previous section, we will briefly present some interesting findings, which can improve the understanding of the CCP and the CFP areas.

All orgs mentioned that they basically passed on the same information (technical and political) to the EC and the EP. However, they also noted that there are completely different ways of doing it as the EP in general, and specifically the MEPs lack a fundamental technical understanding. Donna noted that there is a “different language in EP - different way of speaking to them [MEPs]”. She explained that in the EC more often a “guy with a chemical background” would be the desk officer. He would understand one thing, whereas MEPs understand completely different things. Rapporteurs were the notable exception, as they often were involved in the details. Nevertheless, this is from dossier to dossier and, henceforth, this expertise was lost with every new dossier. Also, the issue of knowledge of constituencies was mentioned as a necessity when communicating with MEPs. On the issue of stability all three interviewees were ambiguous. On the one hand they had stable relations; on the other hand they explained how difficult it was to maintain stable relations in the EP because of changing people and the way things are handled dossier by dossier, not leaving permanent expertise with the people involved. Donna and Peter experienced a slight increase in proactive contact from the EP but attributed it to circumstances such as the nature of their orgs.

All three were clear with relation to the division of labour between the European orgs and their national member orgs. The EC and the EP were for them, whereas the CoM was left to the national member orgs to deal with.

Also, none of the orgs reported using INIs at all. In fact, Peter directly stated that he did not see it as important. Amanda did report that they used a kind of CSR/voluntary approach in certain environmental areas, so as to avoid the agenda going towards hard law/regulation.

The answers are summarised in the table below:
Table 9, Findings in interest group behaviour within the environmental policy area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies:</th>
<th>Donna – O7</th>
<th>Amanda – O8</th>
<th>Peter – O9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in resources towards ENVI from other policy areas due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in allocation of resources towards EP within ENVI due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ management of skills and knowledge due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in image management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why:</th>
<th>Donna – O7</th>
<th>Amanda – O8</th>
<th>Peter – O9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power an opportunity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power a threat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whom: - due to Lisbon</th>
<th>Donna – O7</th>
<th>Amanda – O8</th>
<th>Peter – O9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ towards actor’s in the EP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rapporteurs, Shadow-rapporteurs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chairs, Vice-chairs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual MEPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EP civil servants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The political groups, coordinators and party-group advisors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in stakeholder population – arena – compared to EC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in other stakeholder relations than EP actors – incl. EC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How: - due to Lisbon</th>
<th>Donna – O7</th>
<th>Amanda – O8</th>
<th>Peter – O9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in overall communication strategy – incl. media use, position papers etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in type of information provided</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets – incl. educating</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in interaction type with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ towards more stable relations with EP actors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in utilisation of alliances/coalitions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in org’s role in the EP compared to EC – incl. more national</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in utilisation of agenda-setting possibilities – incl. INIs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ of internal monitoring procedures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 0 demarks ‘no’. Δ demarks ‘change’.

Table 9 shows that the interviewees did not indicate that the orgs had undertaken any changes in their lobby strategies as a consequence of Lisbon. The few changes that had occurred were attributed to other factors.
6.6 Changing perception from recipients: Experience of the European Parliament actors within the environmental policy of the European Union

This section summarises the findings of the interviews with EP actors. The findings presented here reflect the parts of the interviews that shed light on the work of lobbying targets in the EP. Overall very little change had occurred according to the interviewees; however, some general trends unrelated to Lisbon were highlighted. Several points were not mentioned by the interviewees and did not resonate in their answers when asked.

Findings on the role of the EP after Lisbon were not clear-cut. Two of the interviewees, Philippe, an MEP, and Francois, a party-group advisor, were both very clear that nothing had changed in the OLP within the environmental policy area after Lisbon. Yves, from the ENVI secretariat, however, had a different view. He of course concurred that formally nothing had changed with Lisbon. Nonetheless, he highlighted that due to the increased competence in international agreements and the general increase of competence in other policy areas and with relation to the election of the College of Commissioners that the role of the EP had increased as the self-confidence or self-image of the EP actors had increased. In his view this led to further influence. Presented with this argument Francois\textsuperscript{25} was baffled and completely disagreed saying that it had had “zero influence”.

Furthermore, Yves was of the opinion that Lisbon and the overall increased role had led to more lobbying from stakeholders. Again Philippe and Francois disagreed. Both acknowledged a slightly increasing trend in the number of lobbyists, but for them it was clearly unrelated to Lisbon and more a consequence of the professionalization of lobbying. None of the interviewees mentioned an increasing activity from the EC, and none of the interviewees spent more time listening to stakeholders after Lisbon.

The three interviewees’ needs for information had not changed, neither had the manner in which they retrieved it. There was no increase in the level of meetings or the like. None of them in general took more proactive contact with lobbyists. However, Philippe did contact universities more often after Lisbon, but it was unclear why. Also, there was no change due to Lisbon in the way they managed their relations with stakeholders. They all agreed that stakeholders varied from dossier to dossier and issue-to-issue.

In general, but clearly unrelated to Lisbon, Philippe did find that the quality of lobbying had increased whereas Yves and Francois did not respond to this. This seemed to fit in

\textsuperscript{25} Who was interviewed after Yves.
well with the fact that none of them in any way responded to questions on learning processes neither internally nor from the organisational side. Furthermore, only Francois mentioned the use of INIs but did not see them as very central and also commented that lobbyists did not pay much attention to them. On the question of European orgs, Philippe stated that indeed for him European orgs were often the first group the turned to when dealing with new dossiers or issues but that he also always asked e.g. SMEs in his constituency how they viewed a certain dossier or issue.

Obviously the question of first-movers was not relevant in the case of Philippe and Francois, as they saw no changes in lobbying patterns. Yves, who did see some change in lobbying patterns, did not identify any first-movers. The findings are summarised in the below table to better give an overview:

### Table 10, Findings in EP actors’ perceptions/experiences within the environmental policy area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- due to Lisbon in the environmental policy area</th>
<th>Yves – Secretariat</th>
<th>Philippe – MEP</th>
<th>Francois – Party-group advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from lobbyists e.g. meetings, phone calls, letters etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from EC</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more time listening to lobbyists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ type of information requested</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed e.g. face-to-face meeting</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More proactively contacting stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foster specifically stable relations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fixed network</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality of lobbying efforts</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning process still on-going</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inside the EP</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Orgs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use or importance of INIs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference to European orgs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0****</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-movers identified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/M indicates not mentioned. 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, N/M demarks ‘not mentioned’, and Δ demarks ‘change’.

* The interviewee agreed that within OLP nothing had formally changed, but that the new competencies in international agreements and in other policy areas affected the self-confidence of the EP, and thereby led to them being stronger in negotiations and getting more influence.

** They do see a slight general upward trend in the number of lobbyists, but both stressed that it was not as a consequence of Lisbon in their opinion.

*** Do experience higher quality but unrelated to Lisbon.

**** Indeed a preference for European org, but this was unrelated to Lisbon.
Broadly, the findings from interviews from the EP side correspond to the answer received from the orgs that Lisbon has lead to no changes within ENVI except for one interviewee who on the question of the role of the EP and on the level of activity from lobbyists saw changes due to Lisbon.

### 6.7 Changing lobbying behaviour: Experience of organised European interests within the internal market policy of the European Union

Interviews were also conducted with three interest groups that are active within the EU’s internal market policy. The findings will be split into two subsections: The first section will focus on the orgs’ perceptions of whether the role of the EP had changed since Lisbon within IMCO. The second section present findings on the lobbying practice of these orgs. Findings are diverse, as two of the orgs interestingly saw a change of influence for the EP after Lisbon, whereas one did not. This had possible consequences on how those two orgs formed their lobbying strategies on five parameters as explained below. All results are summarised in Table 12 below.

#### 6.7.1 Impact of Lisbon on the European Parliament’s role within the internal market policy of the European Union

The below subsection will analyse the interviewees’ perceptions of whether Lisbon has influenced the IMCO area. The findings suggest that two of the orgs indeed see changes.

The three interviewees agreed that the EP as a consequence of the Lisbon had not gained more formal power in OLP. Despite this, Irina from O11 and David from O12 found that role of the EP had increased as a consequence of Lisbon. They reported that the influence of the EP was greater now. Irina explained that it was the case especially in the trilogue after the first reading. She elaborated that as the MEPs became more serious, they also became more confident, and therefore subsequently, exercised a greater influence on the final result. David echoed this by mentioning the INIs, “Even when the EC is discussing a proposal, we have to now check with the EP – there is a drastic increase in the EP [influence] at the early stage of the proposal [from the EC corresponding the INI-phase of the EP]”. Thus, for Irina the EP has improved especially the bargaining in the trilogues with notably the CoM but also the EC, and therefore, they obtain more influence. From David, the argument also centred on an increased sense of legitimacy in the EP. That is, that the EP via Lisbon obtained some more legitimacy, which they channelled into more influence, despite the non-legal changes to the decision-making
process. Justin from O10 did not share this view and stated clearly that nothing had changed in his strategy. Following this it was unclear whether Irina and David believed that the EP would continue to gain in influence, however, already the fact that they believed they had now is an unexpected finding compared to the presented approach. The two interviewees that perceived a changed influence for the EP were also the two to have changed or possibly have changed something in their lobby strategies due to Lisbon.

None of the orgs had gained further resources after Lisbon. However, David believed that this could have happened if it had not been due to the economic crises that constrained the budgets of their member orgs. So they actually considered it positive that member orgs had not reduced their budget, but rather maintained the current level.

Table 11, Findings on the changes and expected changes in the environment due to Lisbon in the internal market area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</th>
<th>Justin – O10</th>
<th>Irina – O11</th>
<th>David – O12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more formal power after Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more actual influence now and have had since Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP will have more influence in the future due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall available resources from environment due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 demarks 'yes', 0 demarks 'no', ? demarks 'unclear/ambiguous', and Δ demarks 'change'.

From the table, it can be seen that two orgs saw the role of the EP as increased after Lisbon and that the EP had more influence on legislation, whereas the last org did not perceive any changes. The sections below will focus on whether the orgs have undertaken any changes in their lobbying strategies due to Lisbon.

6.7.2 Who lobbies?

None of the three orgs had changed their image, knowledge, and skills management as they were used to lobbying the EP. They agreed that the EP was more resource demanding due to the nature of the institution with more access points and a higher turnover of people compared to the EC. However, this was unrelated to Lisbon. Nonetheless, O12 had shifted more resources within the internal market area towards the EP and had started discussing how they in their strategy could utilise the existing resources better, as David perceived an increase in influence of the EP. There were some indications that this also was the case for O11, but it was unclear.
6.7.3 Why lobby?
The three interviewees mentioned highlighted threats before opportunities, when speaking about the powers of the EP. However, this was unrelated to Lisbon. Irina and David, nonetheless, and as discussed below, had become much more vigilant vis-à-vis INIs as they perceived the importance of these as having substantially increased after Lisbon. Thus, since they saw an impact of INIs and the agenda-setting influence of these, it may be inferred that the issue of opportunities and threats were somehow affected by Lisbon via these. Both interviewees mentioned explicitly how they could be used to influence the direction of the EC already at the proposal formulation stage.

6.7.4 Whom to lobby?
In general, there were no changes to whom the three orgs targeted in their lobby strategies as a consequence of Lisbon. The above divergent findings on EP influence and the subsequent allocation of resources and opportunities and threats, however, did not imply that their stakeholder mapping had changed. Thus, the same actors in the EP still remained important (including the INI rapporteurs/authors).

In general, the three orgs used rapporteurs and shadows as access points in the EP. Justin and David found the IMCO secretariat to be very important, whereas Irina had relations with them, but found them unimportant. The three had a higher interest in the coordinators and the chair than in the other policy areas. In general, individual MEPs who were ‘friends’ of the orgs also remained important, especially as stable contacts in the same manner as the chair and the coordinators. All three orgs agreed that the EP displayed much more heterogeneous with more players present than in the EC.

6.7.5 How?
To a large extent there were no changes in how the three interviewees carried out their lobbying strategies after Lisbon. However, one change was obvious for the two interviewees that saw an increased role for the EP. Namely, they had changed their monitoring processes. As INIs had become more important they also had to keep an eye on these, and especially the timing of when a dossier was in the EP, as the INIs are prepared in the EP in a phase where the EP is not formally involved in the policy-making process.

For Irina and David, it was clear that INIs mattered. Irina explained that the INIs could set the direction of the EP and, therefore, influence the overall agenda of the EU. She reported that she used this proactively, for instance by going to the EC with the INIs to
explain the EC what should be taken into consideration from the INIs. Thus, it had changed her way of working with this. She stated, “We actually lobby on it as if it was a legislative proposal, so on that we also do amendments and everything, cause at the end of the day it is important”. David echoed this by saying that one would not expect the big impact of the INIs, but that it was indeed real in his view.

On a more general level the interviewees agreed that the EP and EC were their arenas as European orgs whereas the CoM were more the arena of their national member orgs.

With relation to the type of information the interviewees also agreed that in general the EP is more political whereas the EC is more technical. Again, all three mentioned constituencies as important in the EP with Justin saying it most clearly: “As long as you give them something […] they can sell back home – then I think you have much more chances to actually having the MEP taking that point of view in account”. Therefore, Irina, actually often brought national member orgs to MEP meetings to cover both the European side as well as the national side. The answers received are summarised in the table below:

Table 12, Findings on interest group behaviour within the internal market area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies:</th>
<th>Justin – O10</th>
<th>Irina – O11</th>
<th>David – O12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in resources towards ENVI from other policy areas due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in allocation of resources towards EP within ENVI due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in image management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why:</th>
<th>Justin – O10</th>
<th>Irina – O11</th>
<th>David – O12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power an opportunity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EP increased power a threat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whom: due to Lisbon</th>
<th>Justin – O10</th>
<th>Irina – O11</th>
<th>David – O12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Δ towards actors in the EP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rapporteurs, Shadow-rapporteurs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chairs, Vice-chairs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual MEPs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EP civil servants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The political groups, coordinators</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and party-group advisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in stakeholder population – arena – compared to EC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Δ in other stakeholder relations than EP actors – incl. EC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12 shows that Lisbon did not have an evident impact on 18 of the 23 discerned parameters. However, two of the orgs indicated that they had undertaken some changes in their lobbying practice due to Lisbon. These changes mainly related to perceived increased importance of the INIs.

### 6.8 Changing perception from recipients: Experience of the European Parliament actors within the internal market policy of the European Union

This section summarises the findings of the interviews undertaken with actors in the EP. The findings presented here reflect the parts of the interviews that shed light on the work of lobbyists in the EP. Overall Lisbon had not changed much within the internal market policy area, though there were some uncertainty with respect to the relationship between Lisbon and INIs.

The three interviewees agreed that the role of the EP had not changed as a consequence of Lisbon. Olivier explicitly mentioned an academic report made by the IMCO secretariat concluding that IMCO would have no further OLP powers. Nevertheless, despite this very legal approach to the matter, the three interviewees had some nuances individually that is worth noting in this context. First, Jacques from the IMCO secretariat actually felt an increased activity from lobbyists since Lisbon. In his opinion, this was related to the fact that ‘outsiders’ saw an increased role/influence of the EP, whether it was real or not. From Juliette, a party-group advisor, there were mixed views. On the one hand, she felt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How: - due to Lisbon</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall communication strategy – incl. media use, position papers etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in type of information provided</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets – incl. educating</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in interaction type with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with EP actors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of alliances/coalitions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in org’s role in the EP compared to EC – incl. more national</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of agenda-setting possibilities – incl. INIs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ of internal monitoring procedures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/M indicates not mentioned, 1 demarks ‘yes’, 0 demarks ‘no’, ? demarks ‘unclear/ambiguous’, and Δ demarks ‘change’.
no difference strictly on OLP, on the other she noted that more and more importance was attached to INIs. She did more work on these reports, but it was unclear if this was then directly linked to Lisbon or a more general focus on the EP. Olivier, an MEP Assistant, explained that indeed IMCO used the INIs very consciously and strategically as an attempt to influence the work of the EC. Hence, this could indicate that the EP gained increasing influence gained in this area, but again whether the INIs’ increasing importance was linked to Lisbon was hard to establish. In any case, they did not report increased activity from the EC. Furthermore the interviewees did not spend more time listening to stakeholders as they were already at the maximum level they could handle.

The interviewees reported no change in the type of information requested, the way in which it was passed, and in the general interaction with stakeholders due to Lisbon. They did from time to time proactively contact stakeholders but this was unrelated to Lisbon. Also, there was no change towards more stable relations or more fixed networks due to Lisbon. There was, nonetheless, reportedly a core of big European orgs, which always ‘surrounds’ IMCO, with an additional vast population of lobbyists/orgs varying from dossier to dossier and issue-to-issue.

There was not much attention given to learning processes among the interviewees. However, Olivier did explain that he often tried to help lobbyist polish their messages if he felt that they were important for a dossier. In that sense, he was teaching the lobbyists how to improve. Furthermore, in general he observed what he termed a natural rise of quality in the lobbying efforts, as the system had matured. The findings are summarised in the table below to give an overview:

Table 13, Findings in EP actors’ perceptions/experiences within the internal market area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- due to Lisbon in the environmental policy area</th>
<th>Jacques – Secretary</th>
<th>Olivier – MEP</th>
<th>Juliette – Party-group advisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from lobbyists e.g. meetings, phone calls, letters etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from EC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more time listening to lobbyists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ type of information requested</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed e.g. face-to-face meeting</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More proactively contacting stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Towards more stable relations with stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
<th>N/M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster specifically stable relations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed network</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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Improved quality of lobbying efforts

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0**</td>
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Learning process still on-going

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<tr>
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<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
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<tr>
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<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orgs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
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<td>N/M</td>
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Use or importance of INIs

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
<th>N/M</th>
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<td></td>
<td>N/M</td>
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Preference to European orgs

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
<th>N/M</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/M</td>
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First-movers identified

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Orgs</th>
<th>N/M</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
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</table>

Note: N/M indicates not mentioned. 1 demarks 'yes', 0 demarks 'no', N/M demarks 'not mentioned', and ? demarks 'unclear/ambiguous'. Δ demarks 'change'.

* Sees a slight general upward trend in the number of lobbyists, but both stressed that it was not as a consequence of Lisbon but rather the last two enlargements.
** Do experience higher quality but unrelated to Lisbon.
*** Indeed a preference for European org, but this was unrelated to Lisbon.

Generally, the findings from interviews from the EP correspond relatively well with the findings from the interviews with the orgs with few changes having occurred due to Lisbon. The uncertainty relating to the use and importance of the INIs and the outside’s view on the EP also reflected the uncertainty of the orgs operating within the internal market policy.
7 Analysis: Understanding the findings and expectations

The preceding chapter analysed the individual answers to identify general trends within the respective policy areas. The chapter is separated into two sub-analyses. The first sub-analysis will analyse the collected data on the basis of the exchange perspective and the derived empirical expectations. Specifically, the findings will be analysed through pattern matching, where the findings are contrasted and compared to the expected empirical findings. The second sub-analysis will focus on additional changes that were made in their lobbying strategy in response to Lisbon that were not addressed explicitly addressed by the exchange perspective, but are relevant for the literature presented on lobbying in practice. The tables in Appendix IV provide an overview of the findings across the investigated policy areas.

7.1 Analysis in accordance with the exchange perspective

This section will analyse the findings from an exchange perspective. Specifically, the section is structured thematically, where the evidence will be compared to the expectations that were put forward in section 4.3. As the methodological section explained, the four cases were selected on the basis of two different logics. On the one hand, INTA and PECH were selected on the basis of the literal replication logic, where changes are expected. On the other hand, ENVI and IMCO constitute the two theoretical case areas, where no changes are expected. Subsequently, the analysis for each empirical section will be split into further two subsections and compared to the expectations of changes occurring within INTA and PECH and no changes within ENVI and IMCO respectively.

7.1.1 The impact of Lisbon on the role of the European Parliament within the respective policy areas

For the two literal replication case areas INTA and PECH, the interviewees were expected to confirm that the role of the EP indeed had increased following Lisbon and consequently had increased their legislative influence in EU policy. On the contrary, no changes were expected with respect to the two theoretical case areas ENVI and IMCO.

7.1.1.1 The impact of Lisbon on the role of the European Parliament within the Common Commercial policy and the Common Fisheries Policy

In line with the expectations of the literal case areas, all interviewees both from the organisational and EP side indeed recognised that the EP’s role in the legislative process had increased within their respective policy areas. From the org side, the interviewees
concurrently affirmed that the EP had gained increased formal powers in line with our assumption. However, their answers with respect to the influence exercised by the EP were less clear. Interestingly, only one of the orgs explicitly recognised that the EP already enjoyed more influence on the individual dossiers. This is somehow contradictory with respect to the underlying assumption that the EP would gain more influence directly as a consequence of the extension of the OLP. This rather ambiguous finding seemingly reflects the fact that the EP is in a process of learning the game. Five of six interviewees from the EP side indeed explicitly indicted that the EP is in an on-going learning phase.

Naturally, this finding begets the question why the orgs target the EP, if the EP’s influence within the given policy areas is unclear. In this respect, the findings suggests that the mere fact that the EP gain formal legislative powers imply that the organised interests’ interests in exchanging with the institution increases. All the orgs within INTA and PECCH had changed behaviour as a result of Lisbon. However, this does not imply that the orgs were irrational. On the contrary, it seems that the orgs changed behaviour in anticipation that the EP sooner or later will start capitalising on this gain in formal power in terms of increased influence. Five of six orgs within PECCH and INTA indicated that they were of the opinion that the EP would gain increased influence in the future. Therefore, their behavioural change rather reflects that the fact that with the increased formal powers, the EP will at some point start exercising influence. Thus, the change may reflect risk-aversion or opportunism, as subsection 7.1.3.1 will explain further below.

Thus, the preceding analysis confirmed the expectation that organised interest change behaviour as a result of Lisbon not necessarily because the EP has gained instant influence, but due to the anticipation that the EP eventually would/will exercise influence.

### 7.1.1.2 The impact of Lisbon on the role of the European Parliament within the environmental and internal market policies

For the two theoretical case areas, the picture to a large extent confirmed the expectations of no change. Within ENVI, five of the six interviewees indeed confirmed the expectation that they saw the role of the EP as being unaffected by Lisbon. Thus, the collected evidence for ENVI confirms our expectation of no change. For IMCO, the collected evidence was less clear. Four of the respondents did clearly indicate that Lisbon had not changed the role of the EP within IMCO, whereas two from the organisational side saw the EP as having gained a more prominent role after Lisbon. The two interviewees that recognised changes in the institutional power balance had also changed be-
haviour accordingly, whereas the other had not changed behaviour. In all in the theoretical case areas nine of 12 interviewees saw no change in the role of the EP.

The preceding analysis for the four policy areas to a large extent confirms the expectation that the organised interests changes behaviour in response to whether the legal basis changes. This suggests that the legal basis determines the degree of influence that an institution can offer in exchange for information. However, in this respect, the responses received from the interviewees within IMCO could indicate that the legislative procedure given by the Treaty basis only sets the framework for influence that in turn may be dependent on additional factors. We shall discuss this further below.

7.1.2 The impact of Lisbon on who lobbies within the respective policy areas
The theoretical framework indicated that the orgs within the two literal replication cases areas, INTA and PECH, would allocate increasing resources to lobbying the EP in response to the recognition that the EP may offer more potential influence after Lisbon. On the contrary, no changes would be expected within ENVI and IMCO.

7.1.2.1 The impact of Lisbon on the organisations’ allocation of resources within Common Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy
In line with the expectations of a change in the allocation of resources, the interviewees from the organisational side within INTA and PECH concurrently reported that they allocated more resources to lobbying the EP after Lisbon. The interviewees explicitly recognised that Lisbon was the main cause for their reallocation of resources in line with our theoretical expectation. The answers from the organisational-side also matched the answers received from the EP side, where the six interviewees within INTA and PECH shared the perception that organised interests had increased their lobbying efforts vis-à-vis the EP. Consequently, this evidence strongly indicates that organised interests indeed see increased benefits in exchanging with the EP after Lisbon.

7.1.2.2 The impact of Lisbon on the organisations’ allocation of resources within the environmental and internal market policies
For the two theoretical case areas, the interviewees largely confirmed the expectation of no change. Within ENVI, the interviewees did not indicate that they had allotted more resources to lobbying the EP after Lisbon. Also, two of the three interviewed from the EP side also indicates that they saw no increase in organised interests lobbying efforts. Thus, all interviews except one within ENVI confirm the expectation of no change.
Within IMCO, the evidence suggests a mixed picture. Two of the interviews did not report anything that indicated changes in the behaviour of organised interests that could be linked to Lisbon. Two of the interviewees reported contradictory evidence; David explicitly indicated that they had allocated more resources to lobbying the EP, which was in line with their perception of an increased role of the EP after Lisbon. For the last two interviewees, the impact was of Lisbon was unclear. Thus, the collected evidence within IMCO is not conclusive. Taken together for the theoretical case areas seven interviewees confirmed no change whereas three experienced changes and two were unclear.

In sum, the preceding analysis again to large extent confirmed the suggested causality. INTA, PECH and ENVI confirmed the respective expectations whereas IMCO was inconclusive. Consequently, this indicates that the degree to which organised interests see benefits in exchanging with the EP to a high degree is dependent on the applicable legislative procedure that may decide the potential influence that an institution may have on a given dossier. However, the responses received from the interviewees within IMCO could indicate that the legislative procedure given by the Treaty basis only sets the framework for influence. We shall discuss this further below.

7.1.3 The impact of Lisbon on why lobby within the respective policy areas

The analysis of the interviewees’ perceptions on the role of the EP after Lisbon did somehow indicate the larger picture of the reason why the orgs changed the behaviour. This section will more specifically analyse the reasons by focusing on whether perceived change were seen as an opportunity or threat, as the presented argument of venue-shopping and competitive interest group pressures would indicate. Again changes were expected to be perceived within INTA and PECH, and not so for ENV and IMCO.

7.1.3.1 The impact of Lisbon on the organisation’s perception on why lobby within the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy

The answers from the orgs within INTA and PECH confirm the expectation that the change was perceived, both as a threat and opportunity, with a minor difference between the two policy areas. Within INTA, the orgs leaned towards seeing the new powers more as a threat than an opportunity. Specifically, the three orgs stressed that the new power of the EP was a threat whereas only two also stressed that the new powers could be an opportunity. The opposite was the case within PECH, where the orgs leaned towards seeing the new powers more as an opportunity than a threat. The three orgs emphasised
opportunities, while two explicitly indicated that the powers also constituted a threat. In this respect, one should not over-interpret this difference, as we only interviewed a limited number of orgs. On the contrary, when looking at all the six interviewed orgs within INTA and PECH, the picture suggests that five orgs in total stressed opportunities and threats arising as a result of Lisbon depending on the specific goals for a given dossier. Thus, this evidence confirms the expectation that the institutional change may be both a threat and opportunity for the orgs. Further research would in this respect be necessary to investigate whether there indeed the difference between the two case areas indeed reflect genuine different perspectives on the powers of the EP. Consequently, the evidence does confirm the reasoning behind the idea of venue shopping and competitive interest group pressures especially present in pluralistic systems or institutions.

7.1.3.2 The impact of Lisbon on the organisation’s perception on why lobby within the environmental and internal market policies
The collected evidence within ENVI confirms our expectation of no change, as none of the interviewees from the organisational side indicated that they saw more opportunities or threats as a direct consequence of Lisbon. For IMCO, the evidence is largely aligned with the expectation with some minor modifications. Within IMCO, the fact that Irina and David mentioned that INIs had become more important after Lisbon, as a mean to influence legislative proposals before they had been tabled by the EC, could indicate that new opportunities and threats had arisen. Nonetheless, the fact that two of the three orgs could possibly perceive changes in this respect was not expected from the suggested causality. Thus, this will be discussed further below.

Thus, three of the four case policy areas i.e. PECH, INTA and ENVI indeed confirm that as new opportunities and threats resulting from venue shopping and competitive group pressures indeed are contingent upon the change in institutional power balance given by a new Treaty. The evidence from IMCO is vague and could be interpreted both as support and the opposite, and can thus not be the base of any solid conclusions.

7.1.4 The impact of Lisbon on whom to lobby within the respective policy areas
With respect to the lobbying targets within the EP, the theory would suggest that organised interests should target the individuals that would exercise the highest degree of influence on a dossier. On the basis of how the EP works, it was expected that rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs should be the main target. Consequently, the orgs within INTA and PECH, i.e. the two literal replication cases, should increasingly have changed their
lobbying targets to include rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs. Within IMCO and ENVI, no changes with respect to the lobbying targets were expected.

### 7.1.4.1 The impact of Lisbon on the organisations’ lobbying targets within the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy

In line with our expectations, the orgs concurrently indicated that they had begun to target actors in the EP and that the main targets remained rapporteur and shadow-rapporteurs. The two MEPs interviewed within PECH and INTA also confirmed that they perceived that attention from organised interests increased significantly, when they were holding the rapporteurship or shadow-rapporteurship. Thus, this provides further evidence for the expectation that these institutionalised roles indeed are the most targeted by lobbyists. Furthermore, non-rapporteur but ‘friendly’ MEPs were also emphasised by all but one org as being important lobbying targets.

With respect to the role of the political groups, the interviewed orgs provided rather mixed answers within INTA and PECH with some emphasising the importance of maintaining close contact to the policy advisors or coordinators of the political groups, whereas the others did so to a lesser extent. This evidence could indicate that political groups were less important within both areas. Furthermore, the interviews also indicated that political groups were relatively less salient within PECH than INTA. Within PECH, respondents did emphasise the importance of nationality over political groups several times e.g. by going through national associations. The EP side also confirmed this trend. Therefore, this could indicate that PECH indeed may be more national-inclined than INTA and therefore rendering political groups less significant. Evenly so, the evidence within both policy areas does indicate that political groups are less important lobbying targets than the MEPs that were directly engaged in the dossiers.

The orgs within both policy areas also reported that they maintained contact with the secretariats, but albeit less so than the MEPs and rapporteurs. In this respect, this was mainly for collecting information that facilitated the orgs to lobby more effectively. The two interviews with the administrators of the Committee Secretariat did indeed also recognise that they were not main targets for organised interests, as they reported that organised interests more lobbied the MEPs, whereas they were less frequently contacted.

The interviewees concurrently also noted that the ‘population’ of stakeholders was different in the EP than the EC, which indicate could suggest that the EP may be more plu-
realistic than the EC. However, there were some notable differences between the two case areas. The orgs within INTA noted that they perceived more actors in the EP, but to a varying degree. Within PECH, the interviewees provided a clearer indication that the EP indeed may be more pluralistic than the EC. Furthermore, the fact that the interviewed orgs within PECH to a much higher extent relied on national orgs when lobbying the EP in contrast to orgs’ strategy vis-à-vis the EC, also indicates that more national associations may be active in the EP than in the EC. Such an interpretation could be further supported by the fact that the interviewed MEP within PECH stressed that he proactively sought to maintain contact with national orgs, in which case the national orgs indeed may be active in the EP. Thus, the evidence within PECH provides stronger evidence in favour of the expectation that the EP indeed is a more pluralistic venue than the EC. Consequently, this evidence would suggest that with an increased number of actors present in the EP the competitive pressures over outcomes in the EP ceteris paribus would increase the need of lobbying the EP. Thus, the more pluralistic character of the EP seems to imply that the orgs have to adapt to a new and more competitive way of lobbying, with a more open game.

7.1.4.2 The impact of Lisbon on the organisations’ lobbying targets within the environmental and internal market policies

On the specific lobbying targets, the interviewed within ENVI and IMCO confirmed the expectation that their lobbying targets had been unchanged as a consequence of Lisbon. In ENVI, the orgs in line with our expectation did indicate that Lisbon had not influenced whom they targeted in the EP. In line with the preceding analysis of the lobbying targets within INTA and PECH, the orgs indeed also emphasised that rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs were the key lobbying targets underlying the importance of these institutionalised roles in the EP. Similarly, political group representatives and the Committee Secretariat were also emphasised as less crucial lobbying targets. Within IMCO, the orgs did not indicate that they had changed their concrete lobbying targets as a result of Lisbon in line with the expectation of no change. On the specific lobbying targets, IMCO confirmed the trend from the other policy areas that rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs remained key targets.

The interviewed orgs within IMCO and ENVI did not indicate that that the population of stakeholders had been directly influenced by Lisbon. However, with respect to whether the population of EP is more diverse than the EC and consequently could be more
pluralistic, there was some notable difference between the two policy areas. On the one hand, the interviewees within IMCO did recognise that more actors were present in the EP compared to the EC. However, in contrast with this, two of the orgs within ENVI did not perceive the network of actors as being different in the EP compared to the EC.

To conclude on the preceding analysis in line with the expectations, the orgs within PECH and INTA increasingly targeted the influential actors within the EP. For ENVI and IMCO, the lobbying targets had not changed. On the population of stakeholders, three of the four policy areas indeed indicated that the population of stakeholders were more heterogenous in the EP than in the EC, which does indicate that the EP may be more pluralistic in nature than the EC that consequently may increase the need of lobbying the EP due to increased inter-interest group pressures in pluralistic systems.

7.1.5 The impact of Lisbon on how the organisations lobby

The exchange perspective suggest that the EP’s informational demand would be different from the other European institutions, primarily being national political information, but to a lesser extent technical and European political information. Hence, it should be expected that organised interests primarily offer this information to the European institutions. For the two literal replication cases, INTA and PECH, the orgs interests should indicate that their lobbying strategy should change to account for this fact as a result of Lisbon, where the EP had become a more attractive exchange partner, whereas no changes should expected for the two theoretical replication case areas, ENVI and IMCO.

7.1.5.1 The impact of Lisbon on how the organisations lobby within the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy

The orgs within INTA indeed did recognise that they had to provide another form of information, when lobbying the EP than the other institutions. In this respect, they emphasised the need of providing political information to the EP, but also the need of providing technical information along with the political information. As noted above, the orgs also had to educate relevant people in the EP on the technical aspects of legislation. In this respect, the interviews from the EP side suggested that indeed their need for technical information had been influenced by Lisbon. On the other hand, the EP interviews also concurrently explained that the EC had started providing more technical information after Lisbon. However, this did not imply that their need for technical information had decreased. Two of the interviewees explained that at times they also needed to verify the received information from the EC to ensure that the EC was not “pushing
their agenda”. Nonetheless, somehow surprisingly to the theory was the fact that the orgs stressed the need of now having to pass on more detailed technical information in comparison to lobbying the EC. On the other hand, this could rather reflect the fact that the interviewed orgs as European orgs mainly provide information on the European interests in exchange for potential influence, when lobbying the EC. Nevertheless, the orgs also emphasised that the technical information provided to the EP had to provide along with political information. For instance, the orgs stressed the need of now having to collect further information on the specific rapporteur’s and MEP’s constituency, in line with the expectation of the need of providing national information. Nonetheless, the orgs also stressed that the EP was also a natural lobbying venue for European orgs, which in turn indicates that the EP indeed also demand information on the European interests. This later aspect may reflect the fact that we only interviewed European orgs that as European orgs obviously mainly would be able to provide information on the European interest rather than national information. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the information that they pass to lobbying targets indeed had become more technical in substance, more political in the appearance and finally also had include more national information.

The orgs within PECH also confirmed that they indeed had to provide other forms of information to the EP than the other European institutions. In contrast to the orgs within INTA, the orgs concurrently emphasised that they primarily had to pass on national information for the EP to gain access. To be able to provide this information, the European org liaised more strongly with their national members to be able to take care of the MEP’s constituencies’ need. In line with the evidence from INTA, the orgs also emphasised the need of gathering and passing technical information. This included educating the EP of technical aspects. From the EP side, the interviews also provided evidence in favour of this need. As within INTA, the interviewed party advisor indicated that at times they also checked the information provided by the EC. Two of the three orgs also emphasised that they had to provide more technical information than what they had provided to the EC, in line with the suggestions from INTA. However, again the fact that they are European orgs may imply that their access good to the EC is European rather than technical information. Furthermore, as within INTA, it was also underlined that in addition to providing technical information they had to be political both in substance and in the way it was presented. But as explained this information had to be more national than European, as the EP within PECH seem more national based than European. This was also confirmed by the interviews on the EP side. To sum up, the infor-
information provided within PECH in line with INTA was both more technical and political than what was lobbied to the EC, but in contrast to INTA more national than European.

7.1.5.2 The impact of Lisbon on how the organisations lobby within the environmental and internal market policies

The orgs within ENVI confirmed the expectation not having changed how they lobbied as a result of Lisbon. In line with INTA and PECH, they also stressed the need of passing on technical information, and this had to be done so it was easily understandable by non-experts in contrast to when lobbying the EC. Furthermore, the need of providing information on constituencies was also emphasised. Evidence from ENVI confirms the expectation of no change in the information provided to the EP, and that the EP generally requests technical, political information on both European and national interests.

In line with the expectation, the orgs within IMCO did not report that the information that they provided to the EP had changed. They emphasised that it had to be more political than technical in the EP compared to the EC. The orgs also stressed the need of not only providing European but also national information for the constituencies.

To summarise, the above findings confirmed the expectations of change in information provided for INTA and PECH, and no change for ENVI and IMCO. The information provided largely had to include technical aspects, political information on European and national interests. Within PECH, national information was much more in demand than European information. Thus, this indeed suggests that the EP demands a wide range of information in exchange for potential influence on EU policy-making and that the information demanded may vary from policy-area to policy-area.

7.1.6 Partial conclusion on analysis

The preceding analysis indeed to a large extent confirmed the expectations. The table below summarises, the empirical findings with the empirical expected:

Table 14, Partial conclusion on analysis quantified

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Change due to Lisbon</th>
<th>Literal cases – Changes expected</th>
<th>Theoretical cases – No change expected</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTA</td>
<td>PECH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased role of the EP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who lobbies: More resources allocated to lobbying the EP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why lobby the EP: - Opportunities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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As the table illustrates, the evidence largely confirmed the suggested causality that the interests of organised interests in exchanging with the European institutions depend on the legislative powers, which in turn should influence the degree to which the institutions can offer influence. Furthermore, when the EP is vested with formal legislative powers, the EP to a higher extent becomes an opportunity or threat to the current equilibrium, as the concept of venue-shopping and competitive interest group pressures suggests. The targets in the EP primarily remain the rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs i.e. institutionalised roles with the persons changing from dossier to dossier. As the exchange perspective suggested, the institutional demand was different for the EP compared to the EC. However, this difference was somehow ambiguous, as the orgs reported having to pass more technical information, but in a more political fashion. Furthermore, the orgs also to a larger extent have to pass on national information, in particular within PECH.

The degree to which changes were evident within the two theoretical case areas influences the degree to which we correctly can infer whether the lobbying efforts of organised interest mainly depend on the applicable legislative. As the procedure within ENVI and IMCO was unchanged, no changes should be expected. In this respect, the findings within ENVI confirmed the expectation of no changes that further strengthens the inferences that the behaviour of organised interests is highly dependent on the applicable legislative procedure. However, the evidence within IMCO was mixed in that there were indications that some changes had happened due to Lisbon. Thus, the applicable legislative may only set the frame for the behaviour of organised interests that also can respond to other changes in the institutional power balance, as its will be discussed further below.

7.2 Analysis of findings outside the exchange perspective: Further changes

The interviews also showed that the institutional change also imply additional changes that were not addressed by the exchange perspective. This subsection will discern addi-
tional trends that appeared from the interviews with the organised interests within PECH and INTA with respect to their practical lobbying strategy. The sections underline that Lisbon has made it even more challenging for organised interests to lobby at the European level within PECH and INTA.

With respect to the issue of who lobbies, the orgs within PECH and INTA concurrently stressed that they not only had to change their allocation of resources, but also to gain new knowledge and skills to lobby the EP. The orgs had undertaken various activities to enhance their knowledge of how the EP works internally in order to navigate within the EP. As explained in the preceding analysis, the orgs emphasised that the fact that they now had to learn how to communicate more politically. Consequently, the orgs emphasised that they were still in a learning-phase skills-wise with respect to improving these skills. Some had sought assistance from other external actors, or simply relied on learning by doing. In IMCO and ENVI no such changes had taken place. Therefore, Lisbon also seems to have influenced the capabilities and knowledge necessary to lobby the EU.

With respect to the issue of how to lobby, the orgs indicated that Lisbon in addition to changing the information provided also had to make other changes with respect to their lobbying means. As a consequence of the need of having to provide different information to the EP, the orgs obviously stressed the need of collecting such information. Particularly, within PECH, the high demand for national political information implied that the orgs had to liaise more strongly with their national member associations to collect this information. As indicated above, as a consequence of having to provide the information in a different way, the orgs had changed their communication strategy when lobbying the EP. Consequently, the orgs also had to allocate time to changing the way that they passed on their message. The orgs within INTA and PECH also explained that the orgs had concentrated on building stable relations with specific people in the EP as a mean of their lobbying strategy. Several of the interviewees to a varying extent emphasised that it was more difficult to maintain close contact with the right people in the EP. This was complicated by the fact that relevant people changed from dossier to dossier and a high staff turnover in the EP. Therefore, this further indicates that the Lisbon has made it more demanding for the organised interests to lobby the EU, as they now saw the need of having to build personal contacts with relevant people in EP that at the same time remains an institution, where some of the relevant people change from dossier to dossier. Internally, the orgs within INTA and PECH also emphasised that they had
changed their monitoring procedures to include the activities of the EP, which was a further strain on the orgs’ resources.

Thus, these changes in the orgs’ means of lobbying further underline that the Lisbon change has made it more demanding for organised interest within INTA and PECH to lobby at the European level. ENVI and IMCO furthermore confirmed no changes at all in these parameters. In summary, this strengthens the overall findings that Treaty changes lead to a fundamental and encompassing change in the lobbying strategies of organised interests, and thus practical behaviour, of organised interests and thus provide further support to the results related to the exchange perspective.
8 Discussion

The preceding analysis confirmed the exchange perspectives main idea of interdependence between the legislature and organised interests. It confirmed that rational organised interests seek exchanges with the venues where the legislative power is vested. It also confirmed to a very large extent the affect on lobby strategies changes to the legislative procedure can have. Nonetheless, there were some contradictory and some interesting findings, which deserve further discussion, either due to their complex nature or due to the relatively low amount of attention given to them combined in a bigger picture.

8.1 Utilisation of formal power dependent on a mutual dynamic learning process between the EP and organised interests?

From a European integration perspective, the interviews within INTA and PECH indicated some interesting aspects on the basis of the exchange perspective. The interviews somehow concurrently emphasised that the EP relied heavily on receiving inputs, in particular technical, from organised interests. In particular within PECH and INTA, the orgs indicated that they had experienced more proactive contact from the EP side than within IMCO and ENVI. This could indicate that the institutional change implied that EP indeed lacked the skills to exploit their increased formal powers. In this respect, the orgs also reported that they had to educate the EP on technical aspects of specific dossiers. Furthermore, the interviewees from the EP side also stressed that they were indeed in a learning phase and still was learning how to make the most out of its new powers. Thus, they also openly stated that they needed input from organised interest in many respects. Also the orgs had to acquire skills and knowledge of the EP in general to undertake the new task of lobbying and to understand how they could further induce MEPs to use their competencies.

What the interviews combined convincingly showed was that there seem to be mutual and dynamic learning process on-going in INTA and PECH as a consequence of the new institutional power-balance given by Lisbon. Thus, even after two years with Lisbon and the consequently applicable OLP, both the EP side and the organisational side were still in a learning phase within PECH and INTA. It is not for us to place them on a learning curve, but based on our modest investigation we suspect that neither side has advanced towards the flat end of the learning curve.
The fact that it might take a number of years before a policy area is fully exploiting the possibilities offered by the political system might best be evidenced by the findings from the IMCO. Surprisingly, several of the six interviewees mentioned that there was still an on-going learning process in this area. First, there was the issue of the INIs in the IMCO. From the EP, we noted that the Committee strategically aimed at using them for agenda-setting influence towards the EC to the fullest possible extent. This seemed to transcend into at least one org lobbying fully on them, as if they were legislative with another org being unclear so as to whether this indeed was the case. Second, both orgs expressly stated that the EP due to Lisbon felt an increased importance strengthening their confidence and, thus, consequently won more influence in the power-game especially at the trilogue negotiation level. Again the words learning process came up in this context with two interviewees mentioning that the EP had improved its ability to ‘play the game’. This certainly is contrary to the basic ontological position of this Thesis (that something like self-image of institutions should affect the actual inter-institutional power-balance), and it should be stressed that it was a minority view of the combined theoretical case areas (ENVI and IMCO), but nonetheless a majority in IMCO separately, and therefore it deserves to be mentioned. Stretching the argument further, one could speculate whether even after a decade of co-decision IMCO is still in a phase of learning ‘the game’. However, this remains pure speculation.

Relating to INIs an important finding was that the utilisation was not only important in IMCO but also INTA; thus one of the ‘new’ areas. This may have two implications. First, that different policy areas may develop their own logics as will also be discussed below in section 8.3. Second, that INIs in spite of not having any formal legislative capacities seem to play a role. This may seem counterintuitive for a positivist argument that only formal powers matter. However, following this line one should keep in mind that the EC may only be inclined to allow the EP to influence their right of initiative, because the EC is (in the area of INTA recently attained) aware of the fact that the EP retains the formal power to change and amend the EC proposal, when it has been tabled. Consequently, the impact of INIs may simply reflect that the EC is anticipating the EP’s position by formulating legislative proposals that are aligned with the EP’s interests in the first place. With respect to the learning processes, this could imply that it takes a long time before actors in a policy area start utilising non-apparent ways of influencing the policy process (namely agenda-setting). Nonetheless, some statements from IMCO inter-
viewees could point in this direction. Another speculation is the rapid uptake of this idea in INTA as a consequence of learning from IMCO.

In conclusion what seems to be evident from the many interviews conducted is the very decisive and dynamic role that learning processes seem to have for both sides of the lobbying game. This dynamism calls for further research, as it may be decisive for several years of legislation and our overall understanding of the democratic processes in the EU.

8.2 Arising mutual dependencies with other institutions than the one empowered by Lisbon?
The interviews also indicated that the Lisbon also had influenced the organised interest’s relationship with the EC. Two of the orgs from INTA reported that they had experienced being contacted by the European Commission to ensure that the orgs indeed ‘remembered’ to lobby the EP. This illustrates that the EU institutions are not only dependent on the orgs for legitimacy, but also directly uses the organised interests as an instrument for their own political gains. This could suggest that the EC becomes more dependent on the organised interests as a result of the institutional change, which on the other hand strengthens the relationship for the individual orgs with the EC that potentially may increase the influence of some orgs later on. Furthermore, this finding may be seen in light of the literature on “when the lobbied becomes the lobbyist” that in particular focused on the CCP, where it seems that the EC historically has used organised interests to gain leverage vis-à-vis the MS (Somerset 2002; Woll 2009). In this respect, it is interesting that none of the orgs within PECH indicated that they had experienced this. This could indicate that the different Directorate Generals of the EC have different relations with organised interests, which could be a promising area for further research.

Taken together, this could suggest that the institutional change not only influences the relationship between the EP and organised interests, but also the ECs’ relations with organised interests. The EU institutions may become more dependent on organised interests to retain autonomy and, thus, the ability of these institutions to influence the policymaking process. In this respect, further research could be undertaken to further investigate the impact of Lisbon on the relationships between organised interests and the EC and CoM respectively within the policy areas that have been influenced by Lisbon.
8.3 European versus national

Evidence showed that there were differences in the role of national interests within the different policy areas. Within PECH national interests played a much more decisive role than within INTA. The evidence was fourfold and varied. First and foremost, all six interviewees from the PECH area mentioned the role of national interests promptly, a vast difference from the other areas where it was mentioned mainly in relation to MEPs’ constituencies. Second, comparatively national information and the cooperation with national member orgs were more prominent in PECH compared to INTA. Third, within PECH the party-groups had much less prevalence than in INTA. Instead cross-party national alliances were the usual approach in PECH. Fourth, the orgs within PECH, unlike INTA, concurrently found their role in the EP to be vastly different from that in the EC. The European attribute seemed somehow to be reduced to being the physical representative of individual national member orgs.

It was also notable that the interviews with the orgs indicated the importance of providing national information in the EP, but as the above discussion indicated to a varying degree within the respective policy areas. Subsequently, Lisbon could have further implications for the Europeanization of organised interests by increasingly blurring the distinction between the national and European levels of interest representation. On the one hand, the interviewed European orgs within INTA and in particular PECH reported that they now had to collect information relevant to the MEPs’ constituency. Consequently, this could indicate that the European orgs in addition to following development in Brussels also have to focus on cooperating with national member orgs, also having consequences for the latter. As indicated above, the European orgs within PECH proactively tried to coordinate and stimulate the lobbying efforts of national member orgs in the EP. Depending on the success of such efforts, this could indicate that national member org to a higher extent also are induced to start lobbying the EP and, thus, follow the ‘Brussels route’. As these efforts mainly were reported within PECH, this latter aspect may primarily be prevalent in this area. Nonetheless, these suggested developments could have further implications from a European integration perspective following the reasoning of multilevel-governance where the borders between the national and European level of interest representation may become revised. Consequently, MS’ control of their agendas may decrease further, if organised interests become active at multiple levels. Leaving such speculation aside, further research would be necessary to confirm these findings on a wider scale and in the different policy areas that have been affected by Lisbon. In this
respect, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of Lisbon on the behaviour of national orgs and the degree to which they now follow the ‘Brussels route’.

In summary, the evidence points to the fact that policy areas do indeed function on different dynamics and logics, and that therefore they cannot simply be expected to behave identically. This reaffirms our basic assumption that it was necessary to investigate more than one policy area with expected changes to understand the impact of Lisbon on the behaviour of organised interests. At the same, it strengthens the hypothesis that Treaty change in which legislative procedure applies has a very decisive influence on the behaviour of organised interests, as two distinct policy areas overall reacted similarly.
9 Conclusion

This final chapter will conclude on the findings of the thesis, discuss the wider implications, and suggest areas for further research.

As mentioned in the introduction, the study of change remains an eternal challenge within political science. This thesis addressed this challenge by explicitly seeking to investigate the degree to which the behaviour of organised interests changed as a result of the changes in the institutional power balance arising as a consequence of Lisbon. The focus of the thesis was on the impact of the transition from the consultation procedure to the OLP on the behaviour of organised interests. This change implies that the EP is transformed from being a pure consulted body to co-legislator in the legislative process of the EU. The thesis addresses a gap in the literature, where scholars have given scant attention to the impact of a single treaty change on the behaviour of organised interests.

To analyse the changes, an exchange perspective was presented that suggests that lobbying should be understood as an exchange between the European institutions and organised interests that depend on each other to achieve their respective goals. In short, the perspective suggests that the organised interests increasingly would seek to lobby the EP due to Lisbon. To investigate the impact of Lisbon on organised interests empirically, we devised a research design with multiple case studies. On the one hand, the behaviour of organised with respect to the CCP and CFP were investigated, where Lisbon had changed the legislative procedure from the consultation procedure to the OLP. Consequently, changes were expected within these areas. On the other hand, we investigated the behaviour of organised interest with respect to the EU’s environmental policy and internal market policy as theoretical case studies, where no changes were expected, as the OLP had applied to these policy areas for an extended time.

The evidence collected from 24 interviews, 12 from orgs and 12 from the EP, strongly indicates that Lisbon has had lead to fundamental changes in the behaviour of organised interests, as the 12 interviewees in the literal case areas, CCP and CFP, concurrently confirmed that the behaviour of had changed as a result of Lisbon. As foreseen by the exchange perspective, the interviewees reported that organised interests within CCP and CFP had changed their lobbying strategy with respect to who lobbies, why lobby, whom to lobby, and how to lobby as table 17 in Appendix IV shows. In contrast, the 12 interviewees from the theoretical case areas, environmental and internal market policy, re-
ported almost no changes with respect to the behaviour of organised interests due to Lisbon. Consequently, the evidence indeed suggests that the behaviour of organised interests fundamentally change, when treaties change the applicable legislative procedure.

As explained in the methodological sections, the empirical findings of the thesis were built on six interviews with three European orgs and three lobbying targets in the EP within each policy area. These methodological choices have consequences for the degree to which these findings can be generalised to the wider population of organised interests. Firstly, it would be interesting to investigate the changes in the behaviour of European orgs on a larger scale, also interviewing the EP on a larger scale, both to confirm the degree to which our findings indeed reflect changes in the behaviour of the wider population of European orgs within the selected policy areas, but also in other policy areas that have been affected by Lisbon. Secondly, the fact that we only interviewed European orgs may imply that our findings only are pertinent to European orgs. Consequently, it would be interesting to investigate whether the findings are also reflected in changes in the behaviour of national interest orgs. Notwithstanding these limitations, the collected evidence strongly indicates that Lisbon has had lead to fundamental changes in the behaviour of organised interests, as the different interviewees concurrently confirmed that the behaviour of had changed as a result of Lisbon.

9.1 Wider implications and suggestions for further research

The theoretical implications of this thesis indeed seem to suggest that the behaviour of organised interests to a very high extent is dependent on the applicable procedure that guides the legislative process. The fact that this applies in general across the different policy areas indicates that the conclusion remains a general phenomenon for the behaviour of organised interests. Consequently, the behaviour of organised interests in the context of the EU seems to be guided towards lobbying the institutions that retains the formal powers to influence legislation. The mere fact that an institution gains formal power to influence legislation lead to changed behaviour of organised interests irrespective of whether this institution is perceived to exercise influence immediately. The organised interests change behaviour as a mean of risk aversion and opportunism in the anticipation that the institution may influence legislation. Thus, this would indeed suggest that rational choice approaches do a good job in explaining the behaviour of organised interests. Consequently, rational choice approaches provide an excellent lens to study the behaviour of organised interests.
9.1.1 The wider implications on European democracy

In the introduction we pointed out why investigating changes in organised interest’s behaviour after Lisbon was interesting from a democratic point of view in relation to the raison d’être of treaty change. It was the consequences for organised interest representation in the CCP/INTA and CFP/PECH that was under scrutiny – the underlying idea being that real democracy only exists if organised interest (public as well as private) are able to provide the appurtenances of democratic legitimacy. Therefore, this section will shortly address and discuss some of the findings of this thesis that may shed light on this.

9.1.1.1 Resource constraints: The effect of introducing more venues

One aspect mentioned in the introduction was the quality of the corps intermediaires on the quality of democracy. In relation to this one of the most interesting findings of this thesis was the overwhelming status quo in the available resources to European orgs before and after Lisbon. Two possible consequences caused by the introduction of yet another venue that had to be lobbied seemed to be apparent; 1) less resources available for lobbying the EC as resources shifted towards the EP; and 2) a sharper prioritisation of the number of dossiers handled, possibly rendering certain pieces of legislation to a lower level of attention, if any attention given at all.

The first issue mentioned quickly became quite apparent during the interviews. Though almost all the interviewees initially stated they did not spend less time in the EC, most of them reluctantly admitted that since they said they had not gained resources but spent more resources in the EP, some sort of discrepancy in their statements existed. As the EC to a large extent is dependent on inputs from organised interests in order to draw up legislative acts, and not least to assess the impacts of such legislative proposals, the fact that less resources apparently was spent in the EC by lobbyists could have possible consequences for the quality of the output. Thus, both decreased input legitimacy and less output legitimacy could be the consequence. Said otherwise, introducing a new venue into the legislative system could be intended to be democratic, but if the quality of the corps intermediaires withers as ‘the butter is spread too thin’ then the effect may not be as desired.

This leads to the second issue mentioned. Obviously the quality of the work undertaken on a given dossier may be as high as before Lisbon (not indicating that lobbyists and orgs have decreased in quality). However, as this takes the same amount of resources in the EC and then new resources for the same effort in the EP, fewer resources are left for other dossiers. Hence, another consequence could simply be the lack of lobbyism on
dossiers of lower priority, which previously would have been given attention. Theory would suggest that eventually more resources would be provided to the orgs or new orgs might arise to cover this gap, since the consequences of a lack in interest representation would be too expensive to bear in the long run. Two and a half year after Lisbon more resources have not been given to the orgs. Further research could illuminate whether new orgs or more presence from e.g. companies focusing on these lowly prioritised dossiers is the case. And further research in some years could see whether the existing orgs have managed to obtain further resources.

9.1.1.2 Mutual dependence: Better dialogue between institutions and organised interests?

An aspect of the quality of the policy process is the dialogue between organised interest and the legislature. Consequently, the effects of new venues and procedures on this dialogue are interesting when addressing the deficiencies of the democratic system. What we found in this thesis was an increased dialogue between the actors in the political system. That was both the dialogue between the institutions internally and the dialogue between these institutions and organised interests.

Above we discussed the issue of ‘when the lobbied becomes the lobbyist’. It is an interesting perspective, but the negative connotations of the word lobbyism seem to somewhat negate the whole expression in a broader context. Indeed it is the dialogue and mutual dependencies created by this dynamism in the system that is interesting. The better access and dialogue with organised interests foster an arena that could be more likely to produce utility maximising outcomes. Especially as mentioned in the introduction there is now further checks and balances in the system, as a consequence of both the new venue, but more importantly from the increased dialogue between the actors.

In the above two subsections we have discussed some of the potential positive and negative effects of Lisbon. Hence, increased dialogue in the political system does hold some possible promises of better outcomes, whereas the question of a lack of new resources for the organised interests when new venues are introduced seems to seriously question the effect of Lisbon on democratic legitimacy following the thoughts of Dahl.

9.1.2 Summarising possible areas for further research

The following section will briefly discuss areas for further research. Firstly, relating directly to the methodological choice taken in thesis, studies could be taken on a larger
scale in order to further validate our findings. In this respect, another important area for further research could be to undertake a similar study on the behaviour of Lisbon on national orgs. A study undertaken in a similar scale to this thesis would enable us to compare the findings, whereas a larger study would be necessary to validate the general effects of Lisbon on the behaviour of national orgs.

Further, a second area for further research relating to national orgs is that of their role vis-à-vis the European orgs when the EP is included as co-legislator in the legislative process. In this respect, it should be noted that individual policy areas seem to have their own logics, which should be kept in mind when designing a study.

Third, as mentioned in section 1.1, this thesis may be seen as step one of two, in order to measure the full effects of Lisbon. Step two, the question of influence, is left unanswered. Thus, both the coherence between changes in the EP’s legal power and its subsequent level of influence, and the influence of the organised interests’ efforts vis-à-vis the legislature, should be further researched. The influence and importance of INIs should also be further researched, as there were some indications that these in policy areas become more and more invasive on the EC’s right of initiative.

A fourth area of possible further research is the issue of learning processes and learning curves of the actors in the political system. Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of learning periods on the ability of ‘new’ institution to influence legislation.

A fifth area that deserves further research is how the suggested new mutual dependencies followed by an improved dialogue affect the political system. In this respect, further research could be undertaken to investigate the impact of Lisbon on the relationships between organised interests and the EU institutions within the policy areas that have been influenced by Lisbon. Also, there were indications that the different Directorate Generals of the EC have different relations with organised interests, which could be investigated.

Finally, further research could look into the issue of resource constraints on organised interests following the introduction of a new venue with legal power. It would be interesting to see whether new orgs mobilise to cover the potential gap left by the already existing orgs that due to lack of resources may be unable to carry out the same degree of lobbying as they previously undertook. In this vein, a further area of research could be to investigate whether the already existing orgs eventually see an increase in their resources.
10 Bibliography


Hoffmann, S., 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3), pp.862-915.


11 Appendixes

11.1 Appendix I – Interview guides

11.1.1 Interview guide used for organisations

- Name of organisation:
- Type of organisation (national/European/business/NGO):
- Type of membership of the organisation:
- Name of person from organisation:
- Title:
- Experience in the organisation (same area?):
- Have you personally worked with co-decision procedures before Lisbon:
- Total experience in the area:

- Whom do you lobby:
  (How) do you work with the Parliament:
  (How) do you work with the Commission:
  (How) do you work with the Council:
- Have you had an increase of resources overall after the Lisbon Treaty:
- Have your allotted time/resources for the above institutions changed as a result of the Lisbon Treaty?
  If yes, on what grounds:
- Do you find the role Parliament has increased in the legislative process after Lisbon:
- After Lisbon do you find yourself more often contacted by the EP, interested to hear your organisation’s view:
- Do you work more proactively with the Parliament after Lisbon:

  If yes, when did you initiate this change in strategy:
  What caused the change
  (others moved (had to follow)/chance for better influence):
  Who do you primarily target
  (rapporteurs/shadows/secretariat/party advisors):
  If, no, why have you not found this necessary
  (more influence at Commission/EP not ready/personal uncertainty about the situation/lack of resources):

- Do you think you will (have to) change in the future:
- Do you see yourself as part of a network (including official committees) when working with the Commission:
  If yes, have any stakeholders left/lessened their activity in this network to reorientate their efforts towards the EP:
  And, has the role of the network changed due to changed work methods from the Commission in the legislative process:
  If no, how would you describe your work with the Commission now:
  And, has the Commission changed their way of working after Lisbon:
- What type of access goods does the EP generally ask:
  And, are you able to provide this:
- What type of access goods does the Commission generally ask:
And, are you able to provide this:
- What type of access goods does the Council generally ask:
- Do you find lobbying the EP is different from lobbying the Commission:
  If yes, how so:
  And have you had problems adapting to this if you have not been used to it:
- Do you find your (organisations) role in the Parliament different compared to the role you have with the Commission:
- Do you have very stable contact with certain people/positions in the Parliament:
  How about in the Commission:
- Is it in general harder to have stable relations with one institution vis-à-vis another:
- Have you become more open to alliances etc Post-Lisbon. or is this not dependent on Lisbon changes, but rather lobbying trends in general:

11.1.2 Interview guide used for interviews with MEPs

- Name:
- How long in EP:
- How long in the area in question:
- Party-group:
- Any particular role in the party-group or Committee in the given area (now and before): Coordinator/chair/vice-chair etc.
- Rapporteurships/shadow in the given area: YES/NO
- Do you find your role as Parliament has increased in the legislative process after Lisbon:
- Is there a proactively increased interest from stakeholders after Lisbon:
- Do you spend more time listening to stakeholders requests after Lisbon:
- Do you generally need/ask more information now compared to before Lisbon:
- Do you get the information you need:
- Do you initiate more dialogue with stakeholders / certain stakeholders after Lisbon:
- Overall do you spend more time on stakeholders after Lisbon than you did before:
  If yes, an increase have occurred, who would you say have been the leaders/first-movers, can you make any generalisations:
  If no, why do you think that is:
- Do you actively foster a certain dialogue with a certain stakeholder by exchanging information (before publicly available):
- Does the interest from stakeholders increase in general when you are rapporteur/shadow/coordinator/chair/vice-chair:
- Compared to last legislative period would you say that interest from stakeholders when you are rapporteur/shadow/coordinator/chair/vice-chair have increased (in other terms are the role as rapporteur/shadow/coordinator/chair/vice-chair even more important now):
- Is there a bulk/a group of stakeholders (no need to mention which) who you have a more frequent dialogue with in the process:
If yes, is it because they are better at providing you what you need, or because they represent a group which for reasons of legitimacy must be represented: If no, how do you then orientate from issue to issue who to talk to and what you need (do you expect the stakeholders to get in touch):

- Can you trace a stability in this setting of stakeholders who are more often consulted in your area in general, or is it somewhat personal to you:
- If such a bulk/group/network exist does the level of interaction with other stakeholders expand increase when holding rapporteur/shadow/coordinator/chair/vice-chair:
- Main reason for meeting stakeholders (legitimacy (a must)/expert information/political game information/...):
- Have your preferences for the above changed after Lisbon:
- Do you only meet stakeholders you deem relevant to you - or do you sometimes meet stakeholders upon request from their side - so as to show your willingness to listen (legitimacy rather than actual usefulness of information):
- What type of stakeholders do you prefer to meet (national branch/national horizontal/EU branch/EU horizontal/national alliances/EU alliances):

### 11.1.3 Interview guide used for interviews with Committee Secretariat Staff and Policy Advisors from the Political Groups

- Policy area:
- Name:
- Position in the Parliament:
- How long in EP:
- How long in the policy area in question:
- Party-group:
- Any prior EP positions:

- Can you give us an insight to how you work and what your role in the EP is: Why would you be interesting to lobbyist:
- Do you find the role of Parliament has increased in the legislative process after Lisbon: If no, is there despite this an increased need of stakeholder engagement:
- Is there a continuous increasing proactive interest from stakeholders due to Lisbon, or as a general trend over the last 3-4 years:
- Do you spend more time listening to stakeholder due to Lisbon, or as a general trend over the last 3-4 years:
- Do you generally need/ask more information now compared to before Lisbon: Do you get the information you need:
- Do you generally find yourself contacting stakeholders proactively: Has this been influenced by Lisbon, or is a possible increase a general trend over time:
- Is there a bulk/a group of stakeholders (no need to mention which) who you have a more frequent dialogue/relatin with in a given process: If yes, is it because they are better at providing you what you need, or because they represents a group, which for reasons of legitimacy must be represented: If no, how do you then orientate from issue to issue who to talk to and what you need(do you expect the stakeholders to get in touch):
• Do you actively foster a certain relation/dialogue with certain stakeholders by exchanging information (before publicly available):

• Can you trace a stability in this setting of stakeholders who are more often consulted in your area in general, or is it somewhat personal to you:

• If such a bulk/group/network exist does the level of interaction with other stakeholders expand increase when your party is holding rapporteur/chair/vice-chair:

• Main reason for meeting stakeholders (legitimacy (a must)/expert information/political game information/…

• Have your preferences for the above changed after Lisbon or in general over time:

• Do you only meet stakeholders you deem relevant to your work on a given issue - or do you sometimes meet stakeholders upon request from their side to show your willingness to listen (legitimacy rather than actual usefulness of information):

• What type of stakeholders do you prefer to meet (national branch/national horizontal/EU branch/EU horizontal/national alliances/EU alliances):
11.2 Appendix II – Overview of interviewees

Table 15, Overview of interviewed organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Alias</th>
<th>Years in Policy area</th>
<th>Years in the organisation</th>
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<td>Organisation 1</td>
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<td>INTA</td>
<td>Laura</td>
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<td>Organisation 3</td>
<td>O3</td>
<td>INTA</td>
<td>Mary Ann</td>
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<td>PECH</td>
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Table 16, Overview of interviewed within the EP

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<th>Years in Policy area</th>
<th>Years in the EP</th>
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<td>Francois</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Secretariat</td>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>Jacques</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the Committee</td>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>Olivier</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-group advisor</td>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>Juliette</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.3 Appendix III – Learning’s from the Interview Process

Undertaking a project covering 24 interviews is inevitably a process from which we as conductors learned quite a lot as we went along. These experiences are not just interesting with relation to the findings of the interviews in question, but also more generally to interviewing as a research method. Hence, in this section we will share relevant experiences we had during the process.

One of the key lessons was the extent to which interviews improved when both authors were present. It allowed for several things. First, two minds thinks better than one. Hence, things that one of us did not pick up as interesting, possibly because we were already trying to frame the next question, were often captured by the other. Also, our collective memory became better in the sense that if the interviewee mentioned several interesting things in one ‘go’, we could as two people better pick up on all the points, whereas when alone we were more likely to forget some of the interesting points that arose from the interviewees’ answer. Second, if one of us got off track or went blank for a few seconds, the other took over immediately so as to neither waste time nor momentum in a good discussion. However, obviously during the first couple of interviews this modus operandi was not in place. Hence, the flow towards the end became better. Third, as interviews are by definition inter-personal experiences obviously the chemistry between the interviewee and the interviewer(s) are fundamental. During a few of the one-interviewer interviews, the chemistry did not flow perfectly, as the ‘language spoken’ or ‘common frame of understanding’ were not matching as well as they could. This was not an experience encountered in the two-interviewer interviews, as it seemed at least one of the interviewers ‘spoke with’ and ‘understood’ the interviewee.

Adding onto the point on the interview as an inter-personal experience, we also discovered that telephone interviews indeed did have some drawbacks, despite the interviewees being used to conducting ‘business’ over the phone. For example, it turned out to be much more difficult in general (taking different personalities into consideration) to interrupt the interviewees when they were side-tracked. Indeed, a much higher percentage of the telephone interviews became more monologues with us occasionally interrupting rather than a dialogue with both sides taking equal part. In addition, reading body language was obviously made harder, which was especially difficult to deal with when sensing whether we were losing the interviewee in relation to their feeling of the relevance of the
questions we asked. The relevance of our questions obviously being key for how much of an ‘effort’ they would potentially put into the answers. A last point is that with many of the face-to-face meetings, we were collected in a reception, lobby or security by the interviewee. This transpired into us having a ‘softer’ introduction to each other, asking about the project more broadly, where we were from and so on. We found this was beneficial in contrast to the telephone interviews, in which we were forced to start the questions much more bluntly as soon as the phone was picked up.

The semi-structured interview approach also meant that we learned as we went along with the interviews. Hence, in some of the latter interviews we at times asked questions we would probably not have done without the knowledge achieved in the preceding interviews. However, as the learning curve steepened with respect to the material also meant that some of the latter interviews were somewhat shorter as we took more things for given (as we could recognise the answers patterns etc.), whereby some details that could have been used for documentation and analysis were lost. Thus, the learning process was both positive in the sense that we more quickly got to ‘the nitty-gritty’, but negative in the sense that we lost some degree of detail in some of the intermediary or very ‘familiar’ findings.
### 11.4 Appendix IV – Overview of findings across the policy areas

**Table 17, Findings in the behaviour of organised interests within all policy areas.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who lobbies</th>
<th>INTA</th>
<th>PECH</th>
<th>PECH &amp; INTA</th>
<th>ENVI</th>
<th>IMCO</th>
<th>ENVI &amp; IMCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O1</td>
<td>O2</td>
<td>O3</td>
<td>O4</td>
<td>O5</td>
<td>O6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in resources towards the given policy from other policy areas due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in allocation of resources towards EP within the given policy area due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in management of skills and knowledge due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall communication strategy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards actors in the EP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rapporteurs, Shadow-rapporteurs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chairs, Vice-chairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individual MEPs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EP civil servants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political groups, coordinators and party-group advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in stakeholder population – arena – compared to EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in other stakeholder relations than EP actors – incl. EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall communication strategy – incl. media use, position papers etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in type of information provided</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed on to relevant targets – incl. educating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in interaction type with targets – incl. briefings, meetings, intergroups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with EP actors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of alliances/coalitions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in organisation’s role in the EP compared to EC – incl. more national</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in utilisation of agenda-setting possibilities – incl. INIs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ of internal monitoring procedures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/M indicates not mentioned, 1 indicates ‘yes’, 0 indicates ‘no’, N/M indicates ‘not mentioned’, ? indicates ‘unclear/ambiguous’, Δ indicates ‘change’, and Σ indicates the sum
Table 18, Findings in EP perceptions/experiences within all policy areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Due to Lisbon in the given policy area</th>
<th>INTA</th>
<th>PECH</th>
<th>PECH &amp; INTA</th>
<th>ENVI</th>
<th>IMCO</th>
<th>ENVI &amp; IMCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from lobbyists e.g. meetings, phone calls, letters etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased activity from EC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more time listening to lobbyists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ type of information requested</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in how information is passed e.g. face-to-face meeting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More proactively contacting stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ towards more stable relations with stakeholders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster specifically stable relations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed network</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved quality of lobbying efforts</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning process still on-going</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside the EP</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use or importance of INIs</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference to European organisations</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-movers identified</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/M</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CS indicates Committee Secretariat, GA indicates Group Advisor, Σ indicates the sum, N/M indicates not mentioned, 1 indicates ‘yes’, 0 indicates ‘no’, ? indicates ‘unclear/ambiguous’, and Δ indicates ‘change’. 
Table 19, Findings in the perception of the organised interests of changes within the environment of the respective policy area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTA</th>
<th>PECH</th>
<th>INTA &amp; PECH</th>
<th>ENVI</th>
<th>IMCO</th>
<th>ENVI &amp; IMCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O1</td>
<td>O2</td>
<td>O3</td>
<td>Σ</td>
<td>O4</td>
<td>O5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the EP increased with Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more formal power after Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP has more actual influence now and have had since Lisbon</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EP will have more influence in the future due to Lisbon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in overall available resources from environment due to Lisbon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 indicates 'yes', 0 indicates 'no', ? indicates 'unclear/ambiguous', Δ indicates 'change', and Σ indicates the sum